Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies

The paper develops a theoretical rationale for a non-linear relationship between the level of democracy and government spending. A model is presented showing why and how political participation influences the spending behavior of opportunistic governments that can choose an optimal combination of rents and public goods to attract political support. If the level of democracy remains low, governments rationally prefer rents as an instrument to assure political support. With increasing democratic participation, however, rents become an increasingly expensive (per unit of political support) instrument while the provision of public goods becomes more and more efficient in ensuring the incumbent government's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy, which drives a country from a pure autocracy to a semi-participatory system, tends to reduce government spending, while an increase in political participation from a semi-participatory country to a full democracy tends to raise the size of the public sector.     

The Dynamics of Growth and Income Inequality under Progressive Taxation

This paper develops an endogenous growth model having a progressive income tax structure in which heterogeneous agents, who differ in terms of their rates of time preference, supply labor elastically. We analyze the dynamic adjustment to an increase in progressivity and show that the economy will converge to an equilibrium growth path with nondegenerate distributions of both income and wealth. The role of the endogeneity of labor supply is emphasized and shown to have a major impact on the nature of the transitional path, as a result of the impact of the progressive tax on agents’ work incentives. Our theoretical analysis is supplemented with, and supported by, numerical simulations, which generally match the empirical evidence rather closely. We also show that the responses of the different income groups contrast sharply from one another so that focusing on the economy‐wide average provides an incomplete picture.     

Government Spending, Taxation, and Oil Revenues in Mexico

The paper analyzes the intertemporal relationship between oil duties, taxes, government spending, and GDP in Mexico during the 1981–98 period. The results from estimating a VAR model, impulse response functions, and variance decompositions on the quarterly series of taxes, government spending, oil duties, and GDP suggest that there seems to be a substitution effect between oil duties and tax revenues, and that tax revenues are not able to absorb temporary decreases in oil duties. Also, increases in tax revenue might lead to increasing government spending, but short–run increases in government spending are not likely to lead to political pressure to reduce the expected budget deficit via increased taxation and/or oil revenues. Lastly, GDP is not stimulated in the short–run by temporary increases in government spending and, thus, stabilization measures adopted in recent years to reduce the size of the government are not likely to significantly undermine GDP growth.     

Schumpeterian Growth with Productive Public Spending and Distortionary Taxation

Schumpeterian growth theory eliminates the scale effect by positing a process of development of new product lines that fragments the aggregate market in submarkets whose size does not increase with population or the size of the workforce. This entails the sterilization of the growth effects of selected fiscal variables. This insight is applied to shed new light on the role of distortionary taxes on consumption, household labor and assets income, corporate income, and of productive public spending. The framework allows the identification of which of these fiscal variables have permanent (steady‐state) growth effects, and which ones have only transitory effects. It also allows the transitional dynamics to be solved analytically and thus the analysis of the welfare effects of revenue‐neutral changes in tax structure. It is found that replacing taxes that distort labor supply with taxes that distort saving/investment choices raises welfare, and the intuition behind this surprising result is discussed.     

Trans‐Tasman Transmission of Government Spending Shocks

This paper investigates the international transmission of fiscal shocks between two closely‐linked, open economies. We estimate impulse response functions using a semi‐structural vector auto regressive (VAR) model and quarterly data from Australia and New Zealand for the period 1973:3–2008:4. We compare our empirical results with impulse response functions from a calibrated two‐country international real business cycle model with habit formation and adjustment costs to investment. We show that a positive shock to Australian government consumption leads to an increase in Australian output initially and then to a decline in the medium term, while the New Zealand output is negatively affected both in the short and medium term. This result is in line with the recent literature that reports beggar‐thy‐neighbour effect of positive government spending shocks.     

政府支出、产业结构与经济增长

基于2007～2016年的省级面板数据,构建对称和非对称倒"U"方程检验民生支出对经济增长的影响以及产业结构对其效果的影响,对最优民生支出和偏离最优规模的效率损失进行测度,然后研究消费和生产性支出对经济增长的影响以及产业结构对其效果的影响。研究结果表明:民生支出与经济增长之间存在非对称倒"U"关系,多数省份低于最优规模,但正向最优规模靠拢;产业结构会提高最优民生支出规模,东部和中部地区的民生支出规模低于最优规模,但西部地区已经达到甚至超过了最优规模,偏离最优民生支出的效率损失从东、中到西依次递减;消费和生产性支出对经济增长的影响为负,产业结构对消费性支出效果的影响不显著,但会减轻生产性支出的抑制效应;产业升级对经济增长的促进作用会随着民生和生产性支出的扩张而增大,但受消费性支出扩张的影响很小。     

日本政府财政支出的经济增长效应及启示

政府财政支出与经济增长存在一定的相关关系,但孰为因果莫衷一是。通过对1956-2008年日本政府财政支出与经济增长的协整分析和格兰杰因果关系检验,发现日本政府财政投资性支出与财政消费性支出均与经济增长长期内存在稳定的正向协整关系及单向因果关系,经济增长是财政支出增长的格兰杰因,而财政支出无论是投资性还是消费性支出都不是经济增长的格兰杰因。从这一结论出发,我国应吸取日本的经验教训,在实施积极的财政政策时,要控制规模、优化结构、确保质量、提高效益。     

Spending Growth With Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Decentralized Government Spending In Norway, 1880–1990

Vertical fiscal imbalance, decentralized responsibility of spending with centralized financing, creates a common pool problem with spending pressure towards central funds. A model of decentralized government spending under vertical fiscal imbalance is developed, and the importance of national political characteristics for internalization of costs and spending level is investigated in an econometric analysis of Norway during 1880–1990. We argue that in a parliamentary democracy, the internalization of costs is influenced by the party fragmentation of parliament. This is confirmed by the econometric analysis using a Herfindahl index as a measure of fragmentation and political strength.     

