“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock,the man and the bioeconomist

My tribute paper on Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) provides some memorable stories of Tullock as a person and as a founder of bioeconomics. I include my speech, “Toast and roast: Gordon Tullock,” delivered on the occasion of Tullock’s 80th birthday; also the same “Toast and roast....,” written in the form of a poem, “Ode to Gordon Tullock.” I also discuss Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics. In a concluding section, I recall a couple of my poignant memories of Gordon Tullock.     

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice

In this paper, I discuss Gordon Tullock’s views on Experimentation in Economics, his own research experiment, and his influence on the field of experimental public choice. I argue that Tullock can credibly claim to have been an early supporter of the method and that his work is cited more often than that of other public choice scholars active in the same period. His work on rent seeking forms the basis of an extensive experimental literature and studies on trust, demand revelation and voter turnout have been strongly influenced by Tullock’s work.     

Gordon Tullock as a teacher and mentor

Gordon Tullock was involved in this former graduate student’s life as a dissertation advisor, writing instructor, mentor, and person offering lifelong encouragement. Although my direction was not in public choice, Gordon Tullock has remained a positive influence on everything I have done.     

Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics

In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law School. Tullock’s arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law school close together. The work that resulted during those years consolidated the methodological foundations for a different way of thinking about the economic analysis of law—the “functional” approach to law and economics. The functional law and economics approach espoused by the Virginia School was not attacking any of the results of the Chicago School or the Yale School, but rather proposing a methodological shift. This paper presents some of the results developed by this school and illustrates Tullock’s controversial positions on trials and on the common law system, through anecdotes, Tullock’s own work and related scholarly contributions.     

Gordon Tullock as a political scientist

We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science, focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a “natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago encompassed considerable coursework related to political science. We consider three sources of information to draw conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is clearly significant for central questions in political science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the development of political science scholarship.     

Where are the rent seekers?

In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question ‘where are the rent seekers?’ Tullock proposed that political accountability and ‘free-riding’ incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock’s explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock’s concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock’s model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.     

Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?

Gordon Tullock has been celebrated as an innovative thinker in many areas of public choice. He was also among the first to analyze the law based on the economic approach, yet, his contributions to Law and Economics have been met with skepticism or even outright ignorance. In this paper, I focus on Tullock’s papers dealing with the common law and argue that they contain important insights that have been ignored in the debate regarding legal origins.     

On the extraordinary scholarly life and times of Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock, who passed away at the age of 92 on November 3, 2014, ranks justly near the top of the list of the “founding fathers” of the public choice research program. Most widely known in the academy as coauthor of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), Professor Tullock was not named, unfairly in our joint opinion, as co-recipient of James Buchanan’s 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. A good case nevertheless can be made that Gordon earned Nobel laurels on his own account for groundbreaking contributions to the literatures on, among other topics of scholarly study, rent seeking, autocracy, bureaucracy, war and revolution, law and economics and bio-economics. This essay celebrates Gordon Tullock’s major influences on the field of public choice, including his launching of Public Choice, the journal for which both of us have served as editors, and his impacts on scholars working at the many and obviously fruitful intersections of economics and political science.     

The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

Understanding Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock was rational to a fault, and he tried to insist that others be fully rational, confronting all with any inconsistency in their thinking. He loved to be shocking. He was also quite generous. Tullock’s willingness to take a chance, as editor of Public Choice, on a paper that he did not understand led to the publication of the most widely cited paper ever published in the journal.     

Honoring a pioneer: Gordon Tullock (1922–2014)

Gordon Tullock made seminal contributions to three disciplines, economics, political science, and biology. He was also a founder of bioeconomics. Although economic theory has moved beyond the rational self-interest assumption that underlies his work, Tullock’s contributions were important theoretical stepping stones.     

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.     

