Informed arbitrage with speculative noise trading

We consider speculative noise trading when some naïve speculators trade on noise as if it were information [Black, F., 1986. Noise. Journal of Finance 41, 529–543]. We examine the optimal trading strategy of an informed investor who faces such naïve speculators in the market. We find that the informed investor trades aggressively on her information and takes large, opposite positions against the naïve speculators. The trading volume is thereby drastically magnified. While such speculative noise trading enhances liquidity, it makes prices less efficient. The overall dynamic patterns that emerge from our model are most consistent with the evidence for interday variations in volume, volatility, and transaction costs.     

Short selling in initial public offerings

Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing.     

Short selling of ADRs and foreign market short-sale constraints

We examine the effect of home market short-sale constraints on securities that also trade in other countries that have more liberal short-sale rules. In particular, we focus on the case of ADRs traded in the US, as in some cases, the home markets of these ADRs prohibit short selling. We find that short sellers more heavily trade ADRs from countries where short selling is prohibited than from markets where short selling is allowed. Furthermore, we find that the greater levels of short selling in ADRs with binding home-market constraints is driven by stocks with greater dispersion of investors’ opinion, low fundamentals-to-price ratios, and recent price increases. Our results support the hypothesis that short sellers target ADRs with home market short-sale constraints because these ADRs are more often subject to temporary misvaluation.     

Informed trading,information uncertainty,and price momentum

In this paper we investigate the effects of informed trading (PIN) and information uncertainty in determining price momentum. We find that trading strategies based on buying high-uncertainty good-news stocks and shorting high-uncertainty bad-news stocks work well when limited to high-PIN stocks, while stocks with low-PIN do not exhibit price continuations, even when the uncertainty level of those stocks is high. In contrast, momentum returns are always significant for high-PIN stocks, irrespective of information uncertainty. Overall, we show that the informed trading effect is both independent of and stronger than that of information uncertainty in determining price momentum.     

Changing the rules again: Short selling in connection with public equity offers

We study the impact of two recent regulations that impose restrictions on short selling. First, since October 2007 any investor that short sells a firm’s stock is prohibited from purchasing shares in the firm’s seasoned equity offering (SEO) if the short occurred in the five days prior to the offering (pursuant to an amendment to Rule 105). Previously Rule 105 only disallowed investors from covering a pre-issue short sale with shares purchased in the offering. We hypothesize that the amended rule has the unintended consequence of greater discounting for overnight offers, which are not announced in advance, because the rule excludes some potential buyers and thereby forces underwriters to set lower offer prices to fully distribute the offer. The evidence supports this hypothesis. Second, we examine the impact of the SEC’s 2008 Emergency Order that greatly curtails naked short selling on all stocks under its jurisdiction. We find that the Emergency Order is associated with large increases in discounting for offers announced in advance, suggesting that the removal of naked short sellers is associated with reduced pre-SEO pricing efficiency. Taken together, the results imply that recent restrictions on short selling have significant unintended effects on the capital raising process.     

Connecting two markets: An equilibrium framework for shorts,longs, and stock loans

We analyze a reduced-form framework for understanding the equity loan market's impact on share prices. We show that hard-to-borrow stocks will have distinct return patterns, responding more to shocks in the supply of shares available, and to changes in the heterogeneity of investor beliefs, than other stocks. We conduct two empirical tests in which we find strong support for these equilibrium predictions. In our first test, we take advantage of a tax-driven exogenous shock to share loan supply and find that when supply is reduced around dividend record dates, prices of hard-to-borrow stocks increase 1.1% while prices of easy-to-borrow stocks are unaffected. In our second test, we find that hard-to-borrow stocks have 4.8% lower three-month returns than other stocks, with negative returns concentrated in stocks with high heterogeneity in investor beliefs. Thus, we extend the Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) result that stocks with a greater dispersion of investor beliefs have lower returns.     

Strength of analyst coverage following IPOs

Firms with poor aftermarket performance are given higher target prices and are more likely to receive strong buy recommendations, especially by analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter. This favorable coverage is relatively short lived, typically lasting less than six months. Controlling for the quantity of coverage received, stock prices of newly public firms increase more when the target price ratio is high and recommendation is a strong buy. These results suggest that when a firm goes public, underwriter-affiliated analysts provide protection in the form of “booster shots” of stronger coverage if the firm experiences poor aftermarket stock performance.     

