Soccer transfers,team efficiency and the sports cycle in the most valued European soccer leagues – have European soccer teams been efficient in trading players?

The sale of soccer players is a serious issue for the sustainability of professional teams. This article discusses the efficiency of the values that 183 European soccer teams have received for the sales of their players since 2007. We estimated stochastic frontiers for these soccer teams using stochastic frontier analysis. We found that teams with higher numbers of titles, with huge past acquisitions of players, and achieving good rankings in the previous season tend to receive more transfer inflows. The efficiency of these inflows can be significantly influenced if the team exhibits a long sports history or if the team participates in the Champions League or in the Europa League.     

An industry test for ethnic discrimination in major league soccer

This paper tests for salary discrimination based on player ethnicity in Major League Soccer (MLS) by making innovative use of player movements in a unique setting. The discriminating team investigated is Club Deportivo Chivas USA, which had a preference for employing Hispanic players. Evidence of discrimination is found by analyzing how other teams valued the former players of Chivas USA differently across ethnicity after the team was disbanded by the league. The nature of MLS player contracts and drafting rules allow for a simple and unique test for salary discrimination that has not previously been possible to implement.     

Are there too few trades during the NFL draft?

College football players are initially assigned to teams in the National Football League (NFL) through the league’s draft selection process. At each team’s turn to pick, the team has the option of exercising the pick itself or trading it to another team. If gains from trade are exhausted, draft picks should be exercised by the team with the highest expected value. That is, the expected player contribution garnered from a given pick should not be dependent on whether the pick was traded or retained. Regression results, however, indicate that controlling for a player’s draft position, when a team trades up to acquire a player, that player is more likely to have greater on-field success. This suggests that there are too few draft day trades. Plausible reasons are high transaction costs or the fear of media scrutiny that draft trades can engender.     

Foreign players,team production,and technical efficiency: Evidence from European soccer

As on-field success is nowadays the main objective of European soccer clubs, good management needs to extract the highest sport success from the squad talent at hand. Because teams differ in their quality, performance needs to be compared with the best practice of comparable units. One remarkable source of heterogeneity across teams is the squad composition, which can produce gains from diversity together with communication costs. The paper studies the efficiency in sporting performance of soccer teams, paying attention to how the number of foreign players relates to productive inefficiency. Using data for 146 teams in the top 5 European leagues during 10 seasons, we estimate a double heteroskedastic True Random Effects Stochastic Frontier team production function. We find that (i) the number of passes, ball recoveries, and shots from the penalty area improve team efficiency, and (ii) a higher number of foreign players increase inefficiency. Our findings suggest that gains from squad diversity might be offset by communication costs.     

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT UNDER MLB FINAL‐OFFER SALARY ARBITRATION SYSTEM

This paper provides a detailed analysis of negotiated salaries under Major League Baseball's final‐offer arbitration process using data from the 2007–2010 seasons. There is a wage premium of 25% for hitters and 14% for pitchers filing for arbitration. Interestingly, there is an additional premium for exchanging offers for hitters but not for pitchers. The additional premium in salary for hitters who exchange offers with their clubs amounts to 7%. (JEL J31, J52)     

MAINTAINING MARKET POSITION: TEAM PERFORMANCE,REVENUE AND WAGE EXPENDITURE IN THE ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE

This paper investigates the relationship between playing success and commercial success in team sports. Utilizing a data set relating to the English Premier League that combines both financial measures and indicators of playing skills and performances, our empirical analysis is based on three behavioural equations. Our analysis indicates that on‐field success can be directly related to players’ skills and abilities and that revenue is positively related to on‐field success. Wage expenditure is also shown to systematically reflect player skills and performances. One interpretation of this evidence is that investment in players’ skills and ability buys on‐field success, with richer teams becoming ever richer and able to maintain or even build upon success by spending more on players than less successful clubs. To the extent that richer clubs are successful in their objective there is a causal link between revenue earned and competitive imbalance via investments in players. The implications of this tendency within a league are discussed in our conclusion, which also considers the potentially wider implications of our study as they relate to the evolution of firm size and issues of market share.     

