EVA AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: CAPTURING SYNERGIES AND OTHER ISSUES

This article makes three basic points about divisional performance measurement that managers should keep in mind when attempting to choose between EVA and more conventional, accounting-based measures. First, no divisional performance measure, whether it be EVA, divisional net income, or ROA, is capable of capturing synergies among divisions—those shared benefits or costs that make the sum of the parts worth more than the whole. And EVA is neither more nor less effective than more conventional financial measures in deterring divisional managers from taking actions that increase divisional profits at the expense of corporate value. Thus, there is a fundamental contradiction in the very attempt to evaluate the divisions of a multi—divisional firm as if they were independent companies. If there are synergies, divisional performance measures—even those employing transfer prices—are likely to prove inadequate in some respects (and this article recommends some methods for encouraging synergies that might be used to supplement if not replace divisional measures). But if there are no synergies, then top managers should re-examine their business strategy and consider selling or spinning off divisions. Second, a given performance measure's degree of correlation with stock returns should not be management's sole, or even its most important, criterion in choosing to adopt a given performance measure. A better method for evaluating performance measures is to weigh the behavioral or incentive benefits of a given measure against all direct and indirect costs associated with its implementation. In making such a costbenefit analysis, the incentive benefits from the tighter linkage of rewards to share prices provided by more market-based measures should be traded off against the greater market risk and exposure to other uncontrollables imposed by such measures as well as the costs involved in changing the firm's internal accounting and reporting systems. Third, the EVA practice of “decoupling” performance measures from GAAP accounting, while having have potentially significant incentive benefits, also has potential costs in the form of increased auditing requirements and the possibility of litigation.     

THE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION OF A CORPORATE RETIREMENT PLAN: A CASE STUDY

This paper is based on an actual study of a pooled profit-sharing plan sponsored by a Fortune 50 company from September 1978 to June 1983. The purpose of performance measurement is to identify skill at portfolio management and provide evidence indicating whether performance coincides with the investment skills claimed by the portfolio manager. The approach here is to apply the security market line analysis suggested by Fama. Characteristic lines were determined for the plan portfolio allowing the calculation for alpha, the Jensen differential performance index, beta, and R². Tests are made to determine if the investment manager was able to achieve superior performance by shifting portfolio market sensitivity in anticipation of major market moves (market-timing effect) and/or selecting undervalued securities (security-selection effect).     

INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING LITERATURE: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

This paper reviews the evolution of institutional research on performance measurement and management (PMM) in the public sector accounting literature. An assessment of the progress of this research programme is offered in light of some key developments in the broader neo-institutional sociology (NIS) literature, such as the growing recognition of the role of embedded agency, the need to bridge institutional and rational choice explanations of action and the extension of empirical research across different levels of institutional fields. Some progress has been made in this respect and has contributed to shift the emphasis from a one-sided focus on institutional effects  on  PMM, treating institutional pressures as largely exogenous, to recognize its more intricate roles as an outcome of, as well as a medium for, change. However, further research is required into the micro dynamics involved in transforming and reproducing PMM practices at different levels of analysis and how such practices become infused with meanings conditioned by higher-order institutional logics across various levels of institutional fields. Some research strategies for addressing these issues are outlined.     

STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO RESULTS

A large and growing number of companies worldwide are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems to help them execute their business strategies. SPM systems use some combination of financial, strategic, and operating measures to evaluate management's success in improving operating efficiency and adding value for shareholders. In many cases, the SPMs also provide the primary basis for rewarding top management, divisional operating managers, and, increasingly, rank‐and‐file employees. Some SPM systems are based entirely on a financial measure like economic value added (or EVA), which encourages managers to consider the opportunity cost of investor capital in making all operating and investment decisions. Other systems are based heavily on nonfinancial considerations, such as the balanced scorecard's emphasis on customer and employee satisfaction, operational excellence, and new product introduction. In this article, the author uses the findings of his recent survey of 113 North American and European companies to shed light on a number of questions: What are the most popular measures in such systems—are they primarily financial, nonfinancial, or amix of the two? To what extent is incentive compensation tied to such measures—and how far down in the organization are such measures (and incentives) extended? What are the most formidable challenges to implementing SPM systems in large corporations, with often diverse collections of businesses and tens if not hundreds of thousands of employees? Among the article's most notable conclusions, a majority of companies expect in the next three years to publish SPM targets and results in their annual reports. The most commonly cited financial SPMs will be cash flow, return on capital employed, and other variations of EVA. The most frequently cited nonfinancial SPMs are customer satisfaction, market share, and new product development. The greatest challenge in implementing SPMs is translating the vision and strategic objectives at the corporate level into performance measures that are relevant to activities at the business unit level, and securing buy‐in from business unit managers and employees.     

BIASES IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT DURING CONTRIBUTIONS: A NOTE

This note demonstrates that a statistical error (e.g., due to pricing error) made in valuing an investment fund at the time of an intra-period contribution leads to an error in calculating the period's total return, even if the fund was valued correctly at the beginning and end of the period. On average, even if the valuation error is distributed randomly with mean zero, the fund's performance will be biased.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF POST-ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE: TOWARD A VALUE-BASED BENCHMARKING METHODOLOGY

Mergers and acquisitions are clearly the favorite corporate growth strategy of this generation's executive teams. But there is little evidence that such strategies have paid off for the acquiring companies' shareholders–and many transactions have proved disastrous for the careers of the executives as well as the pocketbooks of the shareholders of the acquiring firms.
This article presents a methodology for evaluating post-acquisition operating performance from the perspective of the acquiring company's shareholders. The cornerstone of the method is a performance benchmark that incorporates the operating performance expectations built into the pre-acquisition market values of the two companies plus the additional promise of performance created by the payment of an acquisition premium.
After illustrating the use of this methodology in the case of an actual acquisition, the article goes on to present the results of a study (using 41 major strategic acquisitions from the period 1979–1990) of the extent to which stock market reactions to acquirers are useful predictors of actual performance over a five-year period following the acquisition. The results of the study provide strong support for building current market expectations into the benchmarking methodology.
The 1990s are often said to have initiated an era of so-called strategic mergers. The clear message from this analysis is that, even if a deal is deemed strategic, it will not add value unless the realized synergies justify the acquisition premium. The burden of proof is on the acquirer to demonstrate to the market that they will. This article provides a tool that senior executives can use both for pre-acquisition analysis and pricing and for post-acquisition performance evaluation and incentive compensation.