Redistribution in a Neo‐Kaleckian Two‐country Model

We investigate the interaction between demand‐driven growth and income distribution in open economies, by combining expenditure‐switching and demand spillover effects in a neo‐Kaleckian two country model. First, we specify elasticities of wage share and real exchange rate to the money wage relative to labor productivity, in order to precisely describe the distributive pass‐through from money wages to the labor share and the real exchange rate. Second, we analyze the demand effects of an increase in the money wage for given labor productivity (a redistribution towards labor) in both Home and Foreign country, as well as globally. We derive closed form results for two identical countries. These results indicate that redistribution towards labor at Home: (i) always increases growth globally if Home is wage‐led, but can lead to lower growth at Home relative to Foreign; and (ii) will always imply lower growth at Home relative to Foreign if Home is profit‐led, but can still be growth‐enhancing at Home. Thus, to the extent that countries are concerned with their relative economic performance, a fallacy of composition can emerge. Numerical simulations suggest that these fallacies could indeed occur. As a consequence, ‘returns to coordination’ over international labor policies might be substantial.     

Mind the Gender Wage Gap – the Impact of Trade and Competition on Sectoral Wage Differences

This paper examines differences between women’s and men’s wages in 18 selected OECD countries in the period 1970 to 2005. The study is based on 12 manufacturing sector‐ and skill‐specific sets of panel data on the gender wage gap. We apply a system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator to the extended version of the conditional gender wage gap convergence equation, controlling for sector concentration and industry‐specific measures of openness using a difference‐in‐difference approach: trade‐affected concentrated sectors versus trade‐affected competitive sectors. The results indicate that: (i) an increase in sector concentration is associated with wage gap growth; (ii) both import and export penetration are associated with a reduction of the high‐skill gender wage gap growth in concentrated industries; (iii) there is evidence of a widening impact of trade on the medium and low‐skill occupational gender wage gap growth in less competitive industries; (iv) institutional regulations of the labour market have an impact on the development of the gender wage gap: for highly‐skilled labour an increase in labour market regulation raises the growth of the gender wage gap, while for medium‐ and low‐skilled workers, it lowers it.     

THE WAGE–WAGE‐ . . . ‐WAGE–PROFIT RELATION IN A MULTISECTOR BARGAINING ECONOMY

The equalization of profit rates across industries subject to firm‐level bargaining over wages generates an interindustry wage structure with higher wages in capital‐intensive sectors. The familiar inverse wage–profit relation gives way to a wage–wage‐ . . . ‐wage–profit surface on which the profit rate can vary directly with the wage paid in an individual industry. Institutional changes that decrease workers' bargaining power and increase the incomes of the unemployed tend to compress the wage distribution; these changes draw political support from cross‐class coalitions of low‐wage workers and capital‐intensive firms. Some capital‐using, labor‐saving technical changes that raise capitalists' profits in current prices lower the equilibrium profit rate.     

Wage Inequality in the United Kingdom: Trade and/or Technology?

I employ two alternative intra‐industry trade Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) models to explain some stylised facts of the British economy. The model with skill‐biased technical change (i.e. exogenous skill‐biased technical change à la Solow) can explain the rise in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, the decline in manufacturing and the expansion of modern services. However, the model where technical change is trade‐induced (i.e. endogenous sector‐biased technical change à la Romer) performs better, because it can also explain the exponential rise of imported intermediate capital goods and developments in the wage rate of unskilled workers.     

Trade‐related Job Loss,Wage Insurance and Externalities: An Ex Ante Efficiency Rationale for Wage Insurance

