首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z2):1-33
Overview: Global growth resilient to trade slowdown
  • ? It seems increasingly clear that the manufacturing‐ and trade‐driven soft patch in late‐2018 is extending into this year. But we still think that global recession risks remain low and see no reason to make any notable shifts to our outlook for the global economy this year. We continue to forecast that GDP growth will slow from 3.0% in 2018 to 2.7% this year, with a similar outcome seen in 2020.
  • ? Various indicators show that trade volumes slowed sharply at end‐2018 and survey indicators for January suggest that the situation has not improved since then (see Chart). The main reason for this weakness has been China, where imports ended the year on a very weak note and we expect a further slowdown in Q1.
  • ? We have lowered our forecast of Chinese imports in 2019 by around 1.5pp in response. However, we expect a bounce back in Q2 and beyond; reflecting this, Chinese import growth over the year as whole is still expected to be notably stronger than in the 2015/16 soft patch. In a similar vein, while global trade growth is expected to slow sharply from 4.6% to 3.3% this year (down from 3.6% last month), it should still be stronger than in 2012–16, providing a solid backdrop for exporters.
  • ? Meanwhile, financial markets have rebounded sharply from the December sell‐off due to renewed optimism regarding US and China trade talks and a more dovish Fed. We now expect the Fed to leave rates on hold until at least Q3 and hike rates only once this year. This, along with lower government bond yields and weaker inflation, is also likely to reduce the need for monetary tightening elsewhere, particularly in emerging markets (EMs), helping to support global growth later in the year.
  • ? Overall, we still see global GDP growth softening in H1, but with a modest rebound in H2 as Chinese growth stabilises and EMs and European growth regain momentum. Sharper slowdowns in China and global trade and financial‐market weakness remain key concerns for the 2020 outlook. But the risk of inflation‐induced policy tightening is still low and the odds of a renewed flare‐up in trade tensions have ebbed lately.
  相似文献   

2.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z4):1-29
Overview: Growth resilient to protectionist concerns
  • ? Despite the mounting threat of more protectionist trade measures, we expect the impact on global growth and trade to be mild. Given this, and the still fairly solid underlying economic picture, we have left our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 unchanged at 3.2% and 3.0% respectively.
  • ? Although economic data in Q1 painted a pretty solid picture, there are signs that the global expansion may lose momentum in Q2. Most notably, the global PMI fell sharply in March, more than offsetting the gains of the previous three quarters or so. Some of the decline may reflect an over‐reaction to recent trade threats and could be reversed in April and despite the drop, the surveys still point to strong growth. But the fall highlights the risk that lingering trade tensions could damage confidence and prompt firms and consumers to delay investment and major spending plans.
  • ? On a more positive note, China's economic growth picked up markedly in early 2018, which could provide a fillip to global trade growth in the near term. Given the betterthan‐expected start to the year, we have made no change to our 2018 China GDP growth forecast (of 6.4%) despite the probable negative effects of trade measures.
  • ? Meanwhile, most advanced economies remain in the late expansionary stage of the cycle. And those that show signs of slowing, such as the Eurozone, are doing so from multi‐year highs. While we have nudged down our 2018 Eurozone GDP growth forecast slightly to 2.2%, the pace is expected to remain well above trend. We judge the impact of US tariffs and counter‐measures on the US economy to be subdued and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 by just 0.1pp.
  • ? For now, we see further solid growth for the world economy this year even in the environment of rising protectionism. While there is a risk that a further escalation of trade tensions could trigger a sharper slowdown in global GDP growth, we still see the risks of a full‐blown and damaging trade war as limited and the chances of protectionism leading to recessions as smaller still.
  相似文献   

