我国农村耐用消费品消费方式的变迁与机理

农村消费方式是耐用消费品消费的基础。改革开放以来,我国农村耐用消费品消费经历从"贫困-温饱"到"温饱-小康"再到"小康-全面小康"的三个发展阶段。该文借鉴西方消费方式的研究范式,从农村消费方式的变迁入手,探求农村耐用消费品消费方式的影响因素和变迁机理,从而得出农村消费方式、农民收入与农村消费增长三者关系的相关结论。     

中国农村耐用消费品需求研究

本利用国家统计局1999年农户家计调查的横截面数据，采有改进的probit模型，对影响中国农户家电需求的因素进行了计量分析。与传统献讨论耐用品需求的思路有所不同，本重点讨论了影响农户家电购买因素中与基础设施有关的部分。在此基础上，本试图遵循统计学的原理，将样本中得到的结论推广到整个农村地区，并提出相应的政策建议。     

当前新型耐用消费品供求失衡的原因及对策

当前家电等新型耐用消费品出现了需求不足与供给结构失衡并存局面。其原因主要是：城乡判别过大，贫富差距拉大，消费者心理预期不安，水电供应不足。需采取的对策是：转变消费观念，调整供给结构，优先启动农村消费市场，提高居民收入水平，加快社会保障制度建设，调节收入差距。     

耐用消费品品牌个性高级性纬度形成机制研究

耐用消费品品牌个性的高级性纬度可以分为"时尚"与"高档"两个次级纬度,"时尚"纬度的主要驱动因素是品牌视觉元素、消费者的时尚形象、品牌知名度与消费者的社会地位,"高档"纬度的主要驱动要素是品牌视觉元素、消费者的社会地位、感知服务品质、消费者的时尚形象、商品价格与产品感知品质。品牌的视觉元素与消费者形象是驱动品牌个性高级性纬度的最主要因素。品牌的视觉元素与典型消费者形象对高级性纬度的形成具有明显的性别差异。     

“扩大内需”重点是扩大耐用消费品需求

尽管金融危机对中国经济的影响还在继续,但我们大可不必惊慌,如果我们冷静分析就不难发现,这场危机迟早要来.对中国来说,危机的出现说明我们的社会迈上了一个新台阶.目前,扩大内需的一个蕈要节点就是要扩大耐用消费品的需求.这也是在中国经济发展的一个阶段内,保障经济平稳增长需要解决的一个重要问题.     

耐用消费品消费补贴的受益归属评析

该文利用2011年江苏省农户的实地调查资料,通过构建消费补贴受益归属曲线、计算人均收入基尼系数在消费补贴前后的变化,研究了现阶段耐用消费品消费补贴政策的受益归属,结果表明消费补贴受益归属确实存在着不均衡的现象,消费补贴政策主要是补贴了农村既有消费意愿又具有一定购买能力的中等收入群体,因而缩小了贫富间的相对福利差距。     

扩大消费的关键在于降低政府和企业的储蓄

本文利用1992年-2007年的三部门储蓄率建立回归模型做实证分析,得出我国过低的最终消费率不仅仅是因为过高的居民储蓄率,政府和企业储蓄率对最终消费率同样有很大反作用;政府和企业储蓄率高是致使消费率偏低的重要原因。因此,通过加大政府转移性支付、增加公共消费、完善企业工资分配制度等措施降低政府和企业的储蓄率,促进消费需求的有效扩大。     

新型农村养老保险对家庭储蓄的影响:基于CFPS数据的研究

本文使用2010年和2012年中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS)数据,考察了新农保对家庭储蓄和消费的影响并发现,对于60岁以下的参保居民,新农保并没有显著影响他们的储蓄率。由于大多数居民的新农保缴费额仅为100元,预期未来能领取的养老金数额较低,因此无法通过财富替代和降低风险的渠道减少家庭储蓄。与此同时,本文发现,新农保显著降低了60岁以上居民的储蓄率,这些老年人不需要缴纳保险费而直接可以领取基本养老金,养老金领取额(约每年660元)占收入的比重平均达到了22.4%,直接为老年人提供了稳定的经济保障。新农保要更大程度地起到促进居民消费的效果,需要采取措施激励人们缴纳更高的保费,提高新农保的养老金替代率。     

International Trade and Commercial Policy for Durable Goods

Many commodities traded internationally are durable in nature. A dynamic durable goods oligopoly trade model is analyzed. The analysis indicates that the pattern of intraindustry trade depends fundamentally on the quality or durability of the firms' output. Indeed, product durability influences the effectiveness of commercial policy. For example, as domestic product durability rises, an increase in domestic tariffs has a smaller impact on domestic production. In addition, the model uncovers a previously unrecognized avenue by which product quality standards act as a barrier to trade. The results may help explain some of the empirical anomalies found in the literature.     

