THE HOUSING MARKET AND THE RECOVERY

In the run up to the key Christmas period the talk is again of renewed weakness in consumer spending. Last month saw the volume of retail sales rise by only 0.1 per cent, and the annual rate of growth has now slowed to a shade over 3 per cent, down from its peak of 4.4 per cent back in July this summer. This weakness in consumer demand is also clearly being reflected in retail prices; with retailers discounting their prices to boost sales, headline inflation fell to 1.4per cent in October, while the underlying rate dropped to its lowest level for 25 years. This forecast release looks at the wider determinants of consumer spending, especially developments in the housing market. We argue that the slowdown in high street sales is a forbear of sluggish growth to come and that lower interest rates, if they materialise, are unlikely to have much of an impact. While consumer spending has been the driving force out of recession, for the recovery to be sustained, requires that exports and investment spending now take up the running.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The world economy is just starting to emerge from the second trough of a "W-shaped" recession. Compared with the experience after the first oil shock, when industrial production fell by 12 per cent, bringing inflation quickly down from 14 per cent into single figures. the 1980 world recession was mild. Between the first and third quarters industrial output fell 5 per cent; it recovered in the fourth quarter and inflation stopped falling. As a result governments - and this is especially true of the United States - look "another bite at the cherry": monetary policy was tightened and interest rates rose. The effect over the last six months has been to produce a second dip in output. The renewed attack on inflation has, however, been successful and inflation is now well in single figures and falling. Consequently a general easing of policy is evident and a recovery of output in the second half of 1982 and into 1983 remains our forecast.     

Forecast Summary

Although hard evidence of recovery is still elusive, our forecast indicates that the trough of the recession occurred in the second quarter and that output fell 4 per cent peak-to-trough. We estimate that GDP rose 112 per cent in the third quarter - though only because of a rebound in North Sea oil production - and that for 1991 CIS a whole it will be 2 per cent down on 1990 levels. Next year GDP is forecast to rise 2 per cent but it is not until 1993 that the 1990 output peak is passed. Unemployment therefore still has a considerable way to rise - to a peak of 2.8 million in 1993. In the first year of full EMS membership, the economy has made an accelerated transition to European levels of inflation. Against a background of modest growth, it should be possible to consolidate this progress and we expect retail price inflation to average little more than 3 per cent over the next four years. Similar rapid progress has been achieved on the balance of payments where there is a trade surplus on manufactured goods for the first time since 1982. Here, however, we are less confident that the reduction in the trade gap can be sustained. In the recovery phase we expect imports to rise more rapidly than exports with the result that the current account deficit rises from £6bn this year to £8bn in 1992 and £10bn-£12bn in 1993-5.     

Luck or insight? The Simon–Ehrlich bet re-examined

After a long argument about the effect of population growth on the availability of resources, Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich undertook a $1,000 bet in October1980. The wager concerned the inflation-adjusted prices of five metals. If, over ten years, prices rose, Simon would pay Ehrlich. If they fell, Ehrlich would pay Simon. In October 1990 Ehrlich mailed Simon a cheque, as the real price of the five-metal basket of commodities had fallen by 36 per cent. Since then, some researchers have argued that Simon ‘got lucky’; over other periods the result would have been different. We review data from 1900–2019 and find that, if war years are excluded, Simon would have won the bet 69.9 per cent of the time. During this 119-year period, the time price of the five-metal basket fell by 87.2 per cent despite both US and world populations having grown substantially.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery that we forecast in February remains intact, though its composition is shifting between external and domestic demand. As we reported in International Economic Outlook earlier this month, the recession in Europe is intensifying so that, even with the devaluation-induced improvement in competitiveness, exports are being held back The weaker world outlook is the main factor behind a lower growth forecast next year. For 1993, however, we are continuing to forecast growth of 11/2 per cent, principally on the basis of more buoyant consumer spending. But the boost from consumption, while welcome in the first stage of recovery, is short-lived since the higher taxes already announced for next year hold back the growth of disposable incomes. Again this is desirable for the share of consumption, private and public, in GDP has been rising steadily and needs to be reversed in order to devote resources to reducing the two deficits: the PSBR and the trade gap. Over the forecast as a whole it is exports and investment which drive demand, not consumption. Underlying inflation has fallen below 3 per cent for the first time in twenty years, but it is now at its cyclical low point. We expect some increase in inflation from now on, though the Government's 1–4 per cent target is not likely to be breached this year. Next year and beyond, however, without more action on the budget deficit or a sharper increase in interest rates than we are assuming, inflation is forecast to settle in the 4–5 per cent range. Unemployment has fallen in recent months but the underlying trend remains upwards. We expect the three million level to be reached in the second half of the year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