3.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z1):1-29
Overview: entering 2018 with plenty of momentum
  • ? Further evidence that the global economy ended last year on a high note is consistent with our view that world GDP growth in 2018 will be around 3.2%, a little better than the likely rise of 3% in 2017 and the best annual outturn since 2011.
  • ? The global economy has entered 2018 with plenty of momentum. In December, the global composite PMI continued to trend upwards, rising to its highest level of 2017. This was primarily down to developments in the manufacturing sector, with several emerging markets recording especially strong gains.
  • ? While the strength of the manufacturing PMI bodes well for global trade, other timely trade indicators, particularly from Asia, have been less positive. On balance, though, we have nudged up our forecast for world trade growth iwn 2018 to 4.8%. But this would still be a slowdown after last year's estimated rise of 6%.
  • ? This partly reflects the change in the drivers of GDP growth from 2017. We still expect a modest slowdown in China, triggering a sharper drop‐off in import growth there. Eurozone GDP growth is also likely to slow slightly, to 2.2%, which is still well above our estimate of potential growth. By contrast, we have nudged up our US GDP growth forecast for this year to 2.8% – 0.5pp higher than the probable 2017 outturn – as looser fiscal policy will not be fully offset by tighter monetary policy. The recent rise in commodity prices, further dollar weakness and still‐strong global trade growth all bode well for prospects in many emerging markets.
  • ? Some commentators have questioned the durability of the global economic expansion, reflecting the long period of uninterrupted GDP growth and concerns that a financial market slowdown could eventually impinge on growth. But economic expansions do not die of old age. And while equity markets look expensive on many metrics, we expect strong earnings growth to push equity prices higher over the coming months. Meanwhile, although various geopolitical risks remain, more generally economic uncertainty has diminished.
  相似文献   

4.
Patterns of dominant flows in the world trade web   总被引:2,自引:1,他引:2  
The large-scale organization of the world economies is exhibiting increasing levels of local heterogeneity and global interdependency. Understanding the relation between local and global features calls for analytical tools able to uncover the global emerging organization of the international trade network. Here we analyze the world network of bilateral trade imbalances and characterize its overall flux organization, unraveling local and global high-flux pathways that define the backbone of the trade system. We develop a general procedure capable to progressively filter out in a consistent and quantitative way the dominant trade channels. This procedure is completely general and can be applied to any weighted network to detect the underlying structure of transport flows. The trade fluxes properties of the world trade web determine a ranking of trade partnerships that highlights global interdependencies, providing information not accessible by simple local analysis. The present work provides new quantitative tools for a dynamical approach to the propagation of economic crises.  相似文献   

5.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z3):1-33
Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again
  • ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
  • ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
  • ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
  • ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
  • ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.
  相似文献   

6.
World economy     
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(4):30-32
The recent run of soft survey data suggests that an imminent rebound in global GDP growth is unlikely and that concerns about slowing growth and trade tensions may now be taking a toll on service sector activity. We still forecast global GDP growth to slow into early next year but while recession risks have increased, we do not see this as the most likely scenario. In both 2019 and 2020 as whole we expect global GDP growth to average 2.5% each year, the weakest rate since 2009.  相似文献   

7.
World economy     
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(1):30-32
Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But over the past three months, the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.  相似文献   

8.
Japan          下载免费PDF全文
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(3):55-56
GDP grew by a solid 1.7% in 2017, supported by strongly expanding global trade. For this year, we expect growth to ease to 1.2%, dampened by slowing external momentum and weak domestic demand in Q1. Although GDP dropped 0.2% q/q in Q1, we expect this setback to be temporary and look for reasonable, broad‐based growth during the rest of 2018. Monthly indicators of consumption and trade look positive and suggest a recovery in Q2. The outlook for investment also remains broadly positive, although sentiment has moderated somewhat since the start of the year. Protectionism, particularly the threat of US tariffs on Japanese cars, remains a key downside risk for our forecast.  相似文献   

