Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time

Most previous empirical research estimates a greater than 20% discount associated with the sale of foreclosed properties. Under the assumption that the real estate market is somewhat efficient, such a large discount would be counterintuitive. We argue, and empirically show, that the estimated foreclosure coefficients in most of the previous research are upward biased because they do not control for variables such as the physical condition of the property and the relationship between marketing time and price. Accounting for these factors and correcting for two types of spatial price interdependence, our results show that estimates of foreclosure discount reported by previous studies are about one-third higher than the true discount caused by foreclosure per se .     

亚洲地区中东原油溢价问题探讨

由于中东的一些石油输出国对同一时间出口到不同地区的同一原油采用不同的计价公式,使得亚洲地区的主要石油进口国一直在为进口中东原油支付不合理的高价,而且与欧美地区相比,“亚洲溢价”呈现出逐渐增加的趋势。“亚洲溢价”损害了亚洲石油进口国的利益,越来越为亚洲石油进口国政府和石油消费者所关心。随着我国从中东进口的原油量的增加,“亚洲溢价”对我国的影响也越来越大。但是这个问题涉及政治、经济、历史、地缘等多种因素,需要亚洲各国民间和政府做出一致的长期努力。中国作为亚洲政治、经济大国,应该利用自己的优势,发挥更加积极的作用,促使中东有关产油国对改变现行原油作价机制引起高度重视。     

Is There a Risk Premium Puzzle in Real Estate?

This paper is based on my Presidential Address to the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association delivered at Washington, D.C., in January 2003. The paper asks whether there is a risk premium puzzle in real estate. I examine this question by reporting on an empirical investigation of real estate investors' expectations over the last 15 years. The results suggest that ex ante expected risk premiums on real estate are quite large for their risk, too large to be explained by standard economic models. Further, the results suggest that ex ante expected returns are higher than average realized equity returns over the past 15 years because realized returns have included large unexpected capital losses. The latter conclusion suggests that using historical averages to estimate the risk premium on real estate is misleading.     

Downstream Vertical Foreclosure and Upstream Innovation

I examine a link between downstream foreclosure and upstream innovation. The crucial ingredient of the model is the presence of dynamic economies of scale upstream in the form of competition in R&D. The reason an upstream supplier has a captive buyer is to force rival suppliers to incur the disadvantages of low-scale production and discourage them from innovating. The downstream buyer is offered favorable terms and is “convinced” to sign an exclusive supply contract and accept captivity. In this context, downstream foreclosure may reduce consumer welfare.     

The Cost of Foreclosure Delay

We measure the cost of foreclosure delay by estimating time‐related foreclosure costs using a large national sample of residential mortgages before, during, and after the recent U.S. housing crisis. The large volume of foreclosures, coupled with an unprecedented series of government interventions in mortgage servicing practices, significantly extended foreclosure timelines during and after the crisis.  Costs were especially pronounced in judicial review states, which saw average foreclosure costs go up 15 percentage points, 24 percentage points in the highest cost state.  Cost increases of this magnitude are likely to have consequences for servicing practices and mortgage credit availability.     

电价改革与市场风险防范

■改革开放以来我国电力工业的发展,电价改革功不可没。■电价改革必须从国情出发,因地、因网制宜。■电价改革必须把发、输、配、售四个环节统筹考虑,避免顾此失彼。■发电市场竞价模式的设立,要保证发电市场拥有必要的备用容量。■完善输配电价格机制,要保证电网建设具有一定的安全裕度。■要建立终端销售电价与发电市场价格的联动机制。■重视对专项服务价格和辅助服务价格的研究。     

Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns

The lack of a consistent definition of foreclosure discount gives rise to discount rates that vary from nonexistent to sizeable across locations and time. We define the foreclosure discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal‐sale estimated market value. With a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale transactions, across 16 CBSAs between 2000 and 2012, we find three noteworthy empirical findings. First, a high REO sale concentration in a market increases the foreclosure discount. Second, foreclosure discount is negatively related to recent house‐price appreciation. Third, the often reported high foreclosure discount for lower value properties is likely due to property condition.     

