Is Financial Globalization Beneficial?

This lecture examines whether financial globalization is beneficial to developing countries by first examining the evidence on financial development and economic growth and concludes that financial development is indeed a key element in promoting economic growth. It then asks why if financial development is so beneficial, it often does not occur. It then goes on to examine whether globalization, particularly of the financial kind, can help encourage financial and economic development and argues that it can. However, financial globalization does not always work to encourage economic development because it often leads to devastating financial crises. The issue is thus not whether financial globalization is inherently good or bad, but whether it can be done right.     

The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment

We use exogenous changes in Danish local municipality sizes to identify a large positive effect of political power on the profitability of firms related by family to local politicians. Our difference-in-differences estimate is consistent with a unitary elasticity of connected firms’ performance to political power (as measured by population per elected politician). Increasing power boosts firms’ operating returns, especially in industries relying heavily on public demand. Focusing on arguably the world's least corrupt country, we highlight the importance of corporate rent seeking at local governmental levels, which account for nearly half of total public expenditures.     

Eliminating entry barriers for the provision of banking services: Evidence from ‘banking correspondents’ in Brazil

This paper shows that the contractual arrangement of ‘banking correspondents’ has eliminated entry barriers for the provision of banking services in Brazil. With the bank correspondents, banks are allowed to reach the almost 2200 municipalities without bank branches in 2000, connecting 45 million people to the financial sector. The evidence is based on the estimation of an entry model of financial providers in Brazilian municipalities. I estimate a zero population entry threshold for banking correspondents for the period from 2002 to 2007. The estimated population entry thresholds for bank branches in the same period are relatively stable at approximately 8000–9000 people. The population entry thresholds for the second to fifth players for banking correspondents are also consistently lower than those for bank branches.     

Financial development and asset valuation: The special case of real estate

This paper studies the impact of financial development on asset valuation. We model the agency theoretic perspective of risk-averse investors and financiers in a general equilibrium setting under the framework of rational expectations (i.e., symmetric information). We focus on real estate, as it constitutes a special case of complete market contracting where adverse selection and moral hazard are easily mitigated. Our results illustrate an increase in pareto-efficiency, as financial architecture advances from: (i) banks to capital markets; and (ii) plain vanilla debt to an innovative one with participation clauses. This is attributed to the reduction in agency costs and cross-sectional risk-sharing, leading to an increase in the value of property. Our results predict that an optimal financial system will orient itself towards efficient financial contracts, irrespective of its source of origination. We also rationalize the co-existence of banks and capital markets, and generalize our results under a set of restrictive conditions.     

Big business stability and economic growth: Is what's good for General Motors good for America?

What is good for a country may not be good for its big businesses, at least recently. More turnover in top businesses correlates with faster per capita gross domestic product, productivity, and capital growth; supporting Schumpeter's [1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, third ed., Harper & Bros., New York, NY] theory of “creative destruction”—innovative firms blooming as stagnant ones wither. These correlations are greater in more developed economies, supporting Aghion and Howitt's [1992. A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica 60, 323–351] thesis that creative destruction matters more to economies nearer the technological frontier. More big business turnover also correlates with smaller government, common law, less bank-dependence, stronger shareholder rights, and greater openness.     

The delegated portfolio management problem: Reputation and herding

We study the relationship between financial intermediaries’ reputation and herding in a delegated portfolio management problem context. We identify conditions under which equilibria exist such that intermediaries with good reputation invest in private information, whereas those with poor reputation herd. The model’s empirical predictions are discussed and found to be consistent with previous evidence. From a normative stand, our work points out the possible existence of a policy trade-off between protecting investors by demanding more transparency from intermediaries and encouraging herding by free-riders for whom imitating portfolio decisions would be easier under tighter regulation, such as more frequent portfolio disclosure.     

Can We Prove a Bank Guilty of Creating Systemic Risk? A Minority Report

Because increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky really do create systemic risk before subjecting them to this capital punishment. Evaluating the performance of two leading systemic risk models, we show that estimation error alone prevents the reliable identification of the most systemically risky banks. We conclude that it will be a considerable challenge to develop a riskometer that is sound and reliable enough to provide an adequate foundation for macroprudential policy.     

