Confident expectations, rational expectations and the optimal conduct of monetary policy

Under what conditions central banks can afford to deviate from announced targets without losing their reputation is analyzed. For this, the public must have something like ‘confident expectations' vis-a-vis monetary policy and central banks have to behave accordingly. The paper shows that it can be rational for the public and welfare-increasing for the society to retain ‘confident expectations' instead of switching to rational expectations, when central banks have gained long-run reputation. At the end of the paper, alternative optimal money supply rules are compared in a dynamic optimization framework. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.     

Political risk and the expectations hypothesis

This paper develops and empirically supports, using 3 and 6 month interest rates, a theory that political risk can explain the shifting term premia found in U.S. data. We find that incorporating these political regime shifts yield results that support the expectations hypothesis.     

Arenas of expectations for hydrogen technologies

Technological development is often described as an evolutionary process of variation, selection and retention. Different technologies are seen as variations, while the market and other institutions operate as a selection environment. It is less understood, however, how variation and selection relate in the case of emerging technologies. In this paper we introduce the concept of arenas of expectations to examine the relationship between variation and selection processes. Expectations are of particular interest in a pre-market phase of innovation, when performance, cost and other market criteria are less articulated and not stable. In arenas of expectations ‘enactors’ of particular technological variations voice and maintain expectations, while ‘selectors’ will compare and assess the competing claims. We analyse the expectations work of both parties in a case study on metal hydrides for the on-board storage of hydrogen for automotive applications. The paper concludes with a framework of ‘arenas of expectations’ as the linchpin between the processes of variation and selection of emerging technologies.     

Tax policy, venture capital, and entrepreneurship

The paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide funds, covering investment cost plus an upfront payment, in exchange for a share in the firm. The contract must include incentives to enlist full effort of entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists also assist with valuable business advice to enhance survival chances. The paper develops a general equilibrium framework with a traditional and an entrepreneurial sector and investigates the effects of taxes on the equilibrium level of managerial advice, entrepreneurship and welfare. It considers differential wage and capital income taxes, a comprehensive income tax, progressive taxation as well as investment and output subsidies to the entrepreneurial sector.     

Concatenate coordination and mutual coordination

We tell of the evolving meaning of the term coordination as used by economists. The paper is based on systematic electronic searches (on “coord,” etc.) of major works and leading journals. The term coordination first emerged in professional economics around 1880, to describe the directed productive concatenation of factors or activities within a firm. Also, transportation economists used the term to describe the concatenation of routes and trips of a transportation system. These usages represent what we term concatenate coordination. The next major development came in the 1930s from several LSE economists (Hayek, Plant, Hutt, and Coase), who extended that concept beyond the eye of any actual coordinator. That is, they wrote of the concatenate coordination of a system of polycentric or spontaneous activities. These various applications of concatenate coordination prevailed until the next major development, namely, Thomas Schelling and game models. Here coordination referred to a mutual meshing of actions. Game theorists developed crisp ideas of coordination games (like “battle of the sexes”), coordination equilibria, convention, and path dependence. This “coordination” was not a refashioning, but rather a distinct concept, one we distinguish as mutual coordination. As game models became more familiar to economists, it was mutual coordination that economists increasingly had in mind when they spoke of “coordination.” Economists switched, so to speak, to a new semantic equilibrium. Now, mutual coordination overshadows the older notion of concatenate coordination. The two senses of coordination are conceptually distinct and correspond neatly to the two dictionary definitions of the verb to coordinate. Both are crucial to economics. We suggest that distinguishing between the two senses can help to clarify “coordination” talk. Also, compared to talk of “efficiency” and “optimality,” concatenate coordination allows for a richer, more humanistic, and more openly aesthetic discussion of social affairs. The narrative is backed up by Excel worksheets that report on systematic content searches of the writings of economics using the worldwide web and, using JSTOR, of Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, and Economica.     

The curse of low expectations

We examine how a remedial education programme for primary school‐age children affects parental expectations about their children's future. Using original survey data we collected in Serbia, we investigate whether expectations on labour market prospects and educational attainment change as a consequence of exposure to the Roma Teaching Assistant programme. Our results show that parents of pupils in treated schools expect higher returns to education for their children and are more likely to expect them to achieve a secondary level of education. We also investigate the possible mechanisms in place due to the characteristics of the programme: remedial education and role model.     

Retirement expectations, pension reforms, and their impact on private wealth accumulation

We estimate the effect of pension reforms on households' expectations of retirement outcomes and private wealth accumulation decisions exploiting a decade of intense Italian pension reforms as a source of exogenous variation in expected pension wealth. The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large random sample of the Italian population, elicits expectations of the age at which workers expect to retire and of the ratio of pension benefits to pre-retirement income between 1989 and 2002. We find that workers have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform and that there is substantial offset between private wealth and perceived pension wealth, particularly by workers that are better informed about their pension wealth.     

Intertemporal consumption with directly measured welfare functions and subjective expectations

Euler equation estimation of intertemporal consumption models requires many, often unverifiable assumptions. These include assumptions on expectations and preferences. We aim at reducing some of these requirements by using direct subjective information on respondents’ preferences and expectations. The results suggest that individually measured welfare functions and expectations have predictive power for the variation in consumption across households. Furthermore, estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution based on the estimated welfare functions are plausible and of a similar order of magnitude as other estimates found in the literature. The model favored by the data only requires cross-section data for estimation.     

