Forecast Summary

The economy is in the throes of its biggest downturn in ten years. Output has been falling and unemployment rising for nearly a year and business confidence indicators suggest no early letup. In the last 12 months total output has fallen 2 per cent with manufacturing 5 per cent lower. This, we believe, is the trough of the recession and we expect signs of recovery to be evident in the late spring. Even so, output is likely to fall by nearly 1 per cent this year and unemployment should rise well above 2 million. The benefits of recession have been slow to appear, though the trade gap is narrowing sharply. The downward pressure on prices from falling demand is balanced by rising costs as industry struggles to pass on high unit labour and interest costs. Helped by some reduction in mortgage rates and a severe squeeze on profits, we expect retail price inflation to fall to Sper cent by the end of the year and to 3–4 per cent over the medium term.     

Economic Viewpoint The Shape of the UK Recovery

Monthly economic data combined with the more optimistic tone of CBI and other surveys suggest that the recession may be drawing to a close. By the early summer it was becoming apparent that output was no longer falling; now it appears that the economy is in transition front the 'bumping along the bottom' phase, which lasted through the summer months, to the beginnings of a modest recovery in output and demand. The focus of interest is therefore switching away front the timing of recovery towards its shape and strength.
We have previously argued that the recovery would be led by consumer spending, that industry would not resume investment spending un ti1 demand elsewhere was picking up, and that although exports have held up remarkably well, taking some of the strain of the downturn in domestic demand, there was little prospect of a surge in world trade to provide the pre-conditions for an export-led recovery. What was and is needed is a recovery in consumer confidence, with a willingness to borrow at lower interest rates showing up in a reduction in the personal savings ratio.
But the recovery starts with the personal sector still having a large debt overhang from the 1988-9 boom, which will inevitably inhibit new borrowing. Meall while the credit crunch is restricting the ability of banks to lend. Together these imply only a limited response to the interest rate cuts of the last year and would, in the absence of the EMS link with high German interest rates, argue for further interest rate reductions. But high post-unification German rates put a floor under UK rates and will slow the recovery. The economy will do little more in 1992 than make up for the output losses of 1991 and our forecast (as in June) suggests that it will not be until 1993 that previous output peaks are passed and unemployment is stabilized.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The recent weakness of the world economy does not undermine the relatively optimistic forecast for 1987 which we presented in May. At that time we suggested that activity would be sluggish for most of this year as a result of the impact effect of the OPEC III oil price collapse. But we also argued that by the end of the year there would be clear signs of a consumer-led recovery as the personal sector adjusted to the real income gains and lower inflation benefits of the lower oil price and the reduction in nominal interest rates which followed. There is mounting evidence of rising consumer spending, particularly in Europe and it is something of a puzzle that output has not risen to meet this demand. The explanation is partly that producer confidence has lagged behind that of consumers, so that demand has been met from stock, and partly that spending has been supplied from countries outside the OECD, especially the NICs in the Far East. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our earlier view of OECD output prospects next year remains the most likely though, in recognition of the growing importance of non-OECD competition, we have adjusted the output forecast down slightly. OECD GNP is expected to rise 2.6 per cent this year, with an acceleration to over 4 per cent in 1987 arid 1988. Moreover, we believe this can be achieved without a rebound in inflation, which is forecast to be stable at about its present level of 2 1/2 per cent.     

Forecast Summary

There is one overriding question which this issue of Economic Outlook seeks to address: to what extent will the tight monetary policy now in place produce a slowdown in consumer spending and take the savings ratio back up from last year's record lows? The answer, provided by the forecast, is that the savings ratio will rebound this year and our Macroeconomic Viewpoint argues that this will be sufficient, in combination with a rising budget surplus, to effect a reduction in inflation and the current account deficit over the medium term. But it does not achieve the government's target, set out in the MTFS, of a balanced budget - the public sector remains in chronic surplus. This objective requires national savings to be privatized and, in a special Microeconomic Viewpoint, we put the case for tax incentives to boost personal saving and enable the budget surplus to be reduced in a way which does not add to demand.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE GULF WAR: RECESSION AND RECOVERY

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred at a time when many economies were in or heading towards recession. These trends were exacerbated by the Gulf crisis which had adverse effects on consumer and producer confidence. Now that the Gulf war is over, confidence is recovering but against the background of a relatively severe recession. In this Forecast Release we make use of a simple statistical tool to throw some light on how much of the downturn was due to confidence factors and thus to draw implications for the recovery. In broad terms we find that a large part of the US recession, in particular the downturn in consumer spending, was attributable to the effects on confidence of the Gulf crisis. In both the US and the UK, however, the effects on producer confidence were less marked, though here too the analysis suggests that, at its low point, producer confidence was also adversely affected by the crisis in the Gulf. The latest data show that there has been a full recovery in US consumer confidence but that producer confidence on both sides of the Atlantic remains well below pre-Gulf trends. On this basis, therefore, we would expect a further recovery in industry's confidence over the coming months.     

