Honoring a pioneer: Gordon Tullock (1922–2014)

Gordon Tullock made seminal contributions to three disciplines, economics, political science, and biology. He was also a founder of bioeconomics. Although economic theory has moved beyond the rational self-interest assumption that underlies his work, Tullock’s contributions were important theoretical stepping stones.     

Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?

Gordon Tullock has been celebrated as an innovative thinker in many areas of public choice. He was also among the first to analyze the law based on the economic approach, yet, his contributions to Law and Economics have been met with skepticism or even outright ignorance. In this paper, I focus on Tullock’s papers dealing with the common law and argue that they contain important insights that have been ignored in the debate regarding legal origins.     

Gordon Tullock as a political scientist

We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science, focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a “natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago encompassed considerable coursework related to political science. We consider three sources of information to draw conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is clearly significant for central questions in political science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the development of political science scholarship.     

Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry

In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the “non-sciences”. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.     

“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock,the man and the bioeconomist

My tribute paper on Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) provides some memorable stories of Tullock as a person and as a founder of bioeconomics. I include my speech, “Toast and roast: Gordon Tullock,” delivered on the occasion of Tullock’s 80th birthday; also the same “Toast and roast....,” written in the form of a poem, “Ode to Gordon Tullock.” I also discuss Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics. In a concluding section, I recall a couple of my poignant memories of Gordon Tullock.     

Where are the rent seekers?

In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question ‘where are the rent seekers?’ Tullock proposed that political accountability and ‘free-riding’ incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock’s explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock’s concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock’s model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.     

Rent-seeking and the tragedy of the commons: two approaches to problems of collective action in biology and economics

I am interested in how models, practices, and concepts travel across specialties and thereby change and are changed in turn. In the present essay I discuss Gordon Tullock’s ideas about the relationship between biology and economics in the light of his correspondence with the biologist Garrett Hardin. Tullock contributed to one of Hardin’s edited projects, but they took different approaches to related problems, which I characterize as problems of coordinated action. Tullock saw that he and Hardin were up to a similar line of inquiry, and Hardin engaged with him up to a point, but ultimately the biologist differed with the economist regarding the potential for the reliability of a regulating power such as the state.     

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.     

Remembering Gordon Tullock

This is a short tribute to Gordon Tullock, and the unique approach to bioeconomic issues that he took. The example used is hoarding behavior by various species of squirrels.     

Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics

In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law School. Tullock’s arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law school close together. The work that resulted during those years consolidated the methodological foundations for a different way of thinking about the economic analysis of law—the “functional” approach to law and economics. The functional law and economics approach espoused by the Virginia School was not attacking any of the results of the Chicago School or the Yale School, but rather proposing a methodological shift. This paper presents some of the results developed by this school and illustrates Tullock’s controversial positions on trials and on the common law system, through anecdotes, Tullock’s own work and related scholarly contributions.     

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice

In this paper, I discuss Gordon Tullock’s views on Experimentation in Economics, his own research experiment, and his influence on the field of experimental public choice. I argue that Tullock can credibly claim to have been an early supporter of the method and that his work is cited more often than that of other public choice scholars active in the same period. His work on rent seeking forms the basis of an extensive experimental literature and studies on trust, demand revelation and voter turnout have been strongly influenced by Tullock’s work.     

Introduction

This Journal of Bioeconomics Special Issue celebrates the life and accomplishments of Gordon Tullock (February 13, 1922–November 3, 2014), who was instrumental in establishing the Journal of Bioeconomics and was one of the founders of the discipline. He also deserves much of the credit for public choice theory and the theory of rent-seeking. We present ten tribute papers and three bioeconomics papers—from scholars in Canada,China, Norway, Singapore, and the US—in his honor.     

On the extraordinary scholarly life and times of Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock, who passed away at the age of 92 on November 3, 2014, ranks justly near the top of the list of the “founding fathers” of the public choice research program. Most widely known in the academy as coauthor of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), Professor Tullock was not named, unfairly in our joint opinion, as co-recipient of James Buchanan’s 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. A good case nevertheless can be made that Gordon earned Nobel laurels on his own account for groundbreaking contributions to the literatures on, among other topics of scholarly study, rent seeking, autocracy, bureaucracy, war and revolution, law and economics and bio-economics. This essay celebrates Gordon Tullock’s major influences on the field of public choice, including his launching of Public Choice, the journal for which both of us have served as editors, and his impacts on scholars working at the many and obviously fruitful intersections of economics and political science.     