Feedback and the success of irrational investors

We provide a model in which irrational investors trade based upon considerations that have no inherent connection to fundamentals. However, trading activity affects market prices, and because of feedback from security prices to cash flows, the irrational trades influence underlying cash flows. As a result, irrational investors can, in some situations, earn abnormal (i.e., risk-adjusted) profits that can exceed the abnormal profits of rational informed investors. Although the trading of irrational investors cause prices to deviate from fundamental values, stock prices follow a random walk.     

Short sales and speed of price adjustment: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock market

We present empirical evidence that short sales contribute to market efficiency by increasing the speed of price adjustment to not only private/public firm-specific information but also market-wide information. Shortable stocks are characterized by weaker trade continuity and stronger quote reversals. They adjust faster to new information than non-shortable counterparts. These findings remain robust even in an “up” market condition in which short sales are not binding. The amount of information incorporated in each trade is also significantly higher for shortable than non-shortable stocks in both “up” and “down” market conditions. After controlling for firm size, trading volume, liquidity, price and option trading, short sales stand out as one of the significant factors that speed up the price adjustment.     

Access to management and the informativeness of analyst research

We examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences leads to more informative research by analysts. We find analyst recommendation changes have larger immediate price impacts when the analyst?s firm has a conference-hosting relation with the company. The effect increases with hosting frequency and is strongest in the days following the conference. Conference-hosting brokers also issue more informative, accurate, and timely earnings forecasts than non-hosts. Our findings suggest that access to management remains an important source of analysts? informational advantage in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure world.     

Research for sale: Determinants and consequences of paid-for analyst research

I examine the determinants and market impact of paid-for coverage using a hand-collected sample of paid-for reports over 1999–2006. More than five hundred publicly listed US companies paid for analyst coverage since 1999. Yet little is known about the informational consequences of this analyst research. Firms with greater uncertainty, weaker information environments, and low turnover are more likely to buy coverage as they have the most to gain from analyst coverage but are unlikely to attract sell-side analysts. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest, I find paid-for reports have information content for investors based on 2-day abnormal returns. After the initiation of coverage, companies experience an increase in institutional ownership, sell-side analyst following, and liquidity. In addition, the results are strongest for the fee-based research firm with ex ante policies that reduce potential conflicts of interest.     

Aggregate insider trading: Contrarian beliefs or superior information?

We decompose realized market returns into expected return, unexpected cash-flow news and unexpected discount rate news to test the relation between aggregate market returns and aggregate insider trading. We find that (1) the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is much stronger than what was reported in earlier studies, (2) aggregate insider trading is strongly related to unexpected cash-flow news, (3) market expectations do not cause insider trading contrary to what others have documented, and (4) aggregate insider trading in firms with high information uncertainty is more likely to be associated with contrarian investment strategy. These results strongly suggest that the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is because of insider’s ability to predict future cash-flow news rather than from adopting a contrarian investment strategy. These results hold even after we control for non-informative trades and information uncertainty.     

Information footholds: Isolating local presence as a factor in analyst performance and trading

I compare the performance of buy/hold/sell recommendations from foreign, local, and expatriate (foreigners with local operations) analysts in an emerging market. Location appears to be important: expatriate analysts significantly outperform foreign analysts. Expatriates also significantly outperform locals, implying that other factors such as global resources also play a role, and a variety of controls for the characteristics of the recommending firm does not alter findings. Trading based on expatriate recommendations generates significantly positive risk-adjusted returns. Furthermore, foreign and local institutional investors appear to trade on the superior information of expatriate analysts, even when it contradicts their own information.     

Are there long-run implications of analyst coverage for IPOs?

Analyst coverage has been cited increasingly as an important attribute in the selection of an underwriter for a firm about to go public. However, it has also been alleged that affiliated analysts provide biased research. In this study, we examine these interrelated issues by examining the long-run performance of IPOs with coverage from their managing underwriters in a 1993–2003 sample. We find that (1) analysts’ research coverage from their managing syndicate is not related to long-run performance; (2) long-run performance is not different for firms that receive all-star analyst coverage; and (3) investors are not systematically worse off for following lead underwriter recommendations.     

