Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.      

完全信息状态下保险市场主体间的静态博弈研究

保险市场主体的行为以及他们之间的复杂关系直接影响着保险市场的发展,特别是投保人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险代理人的违规操作广泛存在,长期困扰着保险界。本文针对投保人和保险代理人的问题行为,通过建立完全信息静态博弈模型,来深入研究保险人与投保人、保险代理人之间的博弈关系,探讨解决问题的现实对策。     

Pathways to Homeownership: An Analysis of the Residential Location and Homeownership Choices of Black Households in Los Angeles

Recent studies have documented substantially depressed levels of homeownership among African-American households. While prior analyses have focused largely on racial disparities in household financial characteristics, few studies have assessed the potential role of location choice and locational attributes in the homeownership choice decision. This research applies individual-level Census data from the Los Angeles area to explicitly model the residential location and tenure choice decisions of African-American households. Research findings indicate that there is substantial variation across African-American and white households in the determinants of locational choice among South Central LA, other parts of Los Angeles, and Inland Empire (San Bernardino County) areas. In addition, African-American and white households are found to differ in how location characteristics impact in their tenure choices. Overall, after accounting for location, the empirical analysis served to explain three-fourths of the 23 percentage point gap in homeownership rates between Los Angeles white and black households, whereas models that lack controls for location accounted only for about one-half of the observed gap.     

Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals. JEL Classification D82 · D91 · G22     

Insurance loss coverage and social welfare

Restrictions on insurance risk classification may induce adverse selection, which is usually perceived as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society. However, a social benefit of modest adverse selection is that it can lead to an increase in ‘loss coverage’, defined as expected losses compensated by insurance for the whole population. We reconcile the concept of loss coverage to a utilitarian concept of social welfare commonly found in the economic literature on risk classification. For iso-elastic insurance demand, ranking risk classification schemes by (observable) loss coverage always give the same ordering as ranking by (unobservable) social welfare.     

逆向选择与信用配给:中小企业融资难根源分析

文章通过中美中小企业融资的渠道和结构对比,分析中国中小企业融资困难的原因,并进一步通过两个模型解释资金借贷市场上的逆向选择问题和银行被迫采用的信用配给制度.文章最后提出了解决中小企业融资困难的一些建议.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Do firms’ earnings management practices affect their equity liquidity?

This study investigates the relationship between earnings management and equity liquidity, positing that as incentives arise for the manipulation of firm performance through earnings management (due partly to conflicts of interest between firm insiders and outsiders), greater earnings management may signal higher adverse selection costs. If earnings manipulation reveals aggressive accounting practices, liquidity providers tend to widen bid-ask spreads to protect themselves. The empirical results indicate that companies with higher earnings management suffer lower equity liquidity.     

Price impact and bursts in liquidity provision

This paper analyses brief episodes of high-intensity quote turnover and revision—‘bursts’ in quotes—in the US equity market. Such events occur very frequently, several hundred times a day for actively traded stocks. We find significant price impact associated with these market maker initiated events, about five times higher than during non-burst periods. Bursts in quotes are concurrent with short-lived structural breaks in the informational relationship between market makers and market takers. During bursts, market makers no longer passively impound information from order flow into quotes—a departure from the traditional market microstructure paradigm. Rather, market makers significantly impact prices during bursts in quotes. Further analysis shows that there is asymmetry in adverse selection between the bid and ask sides of the limit order book and only a sub-population of market makers enjoys an informational advantage during bursts. Market makers on the side opposite the burst suffer elevated adverse selection costs, while market makers on the side of the burst realize positive spread, irrespective of the order flow direction. Our results call attention to the need for a new microstructure perspective in understanding modern high-frequency limit order book markets and the quote manipulation strategies at the disposal of the fast market makers.     