The unimportance of the choice-value thesis in economics

The choice-value thesis claims that people always choose what is best for them, given their information on the set of alternatives. This paper attempts to show that this assumption is less important than is suggested by the high esteem in which it is held. Modern economics neither relies on it, as shown by inspecting a sample of 742 papers, nor does the rejection of the choice-value thesis imply paternalism, as is sometimes suggested. It is shown that paternalism can be argued against without referring to the choice-value thesis.The author is indebted to an anonymous referee, Laszlo Goerke, Yew-Kwang Ng, Barbara Seel, Gordon Tullock, and other participants at the Forty-ninth International Atlantic Economic Conference in Munich for comments.     

The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

Signaling in a Rent‐Seeking Contest with One‐Sided Asymmetric Information

We consider a two‐player rent‐seeking Tullock contest where one player has private information about his valuation of the prize, which can be high or low. This player can send a costly signal to his opponent, i.e., he can commit to reduce the prize either by some absolute amount of money or proportionally, conditional on winning it. We show that both kinds of signaling imply completely opposite results for separating equilibria, both in terms of conditions for existence and the type of player who sends the costly signal.     

Making a difference — how environmental economists can influence the policy process — a case study of David W Pearce

Can environmental economists influence policy? If so, how? This paper addresses these two questions using the late David Pearce’s career as a case study. Influence can be exercised, but Pearce’s career shows that certain conditions must be met. The first is desire: he wanted to influence policy, and directed a high proportion of his efforts to doing so. He focused particular attention on the power centres of his time — the OECD, World Bank, European Commission, UN, UK government; his influence was aided by his status and location as a professor in a prestige university (UCL) in a major global city (London). His messages were consistent and clear: theory is important, and can be used to frame most environmental challenges as regards both explanation and solution; externalities can be valued; assessing benefits and costs of options is important; market signals (taxes etc) and incentives generally are powerful shapers of behaviour; stock of capital (human, built, natural) is a key measure of sustainability. He communicated simply and clearly, in words and phrases that Ministers for Finance and journalists could understand. All of the broadsheet newspapers in England (Financial Times, Guardian, Independent, Telegraph, Times) were grist to Pearce’s mill of advocacy for environmental economics. He provided the Blueprint books that could be read on a commute and summaries to the media that they could fit into a 1,000 word piece. He didn’t seek out, but neither did he shirk controversy. He worked with various interest groups and politicians, but never to the point were he was co-opted. He initiated and directed the MSc in Environmental and Resource Economics that created an ever-widening and influential pool of advocates for his ideas. Finally, he achieved a prodigious academic output that ensures a sort of immortality, and provided the intellectual ballast the enabled his policy influence.     

Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry

We examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precision r of Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.     

The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec

In the absence of oppression, citizens of a sub-unit who contemplate secession carefully weigh the benefits and costs of different outcomes. Here these costs are shown to be highly variable: they depend on the strategic behavior of each state and on whether cooperative relations would be re-established after secession. Using Quebec as a case, it is shown that threats of non-cooperation by the predecessor state may be discounted as not credible. Elementary game theory, however, shows that, with repeat play, retaliatory non-cooperation could be a rational strategy. Moreover, it is shown that reaching a compromise solution requires a credible threat on the part of the potential secessor to accept a sovereignty where there would be no economic cooperation. In modern welfare states, these risks are severe enough to make secession rare, and incremental constitutional change the norm. For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to Gordon Tullock, Isidoro Massa, other participants at meetings of the Public Choice Society and the European Public Choice Society, Ignatius Horstmann, Douglas Brown, the editors, and two anonymous referees. Errors are mine.     

Gordon Tullock as a teacher and mentor

Gordon Tullock was involved in this former graduate student’s life as a dissertation advisor, writing instructor, mentor, and person offering lifelong encouragement. Although my direction was not in public choice, Gordon Tullock has remained a positive influence on everything I have done.