后危机时代商业银行不良资产形成因素的实证研究——基于江西省数据的经验分析

2009年,我国信贷高增长引致未来银行不良资产大量积聚的潜在风险引起了各方关注。在后金融危机背景下,研究商业银行不良贷款的现状,发掘不良贷款存在的根源,对信贷风险管理具有重要的现实意义。本文在回顾以前研究成果的基础上,试图以更加全面的视角,从宏观经济金融环境、宏观调控政策以及银行业运行情况等三个方面深入分析商业银行不良资产的影响因素。文章运用协整分析、格兰杰因素检验和脉冲响应模型对资产价格、固定资产投资、通胀率、存款准备金率、基准利率、银行利润等指标与不良贷款率（或不良贷款余额）的因果关系、影响程度进行了实证分析。结果表明,宏观经济金融形势的变化和货币政策调整都是影响不良贷款变化的重要原因,而不良贷款率的变化对商业银行利润影响明显。     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy

Under the incomplete contract framework, we consider an optimal regulatory policy for motivating bank equity owners and bank managers to restructure the bad loans of their banks in the presence of managerial compensation contracts with stock options. The regulatory policy studied in this paper is mainly concerned with the design of repayment schedules in the scheme of injection of cash funds into insolvent banks by the regulator. We show that the regulator cannot necessarily attain the social optimal allocation by injecting cash funds into insolvent banks through the purchase of subordinated bonds with the risk-free interest rate. However, even in that case, we also suggest that, if the regulator injects cash funds into active restructuring banks through the purchase of subordinated bonds or preferred stocks with less stringent repayment conditions and nationalizes passive restructuring banks, the regulator can attain the social optimal allocation by performing such a non-linear injection scheme under certain conditions.     

Does regulatory forbearance matter for bank stability? Evidence from creditors’ perspective

Regulatory forbearance in times of corporate distress has been a common practice in many countries to achieve bank stability, particularly so in the absence of a unified bankruptcy code, yet very little is known in the context of emerging market economies. Exploiting variation of membership across banks in a corporate debt restructuring programme (CDR) sponsored by the central bank in India, this paper finds that the banks that made use of regulatory forbearance (RF) on the restructured corporate loans could increase their stability significantly due to the extension of low provisioning on restructured loans. However, the positive effect of RF diminishes at higher levels of market power, highlighting that member banks with higher market power tend to originate riskier assets (as reflected in their risk-weighted assets) under the auspices of this programme. Our results remain robust to different estimators (including propensity score matching), ownership structure, and alternative measures of bank stability.     

Bank exposure to market fear

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.     

The output and profit contribution of information technology and advertising investments in banks

This paper examines the contribution of investments in Information Technology (IT) and in advertising to the output and profits of Spanish banks, in the period 1983–2003. We find that the growth in the stock of IT capital explains one third of output growth of banks, and that an additional investment in IT of one million euros may be substituted for twenty-five workers. The paper also finds that advertising investments increase the demand for bank services with an elasticity of 0.22 for deposits and 0.11 for loans. For all the assets considered, the null hypothesis that banks use the profit-maximizing amount of services per period cannot be rejected with the data.     

Competition and Coalition among Underwriters: The Decision to Join a Syndicate

This paper studies the decision of lead investment banks to organize hybrid syndicates (commercial banks participating as co‐managers) versus pure investment bank syndicates. The findings show that hybrid underwriting issues are more challenging to float. Compared to pure investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates serve clients that are smaller, have lower common stock rankings and less prior access to the capital markets, rely more on bank loans, and invest less capital but issue larger amounts, which indicates that commercial banks' participation enhances hybrid services. Moreover, lead investment banks tend to invite banks' participation when clients exhibit higher loyalty in reusing their services.     

Characteristics of failed U.S. commercial banks: an exploratory study

This study uses survival analysis to determine how early the indications of bank failure can be observed. We find that banks with high loan to asset and high personal loan to assets ratios are more likely to survive. Older banks and banks with high real estate and agricultural loans, loan loss allowance, loan charges off and non‐performing loans to assets ratio are more likely to fail. It is possible to predict survival functions of <50% for failed banks, 3 years or less before failure. Moreover, we find that most of the variables present a behaviour that departs from Benford’s Law.     

Herding behaviour in the Australian loan market and its impact on bank loan quality

We examine the effect of herding behaviour on the credit quality of bank loans in Australia. We find that bank herding varies with different types of loans. It tends to be more prevalent in owner‐occupied housing loans and credit cards than other types of loans. During the global financial crisis period, herding in owner‐occupied housing loans was most pronounced due to the flight‐to‐quality phenomenon in the housing sector. Furthermore, we find that the big four banks tend to herd more than smaller and regional banks. Bank herding behaviour is countercyclical, as it is negatively related to real GDP growth and the cost of funding but is positively related to market risk. Regulatory capital requirements may also encourage herding as banks are required to hold less risk‐weighted capital for residential loans. Most importantly, bank herding is related to higher impaired assets and therefore lower loan quality. Our findings may have implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Bank systemic risk and corporate investment: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model in which a bank’s investment (e.g., loans) is influenced by short-term financing and a probability of a financial crisis. When banks ex ante expect to be bailed out during financial crises, they do not necessarily internalize the cost of financial crises and invest more. We argue that the level of systemic risk in the banking sector is largely driven by (1) the way in which banks finance their investment (e.g., loans) using more short-term debt and/or (2) the increase in asset commonality amongst banks. We use three measures that arguably capture two dimensions of “bank systemic risk”, namely, (1) bank funding maturity and (2) bank asset commonality, to empirically test whether bank systemic risk has a positive effect on corporate investment. We document that in a sample of publicly listed firms in the United States over the period 1991–2013, bank systemic risk is positively associated with the firm-level investment ratio after controlling for a large set of country- and firm-level variables. In addition, we show that a firm's leverage strengthens the positive effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment, suggesting that more financially constrained firms experience a larger effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment than less financially constrained firms.     

