Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

Price Competition and Consumer Externalities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Information Disparities

In this paper, we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to consider information disparities about quality differences and their effects on price competition. If uninformed consumers overestimate vertical differentiation, asymmetric information is a source of market power and informed consumers exert positive externalities on high quality product purchasers and negative externalities on low quality product purchasers. Such a result is consistent with the fact that information undermines brand. If uninformed consumers are skeptical, adverse selection issues arise and market demands may be perfectly inelastic to prices. With elastic demands equilibrium prices may be either distorted downwards or reflect real quality if the share of informed consumers is suffciently high. Therefore, with skeptical consumers firms may want either to signal quality or subsidize information provision.     

高技术企业技术标准合作网络与质量互动模型

指出高技术企业趋向于通过合作网络来参与技术标准竞争,对技术标准合作网络进行描述,并研究其互补产品质量变化引起的互动,建立质量互动模型,得出标准合作网络内各主体之间的决策和行动是相互影响的结论。     

Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree

A quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave).     

会计准则改革与会计质量的改进研究

以新企业会计准则实施前后各一年为研究区间,以一般上市公司为研究样本,针对会计准则和会计质量的变化进行实证研究。建立有关模型,对2006年和2007年的样本公司进行了实证分析。结果表明,新准则在提高价值相关性方面有贡献,也提高了大额亏损确认的频率。但新准则在盈余管理控制上并没能起到显著的效果。因此,新准则对公司会计质量的提高作用是有限的。     

产品差别化、价格战与合谋

随着中国市场化改革的不断深入,价格战成为各行各业企业间不断上演的舞台剧。文章旨在从产品差别化与企业间合谋的相互关系出发,来分析企业频繁选择价格竞争而难以进行合谋的原因,即产品垂直差别水平的降低将使合谋难以维持,价格战容易爆发。因此,解决价格战的途径之一是中国企业应该加大自主创新的能力,提高产品垂直差别化程度。     

基于垂直产品差异的技术扩散分析

针对网络外部性和产品差异程度在新产品技术扩散中的作用,采用垂直产品差异分析框架和动态分析方法,分析了在双寡头垄断环境中新技术在不同条件下的扩散路径。研究结果表明:当产品差异-外部性系数(即网络外部性强度和产品差异程度之比)较小时,新技术总能够在市场中成功生存,特别是当消费者偏好差异不是很大时,新技术最终能够垄断整个市场;当该系数较大时,只有当新技术期初的网络规模超越了一定阀值后,它才能在市场中成功扩散。厂商可根据产品差异-外部性系数、期初网络规模铺设成本及新技术在市场中生存的期限等因素选择最佳的新技术扩散路径。     

Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision

This paper examines the effects of the imposition of minimum quality standards (MQS) on a vertically differentiated natural duopoly with free entry. It is shown that the welfare effects of MQS are crucially dependent upon the timing of the quality choice with respect to the decision to enter the market. If irreversible decision to enter is taken without pre-commitment to a specific quality level then a welfare improving MQS always exists. If, however, a firm's product quality must be decided prior to entry then a MQS is either redundant or counterproductive, since it can induce a monopoly.     

Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information

The literature so far has analyzed the effects of minimum quality standards (MQS) in oligopoly, using models of pure vertical differentiation, with only two firms, and perfect information. We consider products that are differentiated horizontally and vertically, with imperfect consumers’ information, and more than two firms. We show that a MQS changes the consumers’ perception of produced qualities. This increases the firms’ returns from quality enhancing investments, notwithstanding contrary strategic effects. Our analysis justifies the use of MQS in industries where consumers cannot precisely ascertain the quality of goods, for instance pharmaceuticals or products with chemical components involved. Paper presented at the 2004 ASSET conference in Barcelona, and at the 2005 EARIE conference in Porto. The authors wish to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.     

An Experimental Validation of Hypothetical WTP for a Recyclable Product

Using a within-subject experiment, we compare hypothetical andreal willingness to pay (WTP) for an improvement in therecyclability of a product. Subjects are faced with a real paymentscenario after they have responded to a hypothetical question.Contrary to most of the results obtained in similar studies, at apopulation level, there are no significant median differencesbetween actual and hypothetical stated values of WTP. However,within-subject comparisons between hypothetical and actual valuesindicate that subjects stating a low (high) hypothetical WTP tendto underestimate (overestimate) the value of their actualcontributions.     