Predicting Commercial Mortgage Foreclosure Experience

This study has two objectives: (1) it directly evaluates the relationship between commercial mortgage default incidence and characteristics of the mortgage, borrower, property, market, and general economic conditions, and (2) it uses this relationship to predict the exposure of life insurers to future mortgage defaults and to examine the relative importance of various causes of current and past credit quality problems. A theoretical model of the default decision predicts that the decision would be expected to be driven primarily by the borrower's current equity stake in the property, or the ratio of the market value of the loan to property value (M_t/V_t), but that the presence and magnitude of transaction costs associated with default would be expected to result in underexercise of the default option. Empirical estimation making use of American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) and National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) data confirms both expectations. A high proportion of the longitudinal variation in foreclosure incidence is explained by variations in M_t/V_t, but even at high ratios M_t/V_t in excess of 1.1. only 5% to 8% of mortgagors default, although this magnitude of underexercise is probably overstated because of problems in measuring M^t and for other reasons. Simulations using the model provide a pessimistic outlook for future defaults. Default rates are predicted to double in the five-year period 1988–93. Other simulations examine the relative importance of interest rate fluctuations, property value declines, and geographic or temporal correlations in lending during the 1976–88 period on current default experience.     

Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?

The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadband customers can access Internet content at high speeds. We consider the economic incentives of such a firm to engage in two distinct vertical foreclosure strategies: (1) conduit discrimination—insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting rival platform distribution of its affiliated content and services, and (2) content discrimination—insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content.     

Hedging House Price Risk in China

The increasing risk associated with China's housing prices is globally recognized. However, hedging this risk is challenging because of a lack of financial derivatives on China's housing assets. We suggest that the short sale of futures contracts for construction raw materials, i.e., iron ore or/and steel, can act as useful tools to hedge the systematic risk of China's new home price. We first present evidence that there is a strong and stable correlation between changes in China's housing prices and global steel/iron ore prices. Using a hedging strategy model, we then show that, during the sample period between 2009 and 2015, 20.6% of the total unpredicted variance in Chinese housing prices can be hedged by shorting rebar and iron ore futures. We further examine this strategy with an event study based on the announcement of the “home‐purchase restriction” policy in April, 2010. The cumulative abnormal returns show that both steel and iron ore prices reacted significantly to this negative shock, and therefore the proposed strategy could substantially help investors offset losses in the housing market. We finally provide some evidences that this strategy can also help investors in specific regional housing markets, or the resale housing markets.     

Exclusivity Contracts,Insurance and Financial Market Foreclosure

We study the trade‐off between the positive effects (risk‐sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton [ 1987 ] under risk‐aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk‐sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival into the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk‐sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, risk‐sharing alone cannot be invoked to defend exclusivity contracts.     

煤炭市场供需波动与价格风险管理

大秦线的春季检修是历年上半年北方下水煤供应波动的主要因素,通过分析发现大秦线检修带来的供给波动在历年的夏季价格大跌中发挥了关键性作用。除了大秦线检修之外,需求的波动、运输计划的调整等都会带来市场的波动。在供大于求的市场环境下,价格易跌难涨,波动对于短期价格变化有重大影响。价格的下行实际上是在各种供需波动作用下,少涨多跌的动态调整过程。因此,在当前的煤炭经营管理中,应强化波动管理,最大限度地避免供需波动、平滑煤炭供应、稳定市场价格。     

Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure

This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.     

House Price Changes and Idiosyncratic Risk: The Impact of Property Characteristics

Although the average change in house prices is related to changes in fundamentals or perhaps market-wide bubbles, not all houses in a market appreciate at the same rate. The primary focus of our study is to investigate the reasons for these variations in price changes among houses within a market. We draw on three theories for guidance, one related to the optimal search strategy for sellers of atypical dwellings, another focusing on the bargaining process between a seller and potential buyers and the third relying on the concept of land leverage. We hypothesize that houses will appreciate at different rates depending on the characteristics of the property and the change in the strength of the housing market. These hypotheses are supported using data from three New Zealand housing markets.     

