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1.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(3):25-29
  • ? A combined slump in house prices and housing investment in the major economies could cut world growth to a 10‐year low of 2.2% by 2020 – and to below 2% if it also triggered a tightening in global credit conditions.
  • ? In such a scenario, inflation would remain well below target in the main economies, and US Fed rates would be up to 100 basis points lower than in our baseline by 2021.
  • ? Signs of a global house price downturn are already visible, with around a third of our sample of economies seeing falling prices and world residential investment starting to decline. High house price valuations add to the risk that this downturn will deepen in the coming quarters, hitting consumer spending.
  • ? Using the Oxford Global Economic Model, we find that a 10% fall in house prices and an 8% fall in housing investment both cut growth by around 0.3%‐0.4% across regions. Adding a sharp Chinese downturn, such as that seen in 2015, has a large additional impact on growth in Asia .
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2.
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(4):26-29
  • ▀ Global monetary growth has been its fastest for decades over recent months, but we continue to believe inflation risks are lower than many think. A modest inflation overshoot in the coming years is possible but would not be very damaging.
  • ▀ While headline money growth figures still look strong, heavy precautionary borrowing by firms in March-April is already starting to unwind in the US and UK. About 80% of the rise in borrowing by large UK firms has been repaid.
  • ▀ In addition, tightened lending standards at banks are likely to weigh on future corporate borrowing and money growth. A net 70% of US banks tightened corporate credit standards in the latest Fed survey. Rising loan defaults risk exacerbating this.
  • ▀ Heavy government borrowing and accompanying central bank QE have been key drivers of monetary growth and are likely to remain so, notwithstanding a slowdown in the pace of central bank bond purchases. This is the main risk factor those who fear inflation cite.
  • ▀ But if credit to the private sector starts to shrink, deficit financing of this sort may be essential to prevent long-term weakness in money, credit, and economic growth. Japan's experience in the 1990s and 2000s is relevant here.
  • ▀ Inflation also has room to overshoot current targets, if necessary, given the substantial undershoots of the last decade. This consideration in part explains the recent shift in Federal Reserve thinking towards targeting an average inflation rate over time
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3.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(3):17-24
  • ? The China‐commodity nexus has been at the heart of the global upturn in trade and industry. It could directly and indirectly account for as much as 70% of the recovery since mid‐2016, based on our analysis. We think this nexus will continue to support world growth in the near term, but the global upturn is vulnerable to moderating Chinese growth and slippage in commodity prices.
  • ? China has directly accounted for around a third of the upturn in world trade, similar to the contribution of G7 countries. But adding in indirect effects, China's influence is likely to have been much more significant. Stronger Chinese demand has contributed to an improvement in the trade performance of its Asian trading partners, commodity exporters and other advanced economies.
  • ? Using a model simulation that introduces positive shocks to imports in “greater China” and to commodity prices (based on the scale we have seen since mid‐2016), our top‐end estimate for China's contribution to the upturn in world trade is around 70%.
  • ? The simulation points to especially strong improvements in output and exports for economies such as South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and some commodity exporters. This broadly matches the pattern of performance seen over recent months, though commodity exporters' performance has been quite mixed.
  • ? G7 investment growth is likely to have played only a modest role in the recent global upturn. But Japan is an exception, while upgrades to investment forecasts for South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have also been large.
  • ? A 1% rise in commodity prices could raise commodity exporters' investment by 0.3–0.6%, based on our analysis. As a result, there could be additional improvement in commodity exporters' investment this year, supporting world growth. However, with our forecasts suggesting that commodity prices are set to slip further over the coming quarters, this boost could prove short‐lived.
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4.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(2):32-36
  • ? Strong labour markets and rising wages in advanced economies stand in sharp contrast to recent declines in economists’ inflation forecasts and market expectations. In our view, though, these developments are not necessarily contradictory. Even if wage growth edges higher, we think demand factors will limit any pick‐up in prices. Instead, we expect firms’ margins will be squeezed.
  • ? Although the labour share has risen more sharply than we had expected over the past couple of years, we are sceptical that this will translate into substantially stronger underlying inflation. Not only has the rise been small, it has been employment rather than wages that has surprised to the upside. The strength of employment is probably more about firms’ production preferences than workers’ capitalising on a stronger negotiating position.
