A characterization of Ramsey equilibrium in a model with limited borrowing

This paper considers a one-sector economic growth model with several infinitely-lived heterogeneous households, who differ both in the discount factors as well as preferences over consumption. Unlike the extreme form of borrowing constraint observed in the classical Ramsey model, recently surveyed in Becker (2006), we allow limited borrowing by the households and prove the existence of a perfect foresight equilibrium. We also show that irrespective of production technology employed by the firms, the capital stock sequence converges to the steady state stock and from some time onward all impatient households are in the maximum borrowing state, whereas the most patient household owns entire capital stock and the debts of all other households.     

A simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation

This paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity-enhancing investment. In this model, the central government is benevolent but cannot commit to ex post intergovernmental transfer policies, while local governments act strategically after accounting for the ex post motives of the central government. We then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium. We analyze the effect of central control on local borrowing and show that central control is of no benefit because ex ante local taxation works to offset it. We find the model yields different policy implications that central control is effective when extended to the case of residential mobility.     

On existence in equilibrium models with endogenous default

The equilibrium concept defined by Dubey et al. ,  and  generates equilibria such that asset buyers could raise expected returns by paying more for the assets that they purchase. A simple example shows that, in fact, all equilibria may be return-dominated in that sense. Universal existence in the DGS model thus depends critically on the assumption that lenders are unable to exploit an obvious profit opportunity.     

Solving the incomplete markets model with aggregate uncertainty by backward induction

This paper describes a method to solve models with a continuum of agents, incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty. I use backward induction on a finite grid of points in the aggregate state space. The aggregate state includes a small number of statistics (moments) of the cross-sectional distribution of capital. For any given set of moments, agents use a specific cross-sectional distribution, called “proxy distribution”, to compute the equilibrium. Information from the steady state distribution as well as from simulations can be used to chose a suitable proxy distribution.     

On the Ramsey equilibrium with heterogeneous consumers and endogenous labor supply

In this paper, we address the stability issue, stressing the role of labor supply, in a Ramsey model with heterogeneous households subject to borrowing constraints. Making labor supply endogenous leads us to prove the existence of two kinds of steady state: the one where everybody supplies labor, the other where only the most patient agent refrains from working. Going beyond models with inelastic labor supply, we show how preferences of impatient agents affect the saddle-path stability of each type of steady state and the occurrence of endogenous cycles. When their elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption exceeds one, instability and cycles are less likely, requiring lower degrees of capital-labor substitution. Conversely, elasticity values below one promote the emergence of fluctuations. We end the paper by showing the existence of the intertemporal equilibrium under market incompleteness, using a local approach based on the first-order conditions.     

Learnability of an equilibrium with private information

This paper investigates the learnability of an equilibrium with private information. Agents of each type have their own private information about an exogenous variable and conduct adaptive learning with a heterogeneously misspecified perceived laws of motion (PLM) that includes only this variable. The paper shows that the existence of private information has a nonnegative impact on the learnability of the equilibrium; that is, the condition for learnability is unaffected or relaxed by heterogeneity and/or misspecification in PLMs caused by private information. In a New Keynesian model with private information about fundamental shocks, the learnability of the equilibrium is ensured by the Taylor principle of monetary policy. The paper also confirms that these results hold true not only in the presence of private information, but also in a variety of informational structures.     

A Turnpike Theorem in the Closed Dynamic Leontief Model with a Singular Matrix of Capital Coefficients

The paper refers to the well-known Tsukui turnpike theorem on convergence of optimal growth trajectories in the closed dynamic Leontief model to the maximum balanced growth trajectory, called turnpike. In the original proof of this theorem, the assumption that the matrix B of capital coefficients is non-singular plays an essential role. For many reasons this assumption, very convenient for theoretical analysis, is not always satisfied in input-output systems built for empirical purposes. This paper fills the gap between theory and empirical studies, presenting a proof that convergence of optimal trajectories towards the turnpike is also a characteristic feature of the closed Leontief model in the case when matrix B is singular. The general idea of the proof is based on the approximation of a singular matrix B by an infinite sequence of non-singular matrices.     

A weak α-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents

Inspired by Kajii (1992) and Askoura (2011, 2017), we introduce the notion of the weak $\alpha$-core for games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents. First, we extend the work of Kajii (1992) to games with spaces of strategies defined on Hausdorff topological vector spaces. Furthermore, we prove the nonemptiness of the weak $\alpha$-core. Finally, we establish the relations between normal-form games, games with nonordered preferences and games with pseudo-utilities.     

Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of identical leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showing existence I characterize the equilibrium set and provide a number of results that contribute to the applied literature. As the number of leaders increases, leaders produce more and eventually they deter entry. Leaders produce more than the Cournot best reply, but they may underinvest in entry deterrence. As the number of followers increases, leaders become more aggressive. When this number is large, if leaders can produce the limit quantity and at the same time have market power, then they deter entry.     

Solving the incomplete market model with aggregate uncertainty using a perturbation method

We use a perturbation method to solve the incomplete markets model with aggregate uncertainty described in den Haan et al. [Computational suite of models with heterogeneous agents: incomplete markets and model uncertainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, this issue]. To apply that method, we use a “barrier method” to replace the original problem with occasionally binding inequality constraints by one with only equality constraints. We replace the structure with a continuum of agents by a setting in which a single infinitesimal agent faces prices generated by a representative-agent economy. We also solve a model variant with a large (but finite) number of agents. Our perturbation-based method is much simpler and faster than other methods.     