The extension of adjustment assistance to those who have suffered trade‐related job displacement is widely supported on both sides of the economics of globalisation debate. The form that such assistance should take, namely wage insurance, is also the subject of wide agreement. Nevertheless, the formal economic rationales offered for such a policy are varied, including political economy arguments, equity arguments and market failure/ex post efficiency arguments. This note proposes an ex ante efficiency‐based rationale for the provision of adjustment assistance in the specific form of wage insurance. Job displacement imposes pecuniary externalities on displaced workers, which, in a complete markets setting, induce only shifts along the ex ante Pareto‐efficient frontier. However, when markets are incomplete, pecuniary externalities become welfare‐relevant. Without the possibility of diversifying or hedging the risk of pecuniary external diseconomies of job displacement using contingent claims, welfare is reduced ex ante. Wage insurance – whether publicly underwritten, privately underwritten (as in Shiller's (2003 ) ‘livelihood insurance’), or supplied on a mixed public/private basis – completes the market for contingent claims, allowing workers to diversify or hedge the risk of trade‐related pecuniary external diseconomies. By facilitating risk sharing, wage insurance removes an impediment to ex ante Pareto efficiency. Moreover, wage insurance affects not only post‐displacement behaviour by increasing the incentive to reacquire employment quickly, but it also affects pre‐displacement consumption and investment behaviour, in particular, lowering the threshold at which workers will be willing to undertake irreversible investment in industry‐specific skills.     

Wage Effects of Labour Migration with International Capital Mobility

Wage effects of immigration are investigated in a setting with international capital mobility, which eliminates two‐thirds of the native wage effects of immigration. Without international capital mobility, overall gains from migration in the immigration region are only a small fraction of total losses to native workers, but with perfect international capital adjustment, overall gains are larger than total losses to native workers. Two alternative tax policies to eliminate the negative wage effects of immigration on low‐skilled native workers are evaluated.     

Impact of Trade on Canada's Employment,Skill and Wage Structure

Using newly constructed data for 88 Canadian industries (including primary, manufacturing and services), for 15 years (1992–2007), we analyse the impact of trade and technological change on labour demand, skill structure, wage premiums and welfare in Canada. Results show that export growth has no impact, whereas import growth reduces employment growth. But contrary to popular belief, Canada's job loss due to imports has been very small, only about 6,000 persons annually. China's negative impacts are more pronounced in industries where the share of information and communication technology (ICT) capital is rising fast and among low R&D intensive industries. In terms of skill change, ICT use and real exchange rate appreciation are biased towards high skill workers. Imports from the United States and China are skill‐neutral, whereas imports from Mexico are skill‐upgrading. Overall, neither export nor import growth has an impact on the wage rate. However, had there been no imports from China, the annual wage growth rate of high skill manufacturing workers would have been 0.6 per cent higher. Between 1992 and 2007, there was an annual net gain from the rise in imports at about 0.4 per cent of GDP, in addition to the gains obtained from 1992 import levels vis‐à‐vis autarky.     

Cheap Imports and the Loss of US Manufacturing Jobs

This study examines the role of international trade and specifically imports from low‐wage countries, in determining patterns of job loss in U.S. manufacturing industries between 1992 and 2007. Motivated by intuitions from factor‐proportions‐inspired work on offshoring and heterogeneous firms in trade, we build industry‐level measures of import competition. Combining worker data from the Longitudinal Employer‐Household Dynamics data set, detailed establishment information from the Census of Manufactures and transaction‐level trade data, we find that rising import competition from China and other developing economies increases the likelihood of job loss among manufacturing workers with less than a high school degree; it is not significantly related to job losses for workers with at least a college degree.     

Multi Fibre Arrangement and Wage Inequality: Firm and State‐level Evidence from India and a Theoretical Model

The phased elimination of Multi Fibre Arrangements (MFA) for textile and apparel has been one of the most compelling trade policy reforms that removed a system of bilateral quotas. The reform brought in significant changes in the industrial structures for exporters from the south, including India. Has the labour‐intensive high‐employment textile and clothing industry in India benefited from this global move towards freer trade? For India, the industry has witnessed unprecedented market concentration of export‐oriented firms. Firm‐level empirical estimate illustrates that workers in the export‐oriented firms in India are adversely affected due to withdrawal of quota. Accumulation of net fixed assets and growth of sales impart positive impact on firm‐level wages that cannot outweigh negative impact due to fall in exports. We also find negative impact of profit on aggregate wage bill for the industry with firms spread over 11 major states in India. We show that the mean deviation of industry‐level wage is positively and significantly associated with mean deviation of the number of factories at the state level and negatively with profit. Finally, a brief analytical exercise obtains conditions under which joint withdrawal of quota and import tariff could raise the aggregate labour income in developing countries, in general.     