  • ? True, wages adjusted for productivity now look high by historical standards. But neither theory or empirical evidence suggests that this must inevitably lead to stronger CPI inflation in the short‐term. Our forecast for flat wage growth in 2019 and the absence of strong cost pressures elsewhere are also a comfort.
  • ? Inflation tends to be more responsive to demand indicators – and the recent GDP growth soft patch suggests any further pick‐up in underlying inflation pressures will be limited (see Chart below).
  • ? More generally, we think that the consensus view on inflation for the key advanced economies is high. Market‐based inflation expectations are typically lower than our own, which may reflect the perception that inflation risks are skewed to the downside. Positive economic surprises could lead downside risks to narrow, but ageing expansions and secular stagnation worries suggest this is unlikely, limiting any future pick‐up in bond yields.
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5.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(2):15-19
  • ? We expect CPI inflation to slow markedly this year, dropping below the 2% target by the autumn. The inflationary impulse from the 2016 depreciation is fading and should partially reverse, while global food and energy prices are expected to stabilise. Base effects will become increasingly important.
  • ? CPI inflation reached a five‐and‐a‐half‐year high of 3.1% in November, up from a little over 1% a year earlier. The 2017 pick‐up in inflation was the result of a perfect storm of a weaker pound, higher oil prices and sharp rises in domestic electricity bills. But inflation has subsequently slowed, reaching 2.5% in March. And, after a brief hiatus, we expect the downward trend to continue as we move through the year.
  • ? The key driver of lower inflation will be weaker core pressures. In line with the literature, there is already evidence that the impact of sterling's depreciation is fading, and we think that the pressures could partially reverse if sterling continues to strengthen. We see little prospect of an offsetting escalation in domestic cost pressures. The recent pick‐up in wage growth has been muted and a further acceleration above 3% looks unlikely while there remains slack in the labour market.
  • ? The food, petrol and energy categories contributed 0.8 ppt to CPI inflation last year, compared with a drag of 0.5 ppt in 2016, as stronger global pressures combined with the weaker pound. But as global prices have been more subdued of late, by the end of 2018, we expect these categories to be contributing 0.5 ppt to CPI inflation.
  • ? The final element behind the expected slowdown in inflation is base effects. The comparison with last year's strong price pressures will depress the 2018 inflation rate, and we see the base effects being at their strongest mid‐year.
  • ? We think it unlikely that such a slowdown in inflation would derail the MPC from hiking interest rates twice this year. But it could temper its hawkishness in 2019.
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6.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(2):25-30
  • ? Demographic changes have played a crucial role in pushing savings rates up and real rates down in the advanced economies. Despite some voices to the contrary, we think such forces will remain in place for many years to come.
  • ? For such a predictable process, it's amazing that the economic implications of ageing are so hotly debated. Ageing affects everyone's lifetime savings decisions and has an impact on macroeconomic variables through several direct and indirect channels, the strength of which varies over time.
  • ? The impact of ageing on savings depends on interpreting two distinct long‐term drivers. On the one hand, aggregate savings may start to fall as the baby‐boomer “bulge” in advanced economies transitions from the peak period of saving to the phase of lower saving in retirement.
  • ? On the other hand, rising life expectancy should lead individuals to save more during their working lives or wait longer to retire. Greater labour market participation by those close to the official retirement age suggests that rising life expectancy is already leading many to remain in the workforce for longer – a trend that is likely to continue.
  • ? Accounting for ageing and rising life expectancy together, we find there will be no major decline in savings even as the elderly's share of the population rises further.
  • ? The impact on future real interest rates will, if anything, be negative. Comprehensive studies have reached a similar conclusion, taking into account the impact of demographic changes on savings, investment and other factors affecting real interest rates.
  • ? Ageing populations may be complicating the escape from low global inflation. Crosscountry evidence suggests older populations may prefer lower inflation. As societies in advanced economies continue age, there is a downside risk to the long‐term outlook for inflation and bond yields.
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7.
《Economic Outlook》2015,39(2):20-29
  • Stunningly low global long‐term bond yields provide some credence to a secular stagnation view of the world. We present an analytical framework – culminating in a simple scorecard – for assessing the extent to which purported drivers and manifestations of secular stagnation match global economic and financial developments and we compare with a complementary narrative focusing on balance sheet boom and bust. We find some support for each, but think global rates will not stay as low for as long as markets price in.