Do Major League Baseball Hitters Engage in Opportunistic Behavior?

This study focuses on 256 Major League Baseball free agent hitters playing under the 2006–2011 collective bargaining agreement to determine whether players engage in opportunistic behavior in their contract year, i.e., the last year of their current guaranteed contracts. Past studies of professional baseball yield conflicting results depending on the econometric technique applied and choice of performance measure. When testing whether players’ offensive performances increase during their contract year, the omitted variable bias associated with OLS and pooled OLS estimation leads to contrary results compared to fixed effects modeling. Fixed effects regression results suggest players increase their offensive performance subject to controlling for the intention to retire.     

Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents

Under the reserve-clause system that assigns the property-rights on the Major League Baseball players’ services to teams, player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players. In contrast, under the current free-agency system, players with free-agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors. Thus, the system assigns the property-rights to players. Using data extracted from the Baseball Archive (http://baseball1.com), this article examines the effect of the change in the property-rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams. We find that the change increased large-market teams’ shares of veteran all-star players and the concentration of senior players.     

Productive Efficiency and Salary Distribution: The Case of US Major League Baseball

Recent theoretical research suggests that a firm's salary structure can affect the firm's productivity. We investigate the relationship between payroll inequality and production using US Major League Baseball data. Employing panel data methods, this study finds that salary inequality has a significantly negative effect on team success. A general result is that team success in term of wins does not seem to be correlated with efficiency; specifically, some of the least successful teams are also some of the most efficient. In addition, salary inequality does not appear to be correlated with efficiency. Furthermore, revenues generated by teams are not necessarily correlated with team efficiency.     

FAVORITISM AND REFEREE BIAS IN EUROPEAN SOCCER: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH LEAGUE AND THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE

In this paper, we test for, and find evidence of, referee bias in favor of home teams in European football using minute‐by‐minute analysis to control for within‐game events. The context for the analysis is Spain's Primera Liga and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League. We find that the award of sanctions by Spanish referees in the Champions League are not significantly different to those of the referees from other countries and as such are subject to the same sources of bias. In Primera Liga matches where the crowd is separated from the pitch by running tracks, we find that the probability of the award of a yellow card to the home team is higher and that of the away team is lower compared to matches played at stadia without running tracks. Similar results are found in the Champions League, where efforts are made to hire “neutral” referees. Referee behavior is also influenced by the size of the crowd in attendance. (JEL D8, J2)     

The impact of skilled immigrants on their local teammates’ performance

We use the Bosman ruling, which invalidated restrictions on the maximum number of foreign players allowed on professional football teams, to identify a causal positive impact of foreign players in German Bundesliga clubs on the individual performance of their domestic teammates.     

Location and attendance in major league baseball

This study uses a travel-cost model to analyse the attendance impacts on Major League Baseball (MLB) of the closest substitute MLB team. It is found that the closer two teams are, the lower attendance is at each team relative to two teams that are farther apart. In addition, when a new team moves into the area of an existing team, there is an additional initial reduction in attendance for the incumbent team. This has implications for actions aimed at changing the number of teams in MLB either by contraction or by possible antitrust approaches that would increase the number of teams, especially in megalopolis markets. Further, and consistent with past demand studies, pricing is in the inelastic portion of gate demand and fan loyalty is a significant contributor to the estimation of gate attendance.     

Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams

We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a repeated game between two “teams” with one, two, or three players in each team. We found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person teams. There were no general effects of team size, but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team's profits were divided equally. This result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning.     