Inflation Stabilisation and the Consumption of Durable Goods

Exchange rate-based stabilisations in chronic-inflation countries have often been characterised by an initial consumption boom (which is most evident in the behaviour of durable goods) followed by a later contraction. This paper provides an explanation for such a boom-recession cycle based on the timing of purchases of durable goods. The initial fall in inflation results in a wealth effect which induces many consumers to bring forward their purchases of durable goods, thus generating an aggregate consumption boom. Since most consumers replenish their stock of durable goods at the beginning of the programme, a later slowdown follows.     

The Gain from International Trade in Pool Goods and Private Goods

It is well known that perfectly competitive free trade is potentially beneficial for all countries if all goods are both rivalrous and excludable in consumption (“private goods”) and recently (2011) the proposition has been modified to accommodate non‐rivalrous and non‐excludable goods (“public goods”), as well as non‐rivalrous and excludable goods (“club goods”). In the present paper the proposition is modified again, to accommodate rivalrous and non‐excludable goods (“pool goods”). The primary focus is on ocean fisheries, access to which is shared (not necessarily equally) by all countries. However the central proposition to be established is valid for all international pool goods.     

Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods

The formation of social norms for voluntary contributions to a public good is analyzed in a game in which people have preferences for private consumption, a public good, and social approval. Each person chooses to be one of the two types: a contributor or a non‐contributor. Thereafter, each person meets people who can observe his type. A non‐contributor feels disapproval, whereas a contributor feels approval if he believes that a contributor observes his type. The game has two asymptotically stable states: one in which everybody is a contributor, and one in which nobody is a contributor. Governmental subsidization of the public good can move the society to the former state, whereas a governmental contribution to the public good can move the society to the latter. Indeed, this crowding in or crowding out prevails even after policy reversal.     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

Factor Endowments and the Private Provision of Public Goods

The paper examines the consequences of increasing the size of the community in the standard model of the private provision of public goods when costs are variable. In contrast to an economy with fixed costs, the provision of the public good can fall with a larger community, and an increased provision of the public good is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for individual utility to rise. The paper also contributes to the literature on immiserizing growth in that it shows that capital accumulation can possibly result in lower utility for all individuals.     

Repeated Interaction and the Public Provision of Private Goods

The literature suggests that governments can use in-kind transfers to design efficient and targeted redistribution schemes if individual incomes are not directly observable. We investigate the extent to which the self-selection property of in-kind transfers carries through if redistributive transfers are made repeatedly. In a two-period setting, the government may gain information about the individuals' incomes in the first period and exploit this information for making targeted transfers in the second-period. This, however, also triggers changes in the individuals' behavior. If the government can commit to its future policy, the least cost policy may involve randomization between cash and in-kind transfers. Without commitment, the dynamic setting works against the government's interest. It may no longer be able to use in-kind transfers to generate information about the individuals' types.
JEL classification : H 42; H 2     

Social Insurance with In-kind Provision of Private Goods

This paper addresses the desirability of providing in-kind transfers as a screening device to facilitate redistribution of income from able to disabled persons within a social insurance system. An optimal policy—consisting of cash transfers, income-contingent in-kind transfers of one good particularly demanded by disabled workers, and linear taxation of other commodities—is characterized. It is then asked whether and, if so, when this policy can be replaced by an "earning-tested scheme" that provides the in-kind good only to those indivi duals who have no earnings from labor or by a non-linear pricing policy.     

公共产品的私人供应与气象服务的商业化

气象服务是一种典型的由政府无偿提供的社会公益性公共产品 ,由于其垄断经营的固有缺陷 ,造成气象服务供给的高成本和低效率。随着人类社会的不断发展 ,许多发达市场经济国家或地区已经尝试与推广气象服务商业化 ,并取得了显著的效果。本文从公共产品供应理论出发 ,在介绍国外气象服务商业化运行机制和经验的基础上 ,分析与提出了我国气象服务商业化的可能性、必要性及其相关政策建议等     

Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods

To analyze the private provision of a public good in the presence of private information, we explore the connections between two frameworks: the binary public good model with threshold uncertainty and the standard continuous model à la Bergstrom et al. Linearity of best responses in others' contributions is key to matching the two frameworks. We identify all utility functions that display this linearity, and we provide conditions ensuring that the minimal properties that Bergstrom et al. require for utilities are satisfied. Using techniques developed in the threshold uncertainty framework, we show existence and uniqueness of the Bayes‐Nash equilibrium—thus generalizing existing results—and we analyze its comparative statics properties. In particular, under the reasonable assumption that agents' income is stochastic and private information, we complement the full‐information crowding‐out and redistribution results of Bergstrom et al. If the government taxes agents' income proportionally and redistributes (expected) revenues lump sum, equilibrium public good provision can increase or decrease, even if the set of contributors is unchanged. Similarly, we show that crowding‐out can be one‐for‐one, less than one‐for‐one, or more than one‐for‐one. Finally, we extend our results to a multidimensional framework in which agents' unit costs of contributions are also private information.