False discoveries in volatility timing of mutual funds

This paper examines the volatility timing of US mutual funds by controlling the false discovery rate to find out how many funds are truly countercyclical (procyclical) timing funds. Empirical results show that, given the whole universe of our sample funds, the percentages of countercyclical and procyclical volatility timing funds are about equal. We also find that while the standard approach, which simply counts the number of significant positive (negative) timing coefficients, does not incorporate false discoveries in volatility timing, it provides quite accurate volatility timing results. Finally, we find that the performance measures for an equally weighted portfolio of procyclical timing funds are greater than for an equally weighted portfolio of countercyclical timing funds in the in-sample test, consistent with our expectation that procyclical timers earn higher returns because they take on more risk. However, the countercyclical timing portfolio outperforms the procyclical timing portfolio in the out-of-sample test.     

Idiosyncratic volatility and equity returns: UK evidence

The proposition that idiosyncratic volatility may matter in asset pricing is currently a topic of research and controversy. Using data from the UK market we examine the predictive ability of various measures of idiosyncratic risk and provide evidence which suggests that: (a) it is the idiosyncratic volatility of small capitalization stocks that matters for asset pricing and (b) that small stocks idiosyncratic volatility predicts the small capitalization premium component of market returns and is unrelated to either the market or the value premium. The predictive power of the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility of small stocks remains intact even after we control for the possible proxying effects of business cycle fluctuations and liquidity and is robust across time and different econometric specifications.     

Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment

We study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm's security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, in which speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large pressure on prices. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise.     

Switching costs and relationship profits in bank lending

This paper studies how the cost of switching banks affects the profits available from relationship based lending when the relationship produces inside information. Lower switching cost compounds the adverse selection problem, discouraging outsider banks to depress loan rates. The adverse selection effect eases off along with higher switching cost, leading to more aggressive bidding and thereby reduction in insider profits. Above a certain threshold, however, the adverse selection effect vanishes completely and the insider profits turn increasing in the switching cost. The model predicts that the availability of relationship credit is non-monotonously related to the magnitude of the switching cost.     

An empirical analysis of the dynamic relationship between mutual fund flow and market return volatility

We study the dynamic relation between aggregate mutual fund flow and market-wide volatility. Using daily flow data and a VAR approach, we find that market volatility is negatively related to concurrent and lagged flow. A structural VAR impulse response analysis suggests that shock in flow has a negative impact on market volatility: An inflow (outflow) shock predicts a decline (an increase) in volatility. From the perspective of volatility–flow relation, we find evidence of volatility timing for recent period of 1998–2003. Finally, we document a differential impact of daily inflow versus outflow on intraday volatility. The relation between intraday volatility and inflow (outflow) becomes weaker (stronger) from morning to afternoon.     

An analysis of trade-size clustering and its relation to stealth trading

NYSE and Nasdaq trades increasingly cluster on multiples of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 shares. Such clustering varies over time and across stocks, and tends to increase with the level of trading activity. Furthermore, rounded trades tend to have more persistence both in occurrence and in trade initiation. Finally, medium-sized rounded trades tend to have greater relative price impact than large rounded trades. From these observations we surmise that trade-size clustering is consistent, at least in part, with the actions of stealth traders who tend to use medium-sized rounded transactions in an attempt to disguise their trades.     

Market power and reputational concerns in the ratings industry

This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public information and obtain either precise or noisy private information about a firm. Reputational concerns dictate that a rating reflects private information when it is precise. However, when private information is noisy, two situations arise. In a monopoly, the rating agency may ignore private information and issue a rating that conforms to public information. Under some conditions, it may even become cautious and issue bad ratings ignoring both types of information. With competition, however, it has incentives to contradict public information as a way to pretend that it holds precise private information. Moreover, it may become more likely to issue good ratings in an attempt to protect market power.     

The delegated portfolio management problem: Reputation and herding

We study the relationship between financial intermediaries’ reputation and herding in a delegated portfolio management problem context. We identify conditions under which equilibria exist such that intermediaries with good reputation invest in private information, whereas those with poor reputation herd. The model’s empirical predictions are discussed and found to be consistent with previous evidence. From a normative stand, our work points out the possible existence of a policy trade-off between protecting investors by demanding more transparency from intermediaries and encouraging herding by free-riders for whom imitating portfolio decisions would be easier under tighter regulation, such as more frequent portfolio disclosure.     

Suppliers’ and customers’ information asymmetry and corporate bond yield spreads

This study investigates the information asymmetry effects of suppliers and customers on a firm’s bond yield spreads by employing American bond market data from 2001 to 2008. This study finds that both suppliers’ and customers’ information asymmetry effects significantly explain a firm’s bond yield spreads. Besides, the information asymmetry effects of more important suppliers and customers are more significant than those of less important ones. The results are robust even after controlling for other well-known firm specific and economic variables.     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.     