World output, which was strengthening immediately prior to last October, appears to have barely suffered in the short term from the stock market crash. Apart from an early reaction by US consumers - since reversed - demand is proving robust and in early 1988 OECD industrial production is, we estimate, 6 per cent up on year-earlier levels, with GNP more than 4 per cent higher. Indeed such is the strength of activity that the present balance of risk is not that recession is imminent but that inflation may pick up again. In the United States, where activity rates are at their highest level for eight years and unemployment is at a fourteen-year low, monetary policy has been tightened and interest rates are moving higher. The Bundesbank is keen to follow suit and the BoJ is keeping the situation under review. Nevertheless, with wages in most countries still adjusting to the low inflation rates of the last two years, there is little evidence yet that prices are accelerating.
We expect to see world interest rates edging higher in the second half of the year as recorded inflation picks lip. But we believe that underlying inflation remains low and that, even on the assumption that oil prices return to 18 a barrel, OECD consumer price inflation will peak early next year at a little over 4 per cent. Tighter monetary policy is also expected to hold back demand over the next 12 months. Consequently, we expect some weak- ness in output in the first half of next year but discount the possibility of a severe recession. GNP growth in the OECD area is forecast to decline from the 3 per cent rate of 1987–8 to a little over 2 per cent next year and to a sustainable 2½ per cent p.a. over the medium term.     

Forecast Summary

A pause in world activity held back UK industry in the first quarter of the year and, even though we expect faster growth from now on, we forecast total output growth of only 2 per cent this year. But next year a stronger world economy and pre-election tax cuts lift growth to 3 1/4per cent. Lower oil prices and falling interest rates help keep inflation at its current level both this year and, as long as wages respond, next. In the medium term we expect the growth rate to fall back but, assuming that a fairly tight fiscal policy is pursued by whichever government is in power, we predict that inflation stays below 3 per cent     

The behavior of real exchange rates

Dominating the behavior of real exchange rates for the dollar during the course of the past two and a half decades have been two substantial and for many countries largely offsetting movements. In the years surrounding the breakdown of Bretton Woods most exchange rates fell precipitously and throughout the 1970s remained low. Near the start of the 1980s they began a rise that continued more or less unabated until early 1985. Any explanation of exchange rate behavior over this period, therefore, has to account for both of these movements, not simply the increase in real exchange rates for the dollar in the 1980s that has been the topic of so much discussion in the financial press. The explanation offered in this paper attributes these movements to the two important changes in monetary policy that occurred during these years.     

Why has inflation fallen?

There is no doubt that the most encouraging aspect of Britain's economic performance in recent years has been the fall in inflation from a peak of over 20 per cent in June 1980 to a current rate of about 5 per cent. The speed at which inflation fell has taken many forecasters (including ourselves) by surprise. In this Economic Viewpoint we ask why the inflation rate has fallen. If we can understand why it has happened we are better placed to answer questions about the future. In particular we can try to decide whether the success in reducing inflation will be maintained and whether further cuts in inflation will be consistent with a fall in unemployment.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Suddenly the recovery is with us. After two months in which manufacturing output rose 2.5 per cent, there are few who doubt that a sustainable recovery is under way. While it is unlikely in the extreme that manufacturing will continue to grow at the rate of January-February, an annual rate of 15 per cent, and equally likely that there will still be some bad months, almost no one is dismissing the recent experience as another 'false dawn'. With retail sales rising steadily, and industrial surveys registering a marked upturn in business confidence, it would appear that the Chancellor's green shoots' are finally with us. Indeed, when the CSO conies to date the trough of the present cycle, it is likely to put it in the second quarter of last year. If this is the case, the first year of recovery will have been particularly weak, reminiscent of the experience in 1981-2 when the trough of the cycle was in February 1981 but it was not until late 1982 that a convincing recovery was under way. Given the apparent similarity between these two episodes, we draw comfort from the fact that (non-oil) GDP rose 1.3 per cent in 1982 and 2.8 per cent in 1983, in line with our February forecast of 1.3 per cent growth this year followed by 3.2 per cent in 1994.     

Is the Economy Overheating?

In the last year total output has risen 4 per cent and manufacturing is up 6 per cent. Unemployment has fallen by 400,000. The current account, which was in surplus in the first half of the year, has moved back into deficit. Does this mean that the economy is “over- heating”? In the context of our forecast we examine this issue; we consider how rapidly supply can increase and how fast demand is increasing. We conclude that the growth of output in the last year was initially driven by supply and that, more recently, domestic demand has been growing very rapidly. The emergence of a current account deficit is evidence of excess domestic demand but from now on we expect demand to grow less rapidly. With non-oil supply expanding at a rate in excess of 3 per cent, we forecast steady output growth and little change in either inflation or the current account. In our judgement, the economy, though hot, is not overheating.     