Information transfers and learning in financial markets: Evidence from short selling around insider sales

We document significant increases in short positions on days when company insiders sell their firms’ shares. Short selling increases before insider sales are publicly reported and often before insiders finish selling. Furthermore, the magnitude of short selling activity is consistent with short sellers’ knowledge of the insider’s rank (e.g., CEO, CFO, or a lower-ranked manager) and with knowledge of the unobservable size of the insider’s trading position. We show that short sellers’ superior timing is consistent with (i) monitoring of order flow and (ii) obtaining price-relevant information from brokerages that execute insider sales. Some of our results extend to insider purchases.     

Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets

This paper examines the relation between the stock price synchronicity and analyst activity in emerging markets. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that security analysts specialize in the production of firm-specific information, we find that securities which are covered by more analysts incorporate greater (lesser) market-wide (firm-specific) information. Using the R² statistics of the market model as a measure of synchronicity of stock price movement, we find that greater analyst coverage increases stock price synchronicity. Furthermore, after controlling for the influence of firm size on the lead–lag relation, we find that the returns of high analyst-following portfolio lead returns of low analyst-following portfolio more than vice versa. We also find that the aggregate change in the earnings forecasts in a high analyst-following portfolio affects the aggregate returns of the portfolio itself as well as those of the low analyst-following portfolio, whereas the aggregate change in the earnings forecasts of the low analyst-following portfolio have no predictive ability. Finally, when the forecast dispersion is high, the effect of analyst coverage on stock price synchronicity is reduced.     

Short Selling: The Impact of SEC Rule 201 of 2010

Despite its sizeable compliance costs, we are unable to document any clear benefits of SEC Rule 201 in ensuring fair valuations and price stability, promoting higher liquidity and execution quality, or preventing a sudden flash crash or prolonged market crises. Our daily and intraday analysis of data both before and after Rule 201 finds that short sellers are naturally more active before the occurrence of negative returns, not after significant price declines. Our simulation results show that Rule 201 further curtails short selling during normal periods, but is not binding on short sellers during the volatile period of the 2008 financial crisis.     

Asset pricing: A tale of two days

We show that asset prices behave very differently on days when important macroeconomic news is scheduled for announcement. In addition to significantly higher average returns for risky assets on announcement days, return patterns are much easier to reconcile with standard asset pricing theories, both cross-sectionally and over time. On such days, stock market beta is strongly related to average returns. This positive relation holds for individual stocks, for various test portfolios, and even for bonds and currencies, suggesting that beta is after all an important measure of systematic risk. Furthermore, a robust risk–return trade-off exists on announcement days. Expected variance is positively related to future aggregated quarterly announcement day returns, but not to aggregated non-announcement day returns. We explore the implications of our findings in the context of various asset pricing models.     

Informed momentum trading versus uninformed “naive” investors strategies

We construct a zero net-worth uninformed “naive investor” who uses a random portfolio allocation strategy. We then compare the returns of the momentum strategist to the return distribution of naive investors. For this purpose we reward momentum profits relative to the return percentiles of the naive investors with scores that are symmetric around the median. The score function thus constructed is invariant and robust to risk factor models. We find that the average scores of the momentum strategies are close to zero (the score of the median) and statistically insignificant over the sample period between 1926 and 2005, various sub-sample periods including the periods examined in [Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993] and [Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001]. The findings are robust with respect to sampling or period-specific effects, tightened score intervals, and the imposition of maximum-weight restrictions on the naive strategies to mitigate market friction considerations.     

Momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift anomalies: The role of liquidity risk

This paper investigates the components of liquidity risk that are important for understanding asset-pricing anomalies. Firm-level liquidity is decomposed into variable and fixed price effects and estimated using intraday data for the period 1983–2001. Unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the variable component rather than the fixed component of liquidity are shown to be priced within the context of momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) portfolio returns. As the variable component is typically associated with private information [e.g., Kyle, 1985. Econometrica 53, 1315–1335], the results suggest that a substantial part of momentum and PEAD returns can be viewed as compensation for the unexpected variations in the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders.