Optimal Area-Yield Crop Insurance Reconsidered

The implementability of area-yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's "beta" linking his yield to the risk-pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines

This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find evidence that farmers insured under COP contracts spend more on chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e. those inputs whose costs determine the indemnity payments). However, since these same COP insured farmers are still likely to use less inputs (like effort) whose costs do not enter the indemnity payment formula, and yield depends on both types of inputs (i.e. the determinants and non‐determinants of the indemnity payments), the final moral hazard effect of COP insurance on yields is ambiguous. Our analysis also suggests that farmers who tend to spend less on chemical fertilizers and pesticides are the ones with private information on soil conditions and pest incidence. These are the types of farmers who adversely select into COP contracts that only cover weather related losses.     

Economic analysis of the introduction of agricultural revenue insurance contracts in Spain using statistical copulas

This article aims at determining how the introduction of agricultural revenue insurance contracts in Spain will affect the cost of purchasing insurance, relative to yield insurance schemes. We focus our empirical analysis on the apple and orange sectors in Spain. Statistical copulas are used to jointly model price and yield perils. Premium rates under revenue and yield insurance are simulated through Monte Carlo methods. Results indicate that revenue insurance is likely to reduce the price of agricultural insurance in Spain, which may result in higher acceptance and demand for agricultural insurance programs.     

Coping with systemic risk in index‐based crop insurance

The implementation of index‐based crop insurance is often impeded by the existence of systemic risk of insured losses. We assess the effectiveness of two strategies for coping with systemic risk: regional diversification and securitization with catastrophe (CAT) bonds. The analysis is conducted in an equilibrium pricing framework which allows the optimal price of the insurance and the number of traded contracts to be determined. We also explore the role of basis risk and risk aversion of market agents. The model is applied to a hypothetical area yield insurance for rice producers in northeast China. If yields in two regions are positively correlated, we find that enlarging the insured area leads to higher insurance premiums. Unless capital market investors are very risk averse, a CAT bond written on an area yield index outperforms regional diversification in terms of certainty equivalents of both farmers and insurers.     

Demand for area crop insurance among litchi producers in northern Vietnam

This study examines the need for crop insurance for litchi production in northern Vietnam and how farmers might participate in such a program. Hypothetical insurance programs were developed which proposed all‐risk coverage based on area yields. This coverage was offered to farmers to determine both their interest in the program and how insurance features and farmer characteristics affected their decision to buy insurance. Farmers were also surveyed regarding their production practices, price and yield expectations, and financial and personal characteristics. Even before considering other program costs and government budget constraints, there is not a strong case for establishing a crop insurance program here. Results indicate that while farmer participation would be significant, crop insurance is not needed to achieve policy goals like raising farmer income or guaranteeing subsistence levels of income. Crop insurance is not needed to promote litchi production, which is already expanding rapidly due to its high profitability relative to other farm enterprises. In their choice of coverages, farmers preferred higher yield guarantee levels and lower indemnity prices. Estimated premiums were quite low when expressed as a percent of expected revenue, and farmers were not responsive to changes in premiums. Econometric analysis indicated that high income farmers were more likely to participate, but other farmer characteristics seemed to matter little. Anecdotal evidence suggested that farmers believed the expected area yields used to set insurance coverage levels were too low. Because litchi productivity varies significantly by tree age and the litchi planted area is expanding rapidly, determining appropriate values for expected area yields and insurance coverage levels appeared to be the biggest challenge in program design. It is hypothesized that additional farmer education about the relationship between area and farm yields and other aspects of area insurance could improve such a program's operation. Published by Elsevier Science B.V.     

Equity and efficiency considerations in area versus individual yield insurance

Equity and efficiency considerations in area versus individual crop insurance are investigated for 609 Ontario cash crop farms. Results show that the relationship between individual and area premiums and risk reduction are explained by systematic and non-systematic yield risk relationships. On average, area insurance premiums are much lower than individual yield insurance premiums, and in terms of efficiency in risk-reduction individual plans are superior to area plans. As it turns out arguments of asymmetric information which has lead some researchers to investigate area vs. individual yield insurance is not totally resolved. Inequities in the benefits of area plans across farmers are not equitably distributed, favouring high-risk producers. Adverse selection causes instability in the pooled contracts which will ultimately cause area insurance plans to fail.     

Valuing Agricultural Insurance

This paper proposes a method for estimating a farmer's stochastic discount factor that is independent of his or her risk preferences, and shows that that stochastic discount factor is appropriate for calculating a farmer's willingness to pay for a crop insurance product. An empirical example illustrates how production and price data might be combined with returns data to permit econometric estimation of the stochastic discount factor, and the implications of those illustrative results are briefly discussed.     