Price Competition and Product Differentiation When Consumers Care for the Environment

Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which an environment friendly substitute is available. In this paper, we investigate the market implication of product differentiation when customers are concerned about environmental aspects of the good. We use the spatial duopoly model to determine how environmental concern affects prices, product characteristics and market shares of the competing firms. Our analysis is based on a two-stage game, where at the first stage each firm chooses the characteristic of its product. At the second stage, each firm chooses its price. Equilibrium prices and market shares are affected by consumer awareness of the environment and by the higher costs for producing those goods. As for the Nash equilibria in the characteristics, we find three equilibria depending on the parameter constellation. In order to find out whether the market functions in an optimal way, we determine the choice of environmental characteristics by a welfare maximizing authority. The objective of the paper is to understand the environmental quality choices facing firms and to provide policies that would align private choices with the social optimum.JEL classifications: L11, Q38, H23     

进出口产品质量测度方法的比较与中国事实——基于微观产品和企业数据的实证分析

如何科学合理地测算贸易产品质量是研究企业产品质量异质性的一个关键问题,但目前仍缺乏一个被广泛认可的方法,也没有相关研究对不同方法的结果进行比较和检验.文章基于国家层面的进口质量、企业层面的出口质量和企业层面的进口质量三个视角,将已有研究方法进行归类,并利用中国数据进行测算和检验,力求找到不同视角下最符合中国现实的测算方法.研究表明:(1)国家层面的进口质量测算使用KHW方法,而企业层面的出口质量测算则使用SHIBZ方法更加符合中国现实;(2)对于企业层面的进口质量测算,通过引入运输成本和汇率作为产品价格的工具变量对现有方法加以改进,可以克服其存在的样本选择偏差等问题;(3)对贸易产品质量测算方法在国家层面与企业层面、进口方面和出口方面进行划分,其测算结果能够合理地解释我国近年来的进出口产品质量变动趋势,且国家层面与企业层面的一般贸易进口产品质量的变动趋势一致.文章不仅为今后研究中国进出口产品质量问题提供了测算依据,而且有助于我们廓清我国进出口产品质量的现实情况及其变动趋势.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

中国产品质量监管的声誉模型分析

当前中国商品市场上假冒伪劣现象严重,损害消费者权益的事件层出不穷.在两阶段声誉模型中,消费者运用贝叶斯法则推断企业诚信状况并决定下期的购买行为,此时声誉力量可以约束企业的投机主义倾向,将造假企业驱逐出市场.而对重点行业加强监管、加大处罚力度、鼓励消费者投诉,可以促进市场净化,加快诚信社会的建设步伐.     

我国城市居民最低生活保障标准的影响因素与效应研究

近年来,我国各地城市居民最低生活保障标准不断提升.本文利用我国36个城市1998-2005年的面板数据,分析影响城市居民最低生活保障标准动态变迁的经济、政治和社会因素及其影响效应,结果显示:城市居民最低生活保障制度是最低生活保障而非基本生活保障;"低保"标准并未有效地缩小贫富差距;"低保"标准对贫困者就业意愿具有较弱的负效应.针对上述问题,笔者提出建议:对应经济社会的发展动态提高标准、施行分层梯度式"低保"标准以及建立互动支持系统,促进"低保"受益者就业.     

农产品质量管理的信息经济学分析

农产品质量管理是我国农业经济管理的新领域。运用信息不对称原理,分析了我国农产品质量下降的原因;根据信号传递和激励机制的基本思想,提出了对农产品生产者的信用管理模型和利益诱导机制。     

Schooling, Training, Growth and Minimum Wages

We examine how the long-run growth performance of an economy is affected by a labor market distortion. In our model, growth occurs through skill formation, and skills are generated through schooling and training of unskilled workers. We analyze how a minimum wage legislation affects long-run growth. In general, the effects are ambiguous. The reason is that while a minimum wage discourages training, it also encourages schooling. The net effect then depends on whether training or schooling dominates the long-run increases in labor productivity.
JEL classification : I 20, J 31, O 40     

基于网络外部性的产品差异化与兼容性选择

本文研究了网络外部性与转移成本存在下的新进入企业的产品差异化与兼容性选择问题,并考虑了在位企业的兼容性动机。研究结果表明:对于新进入企业而言,只存在两种策略组合,即(最大差异化,不兼容)和(最大差异化,兼容);在位企业是偏好兼容的。     

Mixed Market Competition in a Quality Differentiated Duopoly Model An Approach to Banking Sector

This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks＇ monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.