Forecast Summary

In themselves the drop in interest rates and the fall in the exchange rate following the ERM débâcle of "Black Wednesday" will have an expansionary effect on demand in the UK economy. But because of the way in which the policy shift was handled, any positive impact is likely to be offset by lower business and consumer confidence with the result in our forecast that recession continues well into next year. It is another six months before output stops falling and a rise of as little as 0.9per cent is in prospect for 1993 as a whole. Such a weak recovery will, however, limit the inflationary impact of a lower pound and, helped by lower mortgage interest rates, retail price inflation is forecast to be almost unchanged over the next 12 months. In 1994 and beyond, the inflationary effects of devaluation are more evident and we assume that the Government will tighten its monetary stance, raising interest rates back above 10 per cent to stabilise the pound, possibly re-entering the ERM at a new central parity of DM2.40. On this policy stance, output rises 3 per cent in 1994 but slows thereafter and the peak in inflation is held to 6 per cent late in 1994. The J-curve effects of devaluation enlarge the current account deficit to f20bn next year- The weakness of output over the next 12 months is the main factor behind a rise in unemployment to 3.2 million and a steady increase in the PSBR, which reaches a high of f43bn in 1995-6, equivalent to 6per cent of nominal GDP.     

The monetary policy dilemma: Will interest rates have to rise?

UK interest rates are now at their lowest level for more than two decades, and the government is hoping that interest rates can be kept at a low and sustainable level comparable to the 1960s. Indeed, some commentators are calling for still lower interest rates to offset the risk that the £12bn tax increases and cuts in government spending that will come into effect in the next financial year will lead to stagnant consumer spending and a stalled recovery. Against this must be weighed the risk that the recent very good run of inflation figures will prove temporary. Both headline and underlying inflation will be pushed up by indirect tax increases and there is the possibility that wages will follow too, as employees seek to maintain their living standards in a tightening labour market. That risk would point to a much more cautious monetary policy stance and the possibility that the government may need to raise rates from their present level if it is to achieve its inflation objective. The Chancellor faces a clear dilemma. In this Viewpoint, we assess the evidence available to guide him in his decisions and draw out the implications for the future path of interest rates.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The New Year has started with a burst of enthusiasm in UK asset markets. The stock market has reached an all-time high and the pound has recovered from the sub-1.50 and DM2.40 lows that it hit in the aftermath of its exit from the ERM last September. There are external reasons for the buoyant start to 1993, namely the exposure of UK companies to the us economy where recovery seems assured, and the desire to park short-term funds outside the EMS where renewed turmoil greeted the start of the New Year. But over and above this, hopes have risen that the worst of the UK downturn may be over, that recession is at last ending and recovery beginning. It is this question that we examine here.
We have argued before that the recession will not be over in any meaningful sense until the level of output tops the pre-recession peak of the second quarter of 1990, output growth returns to its trend rate of 2-2.5per cent and unemployment starts falling, But in a more limited sense we can ask whether output has stopped falling and whether a recovery in output is under way. Specifically we may ask whether, when the CSO comes to date the trough of the recession, it will be put in 1992 or whether it is still ahead of us in 1993.
In answer to this last question, we find that the trough of the recession may have occurred as long ago as April 1992. If so, the initial recovery phase has been feeble to say the least - there is almost no hard data yet showing a recovery in output. What is evident - and it is on this that market enthusiasm is based - is that (consumer) demand is rising slowly. The hope is that the increase in demand will be sustained, and that a recovery in output will follow.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery that we forecast in February remains intact, though its composition is shifting between external and domestic demand. As we reported in International Economic Outlook earlier this month, the recession in Europe is intensifying so that, even with the devaluation-induced improvement in competitiveness, exports are being held back The weaker world outlook is the main factor behind a lower growth forecast next year. For 1993, however, we are continuing to forecast growth of 11/2 per cent, principally on the basis of more buoyant consumer spending. But the boost from consumption, while welcome in the first stage of recovery, is short-lived since the higher taxes already announced for next year hold back the growth of disposable incomes. Again this is desirable for the share of consumption, private and public, in GDP has been rising steadily and needs to be reversed in order to devote resources to reducing the two deficits: the PSBR and the trade gap. Over the forecast as a whole it is exports and investment which drive demand, not consumption. Underlying inflation has fallen below 3 per cent for the first time in twenty years, but it is now at its cyclical low point. We expect some increase in inflation from now on, though the Government's 1–4 per cent target is not likely to be breached this year. Next year and beyond, however, without more action on the budget deficit or a sharper increase in interest rates than we are assuming, inflation is forecast to settle in the 4–5 per cent range. Unemployment has fallen in recent months but the underlying trend remains upwards. We expect the three million level to be reached in the second half of the year.     

