“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock,the man and the bioeconomist

My tribute paper on Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) provides some memorable stories of Tullock as a person and as a founder of bioeconomics. I include my speech, “Toast and roast: Gordon Tullock,” delivered on the occasion of Tullock’s 80th birthday; also the same “Toast and roast....,” written in the form of a poem, “Ode to Gordon Tullock.” I also discuss Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics. In a concluding section, I recall a couple of my poignant memories of Gordon Tullock.     

Honoring a pioneer: Gordon Tullock (1922–2014)

Gordon Tullock made seminal contributions to three disciplines, economics, political science, and biology. He was also a founder of bioeconomics. Although economic theory has moved beyond the rational self-interest assumption that underlies his work, Tullock’s contributions were important theoretical stepping stones.     

On the extraordinary scholarly life and times of Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock, who passed away at the age of 92 on November 3, 2014, ranks justly near the top of the list of the “founding fathers” of the public choice research program. Most widely known in the academy as coauthor of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), Professor Tullock was not named, unfairly in our joint opinion, as co-recipient of James Buchanan’s 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. A good case nevertheless can be made that Gordon earned Nobel laurels on his own account for groundbreaking contributions to the literatures on, among other topics of scholarly study, rent seeking, autocracy, bureaucracy, war and revolution, law and economics and bio-economics. This essay celebrates Gordon Tullock’s major influences on the field of public choice, including his launching of Public Choice, the journal for which both of us have served as editors, and his impacts on scholars working at the many and obviously fruitful intersections of economics and political science.     

Reminiscing about Gordon Tullock

Some thoughts about my year with Gordon Tullock and his intellectual contributions,notably rent-seeking.     

Understanding Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock was rational to a fault, and he tried to insist that others be fully rational, confronting all with any inconsistency in their thinking. He loved to be shocking. He was also quite generous. Tullock’s willingness to take a chance, as editor of Public Choice, on a paper that he did not understand led to the publication of the most widely cited paper ever published in the journal.     

Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics

In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law School. Tullock’s arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law school close together. The work that resulted during those years consolidated the methodological foundations for a different way of thinking about the economic analysis of law—the “functional” approach to law and economics. The functional law and economics approach espoused by the Virginia School was not attacking any of the results of the Chicago School or the Yale School, but rather proposing a methodological shift. This paper presents some of the results developed by this school and illustrates Tullock’s controversial positions on trials and on the common law system, through anecdotes, Tullock’s own work and related scholarly contributions.     

Where are the rent seekers?

In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question ‘where are the rent seekers?’ Tullock proposed that political accountability and ‘free-riding’ incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock’s explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock’s concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock’s model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.     

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice

In this paper, I discuss Gordon Tullock’s views on Experimentation in Economics, his own research experiment, and his influence on the field of experimental public choice. I argue that Tullock can credibly claim to have been an early supporter of the method and that his work is cited more often than that of other public choice scholars active in the same period. His work on rent seeking forms the basis of an extensive experimental literature and studies on trust, demand revelation and voter turnout have been strongly influenced by Tullock’s work.     

Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?

Gordon Tullock has been celebrated as an innovative thinker in many areas of public choice. He was also among the first to analyze the law based on the economic approach, yet, his contributions to Law and Economics have been met with skepticism or even outright ignorance. In this paper, I focus on Tullock’s papers dealing with the common law and argue that they contain important insights that have been ignored in the debate regarding legal origins.     

Remembering Gordon Tullock

This is a short tribute to Gordon Tullock, and the unique approach to bioeconomic issues that he took. The example used is hoarding behavior by various species of squirrels.     

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.     

Memories of an altruist who denied the importance of altruism

I consider Gordon Tullock as a scholar who influenced the work of many others both through his own scholarship and in his role as journal editor, and as someone who regularly encouraged younger scholars.     

Gordon Tullock as a political scientist

We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science, focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a “natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago encompassed considerable coursework related to political science. We consider three sources of information to draw conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is clearly significant for central questions in political science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the development of political science scholarship.     

Fond memories of professor Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock made lasting contribution to the economic notion of cost, while his criticism of the adversarial process in common law has generated recurring research into the efficiency of alternative legal systems.     

Gordon Tullock: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed

Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) contributed substantially to public choice theory and bioeconomics. This paper discusses some of these contributions. His scientific contributions have left a Nobel Prize unbestowed.     

Rent-seeking and the tragedy of the commons: two approaches to problems of collective action in biology and economics

I am interested in how models, practices, and concepts travel across specialties and thereby change and are changed in turn. In the present essay I discuss Gordon Tullock’s ideas about the relationship between biology and economics in the light of his correspondence with the biologist Garrett Hardin. Tullock contributed to one of Hardin’s edited projects, but they took different approaches to related problems, which I characterize as problems of coordinated action. Tullock saw that he and Hardin were up to a similar line of inquiry, and Hardin engaged with him up to a point, but ultimately the biologist differed with the economist regarding the potential for the reliability of a regulating power such as the state.     

The memorable Gordon Tullock

During my visit over 1978-9 to VPI, I got to know Gordon Tullock and his colleagues James Buchanan, Geoff Brennan, and David Friedman well, having meals frequently. I learned from these eloquent debaters a lot in many ways.     

Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry

In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the “non-sciences”. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.     

Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly

This article discusses Gordon Tullock’s impact on the economics profession and on public choice in particular. It measures this impact through his publications, his editorship of the journal Public Choice, and his association with the Center for Public Choice.     

Constitutional Economics--Constitutional Politics

Why does the treatment of American constitutional politics presented in We the People depart so radically from models of constitutional deliberation developed in the type of constitutional economics pioneered by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock? The paper defines three premises that account for the divergence, and concludes by proposing an inquiry into constitutional design that requires insights from both traditions.