BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

POLONIA dynamics during the years 2006–2012 and the effectiveness of the monetary Policy of the National Bank of Poland

In the study we investigate the effectiveness of the National Bank of Poland in counteracting the negative results of the financial crisis in the Polish interbank market. The situation was exceptional in a sense, that during the period of the financial crisis the Polish interbank market experienced liquidity surplus, and the main problem of the central bank was to regain confidence among commercial banks and stimulate interbank transactions. We concentrate on the spread between the rate of overnight interbank loans and the reference rate and based upon its dynamics we assess the monetary policy of the Polish central bank. Using econometric techniques we study how the central bank influenced the spread, when its control over it weakened and when was it strengthened. The study is supported by the results of the survey directed to the headquarters of commercial banks. We conclude that the ability of the central bank to control overnight rate was temporarily lost during the first phases of the financial crisis, but gradually regained after implementation of the confidence pact.     

Asymmetric Information and the Russian Individual Savings Market

The article considers the influence of informational imperfections on the performance of the Russian financial market. The focus is on the individual savings market, which exhibits inefficiencies, including those associated with the market power of a dominant agent—Sberbank. Reinforcement of Sberbank's dominance on the market in the period 1994‐98 (before the August default combined with financial crisis) is explained as a consequence of asymmetric information about the probability of bankruptcy of a new bank. Under asymmetric information a new private bank has to provide specific quality signals in order to attract depositors. Two major lines of inquiry are the criteria for choosing forms of savings, including that of a bank in which to deposit money, by Russian citizens, and banks' advertising strategies to confirm the factual risk of default. Within the conceptual framework of a game with separating equilibrium, we analyse the behaviour of the agents on both supply and demand sides in the market. We find that there is evidence of using advertising as a tool of quality signalling at a certain phase of the Russian individual savings market's development.     

The interbank market during a crisis

The autumn of 1998 provides a setting in which to test the performance of the interbank market during a potential financial crisis. This period witnessed Russia's effective default on its sovereign bonds and the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. Despite these negative shocks to bank capital and increased uncertainty in financial markets, the federal funds market still effectively channeled liquidity to those institutions in need at rates consistent with Federal Reserve intentions. Further, risk premiums on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased, suggesting that the federal funds market performed well during this period.     

历史视角中的美国和世界的危机

新古典宏观经济学和数理金融学都没能预期到2008年的这场危机，也没能解释为何这场危机是如此严重。这是因为他们只考虑纯粹的市场经济，完全不考虑制度，也缺乏分析当代经济的历史视角和结构变迁的视角。这就为政治经济学的分析留下了空间。分析从福特制结束以来的社会-政治联盟的变迁开始，转向以金融体制、金融自由化和全球化为基础的市场，赋予国际金融家以前所未有的权力，并导致了当前的经济和金融危机。控制金融部门要求当权者强有力的行动，以及公民的社会运动施压。金融再调节基本等同于民族国家与国际金融资本的博弈。     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

IS TIGHTER FISCAL POLICY EXPANSIONARY UNDER FISCAL DOMINANCE?: HYPERCROWDING OUT IN LATIN AMERICA

Hypercrowding out occurs when fiscally dominated governments' domestic credit demands are so intrusive to a nation's financial system that a move toward fiscal surplus lowers interest rates and increases growth. We sample nine Latin American countries to test for these relationships. The impulse‐response results of vector error correction models, six nations test positive for these two connections, suggesting market concern despite recent efforts toward fiscal balance. (JEL E430, E620, O230, O540)     

Has Canadian house price growth been excessive?

