Identification of firms’ beliefs in structural models of market competition

Firms make decisions under uncertainty and differ in their ability to collect and process information. As a result, in changing environments, firms have heterogeneous beliefs on the behaviour of other firms. This heterogeneity in beliefs can have important implications on market outcomes, efficiency and welfare. This paper studies the identification of firms’ beliefs using their observed actions—a revealed preference and beliefs approach. I consider a general structural model of market competition where firms have incomplete information and their beliefs and profits are nonparametric functions of decisions and state variables. Beliefs may be out of equilibrium. The framework applies both to continuous and discrete choice games and includes as particular cases models of competition in prices or quantities, auction models, entry games and dynamic games of investment decisions. I focus on identification results that exploit an exclusion restriction that naturally appears in models of competition: an observable variable that affects a firm's cost (or revenue) but does not have a direct effect on other firms’ profits. I present identification results under three scenarios—common in empirical industrial organization—on the data available to the researcher.     

Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks, and Welfare

Although equilibrium allocations in models with incomplete markets are generally not Pareto-efficient, it is often argued that quantitative welfare losses from missing assets are small when time horizons are long and shocks are transitory. In this paper we use a computational analysis to show that even in the simplest infinite horizon model without aggregate uncertainty welfare losses can be substantial. Furthermore we show that in this model welfare losses from incomplete markets do not necessarily disappear when one considers calibrations of the model in which agents become very patient. We argue that when the economic model is calibrated to higher frequency data, the period persistence of negative income shocks must increase as well. In this case the welfare loss of incomplete markets remains constant even as agents' rate of time preference tends to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D58, D60.     

Mechanism Design under Alternative Information Structures and Constrained Capacity

In applied models, the choice of a particular incomplete information structure appears to have been motivated primarily by technical convenience. The information structures used can be classified as either probabilistic or partitional. Information is probabilistic if no agent can rule out any type profile of the remaining agents and, for at least one type of one agent, the conditional and marginal probability distributions over the remaining agents' types are not equal. Information is partitional if the only information the agents have is that one or more agents (individually) can rule out type profiles of the remaining agents and, for at least one type of one agent, that agent has information about the remaining agents. Partitional information includes complete information as a special case. Existing results on complete information environments suggest that partitional information might simplify implementation problems. Within the context of an applied agency model in which capacity is constrained, we provide results that seem to challenge this intuition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Using eye-tracking to model attribute non-attendance in choice experiments

We investigate revealed attribute attendance in discrete choice experiments using eye-tracking. A simple theoretical framework is proposed in which choices are a function of visual attention. Consistent with the existing literature, the assumption that participants use all the available information to make their decisions does not hold. The results also illustrate that model fit and predictive power are greatly increased by using visual attendance measures as regressors. The use of eye-tracking technology has value for measuring revealed attention and to benchmark with existing choice models.     

A NOTE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY AND THE EX ANTE VALUE OF INFORMATION

This paper examines the ex ante value of information in the property rights model where the possibility exists that an investing agent can be provided with relevant information before investments are undertaken. When contracts are incomplete, from an ex ante perspective, informing the investing agent does not necessarily increase the expected surplus resulting from a relationship between two economic agents. The paper highlights the fact that the second‐best nature of the problem that arises from contractual incompleteness can ensure this.     

A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental Centipede Games

This paper investigates how well a simple two-sided incomplete information game with a full support prior can be used to explain non-Nash equilibrium outcomes observed in the centipede game experiments. I estimate the variance of the uncertainty about preferences in several versions of the model, select two models, and compare these models to the estimation results of the altruism model and the quantal response models. It is shown that the two selected models have a better fit than the one-parameter altruism and quantal response models and that the estimated variance can explain all qualitative features of these experimental results.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C19, C 44, C91.     

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989–1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.      

Free trade versus strategic trade as a choice between two ‘second best’ policies: A symmetric versus asymmetric information analysis

Abstract

We analyse the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable in the form of R&D investment is chosen, and when the information can be either symmetric or asymmetric. The novel feature of our model is that the information asymmetry stems from the assumption that the government may not a priori know the true mode of competition. The intervention in the above set-up allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and results in a socially inefficient choice of the strategic variable. However, commitment to free trade leads to forgoing the benefits from profit-shifting. Yet, from the social point of view, free trade may be optimal even under the assumption of symmetric information. Due to costly signalling, this result is reinforced in the case of asymmetric information.     

Asymmetric Causality Between Inflation and Uncertainty: Evidences from 33 Developed and Developing Countries

Empirical studies have provided conflicting findings about the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Thus, the direction of the causality is still questionable. The present paper is aimed to extend the existing literature using non-linearity models and asymmetric causality tests. For this purpose, the data for 33 developed and developing countries during 1988Q4-2016Q3 is used. The results showed an asymmetry in the inflation behavior which is specified by smooth transition process, as well as separating positive and negative shocks observed in causality test. The asymmetric causality between inflation and inflation uncertainty is confirmed in most countries, although the empirical evidence in favor of Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis is found to be weaker than Friedman-Ball hypothesis.