Introduction to financial frictions and debt constraints

This is an introduction to the special section on financial frictions and debt constraints.     

Turnpike property and convergence rate for an investment model with general utility functions

In this paper we aim to address two questions faced by a long-term investor with a power-type utility at high levels of wealth: one is whether the turnpike property still holds for a general utility that is not necessarily differentiable or strictly concave, the other is whether the error and the convergence rate of the turnpike property can be estimated. We give positive answers to both questions. To achieve these results, we first show that there is a classical solution to the HJB equation and give a representation of the solution in terms of the dual function of the solution to the dual HJB equation. We demonstrate the usefulness of that representation with some nontrivial examples that would be difficult to solve with the trial and error method. We then combine the dual method and the partial differential equation method to give a direct proof to the turnpike property and to estimate the error and the convergence rate of the optimal policy when the utility function is continuously differentiable and strictly concave. We finally relax the conditions of the utility function and provide some sufficient conditions that guarantee the turnpike property and the convergence rate in terms of both primal and dual utility functions.     

Approximate dynamic programming with post-decision states as a solution method for dynamic economic models

I introduce and evaluate a new stochastic simulation method for dynamic economic models. It is based on recent work in the operations research and engineering literatures (Van Roy et al., 1997, Powell, 2007, Bertsekas, 2011), but also had an early application in economics (Wright and Williams, 1982, Wright and Williams, 1984). The baseline method involves rewriting the household׳s dynamic program in terms of post-decision states. This makes it possible to choose controls optimally without computing an expectation. I add a subroutine to the original algorithm that updates the values of states not visited frequently on the simulation path; and adopt a stochastic stepsize that efficiently weights information. Finally, I modify the algorithm to exploit GPU computing.     

Learning cycles in Bertrand competition with differentiated commodities and competing learning rules

This paper stresses the importance of heterogeneity in learning. We consider a Bertrand oligopoly with firms using either least squares learning or gradient learning for determining the price. We demonstrate that convergence properties of the rules are strongly affected by heterogeneity. In particular, gradient learning may become unstable as the number of gradient learners increases. Endogenous choice between the learning rules may induce cyclical switching. Stable gradient learning gives higher average profit than least squares learning, making firms switch to gradient learning. This can destabilize gradient learning which, because of decreasing profits, makes firms switch back to least squares learning.     

Adverse effects of leverage and short-selling constraints in a financial market model with heterogeneous agents

This paper investigates the impact of leverage and short-selling constraints on financial market stability. Investors׳ demand is modelled in a well-known asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs. In particular, I generalise the heterogeneous agents model of Brock and Hommes (1998) and Anufriev and Tuinstra (2013) to allow for leverage constraints as well as a short-selling tax. I consider two examples of adaptive belief systems describing the coevolution of prices and investors׳ beliefs. First, if the market is inhabited by fundamentalist and chartist traders, demand constraints have potential adverse effects and may restrict the stabilising fundamentalist strategy such that mispricing and price volatility increase. Second, if the market is inhabited by fundamentalists, optimists and pessimists with fixed beliefs, demand constraints drive down price volatility, but mispricing remains. The results suggest the stabilising effects of demand constraints in financial markets are limited. Only if asset prices are too high compared to fundamentals, policy makers should consider constraining leverage ratios in order to deflate financial bubbles.     

Tapping the supercomputer under your desk: Solving dynamic equilibrium models with graphics processors

This paper shows how to build algorithms that use graphics processing units (GPUs) installed in most modern computers to solve dynamic equilibrium models in economics. In particular, we rely on the compute unified device architecture (CUDA) of NVIDIA GPUs. We illustrate the power of the approach by solving a simple real business cycle model with value function iteration. We document improvements in speed of around 200 times and suggest that even further gains are likely.     

Equilibrium asset pricing with Epstein-Zin and loss-averse investors

We study multi-period equilibrium asset pricing in an economy with Epstein-Zin (EZ-) agents whose preferences for consumption are represented by recursive utility and with loss averse (LA-) agents who derive additional utility of gains and losses and are averse to losses. We propose an equilibrium gain-loss ratio for stocks and show that the LA-agents are more (less) risk averse than the EZ-agents if their degree of loss aversion is higher (lower) than this ratio. When all the agents have unitary relative risk aversion degree and elasticity of intertemporal substitution, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and the market dominance of the EZ-agents in the long run. Finally, we extend our results to the case in which the LA-agents use probability weighting in their evaluation of gains and losses.     

Solving the incomplete markets model with aggregate uncertainty using the Krusell–Smith algorithm

This paper studies the properties of the solution to the heterogeneous agents model in Den Haan et al. [2009. Computational suite of models with heterogeneous agents: incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, this issue]. To solve for the individual policy rules, we use an Euler-equation method iterating on a grid of pre-specified points. To compute the aggregate law of motion, we use the stochastic-simulation approach of Krusell and Smith [1998. Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy. Journal of Political Economy 106, 868–896]. We also compare the stochastic- and non-stochastic-simulation versions of the Krusell–Smith algorithm, and we find that the two versions are similar in terms of their speed and accuracy.