SALARY INEQUALITY,TEAM SUCCESS,LEAGUE POLICIES,AND THE SUPERSTAR EFFECT

Using a simple model of a team's salary distribution and data from the recent Collective Bargaining Agreement between players and owners in the National Hockey League, I examine the relationship between a team's salary distribution and its winning percentage. I find that teams with higher relative payrolls and lower salary inequality have higher winning percentages. I also find evidence of a superstar effect, in that teams with a higher maximum player salary have higher winning percentages. The results are sensitive, however, to the particular measure of salary inequality used as well as the endogeneity of the salary distribution. (JEL Z22, L83, J52, C33, C26)     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS AND EFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

This paper seeks to re‐examine the issue of estimating team efficiency for sports teams via an application of data from the National Basketball Association. This paper argues that the inputs the coaches allocate are the players the team employs. Therefore, this paper employs a measure of playing talent in modeling team production. Unlike previous studies, which only employed one measure of playing talent, we employ measures of guards, small forwards and big men in a study of basketball. This paper also argues that the time‐varying stochastic frontier models with the identical temporal pattern assumption such as Lee and Schmidt and Battese and Coelli cannot be used in the analysis of team efficiency in sports. The evidence we present shows by hypothesis test that this argument holds.     

Racial Discrimination in English football

This paper examines data on the racial composition and financial and sporting performance of professional English soccer teams between 1974 and 1993. In an earlier paper, Szymanski showed that teams with an above average proportion of black players would tend to perform better on average that would have been expected given the aggregate wage bills of these clubs. Since players are more or less freely traded in soccer this presents strong market‐based evidence of discrimination. In the present paper we explore the source of such discrimination. In particular we are concerned to test the hypothesis that discrimination is attributable to the fans rather than the owners. If fans were racially prejudiced then the owners of a team might expect to generate a smaller marginal revenue product from a black player compared to an equally skilled white player. We assess the presence of fan discrimination by examining relationships between attendance, revenues, performance and the proportion of black players in the team. We also incorporate evidence regarding statements of racial prejudice (from the British Social Attitudes Survey) in particular regions. We find little evidence that the discrimination against black players has its source in fan discrimination.     

Competition in shared markets and Major League Baseball broadcast viewership

This work evaluates the cross-quality elasticity of related products in the context of local market Nielsen Local People Meter ratings of Major League Baseball (MLB) regular season broadcasts from 2010 through 2013 from six teams in three shared markets. We employ a fixed effects panel regression with multi-way error clustering, finding that fans exhibit nuanced behaviour related to the absolute quality and relative quality of the two local teams. Our estimates imply quality-related competition for viewership between teams in the face of large disparities in quality. However, when both teams are of high quality, viewership increased beyond what own-team success would predict alone for the competing team. The competitive effects are largely dominated by the spillover effects. These findings point to complementary effects of team success beyond own-team interest, and bring about an important nuance in the literature on market definition, competition and substitution in sport.     

Returns to education in professional football

After three years in college, football players face a trade-off between spending more time in college and pursuing a career in the National Football League (NFL). We analyze the salaries for rookies in the NFL and instrument the endogenous decision to enter the professional market with the month of birth (relative age effect). A player enjoys a 6 percent higher starting salary in the NFL for each additional year with the college team. The returns to education in professional sports are sizable and similar to returns to formal education.     

EXAMINING REGULATORY CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE NHL

Regulatory capture has garnered significant attention, but poses a difficult empirical exercise since most relationships between regulators and regulated parties occur behind closed doors. In this research, we overcome this problem by analyzing an environment where the behavior of both the regulator and regulated parties are publicly available. Specifically, we utilize data from the National Hockey League (NHL) to examine the impact of general experience as a referee as well as experience refereeing a particular team on the assignation of penalties. We find that gaining general experience as a referee significantly reduces the number of penalties that a referee assigns. However, as a referee gains experience refereeing a specific team, they significantly reduce the number of penalties assessed to this team relative to teams that they have less experience refereeing, confirming that regulatory capture is observed among referees and teams in the NHL. (JEL G18, L51, K42)     

DOES EXPERIENCE MATTER? SALARY DISPERSION,COACHING, AND TEAM PERFORMANCE

Using Major League Soccer as a unique dataset, this study examines the direct and indirect role of coaches' experience in determining team performance. Inspired by labor market studies, we applied traditional indicators of team salary structure and, unlike previous studies, empirically test the hypothesis that coach experience affects the way in which team salary distribution influences performance. Our results suggest that coaches with experience as professional soccer players improve team performance directly but worsen the negative effect of a skewed salary distribution. Moreover, experience as a player is more important than coaching experience. (JEL D3, J3, M5)