Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games

We develop a notion of subgames and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium – possibly in mixed strategies – for stochastic timing games. To capture all situations that can arise in continuous-time models, it is necessary to consider stopping times as the starting dates of subgames. We generalize Fudenberg and Tirole’s (Rev. Econom. Stud. 52, 383–401, 1985) mixed-strategy extensions to make them applicable to stochastic timing games and thereby provide a sound basis for subgame-perfect equilibria of preemption games. Sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence are presented, and examples illustrate their application as well as the fact that intuitive arguments can break down in the presence of stochastic processes with jumps.     

On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium. Our proof reveals that the assumption in global games that the noise errors are independent of the state imposes a non-trivial restriction on incomplete information perturbations.     

Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice

We study the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule.     

Robustness checks and robustness tests in applied economics

A common exercise in empirical studies is a “robustness check”, where the researcher examines how certain “core” regression coefficient estimates behave when the regression specification is modified by adding or removing regressors. If the coefficients are plausible and robust, this is commonly interpreted as evidence of structural validity. Here, we study when and how one can infer structural validity from coefficient robustness and plausibility. As we show, there are numerous pitfalls, as commonly implemented robustness checks give neither necessary nor sufficient evidence for structural validity. Indeed, if not conducted properly, robustness checks can be completely uninformative or entirely misleading. We discuss how critical and non-critical core variables can be properly specified and how non-core variables for the comparison regression can be chosen to ensure that robustness checks are indeed structurally informative. We provide a straightforward new Hausman (1978) type test of robustness for the critical core coefficients, additional diagnostics that can help explain why robustness test rejection occurs, and a new estimator, the Feasible Optimally combined GLS (FOGLeSs) estimator, that makes relatively efficient use of the robustness check regressions. A new procedure for Matlab, testrob, embodies these methods.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

电网故障模型中贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论的应用

由于电网的复杂性和多变性,导致电网故障中存在信息不确定性问题,这就需要依靠贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论的自动生成方法。文章主要描述了这两种方法的原理,讨论了贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论在电网故障模型领域应用的可能方式和情况,并运用一些实例证明了这种方法的可靠性。     

Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models

A central unanswered question in economic theory is that of price formation in disequilibrium. This paper lays the groundwork for a model that has been suggested as an answer to this question in, particularly, Arrow [Toward a theory of price adjustment, in: M. Abramovitz, et al. (Ed.), The Allocation of Economic Resources, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1959], Fisher [Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983] and Hahn [Information dynamics and equilibrium, in: F. Hahn (Ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989]. We consider sellers that monopolistically compete in prices but have incomplete information about the structure of the market they face. They each entertain a simple demand conjecture in which sales are perceived to depend on the own price only, and set prices to maximize expected profits. Prior beliefs on the parameters of conjectured demand are updated into posterior beliefs upon each observation of sales at proposed prices, using Bayes’ rule. The rational learning process, thus, constructed drives the price dynamics of the model. Its properties are analysed. Moreover, a sufficient condition is provided, relating objectively possible events and subjective beliefs, under which the price process is globally stable on a conjectural equilibrium for almost all objectively possible developments of history.     

A Bayesian approach to optimal monetary policy with parameter and model uncertainty

This paper undertakes a Bayesian analysis of optimal monetary policy for the U.K. We estimate a suite of monetary-policy models that include both forward- and backward-looking representations as well as large- and small-scale models. We find an optimal simple Taylor-type rule that accounts for both model and parameter uncertainty. For the most part, backward-looking models are highly fault tolerant with respect to policies optimized for forward-looking representations, while forward-looking models have low fault tolerance with respect to policies optimized for backward-looking representations. In addition, backward-looking models often have lower posterior probabilities than forward-looking models. Bayesian policies therefore have characteristics suitable for inflation and output stabilization in forward-looking models.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Micro-interaction dynamics in group decision making: Face games, interaction order and boundary work

Drawing on Goffman's face theory, this paper documents and interprets the micro interaction dynamics underlying group decision making within a consultancy task force. Our analysis suggests that decision making is an instance of strategic face-to-face behavior where individuals seek to influence each other and reach decisions by means of face-work and self-presentation tactics. Moreover, face-to-face behavior generates an ‘interaction order’ that frames the decision making situation and constrains further interactions among decision makers. We discuss the implications that can be drawn from the observed case by relating our findings to the emergent stream of studies on micro-decision making.     

Bayesian inference and prediction in the single server Markovian queue

The use of stochastic models and performance measures for the analysis of real life queuing scenarios are based on the fundamental premise that parameters values are known. This is a rarity since more often than not, parameters are usually unknown and require to be estimated. This paper presents techniques for the same from Bayesian perspective. The queue we intend to deal with is the M/M/1 queuing model. Several closed form expressions on posterior inference and prediction are presented which can be readily implemented using standard spreadsheet tools. Previous work in this direction resulted in non-existence of posterior moments. A way out is suggested. Interval estimates and tests of hypothesis on performance measures are also presented.     

Delay,multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games

We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria as the players become infinitely patient need not be unique.     

Portfolio management with robustness in both prediction and decision: A mixture model based learning approach

We develop in this paper a novel portfolio selection framework with a feature of double robustness in both return distribution modeling and portfolio optimization. While predicting the future return distributions always represents the most compelling challenge in investment, any underlying distribution can be always well approximated by utilizing a mixture distribution, if we are able to ensure that the component list of a mixture distribution includes all possible distributions corresponding to the scenario analysis of potential market modes. Adopting a mixture distribution enables us to (1) reduce the problem of distribution prediction to a parameter estimation problem in which the mixture weights of a mixture distribution are estimated under a Bayesian learning scheme and the corresponding credible regions of the mixture weights are obtained as well and (2) harmonize information from different channels, such as historical data, market implied information and investors׳ subjective views. We further formulate a robust mean-CVaR portfolio selection problem to deal with the inherent uncertainty in predicting the future return distributions. By employing the duality theory, we show that the robust portfolio selection problem via learning with a mixture model can be reformulated as a linear program or a second-order cone program, which can be effectively solved in polynomial time. We present the results of simulation analyses and primary empirical tests to illustrate a significance of the proposed approach and demonstrate its pros and cons.     

