Spatial Cournot competition and economic welfare: a note

We investigated welfare implications in location-quantity models in a symmetric linear city. We found that when firms are not agglomerated in equilibrium, increasing the distance between firms raises (reduces) producer surplus and social welfare (consumer surplus). Moreover, central agglomeration is always optimal for consumers among symmetric locations, but not necessarily for producers. Central agglomeration can be inefficient even if it is the unique equilibrium outcome. In short, the firms are more likely to agglomerate or locate closer than what welfare maximizers would dictate, whereas they locate farther apart than what consumer surplus maximizers would recommend.     

An existence theorem for Cournot–Walras equilibria in a monopolistically competitive economy

We establish an existence theorem for Cournot–Walras equilibria in a monopolistically competitive economy. Instead of the traditional approach which depends on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we employ the theories of aggregative games and best reply potential games. We show that, if there exists a representative consumer, under some conditions on preferences and production technologies, the profit maximization game is a (pseudo) best reply potential game. Hence, the existence of the equilibria is proved independently of the well known convex-valued assumption on the best responses. Although our assumptions result in the additive separability on a utility function of a representative consumer, the existence of increasing returns and indivisible productions can be allowed. In our model, it is shown that the game played by firms exhibits strategic substitutes whether the products of firms are substitutes or complements, and this plays an important role for the existence of the equilibria.     

基于cournot Model与Bertrand Model寡头竞争模型的药品最优定价策略

本文将竞争博弈模型引用到药品定价策略中,分别从制造商利润最大化,销售商利润最大化以及总体药品市场价值最大化的角度,研究了在Cournot Model下,制造商应该对销售商采取如何定价策略,而销售商应该如何应对才能达到总体利润最大化;在Bertrand Model下,论证多个药品制造商应该采取一体化的价格管理体系,并在文章最后给出Cournot Model以及Bertrand Model的寡头竞争模型在药品流通渠道管理中的应用。     

非线性古诺模型下的供应链协调问题研究

针对市场需求与资源投入并不一定呈线性增长的特点,在完全信息静态古诺模型的基础上,当面对共同的供应商时,分析在独立市场与竞争市场下的销售商与供应商的利润函数,并在利润驱动导向的前提下,研究其市场进入决策问题。研究发现:当进入成本低于某一阈值,企业应选择进入市场,并且在竞争市场中会降低在位企业的最优定价,减少其市场份额。     

Pricing policy and coordination for a two-layer supply chain of duopolistic retailers and socially responsible manufacturer

This paper explores channel coordination and profit distribution in a two-layer socially responsible supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and two competitive retailers. In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting, the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility and the retailers play Cournot and Collusion games. Besides comparing the optimal decisions of the retailers two game behaviours, the paper analyses the effects of social responsibility on the optimal decisions. It is found that two-part tariff contract resolves channel conflict and provides win–win outcome for a specific range of the franchise fee and it is always possible to find a particular profit split using Nash bargaining product. With increasing social responsibility of the manufacturer, the coordinated wholesale prices of the manufacturer may be both decreasing or ‘U’ shaped and decreasing when the market potentials of the retailers are almost the same or significantly different. Also, at least one coordinated wholesale price is less than the manufacturer's marginal cost. The proposed model is illustrated by a numerical example.     

行业联合限产模型

本文提出了行业联合限产可行性的理论基础,并尝试给出了分配生产配额的限产模型,以期能寻找一种避免价格战不利影响,减少社会资源浪费的可行途径。     

政府管制对基础设施投融资制度变迁的影响——基于演化博弈模型的分析

运用演化博弈模型,对不同强度的政府管制政策下基础设施投融资制度变迁过程进行理论分析,并以我国公用事业民营化改革为案例进行实例分析,结果表明:在基础设施投融资制度变迁过程中,政府管制政策对基础设施投融资制度形成、变迁和演化具有重要影响,政府管制政策的变化情况决定着基础设施投融资制度演化方向和进程.     

法国城市公用事业特许经营制度及启示

文章介绍了特许经营制度的概念 ,分析了法国实行特许经营的政治和经济背景、主要形式及运用这一制度中几个关键问题的解决 ,最后提出了在我国要实行特许经营制度的若干建议。     

关注水利电力工程潜在风险及应对策略

水利电力工程关系到广大人民的切身利益,同时还影响到我国整体的国民经济效益,必须高度重视。本文就我国水利电力工程存在的潜在风险危险以及如何破除这些安全隐患,提出了一些看法。     

“校企合作、工学结合”下利益相关者的博弈分析

大力推进工学结合、校企合作是加快职业教育发展的根本出路,是培养应用性人才的有效方式。     

考虑产品替代和环保水平的供应链优化与协调

针对由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的供应链,考虑制造商生产两种碳足迹不同的可替代的产品,建立供应链优化决策模型,确定最优的产品环保水平与销售价格,提出供应链系统的协调机制.分析了产品之间不同的替代程度对均衡解和各成员利润的影响,并进一步讨论了收益共享契约对于提高供应链环境的作用.研究表明,产品环保水平竞争强度的增加会带来供应链成员利润的增加而价格竞争强度的增加会带来供应链成员利润的减少.集中式决策不仅有利于供应链利润的提高,而且有利于供应链环境的改善.当消费者对产品之间环保水平的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好.     

The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy

International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self‐enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.     

纳入品牌效应的纵向合作广告成本直接分担模型研究

本文研究了合作广告成本直接分担方式下的供应链纵向合作广告问题,考虑了制造商的全国性广告对品牌效应的影响,运用微分对策方法建立模型,根据最优控制理论的极值原理和Hanmilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程求得Stackelberg博弈和协同合作博弈下的最优广告策略,并对模型的最优解进行了比较分析。     

航空公司直销渠道竞合博弈与利益分配研究

各大航空公司纷纷结盟支付宝等第三方支付平台,实现航空公司官网机票直销业务,以期降低分销成本,提高收益;可以预见直销将逐步成为航空公司机票销售的主要渠道。论文首先引入航空公司直销渠道竞争与合作静态一次博弈模型,分析了博弈的结果,从而得到航空公司直销渠道合作与竞争的纳什均衡策略。航空公司之间的博弈是一种长期博弈,因此在静态一次性博弈基础上,建立航空公司直销渠道竞争与合作的动态重复博弈模型,博弈结果是要求航空公司应该采取长期合作策略。最后,分析航空公司之间利益分配问题以及长期合作可能存在的问题和解决建议。