Analyzing U.S. Output and the Great Moderation by Simultaneous Unobserved Components

This paper seeks to determine the causal interaction between structural trend and cycle innovations in an unobserved components framework of aggregate output. For the purpose of identification, I propose allowing for shifts in volatility. This strategy provides good estimation precision when applied to U.S. industrial production. In the early 1980s, predominance of cycle shocks gives way to strong negative spillovers of trend impulses, consistent with real business cycle theories. The coincident reduction of macroeconomic volatility was mainly caused by pronounced dampening of transitory disturbances. This is in accordance with an important role of macroeconomic policy in explaining the Great Moderation.     

Investment‐Specific News Shocks and U.S. Business Cycles

We provide robust evidence that news shocks about future investment‐specific technology (IST) constitute a significant force behind U.S. business cycles. Positive IST news shocks induce comovement, that is, raise output, consumption, investment, and hours. These shocks account for 70% of the business cycle variation in output, hours, and consumption, and 60% of the variation in investment, and have played an important role in 9 of the last 10 U.S. recessions. Our findings provide strong support for shifting focus to IST news shocks when investigating the role of news in driving U.S. business cycles.     

Financial frictions on capital allocation: A transmission mechanism of TFP fluctuations

This paper provides a theory of financial frictions as a transmission mechanism for news shocks to drive aggregate TFP fluctuations. We show that in an economy calibrated to U.S. data, variations in financial frictions on capital allocation in response to news about future technology can generate aggregate TFP fluctuations and, thus, trigger business cycles before the actual technological change is realized. Using the COMPUSTAT dataset, we find that the relative capital productivity of financially constrained to unconstrained firms is highly countercyclical. Moreover, our VAR analysis shows that news shocks can account for a substantial fraction of the relative capital productivity fluctuations over business cycle frequencies.     

Why Manufacture Offshore? An Empirical Analysis of Valuation Effects

In this study, announcements by U.S. firms of offshore joint venture manufacturing during the 1980s are used to provide more comprehensive evidence than past studies on the wealth effects of offshore joint ventures. Evidence shows that the target country's level of economic development and political stability, currency strength of the originating country (U.S. in this study) relative to that of the target country, U.S. firm's mode of entry, and the relative value of the U.S. firm's investment in the joint venture affect the wealth of U.S. firms which engage in offshore joint ventures. The target country's level of economic development, its political stability, and the currency strength of the originating country relative to the target country are shown to be the dominant economic factors. Of particular importance, evidence indicates that the target country's level of economic development is a more important determinant of excess returns than is its political stability.     

Deposit interest rate ceilings as credit supply shifters: Bank level evidence on the effects of Regulation Q

How did deposit interest rate ceilings, an important feature of the U.S. regulatory regime until the mid-1980s, affect individual banks’ lending and the transmission of monetary policy to credit? I estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in Regulation Q on commercial banks’ credit growth using a historical bank level data set starting in 1959. Banks’ credit growth contracted sharply when legally fixed deposit rate ceilings were binding. Interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non-linear and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place. Bank size and capitalization mitigate these effects. At the bank level, short-term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify policy induced credit supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the bank lending channel substantially since the early 1980s.     

Relative prices and inventory investment

In macroeconomic models of the economy disequilibrium is reflected in undesired investment. This undesired investment is largely in the form of undesired accumulations or depletions of inventories. Therefore, in studying inventory investment one is analyzing the adjustment of the goods market in disequilibrium. In order to study this process the Brunner-Meltzer three market model of the economy is modified to explicity treat inventory investment. The resulting relative price model of inventory behaviour is then tested on aggregate yearly and quarterly U.S. data.     

Can financial innovation help to explain the reduced volatility of economic activity?

The stabilization of economic activity in the mid 1980s has received considerable attention. Research has focused primarily on the role played by milder economic shocks, improved inventory management, and better monetary policy. This paper explores another potential explanation: financial innovation. Examples of such innovation include developments in lending practices and loan markets that have enhanced the ability of households and firms to borrow and changes in government policy such as the demise of Regulation Q. We employ a variety of simple empirical techniques to identify links between the observed moderation in economic activity and the influence of financial innovation on consumer spending, housing investment, and business fixed investment. Our results suggest that financial innovation should be added to the list of likely contributors to the mid-1980s stabilization.     

Strategic investment decision making practices: A contextual approach

This paper proposes a contextual approach to explaining differences in strategic investment decision (SID) making practices. First, a systematic contextual framework is developed from the existing research literature. Then this framework's potential for explaining differences in SID making practices is explored through 14 case studies of U.K., U.S. and Japanese companies from both stable and dynamic business sectors. Our findings suggest substantial SID differences across our four contextual categories of market creators, value creators, refocusers and restructurers. The differences relate to the emphasis on strategic versus financial considerations, the thoroughness and rigidity of financial analysis, the attitudes towards incorporating less easily quantifiable factors and the level of hurdle rates.     

Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?

The average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more than doubles from 1980 to 2006. A measure of the economic importance of this increase is that at the end of the sample period, the average firm can retire all debt obligations with its cash holdings. Cash ratios increase because firms' cash flows become riskier. In addition, firms change: They hold fewer inventories and receivables and are increasingly R&D intensive. While the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in explaining the increase in cash ratios, we find no consistent evidence that agency conflicts contribute to the increase.     

The stylized facts about the behavior of manufacturers' inventories and backorders over the business cycle: 1959–1980

Recent theoretical work has highlighted the role of inventories in propagating business cycles. This paper attempts to provide an empirical foundation for current and future research on the role inventories play in business cycles. The evidence presented here indicates that inventories and backorders are major variables in predicting output fluctuations. Further, the evidence is that disaggregating inventories by stage-of-fabrication is important in predicting output. In concert with previous findings, our results suggest that disaggregated inventories ought to be a component of models of the business cycle.     