Focus: Productivity in UK Manufacturing Industry

Manufacturing industry has been the major casualty of the recession, recording a total fall in output of about 20 per cent. It is unusual for productivity to rise when output is falling, yet in the last two years output per person employed in manufacturing has risen by 15 per cent. As a result, and in spite of earnings growth of over 25 per cent between 1980 and 1982, the increase in unit labour costs was held to under 15 per cent in the same two-year period. In this Focus we examine how and why these developments have taken place. Our general conclusion is that, with a recovery now under way, normal pro-cyclical productivity gains are reinforcing the abnormal achievements of the last two years and that, in consequence, industrial costs and profits are improving sharply.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

This forecast release examines the latest monthly indicators. In general there are few surprises although total output in the economy is showing signs of moving upwards more rapidly than we had expected, with the underlying trend in industrial production showing a 1½ percent increase over the last three months. Retail sales are currently running at over 3 per cent above the 1977 level. The underlying rate of retail price inflation is now under 8 per cent although the input price figures are showing some increase after the earlier falls. The balance of payments continues to be very erratic with monthly oscillations of up to £500m. The most recent figures showing a sharp fall in imports are consistent with the view we expressed last month that much of the rise in imports in the first quarter reflected stock- building of imported goods as companies took advantage of the strong pound. The money supply figures continue to be disturbing with recent growth over 12 months at 16 percent while the six-monthly figure has been close to 20 per cent; compared to our major industrial competitors this puts us back towards the top of the league on monetary growth and in this light it is not surprising that the exchange rate has fallen.     

Coping with oil price shocks - the case of Japan

The world economy has now suffered two major oil price shocks. Although the percentage increase in 1973-74 (OPEC I) was much larger than in 1979-80 (OPEC II). the potential effect on the level of world prices - and hence on the real economy - was about the same in each case. One lesson that was learned from OPEC I was that the impact of the oil price increase on individual economies depended on the policies followed by each country. For example, in the UK the inflation rate rose to 27 per cent in 1975 whereas in West Germany - which was just as dependent on imported oil - inflation rose to 7 per cent. In this Economic Viewpoint we consider the example of one country - Japan - which changed its policies between the two events. As a result it changed from being one of the least successful to being one of the most successful in coping with the oil price increase.     

Forecast Summary

Despite a most unhelpful international background, the UK recovery remains in place. Output has been rising, slowly but steadily, for five quarters and is 2 per cent higher than at the trough of the recession in early 1992. We expect output to continue rising at a relatively sluggish rate, held back by the recession in Europe which may persist into 1994. The recovery has generated a modest drop in unemployment but little upward pressure on prices. Inflation has passed its (30-year) low point, though we are optimistic that it can be contained at or close to the Government's 4 per cent ceiling. The five-month decline in unemployment has been reversed in the last two months but it may still be possible not to breach the 3 million level and over the medium term we expect the trend in unemployment to be gently down.     

France

The government of Mr. Chirac, which was elected in March, is establishing a liberalising, market-oriented stance on economic policy. Controls on prices and foreign exchange have been relaxed, credit controls are being dismantled and, in spite of opposition from President Mitterrand, a large-scale privatisation programme is planned. The draft 1987 budget proposes to cut public expenditure in real terms for the first time in 28 years and to use the savings to reduce both taxes and the budget deficit. The projected tightening of the fiscal stance is not expected to hold back output which the government forecasts will rise 2 1/2 per cent this year and 3 per cent in 1987. Inflation is also forecast to improve steadily and the current account is moving into surplus. Unemployment, currently at a postwar peak of 10.7 per cent, is expected to fall towards the end of the year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Autumn Statement updated the government's spending plans and its forecast from those announced in the Budget in March. On both counts there is very little difference between the Treasury view and our own forecast released in October. The Treasury supports our projection that output and demand will decelerate in 1989, that inflation will peak in the first half of the year at about 7 per cent and fall back to 5 per cent by the end of the year and that the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments will narrow only marginally over the next 12 months. On public spending in 1989–90, our October forecast was close to the unchanged official figures. It was clear to us - though not to most City commentators - that savings on unemployment benefit, debt interest and elsewhere would enable greater spending on programmes within an unchanged planning total. In later years the government has upped its expenditure plans from those announced a year ago, as we had assumed it would. As a result, the Autumn Statement projects significant increases in real public spending from now on. We show that, under a more appropriate inflation forecast, public spending rises nearly 2 per cent next year but falls back in 1990–92. Finally we argue that, unless the Chancellor decides to run an even larger PSDR (public sector debt repayment) than the £12bn built into our forecast - and the Autumn Statement forecast assumes a PSDR in 1989–90 similar to the expected outturn in 1988–9 of £10bn - the scope for tax cuts remains intact.     

Forecast Summary

Led by private sector demand, the economy has grown very rapidly in the last 12 months, Output has risen nearly 6 per cent and unemployment has fallen by over ½ million but the current account deficit has widened dramatically and wage and price inflation is increasing. Monetary policy has been tightened sufficiently, we believe, to produce a gradual reduction in the current deficit over the medium term and to prevent inflation from breaking the 7 per cent level which a higher mortgage rate will ensure early next year. But, as demand is reined back, there is a cost to output which rises 3 per cent next year, 2–2½ per cent thereafter. Unemployment continues to fall, dropping below 2 million at the end of next year and reaching 1.8 million by 1992.