Skewness and Kurtosis Implied by Option Prices: A Correction

Corrado and Su (1996) provide skewness and kurtosis adjustment terms for the Black‐Scholes model, using a Gram‐Charlier expansion of the normal density function. In this note we provide a correction to the expression for the skewness coefficient and illustrate the effect on call option prices of the error found.     

The Firm Size Effect and the Economic Cycle

Small firms have, on average, lower return on assets and higher leverage than do large firms. Small firms tend to do well in good economic conditions but to perform poorly in the worst economic conditions. We investigate the hypothesis that the small firm effect is manifest in the expansion phase of the economic cycle but not in the contraction phase. The empirical results of our study confirm the hypothesis for 1976–95. We use the alpha, residual, and regression methods in testing the hypothesis.     

Government Bond Market Seasonality, Diversification, and Cointegration: International Evidence

Using government bond market data for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, I investigate several hypotheses. Market efficiency is investigated by testing for seasonality and cointegration. The seasonality results are mixed. In regression tests, a January effect is detected in several markets (United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Canada) using local currencies. However, in a nonparametric test, the January effect is supported only for France. When U.S. dollar returns are used, regression results also reveal a January effect for several markets (United States, Germany, France, and United Kingdom). These results are not confirmed by a nonparametric test. Correlation analysis shows considerable diversification opportunities for short‐term investors. Cointegration tests indicate that several of the markets share cointegrating vectors, increasing the possibilities of using other endogenous bond markets to better predict movements in a particular market.     

Intra-Industry Reactions to Stock Split Announcements

We examine whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to nonsplitting firms within the same industry. On average, nonsplitting firms' shareholders experience positive and significant abnormal returns at the stock split announcements of their industry counterparts. In addition, industrywide and firm-specific characteristics are important determinants in explaining nonsplitting firms' stock returns. These firms' earnings increase significantly, and the earnings changes are positively related to the stock price reactions. Finally, we find no evidence that investors revise the value of nonsplitting firms because they anticipate a decline in earnings volatility.     

Explaining the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle using Stochastic Discount Factors

I use Stochastic Discount Factors to examine the sources of the idiosyncratic volatility premium. I find that non-zero risk aversion and firms’ non-systematic coskewness determine the premium on idiosyncratic volatility risk. The firm’s non-systematic coskewness measures the comovement of the asset’s volatility with the market return. When I control for the non-systematic coskewness factor, I find no significant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock expected returns. My results are robust across different sample periods and firm characteristics.     

Monetary Policy and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns

Ample evidence shows that size and book-to-market equity explain significant cross-sectional variation in stock returns, whereas beta explains little or none of the variation. Recent studies also demonstrate that proxies for monetary stringency increase the explained variation in stock returns. We reexamine a three-factor model that includes beta, size, and book-to-market equity, while allowing monetary conditions to influence the relations between these risk factors and average stock returns. We find that ex-ante proxies for monetary stringency significantly influence the relations between stock returns and all three risk factors. Additionally, all three variables are found to contribute significantly to explaining cross-sectional returns in a three-factor model that includes the monetary sector.     

Differences in Performance of Independent and Finance-Affiliated Venture Capital Firms

We examine the differences in the investment behavior of independent and finance-affiliated venture capital firms (VCFs). We find that differences in internal management mechanisms and staff backgrounds lead to external performance differences. Using VC-backed companies listed in Singapore as our sample, we find significant differences between these two types of VCFs in industry preference, investment duration, VCF syndication, number of board seats, initial underpricing, and long-term market returns. Independent VCFs add more value to their portfolios. Thus, we conclude that the participation of independent VCFs is an important corporate-level factor for the success of the venture capital market.     

Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

The influence of governance on investment: Evidence from a hazard model

Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments. However, in the presence of financial constraints or strong CEO incentives (high delta (δ)), we find no such timing differences. Finally, these higher investment hazard firms exhibit significantly negative long-run operating and stock performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that poor governance associates with overinvestment.     

What motivates a subprime borrower to default?

This paper uses a real options approach to analyse the exercise of the default option embedded in mortgages. In particular, it examines a subprime household who borrows at a premium, but hopes to refinance at prime rates if their house appreciates. We show how these optimal default decisions can be used to calculate probabilities of default – an important input for risk management and pricing purposes. Numerical examples are provided, calibrated to US data. In a low interest rate environment, the credit-upgrade potential may discourage subprime borrowers from defaulting. However, default probabilities are highly sensitive to changes in interest rates and house prices. This provides a rational explanation for the prevalence of adjustable rate mortgages among subprime borrowers, and the subsequent large numbers of defaults, when interest rates rose and house prices declined.     

The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO

This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards.     

Executive compensation and dividend policy

This study examines the use of dividend provisions in executive compensation contracts to influence dividend policy. A sample is constructed with the largest companies in the oil and gas, defense/aerospace and food processing industries, where dividend-related agency costs are expected to be high. The results indicate that the existence of a dividend incentive in the compensation plan is positively associated with higher dividend payouts and yields, and higher annual changes in dividend levels. Evidence is also provided on firm characteristics associated with the use of a compensation contract with a dividend provision. The results are consistent with the theory that firms link compensation incentives to dividend payments to reduce conflicts between shareholders and management over dividend decisions.     

Common asset pricing factors in volatilities and returns in futures markets

Factor-based asset pricing models have been used to explain the common predictable variation in excess asset returns. This paper combines means with volatilities of returns in several futures markets to explain their common predictable variation. Using a latent variables methodology, tests do not reject a single factor model with a common time-varying factor loading. The single common factor accounts for up to 53% of the predictable variation in the volatilities and up to 14% of the predictable variation in the means. S&P500 futures volatility predicted by the factor model is highly correlated with volatility implied in S&P500 futures options. But both the factor and implied volatilities are significant in predicting future volatility. In derivatives pricing, both implied volatility from options and factors extracted from asset pricing models should be employed.     

A computing bias in estimating the probability of informed trading

This study identifies a factor that leads to a bias in estimating the probability of informed trading (PIN), a widely-used microstructure measure. It is shown that, along with the numerical maximization of the likelihood function for PIN, the floating-point exception (i.e., overflow or underflow) may eliminate feasible solutions to the actual parameters in the optimization problem. Approximately 44% of PIN estimates for recent stock market data may have been subject to a downward bias that is more pronounced for active stocks than for inactive stocks. This study develops a remedy to mitigate the resulting bias.     

Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers? roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO?s power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents. Predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like SOX and the extent to which the CEO?s or CFO?s incentives significantly impact on earnings management. The model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non-powerful CEO can extract rents, which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between CEO power and “excessive” compensation.     

Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

I explore CEOs’ incentives to select firm strategies and to acquire firm-specific skills when CEOs have job-hopping opportunities. Several features of managerial compensation, such as benchmarking of pay to larger and more prestigious companies, payments unrelated to past performance, unrestricted stock awards for highly paid CEOs, long-term incentives, and higher pay in companies granting long-term incentives, emerge in the optimal contract. I argue that the model can explain the change in the structure and the surge in US CEO compensation as well as differences across countries and across firms within a country.