  • Larry Summers has used the term to refer to a situation where demand and supply for savings deliver very low equilibrium real interest rates. The bulge in middle‐aged savers, falling prices of investment goods, and flows of savings ‘uphill’ from emerging markets may have all led to real rates trending much lower in recent decades.
  • Another version of the story is that slow technical progress depresses demand for borrowing, and pushes down on real rates. This is less compelling, and based more on anecdote than anything else. There are as many reasons to be optimistic, as pessimistic, about the supply side.
  • There are holes in the secular stagnation narrative. Until very recently, G7 savings rates have trended down rather than up, partly because of another decades‐long trend of financial innovation. Furthermore, few economists, nor the Fed or the BoE, expect policy rates in the US or UK to stay low for as long as is priced in to markets.
  • A complementary narrative would stress the role of the credit‐fuelled mega‐boom and subsequent balance sheet blow out and Great Recession, and then the long road to financial repair. This is more consistent with the path of savings rates over recent decades, and the policy response – including QE – can explain much of the rest.
  • We see the two explanations as complementary and reinforcing. In global terms, they appear no better or worse than each other. Comparing across countries, Japan comes closest to resembling secular stagnation, followed by EZ, US and UK, according to our scorecard.
  • We think ultra‐low long rates will not be borne out by the future path of short rates, but acknowledge a significant risk they might, for example, if monetary policy remains too tight on average because of zero bound effects on interest rates and limited scope for fiscal accommodation.
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8.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(4):20-24
  • ? This year advanced economies have enjoyed a rare positive supply surprise: output is higher than expected and inflation is lower. The initial China‐related boost not only proved to be a great antidote to secularly weak global demand, but it has also engendered unexpected global momentum and a benign inflation response. As a result, 2016–17 resembles a mini‐reprise of the “nice” 1990s, a non‐inflationary, consistently expansionary decade.
  • ? The global momentum has been propelled by a strong international trade multiplier. This has contributed to strength in several advanced economies, particularly the Eurozone. We expect global growth in 2018 to be bolstered by US fiscal stimulus as the impulse from China fades.
  • ? It will remain “nice” in 2018, albeit in the context of weak secular trend growth. We expect the benign output‐inflation trade‐off to continue. Several of the factors that are underpinning low inflation and unemployment as well as weak wage growth are likely to be present for some time.
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9.
《Economic Outlook》2015,39(Z1):1-41
Overview: Oil price slump boosts growth forecasts
  • Oil prices have fallen further over the past month, with Brent dropping below US$50 per barrel. Prices are now down over 50% from their June 2014 peak levels. We do not expect any significant supply response (either from Saudi Arabia or US shale producers) to come through until late this year so low prices will persist for some time.
  • This is a positive development for world growth, though the impact will be uneven across countries. Based on our new oil price forecast of US$55/barrel for 2015, we estimate that the oil bill for ten leading industrial economies, (accounting for over 60% of world GDP) will be US$440 billion lower than it would have been based on our June 2014 oil forecasts.
  • This is around 1% of their combined GDP, money potentially free to be spent on other goods and services, including those of their main trading partners.
  • US consumer sentiment already shows signs of reacting positively and with other US consumer fundamentals also improving we have upgraded our 2015 GDP growth forecast to 3.3% from 3% last month.
  • We have also upgraded our forecasts for other advanced economies such as the Eurozone and Japan, where lower prices should be a flip to hardpressed consumers in particular.
  • For the emerging markets, the slide in oil has starkly different consequences for different countries. Oil producers will be losers, most strikingly Russia where we now see GDP down over 6% this year – with financial instability exacerbating the oil effect. But China and India should both gain.
  • Lower oil prices will also ease the external pressures some emergers have felt in recent months – reducing the risk of further hikes in domestic interest rates resulting from inflation and currency pressures.
  • We now see world growth at 2.9% in 2015, up a tenth from last month and an increase from 2.6% growth last year. This is our first upgrade to the global growth forecast since August 2014.
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10.
《Economic Outlook》2016,40(Z3):1-48
Overview: Markets rally but risks still to the downside
  • Our growth forecast for 2016 is steady this month at 2.3% but the forecast for 2017 has been cut again, to 2.7% from 2.9%.
  • The near‐term growth outlook has been supported by a decent rally in financial markets. Since mid‐February, world stocks have gained around 8%, US high yield spreads have narrowed around 140 basis points and a number of key commodity prices – including oil – have also risen.
