Cash holdings and share repurchases: International evidence

In this study, we examine the patterns and determinants of share repurchases using firm-level data from seven major countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.—over the period 1998–2006. We find that while non-U.S. firms do not repurchase shares as much as U.S. firms do, both U.S. and non-U.S. firms display a common set of share repurchase behaviors. For example, across countries, firms use share repurchases as a flexible means of distributing cash. More importantly, large cash holdings are significantly associated with the amount of share repurchases in all countries. There is evidence that large cash holdings held by repurchasing firms represent excess cash. Firms tend to experience substantial increases in cash holdings prior to share repurchase as a result of reductions in capital expenditures. Overall, our evidence lends support to two hypotheses: (i) firms discharge excess capital to reduce agency conflicts and (ii) firms use repurchases to distribute temporary cash flows.     

The contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings around the world

Using corporate payout data from 33 economies, this study investigates the contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings in different country-level investor protection environments. We find that stock repurchases contribute more to firm value in countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection. We also report that dividends contribute approximately 60% more to firm value than repurchases in countries with weak investor protection. Furthermore, as the proportion of repurchases in total payouts increases, the marginal value of cash increases in countries with strong investor protection, whereas it declines in countries with weak investor protection. In a poor investor protection environment, the marginal value of cash for a firm that makes 100% of its payouts via repurchases is 12 cents lower than that for a firm that distributes 100% of its payouts via dividends. Overall, our findings highlight that stock repurchases are less effective than dividends in mitigating agency problems associated with free cash flow in countries with poor investor protection.     

Financial market development and the importance of internal cash: Evidence from international data

We examine the impact of financial market development on the extent to which firms have to rely on internal capital for making investments. Using international data from 31 countries for the 1987–1997 period, we find evidence of a negative relationship between financial market development and the importance of internal capital. The evidence is consistent across different estimation procedures, alternative measures of financial constraints and cash flow, and the use of bootstrapped standard errors. Finally, we find that the distortionary effect of negative cash flow observations reported earlier for US data extends to international data as well.     

International evidence on the non-linear impact of leverage on corporate cash holdings

This paper investigates cash holding behaviour of firms from France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US using data for 4069 companies over the period 1996–2000. Our focus is particularly on the relation between cash holdings and leverage. We argue that the impact of leverage on cash balances of firms is likely to be non-monotonic. To the extent that leverage of firms acts as a proxy for their ability to issue debt one would expect a negative (substitution effect) relation between leverage and cash holdings. However, as leverage increases firms are likely to accumulate larger cash reserves to minimise the risk of financial distress and costly bankruptcy. Thus, one would expect a positive (precautionary effect) relationship between cash holdings and leverage at high levels of leverage. Our findings provide strong and robust support for a significant non-linear relation between cash holdings and leverage. Additionally, our results show that the impact of leverage on cash holdings partly depends on country-specific characteristics such as the degree of creditor protection, shareholder protection, and ownership concentration.     

Excess cash holdings and shareholder value

We examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Australia and the impact on shareholder wealth of holding excess cash. Our results show that a trade‐off model best explains the level of a firm’s cash holdings in Australia. We find that ‘transitory’ excess cash firms earn significantly higher risk‐adjusted returns compared to ‘persistent’ excess cash firms, suggesting that the market penalises firms that hoard cash. The marginal value of cash also declines with larger cash balances, and the longer firms hold on to excess cash. The results are consistent with agency costs associated with persistence in excess cash holdings.     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from France,Germany and the UK

We examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of French, German and British firms. These countries represent different financial and legal traditions that may have implications on corporate debt maturity structure. Our model incorporates the factors representing three major theories (tax considerations, liquidity and signalling, and contracting costs) of debt maturity. It also controls for capital market conditions. The results confirm the applicability of most theories of debt maturity structure for the UK firms. However, the evidence from France and Germany are mixed. Overall the findings suggest that the debt maturity structure of a firm is determined by firm‐specific factors and the country's financial systems and institutional traditions in which it operates.     

A bright side of financial constraints in cash management

This paper tests whether financial constraints play a disciplinary role in cash dissipation in the presence of agency problems. We hypothesize that when firms have difficulty raising external funds, empire-building managers of cash-rich firms will be less likely to spend cash on negative NPV projects as compared to unconstrained managers. Empirically, we examine firm performance after cash dissipation and associate it with the degree of financial constraints. We find that cash spending by managers in financially constrained firms is associated with higher future profitability and stock returns compared to cash spending by managers in unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that the positive effect of financial constraints on firm performance is not driven by differences in corporate governance. Financial constraints actually substitute for good governance in disciplining managers. We find that corporate governance improves the efficiency of cash dissipation in unconstrained firms, but not in constrained firms. Likewise, financial constraints' disciplinary effect is found to be concentrated in firms that are poorly governed.     

Brand perception,cash flow stability,and financial policy

This paper demonstrates that intangible assets play an important role in financial policy. Using a proprietary database of consumer brand evaluation, I show that positive consumer attitude toward a firm's products alleviates financial frictions and provides additional net debt capacity, as measured by higher leverage and lower cash holdings. Brand perception affects financial policy through reducing overall firm riskiness, as strong consumer evaluations translate into lower future cash flow volatility as well as higher credit ratings for potentially volatile firms. The impact of brand is stronger among small firms, contradicting a number of reverse causality and omitted variables explanations.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.     

Investment–cash flow sensitivity and investor protection

We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.     

Financial expert CEOs: CEO׳s work experience and firm׳s financial policies

We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one, they manage financial policies more actively, and their firm investments are less sensitive to cash flows. Financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tight, and they were more responsive to the dividend and capital gains tax cuts in 2003. Analyzing CEO-firm matching based on financial experience, we find that financial expert CEOs tend to be hired by more mature firms. Our results are consistent with employment histories of CEOs being relevant for corporate policies. However, we cannot formally rule out that our findings are partly explained by endogenous CEO-firm matching.     

