Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

Optimal securitization with moral hazard

We consider the optimal design of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in a dynamic setting in which a mortgage underwriter with limited liability can engage in costly hidden effort to screen borrowers and can sell loans to investors. We show that (i) the timing of payments to the underwriter is the key incentive mechanism, (ii) the maturity of the optimal contract can be short, and that (iii) bundling mortgages is efficient as it allows investors to learn about underwriter effort more quickly, an information enhancement effect. Finally, we demonstrate that the optimal contract can be closely approximated by the “first loss piece.”     

保险市场道德风险实证研究评述

本文梳理了近年来国内外学者关于保险市场道德风险实证研究的文献,分别从理论基础、实证方法、实证结果三个方面进行评述,总结了目前该领域相关研究尚存在的问题,同时对保险市场道德风险实证研究的未来发展方向提出了相关看法和建议.     

Optimal contracting with moral hazard and cascading

In this article I identify optimal incentive contracts for managersof firms competing in the product market. Such firms often confrontsimilar decisions and uncertainties. Managers can improve decisionquality by generating private signals through costly effort.However, since signals are likely to be correlated, firms thatdecide later get additional information from the actions ofearlier firms. This impacts effort choice. Decision qualityis also affected if later managers disregard their own signalsand blindly imitate preceding decisions. In a competitive environment,such cascading hurts profits. Contracts that solve both moralhazard and cascading problems typically put more weight on firmprofits, making them expensive. Contacts with more weight ondecision quality are less expensive but result in cascades.Shareholders choose contracts that maximize their net surplus.This results in testable implications about which industriesmay have more convergence in investment choices, greater pay-for-profitsensitivity, larger differences in observed contracts, moreinnovation, larger-size firms, and potential for overcompensation.     

风险导向型审计与道德风险

"银广夏"事件的爆发,使我国审计界再次感受到前所未有的审计风险.如何回避审计风险、保护自身的发展,成为会计职业界关注与讨论的一个重要话题.有一种观点认为,引入风险导向型审计,是职业界的最佳选择.本文主要关注风险导向型审计如何合理地应用于我国当前的经济环境,以提高审计质量.     

Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules.     

Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data.     

Capital flows under moral hazard

I analyze a model with moral hazard and limited enforcement in a small open economy. I find that when state contingent contracting is allowed adding the moral hazard friction improves the model's predictions along several dimensions. First, it justifies why non-contingent debt is an optimal way to finance an emerging economy. Second, it explains the limited consumption risk-sharing and high, volatile and counter-cyclical interest rates. Third, it generates realistic crisis-like dynamics in which capital inflows are brought to a halt and interest rates sky-rocket. The model also has a strong internal propagation mechanism.     

The price of moral hazard

Abstract

1. In this note we shall show that a simple application of game theory makes it possible to determine the costs associated with the presence of moral hazard.     

Surety bonds and moral hazard in banking

We examine a policy in which owners of banks provide funds in the form of a surety bond in addition to equity capital. This policy would require banks to provide the regulator with funds that could be invested in marketable securities. Investors in the bank receive the income from the surety bond as long as the bank is in business. The capital value could be used by bank regulators to pay off the banks’ liabilities in case of bank failure. After paying depositors, investors would receive the remaining funds, if any. Analytically, this instrument is a way of creating charter value but, as opposed to Keeley (1990) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), restrictions on competition are not necessary to generate positive rents. We demonstrate that capital requirements alone cannot prevent the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance.     

Credit derivatives and bank credit supply

Credit derivatives are the latest in a series of innovations that have had a significant impact on credit markets. Using a micro data set of individual corporate loans, this paper explores whether use of credit derivatives is associated with an increase in bank credit supply. We find only limited evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit. The strongest effect is for large term loans—newly negotiated loan extensions to large corporate borrowers, with a largely negative impact on (previously negotiated) commitment lending. Even for large term borrowers, increases in the volume of credit are offset by higher spreads. These findings suggest that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow, accruing mainly to large firms that are likely to be “named credits” in these transactions. Finally, use of credit derivatives appears to be complementary to other forms of hedging by banks, though the banks most active in hedging appear to charge more for additional amounts of credit.     

Capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous investors

As a two-parameter model that satisfies stochastic dominance, the mean-extended Gini model is used to build efficient portfolios. The model quantifies risk aversion heterogeneity in capital markets. In a simple Edgeworth box framework, we show how capital market equilibrium is achieved for risky assets. This approach provides a richer basis for analysing the pricing of risky assets under heterogeneous preferences. Our main results are: (1) identical investors, who use the same statistic to represent risk, hold identical portfolios of risky assets equal to the market portfolio; and (2) heterogeneous investors as expressed by the variance or the extended Gini hold different risky assets in portfolios, and therefore no one holds the market portfolio.     

Asset market equilibrium with liquidity risk

This paper derives an equilibrium asset pricing model with endogenous liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is modeled as a stochastic quantity impact on the price from trading, where the size of the impact depends on trade size. Under a strong set of assumptions, we prove that a unique equilibrium liquidity cost process and a unique equilibrium price process exists for our economy. We characterize the market’s state price density, which enables the derivation of the risk-return relation for the stock’s expected return including liquidity risk. We derive a generalized intertemporal CAPM and consumption CAPM for these markets. In contrast to the traditional models without liquidity risk, there is an additional systematic liquidity risk factor which is related to the stock return’s covariation with the market’s stochastic liquidity cost. Traditional transaction costs are a special case of our formulation.     

An analysis of IMF-induced moral hazard

Three channels through which the IMF rescue package may affect international lending can be distinguished: debtor-side moral hazard, creditor-side moral hazard, and debtor and creditor-side moral hazard. We show that if the rescue package fully benefits the debtor, no credit contract between him and the creditor arises. The other two kinds of moral hazard, where the creditor receives the rescue package either fully or in part, increase the scale of international lending relative to the case where no rescue package is forthcoming. The increase is larger if the creditor receives the whole rescue package than if it is shared between the creditor and the debtor.These results are based on the analysis of two sequential credit relationships, the first one between a bank and a government and the following one between the IMF and the government. Each of these credit relationships is characterized by asymmetric information and modeled by a moral hazard model. The two moral hazard models are linked by considering the different channels of the IMF rescue package.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

An experimental approach to the effectiveness of an incentive system against moral hazard in the insurance market

Although traditional Japanese insurance theory has tended to assume the basic altruism of policyholders, this assumption may not be warranted. Many people might be opportunists rather than altruists. So in the actual insurance market, moral hazard may occur not accidentally but naturally. Without effective incentive mechanisms, policyholders may deviate from their original purpose. It is important to design penalties as negative incentives for the control and prevention of moral hazard. We test these propositions here by means of a game theory and questionnaire. The reason why we use a game theory and carry out the questionnaire is that it is not suitable to apply the econometric model to collect reliable data about moral hazard.     

International capital market equilibrium with investment barriers

This paper outlines models of capital market equilibrium when there are explicit barriers to international investment in the form of a tax on holdings of assets in one country by residents of another country. There is a corresponding subsidy on short positions in foreign assets. Asset prices deviate from the predictions of the world capital asset pricing model. Investors do not hold a mixture of national market portfolios, but the mix of risky assets is the same for every investor in a country. Optimal portfolios tend to be heavy in domestic assets, and light in foreign assets. Tax free investors, however, tend to hold assets anywhere in the world that are taxed heavily. Estimates of the magnitude of the average tax (or the magnitude of effective barriers to international investment) can be made by comparing the average return on the minimum variance zero β portfolio, z, with the average across countries and time of the short-term interest rate. When barriers are ineffective, the expected return on portfolio z will be the average short-term interest rate, and the world capital asset pricing model will hold.     

Credit line takedown and endogenous bank capital

This paper investigates the implications of the uncertain timing and usage of loan commitments for the optimal level of bank capital. We use trended Brownian motion to proxy the stochastic takedown of credit lines. Relying on “time to first passage” mathematics, we derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of the bank credit line as well as the likelihood for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan takedown. Armed with these analytical results, we solve for the optimal level of bank capital within a simultaneous equation framework in order to capture the interrelationships of the endogenous variables. The optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations which refuse to yield reduced form solutions and provide no immediate intuition. Therefore, the maximizing values of the bank’s decision variables were simulated over a host of realistic scenarios. We document the comparative static behavior of the bank’s decision variables when equity is unencumbered by capital requirements and, also, examine the impact of the same parametric changes on bank behavior when equity is a fixed proportion of lending. Further simulations produce the expected time to liquidity depletion under different capital requirement schemes.