  • Another supportive trend is still‐healthy consumer demand in advanced economies including the US and Eurozone. Although there has been some slippage in consumer confidence, it has been modest compared to either 2012–13 or 2008–09.
  • So overall, the global economy still looks likely to avoid recession and strengthen a touch next year. But risks to the outlook remain skewed to the downside.
  • Despite the recent market rally, world stocks still remain below their levels at end‐2015 and well below last May's peak. Financial conditions more broadly also remain significantly tighter than in mid‐2015, and inflation expectations somewhat lower.
  • And there are still negative signals from incoming data. The global manufacturing PMI for February showed output flat while the services PMI showed only very modest growth – both were at their lowest since late 2012.
  • Economic surprise indices for both the G10 and emerging markets also remain in negative territory, and our world trade indicator suggests no improvement from the dismal recent trends.
  • Notable growth downgrades this month include Germany, Japan, the UK, Canada and Brazil.
  • In our view, policymakers still have scope to improve the outlook. The latest ECB moves – more negative rates and more QE – will help a little. Widening of QE to corporate bonds also hints that more radical policy options are coming into view. But policies such as central bank equity purchases or money‐financed fiscal expansions will probably require global growth to weaken further before they become likely.
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11.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(4):11-15
  • ? UK house price growth is running out of steam. And with household incomes squeezed and the affordability of housing stretched, we think a prolonged period of very modest growth lies ahead. But the prospect of a crash is remote.
  • ? At 2.6% in Q2 2017, annual house price growth is presently running at a four‐year low. This is a step change down from the recent peak of nearly 10% in mid‐2014 and average growth of 4% over the current economic expansion.
  • ? Three developments are likely to lie behind this slowdown. The first is weak growth in households' real income, cutting the ability to save for a deposit or finance a move up the housing ladder. That said, past periods of sluggish income growth have not always been associated with low house price inflation.
  • ? The second is the consequence of recent tax hikes imposed on buy‐to‐let investors and second‐home owners, which theory suggests should be capitalised in lower property prices.
  • ? The third and perhaps most important reason is the increasing unaffordability of housing to an ever‐widening sub‐set of the population. The ratio of house prices to earnings is almost back at its pre‐crisis record. And the income of the average mortgage borrower is close to £60,000, more than double the average annual wage.
  • ? This third factor has implications beyond price growth, suggesting both a permanently lower level of transactions and a further decline in the number of households with mortgages, continuing a trend which began at the beginning of the century.
  • ? But set against these headwinds is the cushion provided by record lows for both mortgage rates and mortgage affordability. Overall, house prices are caught between a lack of traditional drivers of accelerating growth, but equally an absence of forces which have typically caused prices to fall. Hence, our expectation of a period of sluggish, but relatively stable, growth.
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12.
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(3):24-27
  • ▀ Concerns about high inflation in the medium term are in our view overdone. In fact, we think the bigger risk is some economies sliding into deflation, due to the coronavirus pandemic's long-lasting negative impact on demand, which will intensify existing global disinflationary trends.
  • ▀ We do not think the recent acceleration of monetary growth will lead to rapid inflation, despite the strong historic relationship between the two. The current monetary growth is taking place in extremely unusual circumstances, which may alter the usual link with inflation, and may also be temporary.
  • ▀ Meanwhile, most market-based measures of deflation risk have risen recently – in some cases to historic highs. Some household surveys point to slightly higher inflation, but this may reflect short-term volatility in prices for key goods.
  • ▀ A slide into deflation would have a variety of negative consequences, including feeding back into private saving, weakening growth, and potentially raising debt sustainability issues in some economies.
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13.
《Economic Outlook》2015,39(Z4):1-47
Overview: Global upswing delayed
  • This month sees our global GDP growth forecast for 2015 revised down to 2.7%, implying no improvement from 2014. At the start of the year, we expected world growth for 2015 at 2.9%.
  • A key factor behind the slippage in our global forecast has been a softening of activity in the US. The balance of economic surprises (actual data versus expected) has deteriorated sharply in recent months. As a result, we now expect US growth at 2.7% this year, compared to 3.3% at the start of 2015.