THE HOUSING MARKET AND THE RECOVERY

In the run up to the key Christmas period the talk is again of renewed weakness in consumer spending. Last month saw the volume of retail sales rise by only 0.1 per cent, and the annual rate of growth has now slowed to a shade over 3 per cent, down from its peak of 4.4 per cent back in July this summer. This weakness in consumer demand is also clearly being reflected in retail prices; with retailers discounting their prices to boost sales, headline inflation fell to 1.4per cent in October, while the underlying rate dropped to its lowest level for 25 years. This forecast release looks at the wider determinants of consumer spending, especially developments in the housing market. We argue that the slowdown in high street sales is a forbear of sluggish growth to come and that lower interest rates, if they materialise, are unlikely to have much of an impact. While consumer spending has been the driving force out of recession, for the recovery to be sustained, requires that exports and investment spending now take up the running.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Autumn Statement updated the government's spending plans and its forecast from those announced in the Budget in March. On both counts there is very little difference between the Treasury view and our own forecast released in October. The Treasury supports our projection that output and demand will decelerate in 1989, that inflation will peak in the first half of the year at about 7 per cent and fall back to 5 per cent by the end of the year and that the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments will narrow only marginally over the next 12 months. On public spending in 1989–90, our October forecast was close to the unchanged official figures. It was clear to us - though not to most City commentators - that savings on unemployment benefit, debt interest and elsewhere would enable greater spending on programmes within an unchanged planning total. In later years the government has upped its expenditure plans from those announced a year ago, as we had assumed it would. As a result, the Autumn Statement projects significant increases in real public spending from now on. We show that, under a more appropriate inflation forecast, public spending rises nearly 2 per cent next year but falls back in 1990–92. Finally we argue that, unless the Chancellor decides to run an even larger PSDR (public sector debt repayment) than the £12bn built into our forecast - and the Autumn Statement forecast assumes a PSDR in 1989–90 similar to the expected outturn in 1988–9 of £10bn - the scope for tax cuts remains intact.     

Forecast Summary

Nearly two years after the I990peak in output, the economy continues to 'bump along the bottom' of an L-shaped recession, which has turned into as severe a downturn as its predecessors in 1974-5 and 1980-1. The origins of the recession lie in the weakness of domestic demand, which has failed to respond to the 4.5per cent cut in interest rates that has taken place since we joined the ERM. It is now the turn of fiscalpolicy: public spending was raised in the Autumn Statement and, as the General Election approaches, the odds are on tax cuts in next month's Budget. This relaxation of monetary and fiscal policy should produce recovery and we see output moving ahead from the second quarter onwards. Nevertheless, the outlook for I992 is weaker than before: we forecast a rise in GDP of a little over I per cent, rather less for manufacturing industry. In 1993 and beyond n growth rate of around 2112per cent should be possible but it is the second half of next year before output passes its previous peak. This suggests that unemployment will rise for at least another year - to a peak in the summer of I993 of 2.8 million. The combination of a stable exchange rate inside the ERM and protracted recession has produced a rapid reduction in inflation and the current account deficit. As long as the pound maintains its present parity, inflation should moderate further, to the 3–4 per cent range by the end of the year and beyond. On the trade side, in contrast, imports have already bottomed out and exports are struggling in a weak world economy. This suggests that, as the recovery gets under way, the deficit on current account will widen from last year's £6bn to £8bn this year and £10bn by I995.     

