Are Trade Preferences more Effective than Aid in Supporting Exports? Evidence from the ‘Everything But Arms’ Preference Scheme

This study examines the effect of the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) trade preferences regime on exports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) to the European Union (EU). With this aim, an augmented gravity model is estimated for exports from the 79 ACP countries to the EU‐15 for the time period of 1995—2013 using panel data techniques. The results are used to quantify the effect of the eligibility for EBA preferences on the export performance of the ACP least developed countries (LDCs) and to relate it to the impact of official development assistance on exports. In addition to their separate effects, the combined impact of EBA and aid flows is examined. The main results do not provide evidence for an additional positive effect of the EBA agreement on the export performance of the ACP LDCs. However, receiving aid shows a significant and positive effect on exports from EBA‐eligible ACP countries to the EU‐15, supporting an EU development strategy that includes both sorts of assistance, aid and trade preferences.     

Tariff Preferences,WTO Negotiations and the LDCs: The Case of the ‘Everything But Arms’ Initiative

By assessing the impact of the recently adopted ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative of the EU on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and by showing how further multilateral trade liberalisations erode the EBA preferences and impact the LDCs, this paper attempts to uncover the LDCs’ difficult positions in the WTO trade negotiations. Due to its limited product coverage and previous preferences granted by the EU, welfare impacts of the EBA on the LDCs are shown to be small and the bulk of these gains are associated with the ‘sensitive’ products that are subject to gradual liberalisations. Moreover, these small gains are likely to disappear if the EU conducts trade policy reforms in fulfilling its WTO obligations, resulting in an actually worse‐off situation for the LDCs. Extending the analysis to a multilateral trade liberalisation scenario reinforces the above results that the LDCs may well lose due to preference erosion and higher world market prices. It concludes that other development assistance measures from developed countries should be made available to the LDCs to ease their dependency on trade preferences and to foster their supply capacities. The LDCs themselves should attempt to integrate the duty and quota‐free market access status contained in the EBA into a binding WTO agreement to secure a stable trading environment. But more importantly, in order to solve the difficulties at the root these countries should actively engage in reforming their own trade policies.     

Sweet and Sour Changes in Trade Regimes

Sugar is an important export for a number of developing countries, especially in the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions. In many of these countries, preferential access to the EU market has been a key factor to develop their sugar sectors. The recent and proposed changes to the international sugar trade regimes, particularly in the EU, are threatening this preferential access. We study the possible implications of such changes on ACP countries’ sugar production and exports by using a spatial price equilibrium model specifically developed for the sugar market. The results suggest that the effects of these changes are likely to vary according to the prevailing level of world sugar market price and according to whether ACP countries are current exporters to the EU.     

Disentangling Market Access Effects of Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application for ASEAN Members under an ASEAN–EU FTA

The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS‐10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. First, the measures show that current effective market access for ASEAN EBA members is cut in half by the preferences granted by the EU to countries that compete with these countries in the EU markets. Second, the measures show that about one‐quarter of the preferential margin under the proposed FTA for EBA members would be lost as a result of preferential access granted to ASEAN GSP members. Third, disaggregated estimates of the restrictiveness of rules of origin confirm that rules are more restrictive for products with higher preferential margins and that ASEAN countries usually face tougher rules of origin in the EU because of the composition of their exports.     

Reform of the EU Sugar Market

After years of negotiations, the European Union finally reformed its sugar market in November 2005. Unilateral trade concessions, ongoing WTO negotiations and internal pressures were pushing the EU for a change. The following short article highlights some of the key features of the reform and the implications for EU member countries, world sugar markets and countries that currently enjoy preferential access to the EU market.      

Sweetening the Transition in EU Sugar Preferences: The Case of Fiji

The European Union grants preferential market access for sugar to a group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Sugar exported under these quotas receives between two and three times the world price. These trade preferences are intended as a form of aid, but they tend to stifle productivity growth in the recipient countries. The European Union could better assist ACP countries by providing direct development assistance in place of sugar subsidies, for example by investing the aid transfers into infrastructure or other essential public services. This paper tests this proposition for the case of Fiji using a computable general‐equilibrium model. It is found that significant gains in economic performance can be achieved by employing such alternative strategies for aid. These gains are particularly strong over the medium to long term when the aid funds are diverted to infrastructure development. However, there are issues of equity to consider since, in the case of Fiji, the rural poor would be the losers if trade preferences were to be removed. Moreover, the degree of benefit in alternative strategies such as infrastructure development will be contingent on the economy's flexibility, which in turn depends upon the country's regulatory regime and education performance.     