Forecasting and turning point predictions in a Bayesian panel VAR model

We provide methods for forecasting variables and predicting turning points in panel Bayesian VARs. We specify a flexible model, which accounts for both interdependencies in the cross section and time variations in the parameters. Posterior distributions for the parameters are obtained for hierarchical and for Minnesota-type priors. Formulas for multistep, multiunit point and average forecasts are provided. An application to the problem of forecasting the growth rate of output and of predicting turning points in the G-7 illustrates the approach. A comparison with alternative forecasting methods is also provided.     

“How may I help you?” Politeness in computer-mediated and face-to-face library reference transactions

Drawing upon Wittgenstein’s theory of language games, we apply a pragmatic approach to organizational communication. The study extends current theories of computer-mediated communication, and explores how language actually gets used across media. We conduct a comparative study of face-to-face versus computer-mediated reference transactions in an academic library, and analyze people’s use of politeness strategies. The study observes that people use politeness strategies to play different language games across media, and that a dynamic interplay exists among the three constituents of language games: sense making, language use, and forms of life. In particular, we found that: First, people use significantly more negative politeness strategies and fewer positive politeness strategies online than face-to-face. Second, language use influences people’s understanding and precedes practical forms of life. Third, CMC is a different form of life than a face-to-face communication. The new online form of life shapes people’s sense making and the way they use language, resulting in emerging new grammars of CMC. Finally, our findings suggest the interplay among multiple forms of life. This study offers important theoretical and managerial implications for organizational communication and the production and delivery of services in the rapidly expanding digital economy.     

A Bayesian approach for predicting food and beverage sales in staff canteens and restaurants

Accurate demand forecasting is one of the key aspects for successfully managing restaurants and staff canteens. In particular, properly predicting future sales of menu items allows for a precise ordering of food stock. From an environmental point of view, this ensures a low level of pre-consumer food waste, while from the managerial point of view, this is critical to the profitability of the restaurant. Hence, we are interested in predicting future values of the daily sold quantities of given menu items. The corresponding time series show multiple strong seasonalities, trend changes, data gaps, and outliers. We propose a forecasting approach that is solely based on the data retrieved from point-of-sale systems and allows for a straightforward human interpretation. Therefore, we propose two generalized additive models for predicting future sales. In an extensive evaluation, we consider two data sets consisting of multiple time series collected at a casual restaurant and a large staff canteen and covering a period of 20 months. We show that the proposed models fit the features of the considered restaurant data. Moreover, we compare the predictive performance of our method against the performance of other well-established forecasting approaches.     

Forecasting short-term defaults of firms in a commercial network via Bayesian spatial and spatio-temporal methods

To protect financial institutions from unexpected credit losses, during the monitoring phase of granted loans it is of primary importance to foresee any evidence of a contagion of liquidity distress across a network of firms. This term indicates a situation of lack of solvency of a firm (e.g., a customer) that propagates to other firms (e.g, its suppliers), which could consequently face challenges in repaying their own granted loans. In this paper, we look for the evidence of contagion of liquidity distress on an Intesa Sanpaolo proprietary dataset by means of Bayesian spatial and spatio-temporal models. Our results indicate that such models can detect cases of distress not yet apparent from covariate information collected on the firms by instead borrowing information from the network, leading to improved forecasting performance on the prediction of short-term default with respect to state-of-the-art methods.     

How oil price and exchange rate affect stock price in China using Bayesian Quantile_on_Quantile with GARCH approach

We revisit the links of real exchange rate, oil price and stock market price for China using Bayesian Multivariate Quantile_on_Quantile with GARCH approach over the period of September 14, 2001 to June 17, 2022 (a total of 4051 days). Results indicate both the links between stock price and oil price and between stock price and exchange rate varying under different combinations of quantiles. GARCH model also indicate that yesterday news and persistence measures varying with current conditional variance under different quantiles. We further estimate half-life of a shock to our whole markets and find out the half-life of a shock range from 0.415 to 4.015 days. Result not found in previous study. Our study has important policy implications for the investors, practitioners, and the government.     

区域经济政策制定与实施过程中的政府行为选择的博弈分析--以我国财政转移支付制度的博弈分析为例证

在区域经济政策制定与实施的过程中，由于政策的供给者与接受者、实施对象之间存在着目标与利益的不一致性，因而它们之间的博弈行为就会不可避免地发生政府间行为选择的博弈过程可体现在区域经济政策目标函数选择与政策工具选择等多个方面，应该说博弈的结果对政策制度与选择的优化是有利的。     

A Geo-Additive Bayesian Discrete-Time Survival Model and its Application to Spatial Analysis of Childhood Mortality in Malawi

We describe a flexible geo-additive Bayesian survival model that controls, simultaneously, for spatial dependence and possible nonlinear or time-varying effects of other variables. Inference is fully Bayesian and is based on recently developed Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques. In illustrating the model we introduce a spatial dimension in modelling under-five mortality among Malawian children using data from Malawi Demographic and Health Survey of 2000. The results show that district-level socioeconomic characteristics are important determinants of childhood mortality. More importantly, a separate spatial process produces district clustering of childhood mortality indicating the importance of spatial effects. The visual nature of the maps presented in this paper highlights relationships that would, otherwise, be overlooked in standard methods.