9.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z4):1-33
Overview: Some glimmers of hope start to appear
  • ? Prospects for early‐2019 remain downbeat, but latest data offer some glimmers of hope that growth is beginning to stabilise. We continue to expect easier financial conditions and other policy support to trigger a modest acceleration in global GDP growth in the latter part of 2019.
  • ? On the face of it, our latest forecasts suggest that we have become more upbeat about the outlook for the global economy. We now forecast world GDP will rise by 2.7% this year and 2.9% in 2020, after last year's 3.2% gain, upward revisions of 0.2pp for both 2018 and 2019 and 0.1pp for next year. But these revisions largely reflect a change in the GDP base year from 2010 to 2015. This has increased the weights of faster‐growing economies such as China at the expense of slower‐growing economies, in turn boosting world GDP growth.
  • ? There are plenty of reasons to remain cautious in the near term. For instance, trade indicators have continued to weaken recently, while the global manufacturing PMI has fallen to only just above the 50 no‐change level.
  • ? However, there are some signs that both trade and manufacturing data (at least outside the eurozone) may be beginning to stabilise. Just as importantly, the global services PMI has picked up in the early stages of this year. In the past, sustained global slowdowns have tended to see the services PMI follow the manufacturing PMI down. Meanwhile, European retail sales have continued to expand in early‐2019.
  • ? Beyond the short term, we remain cautiously optimistic that GDP growth will pick up again. Chinese credit data, which leads hard activity data, has recently improved and, although uncertainties over US‐EU trade relations remain, global trade tensions seem to be waning. Last but not least, more dovish central banks — we no longer expect the Fed to hike rates again in this cycle — and the resultant loosening in financial conditions should support growth in both the advanced and emerging economies.
  相似文献   

10.
《Economic Outlook》2014,38(3):13-17
The latest indicators suggest a modest recovery in world trade. The apparent upswing in US import demand over the last couple of months is a notable positive signal for the global economy, and the constraining impact on world trade of the Eurozone recession of 2011–13 is also easing. The pace of world trade growth is, however, still relatively slow; our forecasts suggest world trade growth will only recover to its long‐term average level of just under 6% per year by end‐2015. Trade growth in key emerging markets also remains soft, although some indicators from Asia suggest an improving picture. One reason for the relatively weak growth in world trade may be a restructuring of global supply chains, reducing the growth in trade in intermediate goods. If so, this is not necessarily bad news for the global economy but may have distributional consequences, for example bearing down on growth in countries that have specialised in providing such goods including some emergers.  相似文献   

11.
《Economic Systems》2022,46(1):100868
We evaluate the effect of exchange rate misalignments on the balance of trade and the role that global value chain participation plays in this effect for 11 new European Union member states. Using heterogeneous panel cointegration methods, we first estimate the real equilibrium exchange rate and detect episodes of currency misalignment. We find asymmetric effects of real currency misalignments: overvaluation has a negative effect, but undervaluation has no effect on the trade balance. Additionally, we find that global value chain participation weakens the effect of currency misalignments on the balance of trade. Therefore, our results suggest that globalization reduces the role of exchange rates in stimulating the domestic economy.  相似文献   

12.
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(Z1):1-33
Overview: World growth still seen at just 2.5% in 2020
  • ▀ Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.
  • ▀ While our view remains that global GDP growth is likely to have softened further around the turn of the year, the decline remains gradual. And latest survey-based measures of activity and sentiment show tentative signs that prospects are beginning to improve, consistent with our long-standing view that the low point for global growth will be in Q1 2020.
  • ▀ Just as importantly, the likelihood of the US and China formally signing off a phase one trade deal in mid-January has reduced the chances of a further flare-up in trade tensions between the two economies. However, this has to some degree been offset by the troubling events recently unfolding between the US and Iran.
  • ▀ We remain sceptical that the global economy is set for a major growth boost. Any healing in US-China relations may quickly be unwound and a full reversal of the tariffs already implemented remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, some of the associated growth boost is likely to be offset by less policy support. As a result, we have raised our 2020 GDP growth by just 0.1pp in the US but by a more significant 0.3pp in China.
  • ▀ Meanwhile, although the ongoing and broad-based monetary policy loosening in both AEs and EMs should start to feed through to growth this year, we doubt this will be a game-changer. Not only is policy loosening at a global level set to be fairly muted, limited spare capacity, the rising stock of global debt and elevated asset prices are likely to reduce the positive impulse from policymakers' actions.
  相似文献   