The relationship between the frequency of news release and the information asymmetry: The role of uninformed trading

This paper shows that the degree of information asymmetry is lower for firms with more frequent news releases. The relation holds for various measures of information asymmetry such as the probability of information-based trading (PIN), permanent price impact, and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread, even after adjusting for endogeneity between news release and information asymmetry. By decomposing the PIN into intensities of uninformed and informed trades, similarly to Brown and Hillegeist (2007), we find that intensity of uninformed trading increases much more than that of informed trading for firms with more frequent news releases. As a result, information asymmetry, as is measured by PIN, decreases for such firms due to the large increase in the intensity of uninformed trading. Our findings highlight not only the importance of news releases in leveling the playing field of investors but also the role of uninformed investors in reducing trading cost due to information asymmetry.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

Implied volatility and future portfolio returns

Prior studies find that the CBOE volatility index (VIX) predicts returns on stock market indices, suggesting implied volatilities measured by VIX are a risk factor affecting security returns or an indicator of market inefficiency. We extend prior work in three important ways. First, we investigate the relationship between future returns and current implied volatility levels and innovations. Second, we examine portfolios sorted on book-to-market equity, size, and beta. Third, we control for the four Fama and French [Fama, E., French, K., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56.] and Carhart [Carhart, M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance, 52, 57–82.] factors. We find that VIX-related variables have strong predictive ability.     

Income hedging and portfolio decisions

We examine whether the decision to participate in the stock market and other related portfolio decisions are influenced by income hedging motives. Economic theory predicts that the market participation propensity should increase as the correlation between income growth and stock market returns decreases. Surprisingly, empirical studies find limited support for the income hedging motive. Using a rich, unique Dutch data set and the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY) from the United States, we show that when the income-return correlation is low, individuals exhibit a greater propensity to participate in the market and allocate a larger proportion of their wealth to risky assets. Even when the income risk is high, individuals exhibit a higher propensity to participate in the market when the hedging potential is high. These findings suggest that income hedging is an important determinant of stock market participation and asset allocation decisions.     

Cross-section of option returns and volatility

We study the cross-section of stock option returns by sorting stocks on the difference between historical realized volatility and at-the-money implied volatility. We find that a zero-cost trading strategy that is long (short) in the portfolio with a large positive (negative) difference between these two volatility measures produces an economically and statistically significant average monthly return. The results are robust to different market conditions, to stock risks-characteristics, to various industry groupings, to option liquidity characteristics, and are not explained by usual risk factor models.     

State regulation and the structure,conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states.     

Mutual fund volatility timing and management fees

This paper shows that compensation incentives partly drive fund managers’ market volatility timing strategies. Larger incentive management fees lead to less counter-cyclical or more pro-cyclical volatility timing. But fund styles or aggregate fund flows could also account for this relation; therefore, we control for them and find that the relation between fees and volatility timing still holds. Results show that less aggressive fund styles are associated with pro-cyclical volatility timing, and that volatility timing and flow timing are negatively related. We also find that pro-cyclical timing mostly improves funds’ average excess returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas.     

Optimal portfolios when volatility can jump

We consider an asset allocation problem in a continuous-time model with stochastic volatility and jumps in both the asset price and its volatility. First, we derive the optimal portfolio for an investor with constant relative risk aversion. The demand for jump risk includes a hedging component, which is not present in models without volatility jumps. We further show that the introduction of derivative contracts can have substantial economic value. We also analyze the distribution of terminal wealth for an investor who uses the wrong model, either by ignoring volatility jumps or by falsely including such jumps, or who is subject to estimation risk. Whenever a model different from the true one is used, the terminal wealth distribution exhibits fatter tails and (in some cases) significant default risk.     

The world price of jump and volatility risk

We study international integration of markets for jump and volatility risk, using index option data for the main global markets. To explain the cross-section of expected option returns we focus on return-based multi-factor models. For each market separately, we provide evidence that volatility and jump risk are priced risk factors. There is little evidence, however, of global unconditional pricing of these risks. We show that UK and US option markets have become increasingly interrelated, and using conditional pricing models generates some evidence of international pricing. Finally, the benefits of diversifying jump and volatility risk internationally are substantial, but declining.     

A SPECIALIST'S QUOTED DEPTH AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE VARIABLE: AN APPLICATION TO SPREAD DECOMPOSITION MODELS

Although there is a sizable literature demonstrating that liquidity and transaction costs are multidimensional, researchers continue to estimate adverse‐selection costs using only prices. We present a model of a profit‐maximizing specialist who posts prices and depths. The model is simulated to measure changes in the adverse‐selection component of the spread that result under different levels of informed trading. We find that spread decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse‐selection risk when specialists choose depth. We recommend that researchers use adverse‐selection measures that account for depth as well as spread to mitigate this problem.