The dramatic rise in the ratio of Canada's average house price to average rent has led to speculation that there is a bubble in the Canadian housing market. Others have argued, however, that the currently high level of house prices may be rationalized by the low cost of financing, given the decline in interest rates over the last two decades. In this article, we assess these arguments through the lens of a simple asset pricing model applied to city‐level data. We quantify the extent to which excess growth in Canadian house prices depends on the nature of the current regime governing real interest rates, expectations of rent growth in different cities and variations in property taxes.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Matching markets with price bargaining

The extant microeconomic literature on matching markets assumes ordinal preferences for matches, while bargaining within matches is mostly excluded. Central for this paper, however, is bargaining over joint profits from potential matches. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, a seemingly simple allocation task in a 2×2 market with repeated negotiations. When inefficiency is possible, about 1/3 of the complete matches are inefficient and, overall, more than 3/4 of the experimental allocations are unstable. These results strongly contradict existing bargaining theories requiring efficient matches. Even with regard to efficient matches, the tested theories perform poorly. Standard bargaining and behavioral concepts, such as Selten’s (1972) Equal Division Core, are outperformed by the simplistic ε-Equal Split, i.e., an equal split of the joint profit plus/minus ε.     

Pooling and endogenous market incompleteness

Summary. We study a financial market economy with a continuum of borrowers and pooling of borrowers promises. Under these conditions and in the absence of designing costs, utility-maximizing decisions of price-taking borrowers may lead to financial market incompleteness. Parametrizing equilibria through the borrowers no-arbitrage beliefs, we link expectations to the financial market structure. Markets are complete if and only if borrowers beliefs are homogeneous. Price-taking behavior causes a coordination problem which in turn yields indeterminacy and inefficiency of equilibrium allocations.Received: 29 May 2003, Revised: 13 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D50, D52.Correspondence to: Alessandro CitannaWe would like to thank David Cass, John Geanakoplos, Thorsten Hens, Atsushi Kajii, and an anonymous referee for their comments. The first author also thanks CERMSEM (Paris I) and Columbia University Graduate School of Business for the hospitality. A first version of this paper has appeared as GSIA Working Paper #1997-E137, Carnegie Mellon University, which itself revised Citanna and Villanacci (1995).     

COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r=0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.     

A generalized Okun's Law: Uncovering the myth of China's labor market resilience

A stable labor market is a policy priority for most countries, especially after the burst of the global financial crisis. Unlike most countries, the labor market in China appears to be holding up well, despite sharp slowdown in economic growth. This paper argues that there are underlying fundamental mechanisms that help explain the resilience of China's labor market. The key to understanding labor market dynamics in China is that rural‐to‐urban migrant flows are more sensitive to growth than urban workers in the process of fast urbanization, which serves as a main shock absorber to buffer employment against adverse shocks. Therefore, we propose a generalized Okun's Law (GOL) that incorporates migrant flows with unemployment rates to capture the relation between labor market dynamics and economic cycles. The original Okun's Law can be regarded as a special case of the GOL for developed countries that have already completed urbanization. Conducting empirical analysis with both China's national‐ and city‐level data and cross‐country panel data, we find strong evidence supporting the GOL theory. Findings in the paper have implications for a deeper understanding of the wisdom of Okun's Law and its application in labor market policies.     

Open‐shop unions and product market competition

Abstract Evidence on the effect of product market competition on unionized wages is mixed. In this paper we show theoretically that the result may reflect genuine heterogeneity in the response of union wages to product market conditions. For low levels of unionization, union bargaining power may actually be enhanced by market competition, as firms have more to lose when there is a strike. Using recent data from the UK, we explore interactions between the level of industry competition and unionization, and find supporting evidence for this hypothesis.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS

A critical question in the policy debate about payday lending is whether other financial institutions can plausibly provide attractive and lower‐priced substitutes for standard payday loans. I present several new pieces of evidence addressing the question, focusing on whether credit unions, which are often held as the strongest potential competitors to payday lenders, do (or might) viably compete in the payday loan market. National payday loan offerings by credit unions show that very few credit unions currently offer payday loans. Credit union industry reports suggest that those credit unions offering such loans seem unwilling or unable to undercut substantially the prevailing prices set by payday lenders. Those industry reports also reveal that lower‐priced credit union loans generally ration riskier borrowers out of the market by imposing greater restrictions on approval and repayment; risk‐adjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all. Survey evidence suggests that most current payday borrowers prefer higher‐priced but less restrictive standard payday loans to lower‐priced but more restrictive alternatives offered by credit unions. The combined demand‐ and supply‐side evidence suggests that one should not expect credit unions (or by extension banks) to offer lower‐priced, higher‐quality alternatives for consumers who currently use payday loans. (JEL G2, L0, L5)     

The Alleged Value Neutrality of Economics: An Alternative View

This paper analyzes bank lending activities for owner-occupied housing loan extensions to minority members of Mississippi’s population. We analyze data on housing loan applications and accessibility patterns among the minority Black population relative to the majority White population groups in the State. The study looks hard at data for evidence of any patterns of discrimination toward minority housing loan applicants. And a Probit model is applied to examine the relative importance of economic variables (such as employment status, income level, and credit rating) versus noneconomic parameters (such as geographical location) in the housing loan decision making of banks toward minority borrowers. The evidence from our comparative data analysis suggests that there is a consistently high denial rates for minorities, which is not explained by financial (economic) factors. The formal test of discrimination with the Probit analysis also indicates some evidence of discrimination from, at least, the standpoint of redlining practices, albeit only with a modest predictive power.     

MARKET DISCIPLINING OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

In this article, we contribute to the current literature on market disciplining of the sovereign governments of the developing countries by distinguishing both sides of the market discipline hypothesis by adopting three‐stage least square estimation to incorporate the contemporaneous feedback effects between primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premiums. We provide empirical evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship between a country's default‐risk premium and primary structural budget balances with the direction flowing from primary structural budget balances to country's risk premium in 40 developing countries over the period 1975–2008. We also employ the Arellano‐Bond dynamic panel generalized methods of moments estimation to control for this joint determination of primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premium, and find supportive evidence of undisciplined sovereign governments and of nonlinearly behaving well‐functioning financial markets in the sample countries. (JEL C5, G1, G3)     

Minimum wages and the wage distribution in Estonia

Abstract: This article studies how changes in the statutory minimum wage have affected the wage distribution in Estonia, a post-transition country with little collective bargaining and relatively large wage inequality. The analyses show that the minimum wage has had substantial spillover effects on wages in the lower tail of the distribution; the effects are most pronounced up to the twentieth percentile and then decline markedly. The minimum wage has contributed to lower wage inequality and this has particularly benefitted low-wage segments of the labour market such as women and the elderly. Interestingly, the importance of the minimum wage for the wage distribution was smaller during the global financial crisis than before or after the crisis.     

Dynamic sorting in durable goods markets with buyer heterogeneity

In a competitive dynamic durable good market where sellers have private information about quality, I identify certain inefficiencies that arise due to heterogeneity in buyers' valuations. Even if the market induces dynamic sorting among sellers and all goods are eventually traded, inefficiency can arise because high valuation buyers buy early when low‐quality goods are sold, while high‐quality goods are allocated to low valuation buyers that buy later. This misallocation adds to the inefficiency caused by delay in trading. Under certain circumstances, high‐quality goods may never be traded as in a static market.     

Is Crowdfunding Different? Evidence on the Relation between Gender and Funding Success from a German Peer‐to‐Peer Lending Platform

According to the literature on traditional banking, lenders often discriminate against female borrowers. However, studies of Peer‐to‐Peer lending in the United States find that female borrowers have better chances of obtaining funds than do males. We provide evidence on the success of female borrowers at a large German peer‐to‐peer lending platform. Our results show that there is no effect of gender on the individual borrower's chance to receive funds on this platform, ceteris paribus. Several robustness checks confirm this finding. Hence, female discrimination seems to be eased by the ‘wisdom of the lending crowd’.