Wage Hikes as Supply and Demand Shock

Wage hikes affect production costs and hence are usually analysed as supply shocks. There is a long‐standing debate, however, about demand effects of wage variations. In this paper, we bring together these two arguments in a Kaldorian model with group‐specific saving rates and a production technology that allows for redistribution between workers and entrepreneurs following a wage hike. We thereby pinpoint the conditions under which (a) wage variations affect aggregate demand and (b) the positive demand effects of wage hikes may even overcompensate the negative supply effects on aggregate employment (‘purchasing power argument’). We conclude by noting that, whereas demand effects are very likely to occur, the conditions under which the purchasing power argument does indeed hold are very unrealistic.     

Jobs and Exposure to International Trade within the Service Sector in Sweden

To establish in which service industries there is international trade (or it may potentially exist), we calculate locational Ginis for different industries. The basic idea is that from this measure of regional concentration of different activities within a country we can identify industries where there appears to be regional trade, and hence also a potential for international trade. Based on our method, we find that: (i) the number of employed in tradable service appears to be at least as large as in the manufacturing sector, (ii) tradable service is much more skill intensive than manufacturing, and (iii) lately, the employment in tradable service has increased substantially. We argue that the last mentioned result is consistent with the substantial growth of skilled labour in Sweden since the mid‐1990s (Rybczynski effect) and factors leading to increased relative demand for skilled labour. Particularly, increased competition from and offshoring to low‐wage countries seem recently to have had a considerable impact on the creation of skilled jobs and the displacement of less skilled jobs in the tradable sector in Sweden. Furthermore, we apply a similar method as for industries to identify tradable occupations. Using our classification of tradable industries and tradable occupations in a Mincer type wage equation, we find that workers in such industries and occupations receive a wage premia of 12–13 per cent.     

Trade,Technical Change,and Labour Market Adjustment

This paper empirically examines three possible reasons for the high and rising unemployment of low‐skilled employees in Germany: (i) an upsurge in inter‐industry trade, (ii) a skill‐biased technical change, and (iii) a failure of labour market adjustment. The empirical analyses indicate that an exogenous wage‐setting process as well as a bundle of factors, including a skill‐biased technical and structural change, have contributed to the decline in relative demand for low‐skilled employees in Germany. Thus, economic policy in Germany should focus on improving the employability of workers in the lower segment of the labour market and on raising the adjustment flexibility, above all the flexibility of the wage structure, of the German labour market.     

Trade, wages, and the political economy of trade protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms

Worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in how trade policy affects wages in many trade models. Yet, most research has focused on how trade policy affects wages by altering the economy-wide returns to a specific worker characteristic (i.e., skill or education) rather than through worker industry affiliation. This paper exploits drastic trade liberalizations in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and industry wage premiums. We relate wage premiums to trade policy in an empirical framework that accounts for the political economy of trade protection. Accounting for time-invariant political economy factors is critical. When we do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, we find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. Allowing for industry fixed effects reverses the result: trade protection increases relative wages. This positive relationship persists when we instrument for tariff changes. Our results are in line with short- and medium-run models of trade where labor is immobile across sectors or, alternatively, with the existence of industry rents that are reduced by trade liberalization. In the context of the current debate on the rising income inequality in developing countries, our findings point to a source of disparity beyond the well-documented rise in the economy-wide skill premium: because tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors employing a high fraction of less-skilled workers, the decrease in the wage premiums in these sectors affected such workers disproportionately.     