European Union Market Access Conditions and Africa's Extensive Margin of Food Trade

This paper examines the impact of two European Union (EU) market access regulations in the food sector presumed to simultaneously affect firms’ decisions to export food products to the EU. We analysed EU pesticide standards on African exports alongside a complementary non‐tariff measure in the form of a minimum entry price regulation, which aims to protect EU growers of certain fruits and vegetables against international competition. Analysis was based on Africa's exports of tomatoes, oranges, and lime and lemon to the EU between 2008 and 2013, using the gravity model of trade. Our results show that EU market access conditions constitute significant barrier to the formation of new trade relation between the EU and Africa. In addition, initiation of trade relationships is contingent not only on market access conditions but also on domestic market constraints in Africa. These results imply that negotiating preferential entry prices duties and the removal of domestic market restraints as well as strengthening domestic capacity to comply with EU standards to enhance continuous market access for the continent could stimulate food trade along the extensive margin.     

Australian tariff preferences for LDCs

In the course of the discussion of the tariff preferences granted by various developed nations to less developed countries (LDCs) it should be noted that it was Australla which first set up a comprising preference scheme. The author of this article outlines the scheme and appraises the Australlan experience.     

Institutional Prerequisites of Economic Partnership Agreements

At the end of 2007 the WTO waiver granted for the non-reciprocal EU/ACP trade preferences will phase out. New economic partnership agreements are currently under negotiation, but whether the ACP countries will be able to benefit from them depends to a large extent on the institutional setting in those countries. The following article takes the example of the Economic Community of West African States to examine the situation more closely.     

Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU Imports from ACP Countries

Despite the long relationship between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries aimed at encouraging their exports while stimulating growth and investment, the ACP states still face difficulties in integrating into the world economy. This paper examines the non‐least developed ACP countries preferential trade with the EU using data on EU member states’ imports eligible for preferences under the Cotonou agreement for the period 2001 at the 8‐digit level. Using data on tariffs and preferential quota applicable on each 8‐digit product for the year 2001 ad‐valorem tariff rates were calculated. The paper also investigates the existence of a threshold in the offered duty reduction under which traders have no incentives to ask for preferences since the costs of obtaining these exceeds their benefits. Our results showed that the higher the value of preferences offered, the higher the probability that preferences are requested. Using endogenous threshold estimation techniques we also provided evidence that there exists a minimum value of preferences needed for traders to request preferences. More specifically, if the difference between preferential and third country tariff rates are lower than 4 per cent, there are no incentives for traders to request preferences since the costs of obtaining the preferences are expected to be higher than the benefits from obtaining the preferences. Our results additionally indicate that country specificities also play an important role in the decision whether requesting preferences or not and how much to import.     

The future of the ACP countries

The record to date of trade and development cooperation between the European Union and the ACP countries has been rather disappointing. Evidently, neither the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the ACP countries nor the support for development projects have led to much progress in terms of economic and social development. Can the implementation of the EU's present reform proposals be expected to safeguard the future of the Lome system and of the ACP countries in the new millenium?     

Collected Customs Duties: The Level of Taxation on Imports Applied by the US and the EU

Relating the collected customs duty to the value of imports enables the estimation of a rate of applied duty that takes into account all pricing components and their use. Indeed, this ad valorem equivalent integrates the complex dimensions of customs duties, the measures of exemption and suspension, and those concerning preferential regimes. Processing collected duties for all the products reveals that the 1.5 per cent rate of duty actually applied in 2003 is the same for the EU and the US. Nevertheless, it appears that the US taxes more the least developed countries (LDCs) and developing countries than does the EU. Thus, setting aside those products which enter free of duty, the rate of taxation applied by the US is 15 per cent and 6.2 per cent respectively with regards to LDCs and developing countries, whereas in the EU it is only 3.7 per cent and 4.1 per cent. In the US market the sectors that are the most highly taxed upon importation are textiles, apparel and clothing, cotton and articles of leather, whereas in the EU it is more agricultural and food products (fruits and preserves, meats, sugars and cereals).     

EU Trade Preferences and Export Diversification

Since at least the 1960s, the European Union (EU) has offered various kinds of non‐reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries. Originally, these trade preferences had at least two policy goals: (i) to increase export volumes for developing countries and thereby boost their export earnings and (ii) to facilitate export diversification. While extensive research has confirmed that the first of these goals is typically met, the second goal seems to have been largely forgotten by researchers as well as in policy circles. The aim of this paper was therefore to analyse the impact of the EU's non‐reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries on export diversification. Our estimation results suggest that some trade preference programmes, such as the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), lead to increasing ranges of export products. By contrast, preferences offered to Mediterranean countries typically have no significant effects, and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) preferences actually have negative effects towards the end of our time period, suggesting that ACP countries may respond to preferences by specialising into fewer goods.     

入世十年来中国与LDC国家贸易新发展及展望

中国与最不发达国家间的经贸关系日益紧密,但是针对中国在这些国家的"新殖民主义"活动的指责声日益高涨,在中国加入世界贸易组织十周年之际,文章通过对比分析中国、美国以及欧盟与最不发达国家间的贸易商品结构的演变,发现中国自LDC国家的进口商品结构严重偏向于资源类商品的事实,探讨了中国在未来经贸合作中更应注重对LDC国家自我发展能力的培养以及中方的投资开发行为应遵循的原则,从而构建新型的双边经贸合作前景。     

Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of Origin

A key element of the EU's free trade and preferential trade agreements is the extent to which they deliver improved market access and so contribute to the EU's foreign policy objectives towards developing countries and neighbouring countries in Europe, including the countries of the Balkans. Previous preferential trade schemes have been ineffective in delivering improved access to the EU market since only a small proportion of the available preferences have actually been utilised. The main reason for this is probably the very restrictive rules of origin that the EU imposes, coupled with the costs of proving consistency with these rules. If the EU wants the ‘Everything but Arms’ agreement and free trade agreements with countries in the Balkans to generate substantial improvements in access to the EU market for products from these countries then it will have to reconsider the current rules of origin and implement less restrictive rules backed up by a careful safeguards policy..     

EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Impact, Options and Prerequisites

The EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) are presently renegotiating their trade relations. Behind these negotiations are the fundamental conflict between the existing arrangement and multilateral trade rules, the frustration regarding poor ACP trade performance, the ineffectiveness of trade and trade-related ACP policies, and the inefficiency of corresponding EU assistance. This article highlights the fundamentals of the envisaged Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP countries, sums up previous estimates of their probable economic impact, discusses policy options for ACP countries and sheds light on basic prerequisites, particularly on institutional conditions, that should be fulfilled to ensure the success of EPAs.     

Trade and migration flows between some CEE countries and the UK

The recent enlargement of the European Union (EU) has enhanced interest in the causes and also the consequences of migration between Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Western European countries. This paper considers the possibility that some of these consequences make themselves felt in the trade flows between migrants' countries of origin and destination. Using a panel of data covering a number of CEE countries between 1996 and 2003, we employ an augmented gravity model to examine the effects of immigration from these transition countries on their bilateral trade flows with the UK. We pay attention to a number of issues that have been raised within the literature on gravity models. We find evidence that migration positively enhances the bilateral exports of the migrants' home country; however, there is less (but some) evidence that the imports from their destination country are also enhanced.     

Environmental Regulations in Gravity Equations: Evidence from Europe

One implication of the pollution haven hypothesis is that countries export more by applying more lenient environmental regulations. Most studies that apply gravity‐type equations do not find robust support for environmental regulations to affect bilateral exports. In this paper, we show that one can obtain robust negative effects of stringency, as long as gravity equations are well specified with respect to theory. Our results, based on the European data, are both very consistent with US studies on environmental regulations and another line of very recent studies that infer non‐biased price or substitution elasticities from trade equations. We show that more stringent environmental regulations, when depicting a pure cost effect, are reducing exports. The coefficient is even larger in the case where exporting countries are Central and Eastern European countries, comparing to the EU15. Further, we show that there is no significant difference in the impact of regulations on trade in case of dirty and clean sectors. Finally, when using GMM estimation, our environmental stringency coefficient gets significantly reinforced.     

Global agricultural trade liberalization: Is Sub-Saharan Africa a gainer or loser?

This paper analyzes the potential impact of agricultural trade liberalization on Sub-Saharan Africa. We used the Agricultural Trade and Policy Simulation Model to estimate the potential effects of agricultural trade liberalization, mainly in the US and EU, on the world-market prices of agricultural commodities. We then used the estimated price changes to assess the impact of these reforms on net-food importers as well as other Sub-Saharan African countries that enjoy preferential trade agreements with the EU and US. The results indicate that the world market prices of all commodities imported by Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to rise while the prices of the key export commodities of the region would either decline or remain unchanged. Given that the prices of major food commodities are expected to rise, net-food-importing countries will experience increasing import bill, thus leading to welfare loss. Major Sub-Saharan Africa sugar exporters who are beneficiaries of preferential agreements such as the EU sugar protocol and US AGOA initiative will become losers as preferences erode due to global liberalization. Thus, the region is expected to generally become a net loser from the current WTO reform modalities.     

Assessing the impact of unilateral trade policies EBA and AGOA on African beneficiaries' exports using matching econometrics

The existing literature studying the impact of non‐reciprocal preferential trade agreements (NRPTAs) assumes implicitly NRPTAs are non‐randomly assigned without showing the evidence of that. Using a matching methodology, this paper investigates whether the “African Growth and Opportunity Act” (AGOA) and the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) unilateral trade concessions have had an impact, and in what magnitude, on the exports of African beneficiary countries in the light of the evidence of the non‐random nature (endogeneity) of NRPTAs. Methodologically, previous studies using the matching procedure focused on bi or multilateral trade agreements. Our work focuses on NRPTAs that depend only on donors' conditions. Accordingly, we show that for NRPTAs, gravity covariates cannot be used for the matching procedure. We propose to use political variables as determinants for obtaining non‐reciprocal trade preferences in order to address the endogenous nature of NRPTA assignment. Our main results confirm that a country becomes eligible for a NRPTA only when it meets certain conditions, defined by their donors, such as political stability and economic regulation (for AGOA), and freedom of expression and human development (for EBA). Results also show that both AGOA and EBA policies have had a positive impact on African beneficiary countries' exports to NRPTA's providers, even if the magnitude impact of EBA is significantly lower than that of AGOA.