13.
《Economic Outlook》2015,39(4):27-31
  • World trade growth has slowed sharply in 2015, with our forecast for growth just 1% for the year. High frequency indicators suggest a stagnant picture, with trade in key emerging markets (EM) especially weak. Import growth in the US and Eurozone remains positive and is holding up world trade, but there are downside risks here also. Very slow world trade growth risks incentivising competitive depreciations and depressing global bond yields.
  • In August our OE export indicator fell to its lowest level since late‐2012 –; the point when the US announced ‘QE3’. Its weakness is corroborated by other indicators such as container trade and air freight.
  • The main drag to world trade is from emerging markets, especially the BRIC‐4 whose import volumes contracted sharply in H1 2015, cutting more than 1 percentage point from annual growth in goods trade.
  • US and European import growth looks stronger and should be supported in 2016 by firming GDP growth. This is an important support for world trade, but the latest data suggest some downside risks here also.
  • The weaker world demand growth is then the more that trade will appear like a zero‐sum game where a country can benefit only at the expense of its competitors. This has potentially important implications for asset prices: in particular, countries may turn to competitive depreciation, adding further to global deflationary pressures and holding down global bond yields.
  相似文献   

14.
Since early 1999, global trade liberalization has been sidelined as regional trade agreements (RTA) have become the preferred choice in East Asia. Does this shift suggest that global trade and welfare levels will be raised? In contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, RTAs may well cause both ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion,’ so that their net effect on global trade and welfare becomes ambiguous. It is conjectured that RTAs among “natural trading partners” are more likely to be trade-creating, and less likely to divert trade from non-member countries, in which case welfare will improve. We find that if an RTA involves geographically proximate countries (measured either by distance or border), trade significantly increases among them. At the same time, geographical proximity also contributes to increasing trade between members and the rest of the world. We examine how existing or proposed East Asian trading blocs affect intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade and thereby global trade. We find that the East Asian RTAs are likely to create more trade among members without diverting trade from non-members.  相似文献   

15.
The increasing importance of global supply chains has prompted the use of analytical tools based on trade in value added – instead of traditional measures in gross value. We use this analytical framework to develop indicators that identify production hubs and supply spokes in global supply chains. Using these indicators and the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, we quantify the relative importance of redirected value-added trade and the hub and spoke relationships at the aggregate level and for specific highly integrated industries.  相似文献   

16.
Japan          下载免费PDF全文
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(2):41-42
An acceleration in global trade helped to boost Japanese GDP growth to 1.7% in 2017. But an expected slowdown in demand from China in 2018 means that the contribution from external trade will be lower this year. And while we expect growth to continue to become more broad‐based, with investment playing a prominent role, given the recent increase in protectionist tensions, we have revised down our forecast for GDP growth in 2018 to 1.5% (from 1.7% three months ago). With an expected slowdown in construction and a planned consumption tax hike in 2019, we forecast that GDP growth will ease further to 0.9% next year. The short‐term outlook is influenced by the following factors:
  • Export growth easing over 2018 : exports grew by 6.6% y/y in yen terms in January–February 2018 combined, down from 13% growth in Q4 2017. While the slowdown was less marked in volume terms, with real exports up 5.2% y/y and imports 7.8% higher (in January–February), we see a smaller contribution to growth from net trade in 2018 than in 2017, as external demand cools. The recent easing in export growth is in line with our expectations following last year's acceleration. Our baseline is for trade momentum to ease through 2018 as Chinese import demand moderates. While US protectionist measures threaten the outlook, we believe that the overall impact of the likely US tariffs will be limited, as Japanese trade continues to shift towards Asia.
  • Solid investment growth to continue : we expect the momentum behind business investment to remain solid in 2018, with growth of 2.9% little changed from the 3% recorded in 2017. Overall investment will be supported by strong corporate profits, construction for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and high levels of confidence. Although dropping among large enterprises recently, overall business sentiment (and among SMEs) remains healthy and planned capex for fiscal year 2018 got off to a good start. Protectionism is also a downside risk to the investment outlook, but we believe that the actual impact on Japan will be limited.
  • Weak wage growth to weigh on consumer demand : monthly data suggest that consumption has continued to edge higher this year. Moreover, rising employment in Q1 may provide additional upside momentum. However, despite a tight labour market, wage growth has been disappointing and we expect sluggish wage growth to constrain household demand and inflation going forward.
  相似文献   