Producer Experience, Learning by Doing, and Yield Performance

Current crop insurance rating procedures consider only performance for the individual crop in question. Recent farm legislation has given producers considerable planting flexibility and, as a result, many have shifted to new crops. Producers without a production history for the new crop may be offered levels of insurance that do not accurately reflect their expected yields. Likewise, premium rates may not reflect a producer's actual risk for a new crop. We examine the extent to which information about expected yields may be gleaned from a consideration of historical performance on other crops. We also consider the extent to which yield performance exhibits learning by doing such that yields improve with experience. Though the results are mixed, we generally find that yield performance tends to improve with experience. However, when yields are conditioned on historical yield performance for other crops, the importance of experience is diminished significantly. Yield performance is related to a number of farm characteristics. Finally, we examine the extent to which yield variability is correlated across crops for individual farmers. Implications for crop insurance rating practices are discussed. The results demonstrate robust correlation between a farm's historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop—a factor largely ignored in current crop insurance contracts.     

Constrained Efficient Contracts for Area Yield Crop Insurance

With area yield crop insurance, indemnification occurs when area yield falls below a yield trigger that is chosen by the producer. The maximum value for this yield trigger is generally restricted (e.g., 80% of the long term area average yield). The impact of this trigger constraint on the optimal design of an area yield insurance contract is examined. Within the constrained efficient contract, indemnities consist of both a lump sum payment and a payment that is proportional to the yield shortfall. Because lump sum payments may not be feasible to implement, efficiency-enhancing modifications to standard contracts are also proposed.     

A Comparative Evaluation of Yield Risk Reductions with Alternative Crop Insurance Programs in Manitoba

Three crop insurance programs are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness of yield risk reductions for 371 Manitoba farms. The examination is first conducted with a proposed index method, with which the relative yield risk reduction magnitude is calculated and compared for each farm under each alternative program. The generalized stochastic dominance (GSD) methodology is also used to provide an alternative analytical framework in analyzing producers’relative preferences among those alternatives by comparing the net yield distributions generated by each program for each farm. The results suggest that, given an actuarially sound basis, the filly individualized crop insurance (FI) program is the most favorable choice for risk-averse producers. The area coverage and individual indemnity program (IA) is generally the second best option. The full area crop insurance program (FA) is least preferred by risk-averse farmers.     

Investigating the performance of different estimation techniques for crop yield data analysis in crop insurance applications

We investigate the performance of the ordinary least squares (OLS)‐, M‐, MM‐, and the Theil–Sen (TS)‐estimator for crop yield data analysis in crop insurance applications using Monte Carlo simulations. More specifically, the performance is assessed with respect to trend estimation, prediction of future yield levels, and the estimation of expected indemnity payments. In agreement with earlier findings, other estimators are found to be superior to OLS in simple regression problems if yield distributions are outlier contaminated and heteroscedastic. While this conclusion is also valid for subsequent applications such as yield prediction and the estimation of expected indemnity payments, the difference between the considered estimators becomes less distinct. For these applications, we find particularly the M‐estimator to be a good compromise between high‐breakdown (very robust) estimators and the very efficient OLS‐estimator. Because no regression technique dominates all others in all applications and scenarios for error term distributions, our results underline that the choice of the estimation technique should be dependent on the purpose of the crop yield data analysis. However, alternative estimators such as M‐, MM‐, and TS‐estimator can reduce (and bound) the risk of unreliable or inefficient crop yield data analysis in crop insurance applications.     

Finding optimal price risk management instruments: the case of the Spanish potato sector

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the problem of choosing between alternative market risk management instruments. We model farmers' behavior to optimize the certainty equivalent, formulated by a mean–variance model, by combining instruments with and without basis risk. Results are expressed as the demands for hedging with futures, forward contracts and insurance. Theoretical results are applied to a selection of Spanish producers of fresh potatoes, a sector that is exposed to significant market risks. Amsterdam's Euronext provides potato futures prices, and the recently launched revenue insurance in Spain provides the example for price insurance. Three conclusions summarize the article's main findings. First, we show that Spanish potato revenue insurance subsidies are a factor that determines the instrument rankings and choice. Second, the efficiency of insurance subsidies is generally low. Finally, the Amsterdam potato futures market does not provide a cost‐effective means to manage price risks for Spanish fresh potato growers.     