  • We are wary of reading too much into the most recent data, as the US and other advanced economies also went through ‘soft patches’ at the starts of both 2013 and 2014, but recovered. Also, the balance of economic surprises for the G10 is only moderately negative – and is strongly positive for the Eurozone.
  • One area of concern is sluggish US consumption recently – despite lower oil prices. But with labour market conditions favourable and disposable income growing solidly, we expect this to prove a blip. And the evidence from advanced economies as a whole suggests lower oil prices have boosted consumers.
  • There are nevertheless genuine drags on global growth. The strong dollar appears to be weighing on US exports and investment, and curbing profits. It is also damaging growth in some emerging markets through its negative impact on commodity prices and capital flows and via balance sheet effects (raising the burden of dollar‐denominated debt).
  • Meanwhile, this month also sees a fresh downgrade to our forecast for China – GDP is now expected to rise 6.6% this year versus 6.8% a month ago. This reflects weakness in a number of key indicators and also the likely impact of a squeeze on local government finances from the property sector slump.
  • With the US and China representing a third of global GDP, slower growth there will also tend to retard world trade growth. We continue to expect world GDP growth to reach 3% in 2016, but 2015 now looks like being another year of sub‐par global growth.
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14.
《Economic Outlook》2016,40(1):28-36
  • In a recent speech, ECB chief economist Peter Praet emphasised the importance of the Phillips curve ‐ the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation ‐ when addressing concerns that disinflation (or even deflation) could become a longer‐term problem in the Eurozone. Praet argued that a scenario of a sustained period of disinflation is only realistic if the link between economic slack and inflation is broken. In this article, we revisit the Phillips curve in the Eurozone with the aim of gauging whether there has been a change in the relationship following the global financial crisis and how uniform the curve is among major Eurozone economies.
  • We conclude that the Phillips curve is still valid in the Eurozone, although our analysis indicates a weakening of the link in the post‐crisis period. On the whole, our analysis shows that the Phillips curve relationship has been robust in the Eurozone since the creation of the currency union. However, in replicating the analysis for just the pre‐crisis period, we have noticed that the relationship between slack and inflation for the Eurozone was stronger (i.e. the slope of the curve was steeper) before the crisis rather than over the whole sample, since the introduction of the Euro.
  • We find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the strength of the link between inflation and slack across the Eurozone economies, which adds to our existing body of work on their different responses to same shocks. Moreover, in contrast to the Eurozone overall, we find that in Spain and Italy the responsiveness of inflation to slack appears to have actually increased since the crisis; this might reflect the effectiveness of the structural reforms undertaken in both countries in order to reduce the rigidity of their economies.
  • From 2014 onwards, very low inflation in the Eurozone has led to fears of sustained disinflation and even a deflationary spiral. Our view has always been that these fears were overblown; proving that the key structural relationship needed for ECB to meet its mandate is still in place corroborates our stance. Our forecast is for headline inflation to rise to 0.7% in 2016 (under the assumption that oil prices average US$37pb) and then to 1.7% in 2017 ‐ in line with ECB's target of “close to, but below, 2%”. The Phillips curve we have derived for the Eurozone tells a similar story. However, renewed weakness in oil prices at the start of 2016 presents a downside risk to our forecasts.
  • Our bottom‐up CPI inflation model indicates that inflation might average just 0.2% this year if oil remains at around US$30pb. Furthermore, the prospect of external demand weakness derailing the Eurozone recovery poses another risk. This has raised the possibility of further expansion of the ECB's QE programme. However, as we continue to see resilient domestic demand in 2016, our baseline case still remains that the ECB will make no additional substantial adjustments to its QE programme in the near term.
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15.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(3):27-33
  • ? We do not envisage major central banks being pricked into deflationary action by the oil spike as there are limited concerns over a wage‐price spiral. But further rises — say to $100pb — would sour the global economy's ‘Goldilocks’ period. Vulnerable EM are the biggest concern; for some the impact is relatively large and could pile pressure on already‐strained domestic policies .
  • ? A comparison with historical precedents is generally consoling. First, the price rise of 60% in the last year — though big — is only the sixth largest since 1973. Second, oil‐related global slowdowns have usually been associated with central bank hikes, which are less likely now than in past periods when inflation was less well anchored.
  • ? Global implications: our baseline forecast of $80bp in H2 2018 may prompt a modest rise in non‐energy inflation and wages, and slightly weaker GDP growth. But we anticipate limited monetary policy responses. Concerns about the negative impact on activity are likely to trump fears of second‐round inflation effects.
