Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

Are Islamic Banks More Resilient During Financial Panics?

Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments of the financial sector in developing countries. Rapid growth of this segment is accompanied with claims about its relative resilience to financial crises as compared to conventional banking. However, little empirical evidence is available to support such claims. Using data from Pakistan, where Islamic and conventional banks co‐exist, we compare the behaviour of Islamic and conventional banks during a financial panic. Our results show that Islamic bank branches are less prone to deposit withdrawals during financial panics, both unconditionally and after controlling for bank characteristics. The Islamic branches of banks that have both Islamic and conventional operations tend to attract (rather than lose) deposits during panics, which suggests a role for religious branding. We also find that Islamic bank branches grant more loans during financial panics and that their lending decisions are less sensitive to changes in deposits. Our findings suggest that greater financial inclusion of faith‐based groups may enhance the stability of the banking system.     

Bank efficiency in South‐Eastern Europe

This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six transition countries of South‐Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using a stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost efficiency of South‐Eastern European banks is 68.59 percent, and the average profit efficiency is 53.87 percent. Regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency show that foreign banks are characterized by higher profit efficiency but lower cost efficiency, and government‐owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency than domestic private banks. However, the efficiency gap between foreign‐, domestic private‐ and government‐owned banks narrows over time. We also find that the market power of a bank has a positive association with both cost and profit efficiency. Institutional development, proxied by progress in banking regulatory reforms, privatization and enterprise corporate governance restructuring, also has a positive impact on bank efficiency.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Regulating the banking industry in transition economies: Exploring interactions between capital and reserve requirements

This paper examines the ‘prudential' role of reserve requirements in transition economies using a general-equilibrium banking model. The analysis stresses the role that reserve requirements may play in enforcing an adequate level of bank capitalization in a context in which it is difficult to assess the true value of bank assets. The paper also explores the interactions that exist between capital and reserve requirements and the effect of these regulations on the financial structure of banks and on the level of credit and interest rates.     

WAL‐MART AND BANKS: SHOULD THE TWAIN MEET? A PRINCIPLES‐BASED APPROACH TO THE ISSUES OF THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE

The application in July 2005 by Wal-Mart to obtain a specialized bank charter from the state of Utah and to obtain federal deposit insurance reopened a national debate concerning the separation of banking and commerce. Though Wal-Mart withdrew its application in March 2007, the issue and the debate continue. This article offers a principles-based approach to this issue that begins with the recognition that banks are special and that safety and soundness regulation of banks is therefore warranted. Building on that recognition, the article lays out the principle that the "examinability and supervisability" of an activity should determine if that activity should be undertaken by a bank. Even if an otherwise legitimate activity is not suitable for a bank, it should be allowed for a bank's owners (whether the owners are individuals or a holding company), so long as the financial transactions between the bank and its owners are closely monitored by bank regulators. The implications of this set of ideas for the Wal-Mart case and for banking and commerce generally are then discussed . ( JEL G21, G28)     

Estimating the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees to Thai Banks

The paper estimates the contingent liability of the Thai government to their banking system prior to the 1997 financial crisis by maximizing a likelihood function that utilizes the established result that deposit insurance can be modeled as a put option on the value of bank assets. The results show that the estimated value of the government guarantee was large and statistically greater than the premium banks paid for this guarantee, suggesting that guarantees provided a subsidy to Thai banks. Additionally, the estimates are able to identify weak banks before the crisis emerged. These results suggest that the estimated value of implicit deposit guarantees can serve as an early warning indicator of banking crises. The paper contrasts the option pricing results with traditional balance sheet indicators, and demonstrates that these alternative indicators are unable to identify weaknesses in the Thai banking systems before the crisis.     

Overcapacities in banking: Measurement,trends and determinants

Global banks face profitability challenges since the global financial crisis. Besides cyclical factors, structural features such as overcapacities have been identified as root causes. While policymakers agree on the need for bank consolidation, there is less consensus on the definition and measurement of overcapacities in banking. This paper contributes by conceptualising and formalising the different dimensions of overcapacities in banking and by constructing a novel measure thereof. In addition, it empirically tests the main determinants of overcapacities in banking from 2006 to 2017 and assesses their relative importance. The results indicate that non-bank competition, the interest rate environment and bank business models are the most important driving factors of banking sector overcapacities. This is because shadow banks, benefitting from regulatory arbitrage, have altered banks’ capacity needs, low rates compressed margins and increased pressure to improve cost efficiencies, and retail-oriented business models have operated extensive branch networks entailing heavy fixed costs.     