17.
论我国碳排放权交易体系的构建   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
张志勋 《企业经济》2012,(6):178-181
全球变暖是当今世界必须面对的重要环境问题,而碳排放权交易正是最有效的减排制度。目前,该制度在各国已得到广泛实践,而我国碳排放权交易体系的构建尚处于探索阶段。为此,我国应借鉴国际经验,选择适合中国的碳排放权交易机制,构建起有中国特色的碳排放权交易体系。  相似文献   

18.
《Economic Outlook》2016,40(3):24-25
GDP grew by an annualized 1.1% in Q1 2016 as final sales rose 1.3% and inventories shaved 0.2pp from growth. Consumer spending rose 1.5%, while residential investment surged 15.6%. Meanwhile, business investment contracted 4.5%, its worst performance since Q3 2009, and net trade added just 0.1pp to growth. We expect modest GDP expansion of 2% in 2016 and 2.3% in 2017, with domestic activity constrained by global headwinds.  相似文献   

19.
The effect of changes in trade patterns, particularly increasing international sourcing, on global CO2-emissions growth has yet to be clearly understood. In this paper, we estimate the emission cost of sourcing (ECS), which originates from replacing domestic products by imports from countries with more CO2-intensive technologies. Using a structural decomposition analysis, we find that changes in sourcing patterns between 1995 and 2007 contribute (1) to reducing territorial emissions in high-wage countries (70% of their territorial emissions growth) and (2) to increasing territorial emissions in low-wage countries (30% of their territorial emissions increase). The net global effect, the ECS, amounts to 18% of total global CO2-emissions growth. Our results call the climate change policies based on territorial principles into question given that they disregard that differences in emission intensities between countries contribute to raising global emissions. In contrast, policies fostering the transfer of cleaner technologies to low-wage countries decrease the ECS.  相似文献   

20.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(1):29-33
  • ? Most leading indicators of world trade point to growth remaining robust in the next few months, but there are some headwinds, especially from Asia. Overall, we expect trade growth to decelerate this year, yet the outlook has improved since August. We see world trade rising by 6.1% in 2017 and by 4.8% this year, up from our previous forecasts of 5.7% and 3.8%, respectively .
  • ? The latest trade volume data for the major economies support our forecasts, as does our survey‐based export indicator, which leads trade by around three months. This indicator and the main measure of global freight volumes are consistent with world trade continuing to grow by around 6% y/y in the near term.
  • ? World trade growth is likely to be supported by emerging markets (EMs), which made a large contribution to the trade recovery last year. Another factor that may be supportive – especially for EMs – is the slippage in the US dollar last year, as there is some evidence of a negative correlation between dollar strength and world trade.
  • ? The recovery of demand in the Eurozone and expected fiscal stimulus in the US add to the positive constellation of factors supporting world trade growth. Business sentiment indicators remain positive and imply upside risks to our forecasts. Yet it is not obvious that they have a strong leading relationship with trade – and the statistical relationship has become weaker since 2007–2009. This reinforces our view that there has been a structural change in the relationship between world trade and world GDP.
  • ? The main near‐term downside risks to world trade come from Asia. Freight indicators for Shanghai and Hong Kong have slowed markedly, as have semiconductor billings. Although Chinese activity indicators have also moderated, China's trade volume growth remains surprisingly strong.
  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号