Wage Effects of Trade Reform with Endogenous Worker Mobility

In this paper, we use a linked employer–employee database from Brazil to evaluate the wage effects of trade reform. With an aggregate (firm-level) analysis of this question, we find that a decline in trade protection is associated with an increase in average wages in exporting firms relative to domestic firms, consistent with earlier studies. However, using disaggregated, employer–employee level data, and allowing for the endogenous assignment of workers to firms due to match-specific productivity, we find that the premium paid to workers at exporting firms is economically and statistically insignificant, as is the differential impact of trade openness on the wages of workers at exporting firms relative to otherwise identical workers at domestic firms. We also find that workforce composition improves systematically in exporting firms, in terms of the combination of worker ability and the quality of worker–firm matches, post-liberalization. These results stand in stark contrast to the findings reported in many earlier studies and underscore the importance of endogenous matching and, more generally, non-random labor market allocation mechanisms, in determining the effects of trade policy changes on wages.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

LABOUR SUBSIDIES: A NEW LOOK

This paper reexamines the case for subsidizing employment. One superficially promising approach, based on the idea that government cofinancing of unemployment benefits could induce firms to lay off too many workers in bad times, turns out to be an unsatisfactory argument for employment subsidies when worker-firm contracts are optimal. But efficiency wage explanations for unemployment offer considerable scope for a revenue-neutral combination of a specific labour subsidy and ad valorem wage tax. When pitched low enough, unemployment must fall under a wide set of conditions.     

Who Supports Free Trade in Latin America?

This paper examines individual trade policy preferences across 17 countries in Latin America. The focus is on whether skilled or unskilled workers are more likely to support liberalised trade and on whether country characteristics, such as factor endowments, alter the preferences of skilled and unskilled workers. Based on the standard Heckscher‐Ohlin model and the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem, wage inequality in developing countries will decrease under free trade and unskilled workers will benefit. We find that on average skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to support free trade in Latin American countries. Separate country regressions reveal that this pattern is only statistically significant in 8 out of 17 Latin American countries. However, there are no countries in our sample in which unskilled workers are statistically more likely to support free trade than skilled workers, not even in the lowest skill‐endowed country in the sample. We also find that people from Latin American countries with higher GDP, faster growth, more cropland and a longer period of time since reform were more likely on average to support free trade.     

Offshoring and the Skill‐premium: Evidence from Individual Workers’ Data

During the 1980s the United States has experienced an increase in both international trade and the skill‐premium. The association between these two phenomena has proven elusive in the early empirical literature on the subject. Indeed, the consensus among labour economists seems to be that trade has not been the main cause of such increase in the skill‐premium. This view has been challenged by Feenstra and Hanson (1999, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 3, 907) who find that offshoring sizably affects the skill‐premium. I revisit this debate using individual workers’ data from the March Current Population Survey combined with industry‐level trade data. This strategy improves upon the work of Feenstra and Hanson who do not control for the demographic characteristics of the labour force. In my results, offshoring can explain between 9 and 30 per cent of the increase in the college wage premium, relative to high‐school workers. In addition, I find that offshoring can explain 21 per cent of the increase in the relative employment of skilled labour. These results suggest that offshoring may play an important role in the increase in the relative demand of skilled workers.     

Fairness,trade, and inequality

We develop a model of international trade between two symmetric countries that features inter-group inequality between managers and workers, and also intra-group inequality within each of those two groups. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their managerial ability, and firms run by more able managers have a higher productivity level and make higher profits. There is rent sharing at the firm level due to fair wage preferences of workers, and hence firms with higher profits pay higher wages in equilibrium in order to elicit their workers' full effort. We show that in this framework international trade leads to a self-selection of the best firms into export status, with exporting firms having to pay a wage premium. Aggregate welfare increases, but there is also larger inequality along multiple dimensions: Involuntary unemployment and income inequality between managers and workers increase, and so does inequality within these two subgroups of individuals, as measured by the respective Gini coefficients.     

Trade and Wage Inequality: Local versus Global Comparative Advantages

This paper shows that disentangling the local and global dimensions of trade can be crucial to get a better understanding of the trade impact on wage inequality. In particular, it allows us to reconcile the empirical evidence with the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson predictions. Our focus here is on Italy. As for local trade – within its own cone of diversification – Italy is specialised in the production of unskill‐intensive goods, while for global trade – with respect to the other cone of diversification – it is mainly specialised in the production of skill‐intensive goods. On the evidence of these specialisation patterns, we point out that the local trade has a strong impact on wage inequality. In particular, in line with the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson predictions, the local export performance reduces wage inequality as it favours blue‐collar workers. As for global trade, it affects and increases wage inequality through the export channel, again consistent with the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson predictions.