政府监管的一种规范分析——传统公共利益理论述评及其政策应用

在规制经济学的理论体系中,作为一种规范分析框架下的主流派系,传统的公共利益理论回答了代表公共利益的政府为什么以及应该如何监管的问题,因此从该角度来说,在20世纪90年代新规制经济学出现之前所形成的公共利益理论可称之为传统的公共利益理论,同时也是规制经济学体系形成过程中关于政府监管研究的一个理论起点。此外,文章着重阐述了传统公共利益理论在西方政府监管实践中的政策应用及其影响,评述了其理论发展的合理性、现实性和局限性。     

政府管制理论对我国政府管制改革的启示

对政府管制理论进行了回顾和总结,简要介绍和评析了政府管制的公共利益理论、集团利益理论、公共选择理论和激励理论,提出了我国政府管制改革的几点建议。     

政府俘虏理论与管制改革思路

自有政府管制以来,随着管制的实践,政府管制理论的发展基本上就是沿着“政府管制为谁服务”的争论展开的。最早的政府管制理论是建立在传统观点上的公共利益理     

“经济人”假设与利益集团管制理论的局限性

在西方管制经济学的发展过程中,公共利益理论和利益集团理论长期以来一直存在争论。导致这种分歧的深层原因并不是政府与市场关系的二元对立认识,而是源于对"经济人"假设的适用范围存在着根本性的认知差异。利益集团管制理论的局限性就在于,其对"经济人"假设的极端化运用,不仅混淆了政府行为与市场主体行为之间的根本性差异,而且给政府管制改革带来了严重的误导性影响。     

浅议中国旅游业政府管制的改进

旅游市场存在失灵,需要政府进行管制.政府管制应协调好市场机制与政府干预、个体利益与公共利益等关系,避免给市场机制带来妨害.中国政府对旅游产业的管制还存在一些不合理之处,甚至给产业的发展带来了损害,需要做出相应的改进.     

注册会计师行业监管问题的探讨

一、注册会计师行业监管的理论框架1.管制经济学西方传统管制经济学是一种公共利益理论,把管制视为减少和消除市场失灵,保护公共利益的手段。随着社会的进步,民主程度的提高,传统管制模式进行了必要的改革,政府管制朝着宽容、信任、对话、交流以及合作的方向发展。新兴的管制经济学推崇管制对象的参与并适度引入了竞争机制,管制机构的角色也从传统的行政干预者转变为谈判规则的提供者。2.会计信息的属性及其市场失灵会计信息一方面具有公共物品的属性,使得每个消费者都期望逃避付费而无偿使用信息,从而信息生产成本无法得到有效补偿,信息提…     

管制、政府管制与经济管制

经济管制问题的研究已经成为国内经济学研究的重要领域 ,特别是关于经济管制问题的案例研究和应用研究已经出现了一些重要的研究成果 ,这些研究对于经济管制理论的发展和推动中国经济管制体制的改革是有价值的。但是关于经济管制问题的一般理论研究仍然十分薄弱 ,甚至可以说还是经济管制理论研究的盲区 ,这种现状对于全面、系统和深入地研究经济管制问题是不利的。弄清管制、政府管制的含义 ,厘清政府管制与非政府管制的关系 ,准确界定经济管制的含义、弄清经济管制与政治管制、社会管制之间的关系 ,对经济管制进行适当的分类 ,分析经济管制演变的长期趋势是经济管制问题的一般理论研究的重要内容 ,对其中的一些问题 ,学界已有一些研究 ,但研究盲区仍然存在 ,已有的研究也需要深化 ,基于此本文拟对这些问题及相关问题进行全面的讨论 ,给出笔者对这些问题的研究结论。     

我国地方殡葬业管制失灵与成因：基于管制俘获理论的解释

作为转轨经济体普遍存在的一种社会经济现象,管制俘获正受到越来越多的关注。而我国地方殡葬行业改革为研究利益集团俘获政府提供了一个理想的实验。论文将哈尔滨市殡葬行业作为馆所分离管制模式的代表进行分析,认为殡葬服务机构主要通过自身影响力干预政府管制,创造为特定部门产生高度垄断收益的政策和制度扭曲,使威胁到租金流抽取的改革遭到拒绝,并推断实行馆所分离的其他城市殡葬业也可能存在类似的管制俘获问题。     