Fundamentals,Misvaluation, and Business Investment

Does stock market misvaluation affect business fixed investment? To answer this question, we provide evidence based on U.S. firm‐level panel data. We examine the orthogonality conditions for the investment Q and Euler equations, and our qualitative tests reject the null hypothesis that investment is unaffected by misvaluation (this result is not driven exclusively by the late 1990s). To measure the quantitative effects on investment, we introduce a measure of misvaluation into standard investment equations. Our estimates imply that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in misvaluation increases investment between 20% and 60% relative to the mean level of investment in the sample.     

Tracking U.S. inflation expectations with domestic and global indicators

Are foreign variables important for tracking U.S. inflation expectations? This paper estimates a reduced-form model that takes both domestic and global indicators of economic slack and inflationary pressures into account. Our main findings point towards the instability of the estimated parameters over the last four decades. In particular, global indicators appear to have played a statistically significant role in shaping forecasters’ expectations until the mid-1980s. By contrast, the U.S. monetary policy stance turns out to be relevant in the 1980s and 1990s. We relate this finding to the more aggressive monetary policy conduct implemented by the Fed since the end of the Volcker experiment.     

Inventory Shocks and the Great Moderation

Why did the volatility of U.S. real GDP decline by more than the volatility of final sales with the Great Moderation in the mid‐1980s? One explanation is that firms shifted their inventory behavior toward a greater emphasis on production smoothing. We investigate the role of inventories in the Great Moderation by estimating an unobserved components model that identifies inventory and sales shocks and their propagation in the aggregate data. Our estimates provide no support for increased production smoothing. Instead, smaller transitory inventory shocks are responsible for the excess volatility reduction in output compared to sales. These shocks behave like informational errors related to production that must be set in advance and their reduction also helps explain the changed forecasting role of inventories since the mid‐1980s. Our findings provide an optimistic prognosis for a continuation of the Great Moderation, despite the dramatic movements in output during the recent economic crisis.     

Financing constraints, irreversibility, and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.     

Policy risk and the business cycle

The argument that uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy has been holding back the recovery in the U.S. during the Great Recession has a large popular appeal. This paper uses an estimated New Keynesian model to analyze the role of policy risk in explaining business cycles. We directly measure risk from aggregate data and find a moderate amount of time-varying policy risk. The “pure uncertainty” effect of this policy risk is unlikely to play a major role in business cycle fluctuations. In the estimated model, output effects are relatively small because policy risk shocks are (i) too small and (ii) not sufficiently amplified.     

Why did the average duration of unemployment become so much longer?

There has been a substantial increase in the average duration of unemployment relative to the unemployment rate in the U.S. over the last 30 years. We evaluate the performance of a standard job-search model in explaining this phenomenon. In particular, we examine whether the increase in within-group wage inequality and the decline in the incidence of unemployment can account for the increase in unemployment duration. The results indicate that these two changes can explain a significant part of the increase over the last 30 years, although the model fails to match the behavior of unemployment duration during 1980s.     

Durable Goods,Investment Shocks,and the Comovement Problem

Sticky‐price models suggest that capital investment shocks are an important driver of business cycle fluctuations. Despite quantitative importance in explaining business cycles, a comovement problem emerges because the shocks generate intertemporal substitution effects away from consumption toward investment. This paper resolves the problem by extending the standard sticky‐price model to a two‐sector model with consumer durable services. When durable goods are used as investment in capital and consumer durables, positive capital investment shocks also generate intratemporal substitution effects away from consumer durable services toward nondurable consumption that dominates intertemporal effects. Consequently, consumption increases, and the comovement problem is resolved.     

金融危机背景下我国投资银行业务监管研究

由商业银行次级抵押贷款质量恶化引发的这场金融危机，将美国金融市场拖下泥潭。2008年9月，以雷曼兄弟公司申请破产保护为发端，美国投资银行业遭遇多米诺骨牌效应，相继倒下。美国投资银行业全军覆灭后，中国投资银行业也面临着何去何从的问题。本文首先探析美国投资银行监管模式及其失败的经验与教训，接着对比我国投资银行业务发展中存在的问题与不足，提出了我国投资银行业务健康发展的建议和对策。     

Mood Swings and Business Cycles: Evidence from Sign Restrictions

This paper provides new evidence that bouts of optimism and pessimism are an important source of U.S. business cycles, using the identification schemes based on sign restrictions. We document that identified optimism and pessimism shocks account for about 30% of U.S. business‐cycle fluctuations in hours and output. In addition, our empirical findings are consistent with the intensive‐ and extensive‐margin adjustments in the U.S. labor market over business cycles, providing further support to optimism shocks being an important source of U.S. business cycles. The identified optimism shocks are at least partially rational as total factor productivity is found to rise 8–12 quarters after an initial bout of optimism. While this later finding is consistent with some previous findings in the news shock literature, we cannot rule out that such episodes reflect self‐fulfilling beliefs.     

Investment shocks and business cycles

The origins of business cycles are still controversial among macroeconomists. This paper contributes to this debate by studying the driving forces of fluctuations in an estimated new neoclassical synthesis model of the U.S. economy. In this model, most of the variability of output and hours at business cycle frequencies is due to shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment. Imperfect competition and, to a lesser extent, technological frictions are the key to their transmission. Although labor supply shocks explain a large fraction of the fluctuations in hours at very low frequencies, they are irrelevant over the business cycle. This finding is important because the microfoundations of these disturbances are widely regarded as unappealing.