  • ? Model simulations: souring Goldilocks' porridge. Our $100pb oil simulations reveal a peak impact in 2020, knocking 0.7% off the level of global GDP. Inflation rises 1.2pp above our baseline by 2019.
  • ? The recent association between strong oil and a strong dollar is unusual, but is probably not reflective of a fundamental change in the usual historic relationship (strong oil‐weak dollar).
  • ? Simulations suggest EM oil importers endure the biggest hits via a (i) sharp terms of trade reversal; (ii) dollar strength; (iii) capital flows reversals; and (iv) recent reductions of oil price subsidies leaving consumers vulnerable to price increases. The most affected include already‐vulnerable economies Greece, Argentina and Turkey, as well as EM heavyweights China and India.
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16.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(4):5-10
  • ? With limited scope for conventional monetary policy options, central banks and governments may need to turn to alternative approaches to combat slowing global growth and respond to economic shocks.
  • ? Our analysis shows that not only do governments in advanced economies have limited room to cut rates but that doing so has proved less effective in boosting growth in recent years. This increases the need to look at alternatives, such as negative interest rates, renewed QE and fiscal stimulus.
  • ? While negative interest rates have helped reduce borrowing costs in some economies, the impact on banks has been ambiguous. Also, lowering rates further into negative territory could be hard without incurring significant costs.
  • ? QE in the form practised up to now is also likely to be less effective than in the past due to low yields, narrow risk spreads and high asset valuations. So, a deeper downturn might require more radical QE ‐ buying corporate bonds, bank loans and equities ‐ which comes with significant drawbacks.
  • ? Some central bankers are starting to acknowledge the limits of monetary action, with the next step being to consider fiscal action as a more effective alternative ‐ as argued recently by the likes of Larry Summers.
  • ? In our view, fiscal policy is likely to be especially effective in a climate of weak growth and low rates, with large multiplier effects. Advanced economies have more scope for fiscal stimulus than often recognised and could finance a large public investment programme by issuing ultra‐cheap long‐dated debt
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17.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z1):1-33
Overview: Market falls overstate loss of momentum
  • ? Financial market moves in recent months suggest that there is increasing concern about a substantial global growth slowdown or even a recession. But we continue to see this as an over‐reaction to the weakening economic data; while the downside risks to the global GDP growth outlook have clearly risen, our baseline forecast for 2019 is little changed at 2.7%, down from 3% in 2018.
  • ? Recent economic news confirms that the Q3 economic soft patch appears to have spilled over into Q4, particularly in the industrial sector which has seen a broad‐based loss of momentum in many economies coinciding with a further slowdown in global trade growth. But while surveys of service sector activity have also moderated, the falls have been rather less abrupt, suggesting that overall global GDP growth is slowing albeit not alarmingly so.
  • ? On balance, we think that the weaker data do not provide compelling evidence that global growth is slowing more sharply than our December forecast. Although the financial market sell‐off and associated tightening in financial conditions will impinge on growth, this may at least be partly offset by weaker inflation in response to lower oil prices, now seen at US$61pb in 2019. This, combined with the continued strength of labour markets and the likelihood of further moderate wage growth, points to a further period of solid household spending growth.
  • ? Nonetheless, the risk of a sharper slowdown has risen. Cyclical risks have increased over the past couple of years as spare capacity has diminished. And uncertainty over the economic and financial market impact of the unwinding of central balance sheets have added to the risk of policy mistakes.
  • ? Although our central view is that the recent financial market correction will not morph into something rather nastier, further sustained weakness (particularly if accompanied by dollar strength) would have more significant implications for activity and could see world growth falling below the 2016 post‐crisis low of 2.4%.
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18.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(4):16-19
  • ? The pattern of global credit risks looks very different today than in 2007. Risks are now mostly centred in China and emerging markets. “Excess” private debt in China is as high as $3 trillion compared with $1.7 trillion in the US a decade ago. Yet some pockets of significant risk still exist in advanced economies, which not only implies vulnerability to rising interest rates, but also that the scope for rate rises may be limited.
  • ? With policy normalisation underway in the US and the scaling back of asset purchases expected to start soon in the Eurozone, we focus on assessing vulnerabilities across global credit markets. This article explores the topic using a top‐down, cross‐country approach. We find that although private debt and debt service ratios look more benign in advanced economies than a decade ago, they have deteriorated markedly in many emerging markets in recent years.