浅谈“奖金”的激励作用

一、目前激励制度存在的问题随着分配制度改革的不断深化 ,越来越多的国有企业将职工个人收入与企业或部门效益挂起钩来 ,实行了承包制、效益工资制等多种分配形式 ,其目的是充分调动经营者和生产者的积极性、主动性和创造性 ,激励广大职工为实现组织目标多做贡献 ,尽最大努力创造更好的效益。这些办法在实践中取得了成效 ,但其中也存在这样或那样的问题。1 指标 (目标 )不尽科学合理。有的单位将任务指标订得尽可能低一些 ,认为这样会使完成任务的把握更大一些 ,对职工的激励会更大一些 ;另一些单位认为将下属单位的分解指标订得尽可能高一…     

国际石油公司价格风险管理与启示

石油价格的持续上涨和剧烈波动迫切要求石油公司运用衍生金融工具管理价格风险.国际石油公司运用衍生金融工具管理价格风险的主要做法包括衍生品交易与实货交易的一体化操作、对风险的定量化测算、对多种风险的战略性管理等.我国石油公司在海外期货市场进行交易时面临监管、风险、成本等多重障碍.我国应进一步改革石油定价机制,参照国际经验,建立包括石油现货市场、远期市场、期货市场在内的多层次的石油市场体系,并根据交易所和OTC市场相互促进的特点,推动场外交易市场的发展,加强对衍生品市场和参与者的监管.同时,石油企业应重视复合型人才的培养和储备,进一步完善风险管理机制,增加对国际市场及交易规则的深入细致的了解.     

Previous Marriage and the Lesbian Wage Premium

This paper provides insight into the wage gap between partnered lesbians and other groups of women. Using data from the 2000 Decennial Census, we find that wages of never-married lesbians are significantly higher than wages of previously married lesbians and other groups of women. Results indicate that controlling for previous marriage reduces the estimated lesbian wage premium by approximately 20 percent. Our research also reveals that wage patterns of previously married lesbians mirror those of cohabiting heterosexual women. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that the lesbian wage premium is driven, in part, by differences in the labor-market commitment of lesbians and heterosexual women.     

Foreclosure's Wake: The Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure

While a substantial literature has examined the causes of mortgage foreclosure, there has been relatively little work on the consequences of foreclosure for the borrowers themselves. Using a large sample of anonymous credit bureau records, observed quarterly from 1999 through 2010, we examine the credit experiences of 330,000 borrowers before and after a foreclosure start. Our analysis documents the substantial declines in credit scores that accompany a foreclosure start and examines the length of time it takes individuals to return their credit scores to predelinquency levels. The results suggest that, particularly for prime borrowers, credit score recovery comes slowly, if at all. The lack of recovery appears to be driven by persistently higher delinquency rates on consumer credit (such as auto and credit card loans) in the years that follow their foreclosure start. Our results also indicate that the experiences of individuals whose mortgages entered foreclosure from 2007 to 2009 have followed a similar path to borrowers foreclosed earlier in the decade, though their postforeclosure‐start delinquency rates have been higher and, consequently, credit score recovery appears to be taking longer.     

结构重组、规制滞后与纵向圈定——中国电信、联通“反垄断”案例的若干思考

以反垄断机构对中国电信和中国联通两家公司,在互联网骨干网接入环节"接入歧视行为"的反垄断调查为线索,本文的经验研究发现,2007年中国电信产业重组后所形成的不对称寡头垄断结构,使部分一体化运营商在接入和互联环节获得了一定的垄断势力,可以通过接入的价格或质量歧视,对上下游的竞争者产生一定的圈定效应。这种行为由于获得了行业规制者的许可,也限制了《反垄断法》发挥作用的范围和效力。