内生增长、政府生产性支出与中国居民消费

中国财政支出的较大一部分用于生产建设,中国居民消费与政府生产性支出表现出稳健的正相关关系,这一事实与从标准的新古典和新凯恩斯模型得出的挤出效应截然不同。本文构建了包含存量和流量两部分政府生产性支出的内生增长模型,研究表明,政府支出增加在提高税负、挤出居民消费的同时,也通过其生产性增加收入、挤入居民消费;政府支出增加究竟挤入还是挤出居民消费取决于两种效应的比较以及政府的生产性支出比重和税负水平。政府生产性支出的最优结构等于其相对生产性之比,政府支出的最优规模等于政府支出的生产性。     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

On the Popular Support for Progressive Taxation

The “popular support for progressive taxation theorem” ( Marhuenda and Ortuño‐Ortín, 1995 ) provides an important formalization of the intuition that a majority of relatively poor voters over rich ones leads to progressive income taxation. Yet the theorem does not provide an equilibrium outcome. In addition, it assumes an overly restrictive domain of tax schedules and no incentive effects of income taxation. This paper shows that none of these assumptions of the theorem can be relaxed completely. Most notably, it is shown that a majority of poor voters does not imply progressive taxation in a more general policy space and that a regressive tax schedule may obtain a majority over a progressive one when individuals' income is endogenous.     

Infrastructure Spending and Unemployment: Government Responsibility for Growth and Jobs

Australia has not had full employment for 20 years. Reliance on growth through microeconomic reform has failed. To restore full employment, the government must pursue a judicious program of infrastructure spending.     

Tax Rate Variability and Public Spending as Sources of Indeterminacy

We consider a constant returns to scale, one sector economy with segmented asset markets of the Woodford type. We analyze the role of public spending, financed by labor income and consumption taxation, on the emergence of indeterminacy. We find that what is relevant for indeterminacy is the variability of the distortion introduced by government intervention. We show that the degree of public spending externalities in preferences affects the combinations between the tax rate and its variability under which indeterminacy occurs. Moreover, we find that consumption taxes can lead to local indeterminacy when asset markets are segmented.     

Endogenous Growth,Taxes and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence*

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the simultaneous effects of taxes and government spending on long‐run economic growth in an endogenous growth framework. A two‐sector model is considered: one sector produces physical output and the other produces human capital. Government expenditure is divided into several categories, and several types of taxes are included. The property tax is especially interesting because it is a major source of revenue for local government. The theoretical model is estimated using annual panel data from North Carolina counties. This study finds that state‐level fiscal policies affect economic growth but county‐level fiscal policies do not.     

Progressive Taxation, Tax Exemption, and Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty

We analyze the impact of progressive taxation on irreversible investment under uncertainty. We show that if tax exemption is lower than sunk cost, higher tax rate will decelerate optimal investment by increasing the optimal investment threshold, while if tax exemption exceeds sunk cost, three different regimes arise. For “small” volatilities the optimal investment threshold is a positive function of volatility, but independent of tax rate. For “medium” volatilities it is independent of both tax rate and volatility. Finally, for “high” volatilities the optimal investment threshold depends positively on volatility, but negatively on tax rate so that we have “tax paradox”.     

Comment on 'Infrastructure Spending and Unemployment: Government Responsibility for Growth and Jobs'

The level of public investment in infrastructure should be decided by cost-benefit analysis. To use the employment consequences as an additional criterion to the cost-benefit test, as Kenyon argues, would probably be counterproductive for the aggregate level of employment.     

Efficiency Wages and the Long-Run Incidence of Progressive Taxation;

Received November 3, 2000; revised version received August 2, 2001     

Useful Government Spending and Macroeconomic (In)stability under Balanced-Budget Rules

It has been shown that an otherwise standard one‐sector real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots under a balanced‐budget rule that consists of fixed and “wasteful” government spending and proportional income taxation. However, the economy always displays saddle‐path stability and equilibrium uniqueness if the government finances endogenous public expenditures with a constant income tax rate. In this paper, we allow for productive or utility‐generating government purchases in either of these specifications. It turns out that the previous indeterminacy results remain unchanged by the inclusion of useful government spending. By contrast, the earlier determinacy results are overturned when public expenditures generate sufficiently strong production or consumption externalities. Our analysis thus illustrates that a balanced‐budget policy recommendation which limits the government's ability to change tax rates does not necessarily stabilize the economy against belief‐driven business cycle fluctuations.     

Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*

The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.     

Military Spending, Government Disarray, and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis

Recent years have seen a spate of empirical studies that have used cross-country regressions to examine a variety of possible determinants of long-term economic growth. The present study considers an additional, largely overlooked, explanatory variable: military spending. Consistent with Thompson’s (1974) hypothesis that enhanced national defense fosters economic growth by increasing the security of property rights, the military expenditures share of GDP is found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the growth rate of per capita GDP. This result is obtained for two alternative model specifications, a Barro-regression and a LISREL variant of that regression. The LISREL variant is motivated by Sala-i-Martin’s (1994) claim that the impact of government economic policies jointly, rather than extant government policies individually and separately, is "the phenomenon that really matters" for long-term economic growth.