零利率约束下的货币联盟最优财政政策

文章将零利率约束引入两国新凯恩斯模型来研究货币联盟的最优财政政策。财政政策分承诺规则和相机抉择两种情况,当本国遭受技术冲击时,无论政策是承诺规则还是相机抉择,本国都将增加政府支出和政府债务,外国则是减少政府支出和债务,且零利率约束时的两国财政支出和政府债务均大于无零利率约束时。福利分析表明,承诺规则下的零利率约束恶化了本国福利,但会改善外国福利,整体上恶化货币联盟福利;相机抉择下的零利率约束恶化了本国、外国及货币联盟福利;无论有无零利率约束,承诺规则的货币联盟福利损失均大于相机抉择。     

东亚货币联盟

本文简要分析了东亚(泛指东北亚及东南亚各国和地区)成立货币联盟的可行性,对成立东亚货币联盟的利弊作了较为详细地探讨,并提出了自己的观点.     

财政政策与货币政策运行问题探讨

本文主要针对我国财政政策与货币政策运行现状进行分析,并寻找问题的根源,从而提出相应的解决措施和缓解办法。     

财政政策与货币政策的协调运行问题探讨

财政政策和货币政策作为国家宏观调控的两大重要政策工具，各有所长，各具特色，又互为条件、相互补充。二者协调运行才能更好地发挥对经济的调控作用，但在我国，两大政策在协调与配合方面还有许多不完善之处。要加强两大政策的协调运行，必须强化财政调控的力度．改变货币政策独木撑天的局面；明确财政、货币政策的各自侧重点；把搞好国有企业，重构市场经济的微观主体作为财政、货币政策协调运行的基本出发点；做好财政与货币政策的松紧搭配，寻找财政和货币政策的最佳结合点。     

欧洲货币联盟基础不稳

欧洲货币联盟大厦的基石—《稳定与增长公约》,在2002年遭受了严重的冲击。几乎所有欧元区的国家都采取了扩张的财政政策。德国、葡萄牙两国财政赤字超越3％的红线,法国和意大利也濒临红线。欧元区国家又宣布2004年达成财政平衡的目标已经不能实现,必须要推迟。本文通过对货币联盟运行一年来的现状进行分析,认为欧元区国家财政扩张的原因主要在于:内部的不对称冲击、货币联盟自身的缺陷及政治联合的滞后。如果不加快改革,货币联盟大厦则有倾覆的危险。     

财政政策与货币政策的协调运行问题探讨

财政政策和货币政策作为国家宏观调控的两大重要政策工具,各有所长,各具特色,又互为条件、相互补充.二者协调运行才能更好地发挥对经济的调控作用,但在我国,两大政策在协调与配合方面还有许多不完善之处.要加强两大政策的协调运行,必须强化财政调控的力度,改变货币政策独木撑天的局面;明确财政、货币政策的各自侧重点;把搞好国有企业,重构市场经济的微观主体作为财政、货币政策协调运行的基本出发点;做好财政与货币政策的松紧搭配,寻找财政和货币政策的最佳结合点.     

强化货币政策与财政政策的协调与配合

从理论上讲,宏观经济调控的手段主要包括货币政策和财政政策。国家通过货币政策和财政政策的运用来调控总需求,调整经济结构和产业结构,提高经济运行的整体效益,达到经济持续、快速、稳定发展的目的。但由于我国改革开放以来分配体制和分配格局     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

The Performance of Simple Fiscal Policy Rules in Monetary Union

The paper analyses the stabilising potential of simple fiscal policy rules for a small open economy in monetary union in a 2-region DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. We consider simple fiscal instrument rules for government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes in analogy to interest rate rules in monetary policy. The paper finds a dichotomy in the welfare effects of fiscal policy for liquidity-constrained and intertemporal optimising households, i.e. policies enhancing the welfare of one group tend to reduce the welfare of the other one. The moderate average welfare gains from optimal policy contrast with potentially large welfare losses from non-optimal policy. Fiscal rules that respond to employment fluctuations may be preferred to fiscal rules responding to indicators of price competitiveness, because optimal policy corresponds more closely to the idea of countercyclical stabilisation in the former case. The simulations also emphasise the crucial impact of the budgetary closure rule on the welfare consequences of fiscal business-cycle stabilisation.     

Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis

This article challenges the conventional result according to which an instrument-independent central bank able to strictly commit to price stability makes fiscal constraints unnecessary. We present a model of a monetary union with heterogeneous members where the inefficient policy mix resulting from the lack of coordination between the common monetary policy and national fiscal policies incites the governments to appoint excessively liberal delegates to the central bank's board. We characterize the fiscal restraints necessary to restore the central bank's ability to deliver the most desirable degree of price stability. It appears that even country-specific and state-contingent restraints may be counterproductive for some member states.     

Fiscal Federalism in a Monetary Union: The No-Cooperation Pitfall

Open Economies Review - The relative merits in a monetary union of a fiscal federalism scheme and intergovernmental fiscal cooperation without a federal authority are assessed using a standard...     

地方财政搭便车、财政货币承诺与地方债务治理

本文通过一个简单的理论模型说明了地方政府财政搭便车、中央银行货币政策承诺、中央政府财政政策承诺以及中央政府财政统筹协调之间的关系。研究发现,中央银行的货币承诺或中央政府的财政政策承诺对于降低地方政府的财政搭便车动机至关重要。虽然中央政府的财政统筹协调可以获得与中央银行货币政策承诺或中央政府财政政策承诺相同的结果,但其具体实施存在诸多困难。在此基础上,本文提出地方政府债务治理的政策设想和可行方法。     

Fiscal Discipline and the Question of Convergence of National Interest Rates in the European Union

In this paper, interest-rate convergence in Europe is related to the behavior of integrated federal political systems. Our main results are: Before the final fixing of exchange rates, national interest rates will converge toward the German bond yield in countries eligible to become EMU members in part because no-bailout clauses are not credible in the starting period of EMU. Should such clauses become more credible after 2002 because the EU government and its redistributive mechanisms remain weak, the market-discipline hypothesis has a greater chance to apply. But it may still prove unequal to the task of discouraging excessive fiscal deficits on its own.     

Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?

Could a monetary union in West Africa (either an informal monetaryunion of the non-CFA countries, or a possible future monetaryunion of all ECOWAS members) be an effective ‘agency ofrestraint’ (Collier, 1991) on fiscal policies? We discussthe ways, both positive and negative, that monetary union couldaffect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscalrestraints considered in the literature about the European MonetaryUnion (EMU), and consider their applicability to West Africa.The empirical evidence, EMU literature and CFA experience allsuggest the possibility that monetary union could create thetemptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bail-out,or costs that are diluted through the membership. We concludethat a monetary union in West Africa can be an effective agencyof restraint on fiscal policies only if the hands of the fiscalauthorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraintcriteria, applicable not just for accession to monetary union,but throughout the life of the union.