政府如何放松管制和提高管制效率

管制行为是国家干预经济的重要手段。近年来,政府管制的理论经由芝加哥大学法律经济学派(Lawand Economics)的倡导,正广为世人接受。同时,经济社会合作组织(OECD)努力推广政府管制在各国实际层面的运作与改革。事实上,政府管制是政府直接对微观主体的经济活动做出限制性的规定。中国作为市场经济刚刚起步的国家,市场发育还很不成熟,政府管制仍然是保障经济健康运行的重要手段。目前,经济运行中出现的政府“缺位”和“越位”的问题,使得针对政府管制的讨论日益激烈。问题的关键是,政府管制要与政府职能转变相结合,改变政府的某些错位现象,…     

市场进入壁垒、进入管制与中国产业的行政垄断

本文在对中国产业行政垄断研究的基础上,从产业组织理论的角度对该问题给予了较全面的论述.其基本逻辑过程是:如果不存在市场的进入壁垒,那么,没有外力干预的市场竞争机制将导致最优的社会福利结果.如果存在市场进入壁垒,则可能是技术进入壁垒、企业战略性进入壁垒和政府进入管制,如果这些进入壁垒的效应有利于市场竞争机制的有效发挥及社会福利,那么政府对此就无需进行干预;反之,就应存在着政府干预,而且这种干预的程序和方法都应该具有有效性和公平性.如果我们将这种干预称作政府管制的话,就不应该存在所谓政府对产业的行政垄断.本文从上述分析逻辑给出行政垄断的定义,并对在我国建立完善有效的产业政府管制以及消除产业的行政垄断提出建议.     

新结构经济学为经济发展开出正确药方了吗？——一个主体分析和过程视角的考察

经济持续发展历来是各个国家追求的主要目标之一,其中围绕政府干预以及如何消除这一外生变量成为经济增长和发展理论的焦点。认为不应再执著于政府是否应当发挥作用,而应沿着另一个方向,即政府在经济发展过程发挥何种作用,以及如何发挥作用进行探索。新结构经济学即是在此思路下,从比较优势和产业结构变迁的微观角度提供了一种经济动态发展的分析框架,并为政府干预制订了增长甄别和因势利导的可操作性步骤。但从主体分析和过程视角出发,新结构经济学仍然面临将政府变量内生化的困境。     

中国规制政府的崛起:一个供给主导型制度变迁过程

中国的规制政府是在经济转型过程中崛起的。这一特殊历史背景使得关于规制的公共利益理论、公共选择理论、新比较经济学和制度移植论对其崛起逻辑的解释都值得商榷。事实上,中国的规制政府是中央政府考虑不同利益集团约束和外部竞争压力前提下,根据自己的信念和认知能力,对原有治理制度进行边际改进的一个供给主导型过程。该过程的路径依赖特征既是引发规制失灵的根本原因,也为提高规制效率提供了改革思路。     

新制度经济学的兴起与公共财政论的发展

中国财政学的发展趋势是在社会共同需要论的基础之上发展公共财政论。近年来, 新制度经济学的兴起对正统经济理论（ 新古典经济学） 提出了挑战。新制度经济学的兴起对公共财政论产生了较大的影响, 本文拟对此进行分析, 以期更为全面地认识公共财政论。     

地方政府利益的新政治经济学分析

地方政府由于担任角色的多重性,致使其在行使权力的过程中体现出多元化利益诉求,具体表现为地方公共利益、地方政府部门利益和地方政府官员利益。随着现代经济社会的飞速发展,地方政府利益有必要赋予新的历史内涵,新政治经济学为分析地方政府利益的内涵及其构成提供了新的视角。     

公共产品供给主体及边界确定的交易费用经济学分析——兼论我国公共产品供给过程中交易费用的计量

将新制度经济学中交易费用理论引入公共产品供给分析,给出了供给公共产品的主体确定的理论模型,并在威廉姆森范式扩展的基础上得出了各个主体的边界,认为最优公共产品供给方式的选择和主体边界的确定,取决于公共产品供给过程中发生的交易费用.测算了中国公私部门供给公共产品过程中存在的交易费用,发现就我国公共产品的供给而言,在一定的条件下将公共产品供给由政府部门交给私人部门与第三部门可以节约交易费用,提高公共产品供给的效率.     