RISK AND HEDGING BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE AND DETERMINANTS OF LATENT HETEROGENEITY

The notion of heterogeneous behavior is well grounded in economic theory. Recently it has been shown in a hedging context that the influence of risk attitudes and risk perceptions varies for different segments using a generalized mixture regression model. Here, using recently developed individual risk attitude measurement techniques and experimental and accounting data from investors with differing decision environments, we examine the determinants of heterogeneity in hedging behavior in a concomitant mixture regression framework. Allowing for latent heterogeneity, we find that risk attitudes and risk perceptions do not influence behavior uniformly and that the heterogeneity is influenced by manager's focus on shareholder value and the firm's capital structure.     

How do policy and information shocks impact co-movements of China’s T-bond and stock markets?

We investigate the impacts of policy and information shocks on the correlation of China’s T-bond and stock returns, using originally the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model that allows for the coexistence of opposite-signed asymmetries. The co-movements of China’s capital markets react to large macroeconomic policy shocks as evidenced by structural breaks in the correlation following the drastic 2004 macroeconomic austerity. We show that the T-bond market and the bond–stock correlations bear more of the brunt of the macroeconomic contractions. We also find that the bond–stock correlations respond more strongly to joint negative than joint positive shocks, implying that investors tend to move both the T-bond and stock prices in the same direction when the two asset classes have been hit concurrently by bad news, but tend to shift funds from one asset class to the other when hit concurrently by good news. However, the stock–stock correlation is found to increase for joint positive shocks, indicating that investors tend to herd more for joint bullish than joint bearish stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen.     

Financing patterns around the world: Are small firms different?

Using a firm-level survey database covering 48 countries, we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms. Our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium-size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources, including leasing, supplier, development, and informal finance. Small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance. Protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms, mainly due to its effect on bank finance. Small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms, so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms. We also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries.     

How accurate is the square-root-of-time rule in scaling tail risk: A global study

The square-root-of-time rule (SRTR) is popular in assessing multi-period VaR; however, it makes several unrealistic assumptions. We examine and reconcile different stylized factors in returns that contribute to the SRTR scaling distortions. In complementing the use of the variance ratio test, we propose a new intuitive subsampling-based test for the overall validity of the SRTR. The results indicate that serial dependence and heavy-tailedness may severely bias the applicability of SRTR, while jumps or volatility clustering may be less relevant. To mitigate the first-order effect from time dependence, we suggest a simple modified-SRTR for scaling tail risks. By examining 47 markets globally, we find the SRTR to be lenient, in that it generally yields downward-biased 10-day and 30-day VaRs, particularly in Eastern Europe, Central-South America, and the Asia Pacific. Nevertheless, accommodating the dependence correction is a notable improvement over the traditional SRTR.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.     

Information disclosure in credit markets when banks’ costs are endogenous

In this paper we develop a model of information disclosure among banks based on an endogenous interest rate for externally placed debt. Banks with private credit information are given an opportunity to disclose information prior to competing for borrowers. While disclosure eliminates a bank’s information advantage over its competitors, disclosing information creates a new advantage for the bank in terms of a lower cost of external funds. We find that the incentive for a bank to disclose information is inversely related to the bank’s capital ratio and positively related to the number of other banks that disclose information.     

Will the U.S. bank recapitalization succeed? Eight lessons from Japan

During the financial crisis that started in 2007, the U.S. government has used a variety of tools to try to rehabilitate the U.S. banking industry. Many of those strategies were also used in Japan to combat its banking problems in the 1990s. There are also a surprising number of other similarities between the current U.S. crisis and the recent Japanese crisis. The Japanese policies were only partially successful in recapitalizing the banks until the economy finally started to recover in 2003. From these unsuccessful attempts, we derive eight lessons. In light of these eight lessons, we assess the policies the U.S. has pursued. The U.S. has ignored three of the lessons and it is too early to evaluate the U.S. policies with respect to four of the others. So far, the U.S. has avoided Japan's problem of having impaired banks prop up zombie firms.