Evaluating the Potential of Index Insurance Schemes to Reduce Crop Yield Risk in an Arid Region

We evaluate yield risk reduction through weather index, area yield index and farm yield insurance contracts for wheat farms in Kazakhstan by employing data from 1980 to 2002. We use the usual mean variance (MV) approach and also a second‐degree stochastic dominance (SSD) criterion. While MV is not necessarily consistent with the expected utility (EU) theory, SSD results only in a minimum but EU‐consistent benefit from insuring. Differences in the estimation results for both approaches underline the advantage of applying both criteria to analyse the risk‐reducing potential of crop insurance. Bootstrapping results show that none of the analysed insurance schemes provides statistically significant risk reduction for every single farm. In addition, weather‐based index insurance is found to provide less risk reduction than area yield insurance based on the rayon (county) yield. Moreover, rayon yield index insurance can reduce yield risk more effectively for Kazakhstan's wheat producers than farm yield insurance with a low strike yield.     

Motivations to grow energy crops: the role of crop and contract attributes

Perennial energy crops are a promising source of bioenergy whose production involves production risks, long‐term commitment of land and need for crop‐specific investments without the coverage of crop insurance potentially available for conventional crops. We conduct a choice experiment in five states in the Midwestern and South‐central regions of the U.S. to examine the effect of crop‐contract attributes on the joint discrete‐continuous choice decisions to adopt an energy crop and convert acres to it from a status quo use, while controlling for the effect of various farmers’ risk and time preferences, sociodemographic characteristics, and availability of crop insurance for conventional crops. We find robust evidence that high discount rates, high upfront establishment costs and need for crop‐specific investments create disincentives for adoption and allocation of land to energy crop production. The effects of riskiness of returns and risk aversion are less robust across specifications. The effect of conventional crop insurance on the energy crop adoption decision differs across types of insurance; in particular, farmers with revenue insurance are statistically significantly less likely to adopt an energy crop. Our results have implications for the design of effective contracts and policy incentives to induce the production of energy crops.     

Crop Insurance Valuation under Alternative Yield Distributions

Considerable disagreement exists about the most appropriate characterization of farm-level yield distributions. Yet, the economic importance of alternative yield distribution specifications on crop insurance valuation has not been well documented. The results of this study demonstrate that large differences in expected payouts from popular crop insurance products can arise solely from the parameterization chosen to represent yield distributions. The results suggest that the frequently unexamined yield distribution specification may lead to economically significant errors in crop insurance policy rating and assessment of expected payouts from policies.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

Spatiotemporal Modeling of Asian Citrus Canker Risks: Implications for Insurance and Indemnification Fund Models

Asiatic citrus canker is a disease that poses a significant hazard to commercial citrus production. This article examines spatiotemporal models of the risks of citrus canker transmission. Models evaluate risks and are used to price annual contracts, which would pay producers a prespecified indemnity in the event that their grove is found to be infected with canker. Implications for risk management policy are discussed.     

Area Yield Index Insurance or Farm Yield Crop Insurance? Chinese Perspectives on Farmers' Welfare and Government Subsidy Effectiveness

We evaluate the performance of area yield crop insurance (AYCI) and farm yield crop insurance (FYCI) using farm-level yield data from China, focusing on their effects on farmers' welfare, and their cost-effectiveness in terms of government subsidy. Given a subsidy rate sufficient to generate a politically acceptable participation level, the price advantage of AYCI may no longer offset its higher basis risk, and consequently FYCI may be preferred by farmers. From the government's perspective, AYCI is the cheapest option to maintain reasonable farmer participation in insurance, but is not necessarily the most cost-effective choice. Our findings suggest that, contrary to an assumption that informs many developing country agricultural insurance programmes, AYCI schemes are not necessarily preferred to FYCI. Decisions on the structure of a national agricultural insurance programme should be based on careful consideration of local conditions.     

Does crop insurance influence agrochemical uses under current Chinese situations? A case study in the Manasi watershed,Xinjiang

Government subsidy to crop insurance has been advocated as a policy alternative to support growth of agricultural production and farmers' income in China since the country joined the WTO. However, cautions have been raised as the crop insurance program may impact the environment negatively. This study tries to explore farmers' behaviors with regard to agrochemical use with household data applied to a simultaneous equation system consisting of disaggregated input models. It is found that decisions on fertilizer, pesticides, and agro‐film applications do have different impacts on crop insurance participation, and are influenced by the latter in different ways. It is also implied that encouraging farmers' participation in crop insurance under current low‐premium and low‐indemnity terms does not have a significantly negative impact on the environment.     

The U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program

The US. Federal Crop Insurance Program has evolved from a government-run yield insurance program for wheat farmers to a public-private partnership that provides a variety of yield and revenue insurance products to producers of over 100 different crops. US. policy-makers continue to struggle with defining an appropriate role for the federal government in helping crop farmers manage revenue risk. New approaches using area-yield or weather-based options may hold promise for the future