华晨：续写悲歌

华晨中国（1114．HK）10月30日发布公告称，其以4．94亿元人民币向母公司华晨汽车集团出售旗下沈阳华晨金杯汽车的中华牌轿车业务。     

自主品牌的困惑

华晨经过20年的风风雨雨，我们得出了几个结论，认为对华晨未来十年的发展，至关重要。     

华晨集团:圆中国汽车自主品牌之梦

2007年4月8日,对华晨汽车集团的每个人来说是个大喜的日子.集团A级车项目开工奠基仪式在沈阳华晨金杯工厂举行,这标志着华晨谋划3年之久、进军经济型家轿市场的"A计划"正式启动.     

华晨集团因何积重难返

2020年11月20日,沈阳市中级人民法院裁定受理债权人对华晨汽车集团控股有限公司重整申请,标志着这家车企正式进入破产重整程序。一个如此庞大的国企走到这一步,其原因值得细细探究。根据相关资料,华晨汽车集团(简称华晨集团)是隶属于辽宁省国资委的重点国有企业。截至2019年末,华晨集团拥有一、二级子公司34家,其中有4家上市公司,分别是华晨中国汽车控股有限公司(简称华晨中国).上海申华控股股份有限公司(简称申华控股)。     

祁玉民抹去仰融痕迹 华晨疗伤

尽管最初被业界称为“门外汉”。尽管最初是“稀里糊涂”地来到华晨，尽管来华晨时甚至不知道创始人仰融，但在过去2年中，曾是政府官员的祁玉民，还是将这家沉疴中的企业拉出了泥潭。     

自主品牌的困惑

华晨金杯走了20年，中华走了10年，华晨宝马走了10年，经过这20年的风风雨雨我们得出了几个结论，这几个结论是在经历了一些困惑，吸取了一些经验而得出来的。我们认为对华晨未来十年的发展，至关重要。     

何处是归程：杨波回华晨刘志刚离华泰

在卸任奇瑞汽车副总经理、奇瑞麒麟汽车销售有限公司总经理职位5个多月后，今年46岁的杨波再次回到了老东家华晨汽车。2011年3月23日，ST金杯（600609）发表声明，杨波担任公司副总裁，并获董事会批准。     

化晨董事长质疑新能源炒作呼吁升级传统动力

近日，华晨汽车董事长祁玉民再次质疑新能源车“弯道超车论”，并直斥新能源车市场存在作秀与炒作。他表示，华晨对传统动力系统的研发进入了一个崭新阶段，涡轮增压、缸内直喷发动机的推出，实现了优秀的节能减排效果，这个成果对企业来说更有意义。     

蔺晓刚时代的三种可能

蔺晓刚是“华晨汽车”的拯救者还是出售“华晨汽车"的代理人?中华轿车似乎总是与它的旧主人无缘。三年前,仰融出走,中华轿车第一代上市;自那起两年半后,中华轿车的改进版——尊驰问世,苏强等华晨第二任经营管理层黯然退场。2004年12月15日,与尊驰同时在北京亮相的是五天前刚刚接替苏强就任华展金杯汽车有限公司董事长兼总裁的蔺晓刚,有关“新华晨”的概念是他的开场白。     

风雨金杯

金杯海狮已经处在了一个两头受夹击的时代,作为破局的大海狮能否实现突围,已经关乎华晨的未来在前后夹击、危机四伏之时,华晨金杯急需一款品质高且保障盈利的拳头产品,这是一款甚至决定华晨汽车未来、定位高端商务车市场的产品。华晨金杯以及华晨汽车集团董事长祁玉民显然就希望金杯大海狮能够担起重任。     

徐和谊年末的狂喜

2009年12月9日，我们一踏进北汽集团董事长徐和谊的办公室，已经感觉到了他的兴奋。我记得，他站了起来。 “这事儿太大了，”徐对《中国企业家》说，“爆炸性的新闻，现在绝对保密。”     

The Acquisition of Restructured Firms: An Illustration of Market Discipline?

We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and acquisition activity subsequent to corporate restructurings in a sample of 152 firms created by a voluntary corporate spin-off. We also investigate the linkage between these relationships and the stock market reaction to the initial restructuring announcements. Surprisingly, CEO wealth in the form of stock and options is strongly related to friendly and hostile acquisition activity, respectively. Moreover, the stock market appears to anticipate this subsequent acquisition activity. These results ask us to rethink our understanding of the motivational properties of equity ownership and the stock market's reaction to voluntary corporate spin-off announcements.     