Constitutional stability

Political scientists in the pluralist tradition disagree sharply with public and social choice theorists about the importance of institutions and with William Riker in particular, who argues inLiberalism against Populism that the liberal institutions of indirect democracy ought to be preferred to those of populism. This essay reconsiders this dispute in light of two ideas unavailable to Riker at the time. The first, offered by Russell Hardin, is that if we conceptualize constitutions as coordinating devices rather than as social contracts, then we can develop a more satisfying view of the way in which constitutions become self-enforcing. The second idea derives from the various applications of concepts such as the uncovered set. Briefly, although institutions such as the direct election of president are subject to the usual instabilities that concern social choice theorists, those instabilities do not imply that “anything can happen” —instead, final outcomes will be constrained, where the severity of those constraints depends on institutional details. We maintain that these ideas strengthen Riker's argument about the importance of such constitutional devices as the separation of powers, bicameralism, the executive veto, and scheduled elections, as well as the view that federalism is an important component of the institutions that stabilize the American political system. We conclude with the proposition that the American Civil War should not be regarded as a constitutional failure, but rather as a success. I have benefitted from the comments of a number of people on earlier drafts of this essay, especially William Riker, Emerson Niou, Kenneth Shepsle, Gordon Tullock, Thomas Schwartz, and Matthew Spitzer.     

Memories of an altruist who denied the importance of altruism

I consider Gordon Tullock as a scholar who influenced the work of many others both through his own scholarship and in his role as journal editor, and as someone who regularly encouraged younger scholars.     

Experimental tests of Tullock’s contest with and without winner refunds

We examined experimentally the two-agent, complete-information Tullock’s contest, with and without refund for the winner. We find that the average bids in the refund group are higher than the average bids in the group without a refund, consistent with the theory. However, the auctioneer does not increase his profit if he changes the design of the contest by reimbursing the winner’s cost of effort. We also find underbidding for the low-valuation players and overbidding for the high-valuation player in a contest with a refund. Some players chose the corner solution of staying out of the game by biding zero.     

Chocolate-box soldiers: A critique of ‘an economic theory of military tactics’

The purpose of this article is to challenge Geoffrey Brennan and Gordon Tullock's application of methodological individualism to battle in ‘An Economic Theory of Military Tactics’, this journal, 3 (1982, pp. 225–242). My thesis is that methodological individualism distorts the social nature of combat. To defend this thesis, first, I argue that the analysis of Brennan and Tullock assumes the very thing that is most in doubt in a battle, namely, that anyone is motivated to be killed or to kill. These motivations rest on the social ties of combatants to their comrades. Finally, a proper understanding of heroism illustrates the responsibility and sacrifice of battle neglected by Brennan and Tullock's analysis.     

Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry

In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the “non-sciences”. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.     

Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?

I examine sequential round‐robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player and each match is organized as a Tullock contest. A single prize is allocated to the player with the most matches won. I show that, depending on the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the players' ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs differ. Compared to tournaments with matches organized as all‐pay auctions, however, discrimination is weaker and partially reversed. Moreover, aggregate effort in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests is larger than in tournaments with all‐pay auctions. The fairness of round‐robin tournaments may be improved by an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex ante.     

Polanyi and Post-neoliberalism in the Global South: Dilemmas of Re-embedding the Economy

Although Karl Polanyi Studied a different epoch and focused on Europe, his ideas have inspired an outpouring of studies on contemporary problems and prospects in the neoliberal era. The bulk of these studies pertain to industrial countries or global economic issues. However, the human, environmental and financial impact of market deregulation is arguably more devastating in the ‘developing’ countries than in the core. A question thus arises: do Polanyi's reflections on progressive alternatives to liberalism clarify contemporary debates on development alternatives in the Global South? I contend that democratic socialism – Polanyi's preferred remedy to the ‘demolition’ of society and nature occasioned by market civilisation – is problematical in light of what we have learned from the twentieth century, but his framework for evaluating alternatives – featuring the re-embedding of economy in society – remains as powerful as ever, I support this argument with an exploration of socialism and social democracy – as well as community – based alternatives arising from ‘reciprocity’. Each possibility raises distinctive dilemmas, as an analysis of cases reveals.     

Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly

This article discusses Gordon Tullock’s impact on the economics profession and on public choice in particular. It measures this impact through his publications, his editorship of the journal Public Choice, and his association with the Center for Public Choice.