Microeconomic determinants of acquisitions of Eastern European banks by Western European banks1

A considerable number of Western European banks acquired banks in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid‐1990s onwards. The question is whether or not this will improve the efficiency and profitability of the Central and Eastern European banking sectors. We test the relative strength of the efficiency versus the market power hypotheses by investigating the bank‐specific characteristics of the banks involved in the cross‐border acquisitions. We also examine the determinants of the post‐acquisition target banks’ performance. Our results indicate that large Western European banks have targeted relatively large and efficient Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) banks with an established presence in their local retail banking markets. We find no evidence that cross‐border bank acquisitions in the CEEC are driven by efficiency motivations. The evidence supports the market power hypothesis, raising concerns about the optimal balance between foreign ownership and competition.     

Reserve ratios: A proposal for change

The paper addresses the problem of Fed control of the money supply and the inherent instability of a fractional reserve banking system which Friedman covered in A Program for Monetary Stability. While Friedman proposed a 100 percent reserve requirement as a solution, this work suggests a change from imposing legal reserve ratios on specific liabilities to one of imposing them on total bank liabilities. Reserve ratios are compared to tax rates. Friedman's proposal is to increase the tax rate to 100 percent on specific liabilities and pay interest on reserve balances at the Fed. The proposal of this paper is to keep the tax rates (present reserve ratios) but change the tax base. It is shown that the Fed would gain control over the maximum expansion of banks, but would lose direct control over specific liabilities. The Fed would not tax some liabilities and subsidize others. The Fed could concentrate on setting the tone of the money market and allow the public to use whatever set of bank liabilities it desires as money without specific penalty.     

HIV/AIDS AND BANKING STABILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We argue that the recent large increase in deposits’ turnover in many developing countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence is associated with the spread of the disease. The point is that the need to pay for individual treatments force large‐scale withdrawals of households’ deposits, and that those large withdrawals put the banking industry at risk. In a standard demand‐deposit model where the HIV/AIDS prevalence among depositors is random, we show that (1) the probability of a large‐scale banking failure without a bank run increases as the odds of any prevalence level increases, and (2) it is always optimal to deposit, and thus to accept the risk of banking failure, to maintain long‐term investments in place.     

Financing Channels and Monetary Policy in a Dual Banking System: Evidence from Islamic Banks in Indonesia

Using Indonesian Islamic banking data from 2003 to 2014, this article employs a panel regression methodology to investigate the responses of Islamic banks to changes in financing rates and monetary policy, which may differ depending on their characteristics. The results suggest that the financing rate has a negative impact on financing at Islamic banks, while bank‐specific characteristics have a positive influence on it. The size and amount of capital have a greater impact than liquidity on financing at Islamic banks. However, changes in monetary policy are insignificant on bank financing, which implies that the transmission of monetary policy through the Islamic segment of the banking sector is weak. Furthermore, the weak impact of monetary policy on bank financing can be explained by the dramatic expansion of Islamic banks during the sample period, which contributed to a substantial increase in deposit growth and a high liquidity position.     

HOW DOES FOREIGN BANK OWNERSHIP IN THE BANKING SECTOR AFFECT DOMESTIC BANK BEHAVIOUR? A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how foreign bank ownership in the banking sector affects domestic bank behaviour and whether this relationship depends on the economic and financial conditions of the host country. This paper contains 795 individual banks in 39 countries covering the period 1999–2006. Foreign ownership is calculated using bank level data as a proxy for the degree of foreign bank ownership in the banking sector. First, we find that foreign bank ownership is associated with a decrease in both the profitability and overhead expenses of the domestic bank after applying the system panel Generalized Method of Moments model. Second, a lower level of economic development of the host country enhances the positive effects of foreign bank ownership on the income, profit and cost of domestic banks. Third, financial development plays an important role in determining the effect of foreign bank ownership. Fourth, while the use of aggregate foreign ownership data may provide us with a big picture, it may not explain why individual banks in the same country perform differently, which this study will answer.     