Does the source of uncertainty matter? The impact of financial,newspaper and Twitter-based measures on U.S. banks

This study examines if the source of uncertainty (newspaper, Twitter, financial market) matters in its impact on bank stock returns in the United States. By applying discrete wavelet transformation, we model directional spillovers and Granger causality between uncertainty and bank returns for different time horizons. Our results demonstrate that this distinction between time horizons is crucial. Although newspaper and Twitter-based measures are correlated, they capture a different source of investor perception. Twitter-based uncertainty adversely affects bank stocks in the short run, while newspaper-based policy uncertainty is relevant in the medium run. Financial-based uncertainty, VIX, is the most important factor. Moreover, we find that the impact of uncertainty on bank returns is stronger during the COVID-19 pandemic and for banks with a high ratio of loans to total assets and large off-balance-sheet activities.     

Bad luck or bad management? Emerging banking market experience

A large number of bank failures occurred in transition countries during the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. These were related to increases in non-performing loans and deteriorated cost efficiency of banks. This paper addresses the question of the causality between non-performing loans and cost efficiency in order to examine whether either of these factors is the deep determinant of bank failures. We extend the Granger-causality model developed by [Berger, A., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. J. Banking Finance 21, 849–870] by applying GMM dynamic panel estimators on a panel of Czech banks between 1994 and 2005. Our findings support the bad management hypothesis, according to which deteriorations in cost efficiency precede increases in non-performing loans. Banking supervisors should consequently focus on enhanced cost efficiency of banks in order to reduce the likelihood of bank failures in transition countries.     

Problem bank loans, conflicts of interest, and institutions

I consider problem bank loans as the outcome of decisions made by banks in the dual role they serve as financial intermediaries. This dual role necessarily introduces conflicts of interest that can lead to bank mismanagement and consequently problem bank loans. Because bank activities take place within the tangible and intangible structure of institutions, institutions may affect the quality of bank loans. I consider legal, political, sociological, economic, and banking institutions and explore their contribution to problem bank loans. I find support that a variety of institutions impact the share of bank assets that are non-performing.     

BANK LOAN SALES: A NEW LOOK AT THE MOTIVATIONS FOR SECONDARY MARKET ACTIVITY

Bank lending traditionally involves the extension of credit that is held by the originating bank until maturity. Loan sales allow banks to deviate from this pattern by transferring loans in part or in their entirety from their own books to those of another institution. I use a new methodology to test the validity of two hypotheses regarding banks' motivations for selling and buying loans: (1) the comparative advantage hypothesis, that banks with a comparative advantage in originating loans sell and those with a comparative advantage in funding loans buy; and (2) the diversification hypothesis, that banks lacking the ability to diversify internally use loan sales and purchases to achieve diversification. I also address the possibility that information asymmetries may increase the cost of participating in secondary markets. Particular attention is paid to the importance of affiliate relationships in overcoming informational barriers to participation. The empirical evidence presented here helps clarify the benefits of an active secondary loan market and generates predictions regarding the future of that market in a world of rapid consolidation and disappearing barriers to geographical expansion.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

The sensitivity of bank stock returns to real estate

According to the Federal Reserve Board, banking firms have recently been shifting significantly larger portions of their loan portfolios into real estate. This increase in real estate lending has caused concern about the continuing economic health of banks on the part of state and federal regulators, since changes in real estate returns, evidenced by changes in property value, can potentially have a significant impact on bank default risk and profit-ability. However, concerned parties do not seem to have explicitly considered the relationship between mortgage default risk and the specific characteristics of real estate investments.This study examines the sensitivities of stock returns for different bank groups, based on the percentage of total loans in real estate and the percentage of loans in five different mortgage categories (construction and development loans, farmland loans, one- to four-family residential loans, multifamily residential loans, and nonresidential and nonfarm loans), to changes in real estate market returns. This is done by developing and using a three-index model.The results of this study indicate that bank stocks, overall, are very sensitive to changes in real estae returns. Banks, with a larger portion of their total loans invested in all types of real estate loans, except farmland loans, are most sensitive to changes in real estate returns.     

Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis

This paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the US mortgage crisis. Real estate-related assets are overvalued in banks' balance sheets, especially those of bigger banks, compared to the market value of these assets. Banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules.     

信用卡不良资产管理环节的法律风险及应对

通过对某商业银行信用卡中心信用卡不良资产管理现状的分析,剖析该中心信用卡不良资产管理中的法律风险,特别是催收主体及各种催收方式的法律风险,提出防范信用卡不良资产管理环节法律风险的意见和建议。     

Stronger Risk Controls,Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.