Have the Doors Opened Wider? Trends in Homeownership Rates by Race and Income

Homeownership among U.S. families increased notably in recent years, from 63 percent in 1989 to 66.2 percent in 1998. This article examines this trend and the factors contributing to it. We find that (1) homeownership rose for all racial, ethnic, and income groups; (2) the differences in homeownership between minority and nonminority families and between middle-income and lower-income families declined significantly; and (3) changes in family-related characteristics explain homeownership trends among only the top two income quintiles. Among the lower two income quintiles, family-related characteristics explain almost none of the increase in homeownership. This pattern suggests that the favorable economic climate of the last decade, changes in mortgage and housing markets, and changes in the regulations governing those markets account for the increase in homeownership among lower-income families.     

Adverse selection costs for NASDAQ and NYSE after decimalization

NYSE and NASDAQ completed their decimalization on January 29, 2001 and on April 9, 2001 respectively. In this paper, we compare adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread for NASDAQ and NYSE stocks after decimalization using the data from May 2001 and July 2001. We find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is significantly lower on NASDAQ than on NYSE, and these differences cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the stocks traded in the two markets. In addition, we find that the adverse selection costs increase with trade size on NYSE, however there is no monotonic pattern observed for NASDAQ stocks. Lastly, we report that although the order flows arrived in the two markets are significantly different, they can at best explain a small portion of the observed differences in adverse selection costs.     

GSE Activity,FHA Feedback,and Implications for the Efficacy of the Affordable Housing Goals

There is a seeming paradox regarding the “affordable housing goals”: GSE activities in targeted communities have increased under the goals but there has been little measurable improvement in housing market conditions in these communities. This paper seeks to reconcile this paradox by focusing on linkage between GSE purchases and FHA activities. We present a simple theoretical framework suggesting that GSE activities can have a feedback effect on FHA. More aggressive GSE pursuit of targeted borrowers under the affordable housing goals induces potential FHA borrowers with best credit quality to use the conventional market. Changes to the housing market will depend on the FHA response to the loss of its best credits, with many different possible outcomes for credit supply and homeownership, including scenarios in which they remain effectively unchanged. While market-level benefits might not be forthcoming, the shift from FHA to less costly conventional loans is clearly beneficial for affected borrowers. Two-stage least squares estimates of the relationship between GSE and FHA lending after the affordable housing goals were made more binding are found to be consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

Adverse selection and the market for annuities

Adverse selection is often blamed for the malfunctioning of the annuities market. We simulate the impact of adverse selection on the consumption allocation of annuitants under alternative parameter values, and explore the resulting welfare implications. We show that, for most parameter values, the welfare losses associated with equilibriums that are subject to adverse selection correspond to a loss of wealth of around one percent in a first-best equilibrium. These losses are smaller than the corresponding losses associated with equilibriums with no access to an annuity market by an order of magnitude of ten. The existence of substitutes for annuities such as a bequest motive or a social security system intensifies the adverse selection but reduces its welfare impact.

Did decimalization hurt institutional investors?

We examine institutional trading costs around the move to penny size ticks in 2001 (i.e., decimalization). We find that overall trading costs declined, with improvements in most partitions across order size, firm size, and manager style. Improvements were most pronounced for orders that were executed over multiple days and for stocks where the minimum tick sizes were likely to have been binding. However, costs did increase for orders executed within a single day. The improvements we document contrast with changes accompanying the reduction of minimum ticks to sixteenths in 1997 though, in both cases, results suggest that more patient traders fare relatively better than those that demand immediacy.     

The causal relationships between residential property prices and rentals in Hong Kong: 1982–1991

This study examines the causal relationships between sale price changes and rental rate changes in the Hong Kong real estate market. Three different hypotheses are put forth: 1) the demands in the two markets are substitutes, 2) prices and rentals are positively correlated; and 3) prices and rentals are not correlated because of market segmentation. Using quarterly data of sale prices and rental rates for the five categories of residential property from four different districts, causal relationships are not found in 29 cases out of 40. For the other 11 cases, we find that price changes lead rental rate changes. The lag period is found to be one quarter, and this shows that the two markets are efficient: only one quarterly lag is necessary to establish causality where it exists.