     

Completing Incomplete Revealed Preference Under Limited Attention

This paper discusses how to improve the identification of the preference of a decision‐maker (DM) with limited attention proposed by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012). in “Revealed Attention”. Their identification method relies on choice reversals so the obtained revealed preference is often incomplete. We propose three approaches to address this problem. The first one is accommodating a model‐free approach, which respects the DM's choice in making a welfare analysis, as long as it does not contradict the revealed preference of Masatlioglu et al. The second approach incorporates the DM's exogenously obtained attention/inattention information into the model of Masatlioglu et al. The third approach is to take framings that influence the DM's attention into effect for the identification.     

Monotonic Knowledge Models,Cycles, Linear Versions and Auctions with Differential,Finite Information

In games of incomplete information where each player's information is represented by a partition of the state space, this paper presents a characterisation of monotonic models in terms of connected partitions and another in terms of versions . A model is monotonic if and only if there is a linear version, and this is true if and only if there is a real‐valued function on the state space such that every partition of the model is connected with respect to this function. These results help us understand the strength of the connectedness assumption on common‐value, second‐price auctions with differential, finite information. We offer a simple sufficient condition for non‐monotonicity to check if models are monotonic.     

On the information provided by forecasting models

The aim of the paper is to evaluate the information provided by forecasting models that include explanatory variables besides the variables to be forecasted. It is argued that the content of a forecast is a combination of historical information about the variable to be forecasted and theoretical considerations, normally manifested by a model. The historical information is assessed by a time series model for the variable. In order to assess the theoretical information about a variable, one suggests a measure. This measure is based on the improvement of fit to the actual values of the values obtained from the forecasting model in comparison to the values obtained from the time series model. The R² measure, which frequently is used as a measure of the explanatory power of a forecasting model, is critically discussed.     

How does the diversity of investors’ beliefs affect stock price informativeness?

A growing number of studies have investigated the role of stock prices in aggregating private information and guiding resource reallocation. However, this article may be the first attempt to study how the diversity of beliefs affects stock price informativeness. The framework of the noisy rational expectations model shows that stock informativeness is determined by both the precision and use of private information in trading. If private beliefs about the value are highly diverse, the aggregate average opinion revealed in a stock’s price will be more accurate and, thus, more informative. As the price becomes more informative, however, individual investors will rely less on their private information. When this occurs, less private information will be absorbed in price, which, in turn, reduces price informativeness. Our model shows that the relationship between belief diversity and price informativeness is U-shaped in equilibrium.     

Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

Crémer and McLean (Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258) obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for full surplus extraction in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium—the rank condition, which McAfee and Reny (Econometrica 60(2) (1992) 395-421) later generalize for continuous type spaces. This paper shows that, if the principal does not know how noisy is the agent's signal—or equivalently, when signals available to an agent can be ranked by Blackwell's informativeness and, an agent's informativeness is independent of others’ information, the rank condition fails to hold. Conversely, when rank condition fails and informational rents are left to an agent, the model can be interpreted as if, the principal were uncertain about the informativeness of the agent's signal.     

Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection

This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required.     

Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo

A public decision model specifies a set of alternatives, a variable population, and a common set of admissible preferences. We study the implications of the principle of solidarity, for social choice functions in all such models. The principle says that when the environment changes, all agents not responsible for the change should either all weakly win, or all weakly lose. Under weak additional requirements, but regardless the domain of preferences, each of two formulations of this principle, population-monotonicity and replacement-domination, imply coalition-strategy-proofness; that the choice only depends on the set of preferences that are present in the society, but not on the number, nor on the labels of agents having particular preferences; and that there exists an alternative always weakly Pareto-dominated by the alternative selected by the rule. Replacement-domination is generally at least as strong as population-monotonicity.     

Is the Relationship between Inflation and Its Uncertainty Linear?

Abstract. We use parametric power ARCH models of the conditional variance of inflation to model the relationship between inflation and its uncertainty using monthly data for Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden over a period ranging from 1962 to 2004. For all three countries inflation significantly raises inflation uncertainty as predicted by Friedman. Increased uncertainty affects inflation in all countries but not in the same manner. For Sweden we find a negative impact in accordance with the Holland hypothesis, whereas for Germany and the Netherlands we find the opposite in support of the Cukierman–Meltzer hypothesis. In a sensitivity analysis we show that an arbitrary choice of the heteroscedasticity parameter influences this relationship significantly.     

Noisy information,risk sharing,and international business cycles

We introduce a noisy information structure into an otherwise standard international real business cycle model with two countries. When domestic firms observe current foreign technology with some noise, predictions of the model on international correlation can be very different from those of a standard perfect information model. We show that the model can explain: (a) positive output correlation both in complete and incomplete market models, (b) consumption correlation smaller than output correlation with an introduction of information‐constrained consumers, and (c) observation of both positive and negative productivity–hours correlation in two countries.     

Informed manipulation

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.     

Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players.