  • ? Based on a measure of excess private debt – comparing private credit‐to‐GDP ratios with their trend – China, Hong Kong and Canada are the riskiest. When comparing debt service ratios relative to their long‐term averages, risks are also mainly concentrated in emerging countries. But Canada, Australia and some smaller European countries also have high debt service ratios that have failed to drop since 2007, despite the slump in global interest rates.
  • ? Overall, aggregate private debt indicators look less worrying than in 2007. We would also argue that the concentration of excess private debt levels in China reduces the risk of a sudden financial crisis based on massive credit losses, such as the one in 2007–2010. But with corporate debt levels in the US, Canada and some other G7 countries above their long‐term trend, investors need to be attentive to these considerable pockets of risk.
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19.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z4):1-33
Overview: Some glimmers of hope start to appear
  • ? Prospects for early‐2019 remain downbeat, but latest data offer some glimmers of hope that growth is beginning to stabilise. We continue to expect easier financial conditions and other policy support to trigger a modest acceleration in global GDP growth in the latter part of 2019.
  • ? On the face of it, our latest forecasts suggest that we have become more upbeat about the outlook for the global economy. We now forecast world GDP will rise by 2.7% this year and 2.9% in 2020, after last year's 3.2% gain, upward revisions of 0.2pp for both 2018 and 2019 and 0.1pp for next year. But these revisions largely reflect a change in the GDP base year from 2010 to 2015. This has increased the weights of faster‐growing economies such as China at the expense of slower‐growing economies, in turn boosting world GDP growth.
  • ? There are plenty of reasons to remain cautious in the near term. For instance, trade indicators have continued to weaken recently, while the global manufacturing PMI has fallen to only just above the 50 no‐change level.
  • ? However, there are some signs that both trade and manufacturing data (at least outside the eurozone) may be beginning to stabilise. Just as importantly, the global services PMI has picked up in the early stages of this year. In the past, sustained global slowdowns have tended to see the services PMI follow the manufacturing PMI down. Meanwhile, European retail sales have continued to expand in early‐2019.
  • ? Beyond the short term, we remain cautiously optimistic that GDP growth will pick up again. Chinese credit data, which leads hard activity data, has recently improved and, although uncertainties over US‐EU trade relations remain, global trade tensions seem to be waning. Last but not least, more dovish central banks — we no longer expect the Fed to hike rates again in this cycle — and the resultant loosening in financial conditions should support growth in both the advanced and emerging economies.
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20.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z2):1-29
Overview: Financial turmoil will not derail expansion
  • ? The further run of broadly positive economic news has been overshadowed by the recent financial market turmoil. We do not expect the latter to be the catalyst for any notable economic slowdown and have left our world GDP growth forecast for 2018 unchanged at 3.2%, which would be the strongest result since 2011, up from an estimated 3.0% in 2017.
  • ? January survey data continued to strike a positive tone. Indeed, the global composite PMI rose to its highest level during the current upswing and points to a further acceleration in global GDP growth. Meanwhile, less timely world trade data showed strong growth in November after a weaker performance in September and October.
  • ? Of course, these developments predate recent financial market developments. The key issue is whether the equity market sell‐off triggers significant spillovers to the wider economy. If the market reversal is to have notable repercussions, it will need to morph from a tantrum into a full‐blown crisis. For now, we still expect interest rates generally to edge higher, with three rate hikes still seen in the US this year.
  • ? Despite the recent fall, equity prices are still up sharply compared with a few months ago and earnings growth remains solid. Against this backdrop, further weakness would probably require an additional trigger, such as a sustained rise in bond yields in response to a reassessment of the inflation and monetary policy outlook. Although inflation concerns have risen recently, our view remains that price pressures will rise only gradually in the advanced economies and that the upside risks to both inflation and bond yields remain well contained.
  • ? The upshot is that recent events have not prompted us to reassess the outlook for this year or beyond. We continue to expect world GDP growth to pick up to 3.2% this year, reflecting strong growth in both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. And our forecast for 2019 is also unchanged at 2.9%. In turn, world trade growth remains quite strong, helped by the weaker US$, but is seen slowing to 5% this year from just over 6% in 2017, with a further modest easing to 4.3% in 2019.
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