上市公司CEO的监管机制：一个三方博弈视觉的思考

所有权与经营权的分离是现代企业的基本特征,内部人控制问题已成为制约上市公司健康稳定发展的瓶颈因素。本文通过建立一个CEO、董事会和外部监管机构三方之间的博弈模型,强调了监管的重要性;并从完善董事会职能和加强外部监管力度两个方面对上市公司CEO的道德风险之监管提出合理性建议。     

浅析A汽车销售有限公司的人员流失问题

人力资源是企业间竞争的有力武器之一,它对于组织的价值创造起着积极的推动作用。作为珠海最大的汽车销售企业之一的A汽车销售有限公司目前面临着人力资源结构不合理、人员流失情况严重、员工积极性不高等一系列问题,给企业的持久经营带来了一定程度的阻碍。A汽车销售有限公司应通过建立合理的薪酬制度、健全绩效考评和激励机制、树立正确的人力资源管理观念、把好员工招聘关、营造良好的工作氛围等举措,防止过高的人员流失率,留住人才,进而稳定企业的经营发展。     

The labour relations heritage and lean manufacturing at Fiat

The objective of the paper is interpreting, from an evolutionary perspective, recent developments of work organization and human resource management policies at Fiat Auto, one of the world's largest automobile manufacturers, which achieved a successful restructuring in the early 1990s. Building on a heritage of adversarial labour relations and ‘mass production’ organizational principles, Fiat developed an original and to some extent hybrid version of ‘lean’ human resource management practices (teamwork, flexible compensation, multi-skilling, etc.).

The paper analyses this process of organizational change from an evolutionary perspective based on the concept of dynamic capabilities. From this standpoint, IR. HRM and work organization practices are the result of a learning process, based on original development, imitation, analogical replication, combination and selection of organizational capabilities; organizational capabilities have a cumulative and path-dependent nature; workplace innovations are also rooted in organizational absorptive capacities, that is, the ability of firms to exploit new (and often extramural) organizational and HRM developments; the existence of complementarities among organizational competencies, assets and choices in term of HRM are likely to push toward the adoption of a set or system of (rather than single and insulated) innovations in work organization, HRM practices and industrial relations policies.

The data provided in the paper show that the process of innovation of workplace practices at Fiat Auto (summarized by the concept of the Fabbrica Integrata) is curiously non-linear. The newly designed HRM policies have, on the one hand, been resisted by the unions (who have not been involved in the design process) and by segments of the work-force; on the other hand, they have been hindered by existing organizational features and personnel practices which, in turn, were key success factors during the 1980s. This inertia is significantly lower at the new greenfield plant of Melfi. On the whole, the restructuring process was successful from the competitive and financial standpoint, and represents the basis on which management and the unions can develop a new co-operative model of industrial relations.     

郭台铭走出紫禁城

在媒体报数般地数到所谓“12跳”（5月26日深夜11时20分）之后，28日，《中国企业家》记者在深圳五洲宾馆见到了陪同中央联合调查组的郭台铭。他已极度憔悴，行动迟缓，满脸谦卑，间或无奈。寻不到昔日的一丝霸气。面对记者，他念叨着对员工的“关爱”，一连四遍。     

Does organization capital matter? An analysis of the performance implications of CEO power

Chief executive officer (CEO) power reflects the ability of the CEO to influence the firm's decision-making. Whether the CEO of the firm could manage the firm’s investment assets to support maximizing the efficiency of resource allocation is an important issue. As previous studies found, organization capital is a key intangible asset that improves the firm’s production efficiency and affects long-term performance. This study explores how CEO power affects organization capital investments and how it further affects the efficiency of firm resource allocation. We use the following three variables to measure CEO power: CEO founder, CEO-only insider and CEO duality. Our results indicate that the level of CEO power can influence a firm’s value by controlling the organization capital. When the firm’s CEO is also the founder, the CEO will attempt to increase investments in organization capital to create growth opportunities for the firm, which will therefore increase the firm's value. Specifically, when the company is in financial distress, the powerful CEO's increasing in organizational capital investment will expose the company to greater risk of loss of intangible assets. This result may further increase the company's price volatility.     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,turnover, and risk aversion

Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting.     

Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending

abstract Arguments based on labour market theory suggest that there may be CEO behavioural issues related to pay deviations from the labour market rate for CEO pay; however, few studies examine this phenomenon. This study attempts to address such behavioural issues by examining the influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending, the differences in this relationship between firms in high R&D intensive versus low R&D intensive industries, and the moderating affect of ownership structure on the CEO underpayment and R&D spending relationship. Results suggest that relative CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager‐controlled organizations as compared to owner‐controlled organizations. This study provides evidence that pay deviations may, in fact, affect certain CEO behaviours, specifically relating to innovation.