The London Business School With Gower Publishing: FIGHTING YESTERDAY'S BATTLES

With still no firm evidence at home of a recovery in non-oil GDP, the government's main worries centre on the path of output ahead of the General Election. In a forecast, which relies heavily on exports to stimulate demand in 1992, the Treasury cannot regard the rising probability of renewed recession in the US or the very sharp slowdown currently taking place in Europe as the post-unification German boom runs out of steam with equanimity. The fear mist remain in Conservative politicians' minds that there will be no meaningful recovery within an electorally significant timescale. We sketch out this background, but our focus here is not on the prospects for recovery; rather we ask whether the recession has achieved its objectives. The recession was, it should be remembered, the direct product of government policy - interest rates were raised to 15per cent ahead of ERM membership - aimed at reversing the excesses of the late 198Os'boom and in particular at bringing inflation quickly down to acceptable European levels and reducing the deficit on the current account, which at its peak in 1989 amounted to 4 per cent of GDP. Our answer is that, over the last year of recession, considerable progress has been made: the rate of inflation is now in line with that in Germany and the current account deficit has fallen to under 1 per cent of GDP. But, on the government's own forecasts contained in the Autumn Statement, there will be some slippage on both counts in 1992. It is this worrying feature that we consider here. Our overall conclusion is that the recession has not completely delivered its objectives and that, even as the politicians turn their attention to recovery, we still have to fight yesterday's battles.     

Consumer Demand

Consumer spending had propelled the economic recovery through 2013 despite average earnings continuing to decline in real terms. But falling inflation and a steady uptick in earnings growth have meant that real wages have headed back into positive territory once more. With additional support from gains in employment, the foundations of the consumer recovery look increasingly secure…     

Forecast Summary

Economic recovery is under way fuelled by a sustained rise in consumer spending. We expect. output to grow by 2% per cent this year, slightly faster in 1984. Although prices will rise more rapidly from now on than in recent months, the inflation rate is unlikely to rise signijkantly above 6 per cent over the next two years.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The world recovery, now three years old, has proved more resilient than many expected and will be sustained in 1986 by lower oil prices. Fears that the early-1985 slowdown would turn into renewed recession have proved unfounded, as output in both the United States and Europe picked up in the second half of the year. The improvement stemmed from lower interest rates, falling inflation and weak commodity prices and was further helped by the sharp correction to the value of the dollar following September's G5 agreement. To these factors, which will remain supportive this year, is now added a lower oil price. The recovery in world output has not produced an increase in oil demand and, as the oil price rise of 1979-80 gave a further boost to supply from non-OPEC sources, a severe imbalance has emerged in the oil market. To maintain a £26 marker price (itself cut from £29 last July) has required a cutback in production of ever-increasing magnitude from Saudi Arabia in its role as OPEC's swing producer. Now that Saudi Arabia has abandoned this role in favour of stabilising its market share, oil prices have fallen sharply. We assume that the oil price will fall to £20 by the end of this year, a fall in real terms of 30 per cent. As a result the world recovery is given renewed impetus and output accelerates over the next twelve months. A cyclical peak in activity emerges in 1987, after which output growth settles at 2%-3 per cent and inflation at 4–5 per cent.     

Why the UK saving ratio is unlikely to flip anytime soon

• ? With inflation down and wages rising, the outlook for consumer spending in the UK is brightening. But should households opt to boost savings, the mood could darken.
• ? We think a meaningful rise in the saving ratio from its recent record lows is unlikely, though. Austerity may be easing, but the drag from fiscal policy is still set to limit households’ savings resources, while the durability of the current expansion may reduce the motivation for precautionary saving.
• ? What's more, any rise in interest rates on savings accounts will probably be even slower than the modest pace we expect for Bank Rate. And with the demographic shift toward an older, less thrifty, population, the appetite of households to save looks set to remain subdued.

     

Consumers alone shouldn't trigger the next recession

• ? If consumers in advanced economies were to hike their savings and rein in their discretionary spending in response to fears about the economy, we project global GDP growth in 2020 would slow to a subdued 2.1% (below our 2.5% baseline forecast), but the world economy would avoid a recession.
• ? The risks of rising precautionary savings aren't uniform across the advanced economies. For instance, the UK, Australia, Canada and Japan look particularly vulnerable to slowing retail sales, which could trigger a stronger downturn in those countries.
• ? Economies with the highest rates of consumer debt are also likely to be more at risk to weaker discretionary spending. In this respect, Australia, the Netherlands and Canada stand out the most.