Economic instruments and the environmental accounts

The Nordic countries have now had experience with environmental taxes and subsidies as a major component of their environmental policy over an extensive period of time. The Swedish System of Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA) include environmental taxes and subsidies as part of the official statistics. This article presents the accounts for taxes and subsidies, linked to the accounts for emissions data by industry. It demonstrates disparities between emissions and environmental taxes, as well as where industries or environmental problems are not regulated. The data show that in Sweden economic instruments are always aimed at particular actors or areas, and are never quite as comprehensive as recommended by economic theory. The environmental taxes are primarily aimed at fossil fuel use and related emissions, and have been mostly applied to the household sector and services sector, while industry often has been given exemptions due to concerns about international competition. The environmentally motivated subsidies are mainly directed to agriculture, fishing and research on renewable resources. A fully developed international data set on taxes and subsidies would provide a sound base for comparing the impact on international competitiveness. Eurostat is promoting the use of environmental accounts data for its member countries by harmonizing methods and engaging in publication of international comparisons.     

Money illusion and coordination failure

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inferior equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails.     

Export pricing and exchange rate expectations under uncertainty

This paper contributes to the literature on firms’ export pricing by assessing whether and to what extent firms take into account the expected future evolution of the exchange rates while setting their prices. Using French micro-level trade data, our empirical analysis reveals that by adjusting their export prices, firms partly absorb information about future exchange rate variations. The extent to which individual exporters absorb future exchange rate fluctuations is found to depend on their market power, in accordance with theoretical dynamic demand-side models encompassing mechanisms creating an inter-temporal relationship between current market shares and future profits. The analysis also shows that the strength of such expectation-related mechanism is considerably reduced with greater future exchange rate uncertainty, in line with an interpretation of pricing-to-market as an investment decision under uncertainty. In a comparative perspective our results are shown to drive asymmetric responses across destinations of aggregate bilateral export flows to expected exchange rate movements.     

Dynamic coordination games

Summary Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. In this paper, the extent of delay is studied in a dynamic,N-person, coordination game. There is no social gain from delay, so an equilibrium with delay is always inefficient. For fixedN, there is no coordination failure when the period length is short: all equilibrium outcomes converge to the Pareto efficient outcome as the period length converges to zero. On the other hand, holding period length fixed, there exist equilibria in which delay is proportional toN, for arbitrarily large values ofN. In addition, it can be shown that the possibility of delay depends on the timing of strategic complementarities. However, under certain conditions, delay is shown to be a robust phenomenon, in the sense that well-behaved equilibria exhibit infinite delay forN sufficiently large.This paper grew out of discussions with Christophe Chamley. While writing it I benefited from discussions with Ken Binmore, Russell Cooper, Bob Rosenthal and Michael Manove. Joe Farrell, Drew Fudenberg, Martin Hellwig and Sawoong Kang made very useful comments on an earlier version that led to substantial improvements. Helpful comments were also made by seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the SUNY at Stoney Brook, the NBER Summer Institute, Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago. I would like to thank Nick Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their editorial advice. Financial support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES 9196061.     

When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that there are many ways to engineer coordination successes.      

Evidence on learning in coordination games

This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player’s best response is an order statistic of the cohort’s action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function constant and only changes cohort size and order statistic.

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Competition and coordination in experimental minority games

This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of information about other players’ past choices and the salience of information regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing). Our main findings can be summarized as follows: aggregate efficiency in the game is in most cases significantly higher than the level corresponding to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, providing players with information about individual choices in the group does not improve aggregate efficiency with respect to when such information is absent. Displaying information about more rounds than just the previous one, on the other hand, seems to have a positive effect on aggregate efficiency. At the individual level, we find a stronger statistical relation between players’ current choices and their own past choices than between players’ choices and previous aggregate outcomes. In addition, the depth of the relation between present and past choices seems to be affected by the prompt availability of information about the game history. Finally, we detect evidence of a mutual co-adaptation between players’ choices over time that is partly responsible for the high level of efficiency observed.      

Investment coordination and demand complementarities

Summary. This paper establishes necessary conditions for demand complementarity to imply investment coordination failure and explores the welfare implications of coordinated investment. Our main results caution against demand complementarities as a motive for investment coordination. We find that: 1) generally, a strict notion of complementarity (Hicks) is necessary for the existence of an investment coordination problem and 2) that when the problem does exist, coordination lowers social welfare without countervailing sectoral asymmetries. Received: June 19, 1996; revised version: December 5, 1997     

Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games

Summary. The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that agents follow a rule of ‘switching to better strategies with higher probability’. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality models of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Moreover, agents stay with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is not ergodic but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs with probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of these agents. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: June 21, 2001     

An experimental study of costly coordination

This paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching. The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the set of Nash equilibria nor do they alter the predictions of adjustment theories based on imitation or best response dynamics. As expected, however, increasing the effort cost lowers effort levels. Maximization of a stochastic potential function, a concept that generalizes risk dominance to continuous games, predicts this reduction in efforts. An error parameter estimated from initial two-person, minimum-effort games is used to predict behavior in other three-person coordination games.     

The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates: The Brazilian case revisited

This article tests the Expectations Hypothesis (EH) using Brazilian monthly data for bond yields spanning the 2000–2017 sample period and ranging in maturity from 3 months to 5 years. Three tests are examined: the first is based on interest rates spread and the other two are based on the forward rates. On balance our results suggest rejection of the EH throughout the maturity spectrum examined, and are broadly consistent with previous findings that a linear combination of forward rates provides a statistically significant prediction of bond excess returns.     

Institutions as knowledge capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann's interpretative institutionalism

This article revisits the socioeconomic theory of the AustrianSchool economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the commonclaim that Lachmann's idiosyncratic (i.e., eclectic and multidisciplinary)approach to economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reachesthe following conclusions. (1) Lachmann held a sophisticatedinstitutional position vis-à-vis economics that anticipateddevelopments in contemporary new institutional economics. (2)Lachmann's sociological and economic reading of institutionsoffers insights for the problem of coordination.