The Impact of Foreign Entry on Chinese Banks

Utilizing hand collected data concerning foreign ownership in the Chinese banking sector, we examine whether foreign ownership improves the efficiency of Chinese banks. Foreign banks tend to provide cooperation in retail banking rather than in corporate or private banking. We find no robust evidence of an improvement in the efficiency of an average bank that receives foreign strategic investments. However, the bank cost and profit efficiency significantly improve when foreign strategic investments provide retail banking and internal control assistance respectively to local banks. These findings suggest that foreign investment improves local bank efficiency when it transfers technologies that are lacking in local banks.     

Effects of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in transition economies

In transition countries, the real impact of banking crises has so far been rather moderate. We study the effect of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in a model where incumbent banks possess an informational advantage. We find that bank insolvency reduces the incentive to restructure for firms whose incumbent bank becomes insolvent. However, bank insolvency provides an additional incentive for firms that enter the credit market to develop new projects because it reduces asymmetric information between banks. Firms’ credit costs are thereby lowered. We also explain a path‐dependent development by demonstrating that the firms’ decision to develop new projects depends on the banks’ share of non‐performing loans.     

Do Bank Capital and Liquidity Affect Real Economic Activity in the Long Run? A VECM Analysis for the US

This paper analyses the long‐term economic costs of the new regulatory standards (the so‐called Basel III reform) for the US. Using a Vector Error Correction Model that estimates long‐run relationships among a small set of macro‐variables over the period 1994–2008, it shows that tighter capital and liquidity requirements have negative (but rather limited) effects on the level of long‐run steady‐state output and more sizeable effects on banks’ return on equity. The economic costs are considerably below the estimated positive benefit that the reform should have by reducing the probability of banking crises and the associated banking losses ( BCBS, 2010b ).     

Banking distress in MENA countries and the role of mergers as a strategic policy to resolve distress

This paper studies banking distress in MENA countries and considers the extent to which mergers are used as a solution for resolving individual banking distress. We use a two-level nested logit model to model the interdependence between merger decisions and the distressed state of banks. Both bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables are deployed to predict banking distress. In line with other recent papers, we challenge the view that specific bank indicators such as CAMEL category and bank size are more significant determinants of banking distress than macroeconomic variables. A comparison of model fits and out-of-sample forecasts indicates that the unordered NL model statistically outperforms a standard logit model by substantial margins. Our empirical study shows that 67% of the distressed banks in our sample are involved in merger transactions and that weak financial status systematically increases the likelihood of a bank being involved in a merger. Distressed state-owned banks are less likely to be a target of a merger transaction. However, global economic conditions do not significantly affect the decision of distressed banks to initiate a merger policy.     

INTERSTATE BANKING AND ANTITRUST LAWS: HISTORY OF PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE BANKING COMPETITION

Over the past several years, antitrust laws' significance as a public policy to promote competition in banking has diminished. Deregulation has intensified competition so much that it has made antitrust laws nonbinding constraints, even during a merger movement of extraordinary proportions. Deregulation and attenuating antitrust raise a question as to whether a distinctive competitive policy for commercial banks should exist as it has in the past.
Two earlier policies are identified and reviewed in this paper: (1) free banking, which in several forms existed from the 1830s to the early 1930s, and (2) antitrust, which became relevant during the early 1960s. Experience under both policies illuminates the interaction between competition and regulation in banking. Such experience indicates that the effects of current competitive policy must be evaluated within the developing regulatory environment. Partially evaluating current policy within this context suggests that new charter requirements should be reformulated and that large bank mergers should be limited. So long as a distinctive regulatory system exists, a distinctive competitive policy for banks is needed.     

Implications of Shifting Retail Market Shares for Loan Monitoring in a Dominant‐Bank Model

This study utilizes a dominant‐bank model to investigate whether an increase in retail loan and deposit‐market concentration increases the incentives for both dominant and fringe banks to monitor their loans and thereby improve the quality of their loan portfolios. It shows that the effects on banks' incentives to engage in monitoring aimed at eliminating loan default losses in response to increased concentration of retail market shares of loans and deposits depend critically on whether the banks' asset and liability choices are interdependent. When the asset and liability decisions of both dominant and fringe banks are independent, a shift in market shares in favor of the dominant bank generates a straightforward increase in the incentives of all banks to monitor their loans. Under portfolio interdependence, the effects on monitoring outcomes at dominant banks and at banks within the competitive fringe depend on more complicated configurations of parameters. This fact helps explain mixed empirical evidence on the relationships between bank competition and measures of bank risk and soundness.