论森林生态产品的外在性

文章运用现代经济学的外部性理论系统分析了森林生态产品外部性的表现形式。在分析森林生态产品外部性的特点和本质的基础上提出解决这种外部性的最佳途径是由政府提供森林生态产品这种公共产品。     

THEORY OF THE STATE, GOVERNMENT TAX AND PURCHASING POLICY, AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Until recently, there has been virtually no discussion among professional economists of the impact of government expenditures on the distribution of income.¹ Neoclassical economics has traditionally shown little interest in distributional issues. Little is said beyond the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products. Micro economics is said to take a “neutral” stance with regard to distributional issues. Static efficiency of allocation is attainable for any income distribution, and consequently, so the parable goes, no income distribution is superior on purely economic grounds to any other. Macro economics also purports to be neutral with respect to distribution. Government expenditures in Keynes' model appear as an undifferentiated blob called “G”. The only interest macro economics takes in distribution issues is concerned with the marginal effect of redistribution on the marginal propensity to consume out of income. Keynesian economics, therefore, is unable to say whether one form of government expenditure is superior to another so long as both accomplish macro objectives. When orthodox economists have approached the issue of the government's distributional impact, they have until recently focused solely on its use of taxes and transfer payments. Public finance has traditionally ignored the expenditure side of state activity since, after all, government activity was a necessary evil, benefiting no one. Gillespie's path-breaking study in 1965 finally acknowledged the utility of government spending, but his analysis and those that have followed in the orthodox tradition have been hampered by a number of awkward premises. First, the orthodox studies of fiscal incidence implicitly accept the view of the government as a neutral arbiter rather than a protagonist of the dominant classes in society. Second, benefits of government services are assumed to be accurately measured by outlays. Thus, if we find that the government spends four times as much on highways as on police, it is assumed that the utility of highways is four times that of police even though one cannot even imagine the continuity of the status quo without the police while many responsible citizens argue that we should drastically curtail outlays on roads. Obviously, the utility of the police in terms of system maintenance exceeds that of the more expensive highway expenditures. Third, it is assumed that for each dollar spent by the government, only one person will benefit when, in fact, many disparate groups can benefit from the same expenditure. A dollar spent on education benefits the student as well as hislher employer. Fourth, Gillespie and his orthodox followers ignore any effect of the government on the pre-tax, pre-transfer distribution of income which they take as given. A hypothesis which we examine in this paper is that the government has an enormous influence over the shape of the pre-tax, pre-transfer income distribution. A more general criticism of previous studies of fiscal incidence is that they suffer from a poorly defined theory of the state. This assertion is most clzarly illustrated by the categorization in previous studies of a wide variety of public exp-enditures as “public goods” (such as national military expenditures). The benefits of these “public goods” are allocated among various income groups in several ways, for example on the basis of wealth ownership (both productive and consumptive) or on a per capita basis. The method of allocation chosen has enormous consequences for one's estimate of overall fiscal incidence. According to Herriot and Miller, those with incomes over $50,000 either receive a net benefit of 4.5 percent of their total income from the government or lose 42.1 percent, depending upon the allocation formula chosen for public goods. Previous studies have taken an agnostic position with respect to the appropriateness of the several allocative assumptions. But this is merely simple empiricism without theoreticai foundation, and thus the formulation of specific hypotheses which employ scientific procedures is impossible. What is needed to provide an interpretation of the data is a well-articulated theory of the state-an area to which we turn our attention in the next section of this paper.     

Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of “the golden rule of public sector borrowing”

In this paper I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth-enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debt-financed public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital.     

POLITICS AND THE NEW RESOURCE ECONOMICS

Two competing theories generally used, at least implicitly, to justify and analyze public resource management are scientific management and pluralism. We briefly review these theories and compare them to the new resource economics, an emerging body of theory which revises resource economics by introducing concepts from Austrian economics, property rights theory, and public choice. We argue that the new resource economics is superior to these traditional theories and then present specific policy proposals for the national forests, wilderness areas, and the public grazing lands. We also criticize new resource economists for not clearly distinguishing ideology from science, for emphasizing efficiency as a criterion for policy analysis, and for lacking political strategies for implementing their proposals     

The dynamics of economic systems,or how to transform a failed socialist economy

How to transform a failed socialist economy raises questions about the processes of structural and institutional changes, which standard economics is inadequately equipped to study. An economic theory that can study both these processes is suggested and applied to the actual debate of how the transformation should be conducted. Standard notions of institutional roles (R) and organizational structures (S) are seen in a non-standard way as outcomes of two interrelated but distinct evolutions. Comparing different given Rs for their influence on S-evolution throws new light on which R should be the target of the transformation. Compared to standard analysis, the case against socialism on the supply side is strengthened, whereas the case against a redistributive welfare society on the demand side is weakened. S-evolution is shown to require more time and be more difficult to be helped by government than R-evolution. This clarifies several controversial points about the speed and the sequencing of the transformation policies. The study of R-evolution discloses an important cognitive constraint on these policies, which teaching of economics can help to soften. Standard economics, shown to be a special case of the suggested theory, is rehabilitated as the best subject by which such teaching should start.