Passive Institutional Ownership,R2 Trends,and Price Informativeness

A distinctive trend in the capital markets over the past two decades is the rise in equity ownership of passive financial institutions. We propose that this rise has a negative effect on price informativeness. By not trading around firm‐specific news, passive investors reduce the firm‐specific component of total volatility and increase stock correlations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the growth in passive institutional ownership is robustly associated with the growth in market model R²s of individual stocks since the early 1990s. Additionally, we find a negative relation between passive ownership and earnings predictability, an informativeness proxy.     

Lead independent directors and investment efficiency

I show that the presence of a lead independent director on the corporate board is positively associated with investment efficiency. The result is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance standards, less transparent financial disclosure, and greater financial constraints. The lead director presence is negatively associated with overinvestment (underinvestment) for firms with large cash balances and low leverage (high cash flow volatility). Moreover, the lead director investment-related committee membership as well as CEO power matter in this setting. The lead director board role is also positively associated with future firm performance.     

The taxman cometh: Does tax uncertainty affect corporate cash holdings?

We examine whether firms hold more cash in the face of tax uncertainty. Because of gray areas in the tax law and aggressive tax avoidance, the total amount of tax that a firm will pay is uncertain at the time it files its returns. The tax authorities can challenge and disallow the firm’s tax positions, demanding additional cash tax payments. We hypothesize that firms facing greater tax uncertainty hold cash to satisfy these potential future demands. We find that both domestic firms and multinational firms hold larger cash balances when subject to greater tax uncertainty. In terms of economic significance, we find that the effect of tax uncertainty on cash holdings is comparable to that of repatriation taxes. Our evidence adds to knowledge about the real effects of tax avoidance and provides a tax-based precautionary explanation for why there is such wide variation in cash holdings across firms.     

Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory

Consistent with a life-cycle theory of dividends, the fraction of publicly traded industrial firms that pay dividends is high when retained earnings are a large portion of total equity (and of total assets) and falls to near zero when most equity is contributed rather than earned. We observe a highly significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balances, and dividend history, a relation that also holds for dividend initiations and omissions. In our regressions, the mix of earned/contributed capital has a quantitatively greater impact than measures of profitability and growth opportunities. We document a massive increase in firms with negative retained earnings (from 11.8% of industrials in 1978 to 50.2% in 2002). Controlling for the earned/contributed capital mix, firms with negative retained earnings show virtually no change in their propensity to pay dividends from the mid-1970s to 2002, while those whose earned equity makes them reasonable candidates to pay dividends have a propensity reduction that is twice the overall reduction in Fama and French [2000, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 549–582]. Finally, our simulations show that, if well-established firms had not paid dividends, their cash balances would be enormous and their long-term debt trivial, thus granting extreme discretion to managers of these mature firms.     

Measuring time-varying financial market integration: An unobserved components approach

We measure the time-varying degree of world stock market integration of five developed countries (Germany, France, UK, US, and Japan) over the period 1970:1–2011:10. Time-varying financial market integration of each country is measured through the conditional variances of the country-specific and common international risk premiums in equity excess returns. The country-specific and common risk premiums and their conditional variances are estimated from a latent factor decomposition through the use of state space methods that allow for GARCH errors. Our empirical results suggest that stock market integration has increased over the period 1970:1–2011:10 in all countries but Japan. And while there is a structural increase in stock market integration in four out of five countries, all countries also exhibit several shorter periods of disintegration (reversals), i.e. periods in which country-specific shocks play a more dominant role. Hence, stock market integration is measured as a dynamic process that is fluctuating in the short run while gradually increasing in the long run.     

Does national culture affect international corporate cash holdings?

The current literature frequently examines the effects of shareholder rights protection on corporate cash holdings in the context of agency theory. In this study, we show that national culture influences corporate managers’ cash holding behavior beyond the effects of corporate governance and financial market developments in each country through the perception of agency costs and value of financial flexibility. Using Hofstede's cultural dimension indices, we find that corporations hold larger cash and liquid balances in countries where the people tend to avoid uncertainty more, are culturally more masculine, and have longer term orientation.     

Costly external finance,corporate investment,and the subprime mortgage credit crisis

We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. Corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, are financially constrained, or operate in industries dependent on external finance. To address endogeneity concerns, we measure firms’ financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis, and confirm that similar results do not follow placebo crises in the summers of 2003–2006. Nor do similar results follow the negative demand shock caused by September 11, 2001. The effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008, when the demand-side effects of the crisis became apparent. Additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that is generally overlooked in the literature.     

Reaching out: Access to and use of banking services across countries

This paper is a first attempt at measuring financial sector outreach and investigating its determinants. First, we present new indicators of banking sector outreach across 99 countries, constructed from aggregate data provided by bank regulators. Second, we show that our indicators closely predict harder-to-collect micro-level statistics of household and firm use of banking services, and are associated with measures of firm financing obstacles in the expected way. Finally, we explore the association between our outreach indicators and standard determinants of financial sector depth. We find many similarities but also some differences in the determinants of outreach and depth.     

Creditor rights and capital structure: Evidence from international data

For a large sample of 48 countries, we find robust evidence that strong creditor rights are associated with low long-term leverage across countries. We further find that strong creditor protection lowers long-term debt issuance, the extent to which investments are financed with long-term debt, and target leverage ratios. Finally, we find that firm and country characteristics influence the link between creditor protection and long-term leverage. Our results support the demand-side view that strong creditor protection discourages firms from making long-term cash flow commitments to service debt because managers and shareholders avoid the risk of losing control in the case of financial distress.