基于O2O的废旧手机逆向供应链SD模型研究

对国内外废旧手机回收与逆向供应链现状进行了综述.运用互联网思维,基于O2O方式构建了以手机制造商为回收主体的废旧手机逆向供应链,对进行了流程设计.从企业实际出发,综合考虑再制造利用对原材料采购、制造库存、手机销售产生的影响,运用系统动力学理论对基于O2O的废旧手机逆向供应链构建SD模型并进行仿真,结果表明实施废旧手机逆向供应链有助于提高手机销售额与产品市场份额.最后,根据仿真结果提出建议.     

考虑质量不确定性的互联网回收多主体定价决策研究

随着互联网经济的快速发展,庞大的二手市场催生了许多互联网回收平台。本文基于废旧产品回收质量不确定性,将互联网回收平台开辟二手市场的现实情境纳入模型,构建制造商、零售商、互联网回收平台、消费者多方参与的闭环供应链模型,探究了相关因素对各主体的决策影响。结果表明：在回收过程中,存在最低回收质量门槛,回收产品的质量与产品回收价格、回收数量、互联网回收平台利润与制造商利润成正比;消费者回收失败时的损失系数与回收数量、制造商利润、互联网回收平台利润成反比;互联网回收平台设置翻新门槛时应考虑回收产品质量,当回收产品质量高时,高翻新门槛对参与者最优。     

基于苏南地区的电子废旧品回收物流管理对策研究

针对电子生产企业、回收个体或企业、消费者设计三份电子废旧品回收物流问卷,从电子废旧品来源、回收渠道、流向等方面对苏南地区电子废旧品回收物流实际情况进行调查,分析电子废旧品回收物流特点,寻找存在的问题,提出电子废旧品回收物流管理对策,以助实现电子废旧品无害化、资源化。     

废旧电脑回收网络规划模型研究

本文针对目前国内废旧电脑回收的情况,提出了构建以生产企业为主导的废旧电脑回收网络模型;根据实际情况,以总成本最小原则建立了一个具体的回收网络模型;同时本文还分析了网络模型中存在的缺点,指出了以后研究需要关注的方向。     

不同补贴对象下双渠道闭环供应链定价模型

基于双渠道销售/回收的三级闭环供应链,分别以制造商和消费者为补贴对象建立闭环供应链定价模型;求解并对比了不同补贴对象下产品直销价格,批发价格,零售价格,制造商回购价格,零售商和第三方回收商的产品回收价格;分析了政府在补贴制造商和消费者两种情形下补贴系数对定价的影响。研究表明:政府补贴制造商时,会提高闭环供应链回收渠道定价;政府补贴零售商或消费者时,会提高闭环供应链销售渠道定价。     

废旧汽车回收的激励与约束机制研究

文章提出了政府引导企业实施废旧汽车回收激励约束机制的问题,指出政府对汽车回收企业实施激励约束的原因,具体分析了相关激励约束机制的主要内容,并建立了政府运用财政补贴手段对回收企业实施激励约束的委托代理模型.     

基于演化博弈的政府奖惩对逆向供应链实施影响的研究

政府引导下的逆向供应链的实施越来越受到社会关注。本文采用演化博弈理论的方法,建立回收废旧物品过程中政府和企业间的演化博弈模型。研究结果表明,政府适度加大惩罚力度、媒体加大对积极参与回收废旧物品的企业报道,有利于演化路径向着良好状态调整。     

基于多周期回收网络的废旧品数量预测

考虑到废旧品的产生机理,以及在多周期回收网络中各个周期废旧品数量之间的因果联系,建立了基于多周期回收网络的废旧品数量预测模型,在建模过程中考虑了将所有消费者区域看成整体和多个消费者区域两种情况,并通过matlab7.0编程实现。通过算例分析对模型进行了应用,并得出了产品流分配决策只影响各消费者区域的废旧品数量,而不影响全部消费者区域的废旧品总量的结论。     

服装逆向物流信息管理平台研究

如何利用信息技术完成废旧衣服的回收、再处理和再利用，以实现资源再生和服装的“低碳化”和“绿色化”，进而帮助服装企业实现经济转型是一项重要研究课题。根据服装电子商务快速发展的基本事实，本文以电子商务理论和信息技术为基础，从服装逆向物流信息管理需求、关键技术和原型系统三个方面研究了如何从电子商务视角建立服装逆向物流信息管理平台，以帮助政府、企业和终端消费者实施逆向物流活动，促进废旧服装的回收、再处理和再利用。     

三方博弈下共享单车回收处理的激励机制研究

为了解决共享单车行业快速发展中产生的社会问题,促进共享单车行业健康发展,建立了参与主体为政府、共享单车企业和消费者的共享单车回收处理三方博弈模型并求解,同时分析了影响共享单车企业和消费者行为的因素。通过研究发现,政府对共享单车企业和消费者的补贴,对共享单车企业拒绝回收处理共享单车的处罚,能够有效激励共享单车企业和消费者参与共享单车的回收处理活动。最后,为推广共享单车的回收处理制度,从健全完善相关法律法规、设立政府监管部门以及有效的正向和负向激励机制三个方面建立了激励机制。     

Welfare and quality improvement in an international market

This paper analyzes the optimal uniform and discriminatory quality requirements under Cournot competition when two firms produce high-quality and low-quality products, respectively, in an international market. The quality requirements in our paper are not set for the foreign firm but are set to regulate products of different qualities, since in the real world a domestic firm could be a high- or low-quality producer. We find that whether the government should raise the quality requirements depends on the type of competition in which firms engage and the adopted quality requirements. By and large, the government should always set quality requirements raising both firms’ quality directly or indirectly, regardless of the quality of the product of the domestic firm. However, if the domestic firm is a high-quality producer, the government should set a quality requirement that enables the domestic firm to monopolize the market when a discriminatory quality requirement is adopted, and should not set any quality requirement when a uniform quality requirement is adopted. Moreover, we show that the quality requirement can actually improve global welfare in most cases.     

Posted price and name-your-own-price in a product line design problem

In this research, we address Name your own price (NYOP) as a mechanism to offer products with transparent, rather than opaque, quality levels. We compare posted price (PP) and NYOP in a product line design problem from a firm’s viewpoint. We first consider the firm offering two vertically differentiated products that each can be priced by NYOP or PP. The quality level of products is considered either as a decision variable or as a fixed predetermined value for the firm. A customer correspondingly decides which product to purchase and if applicable, the bid at NYOP. We characterize both the customer’s and the firm’s decisions under four possible pricing scenarios. The results show that, it is most profitable for the firm to use PP for both products. We then consider if each product is offered by a competitive firm, where quality levels might again be decision variables or fixed. Results show that both competitive firms prefer PP to NYOP when they can create quality differentiation. The firm that offers the product with a lower quality level prefers PP to NYOP for all combinations of fixed quality levels as well. The other firm, with a higher quality level, also usually prefers PP to NYOP; However, it can be better off using NYOP when fixed quality levels are large and close enough to each other. In this case, the preference of NYOP over PP increases as customers’ willingness to pay enhances.     

Strategic Implications of Keeping Product Value Secret from Competitor’s Customers

Customers can sometimes learn unanticipated or hidden use value of a firm’s product whereas the non-customers remain uninformed about that extra value. A monopolist will increase its profit by informing the non-customers of its product’s hidden value. However, our analysis reveals that this may not be true when the firm faces competition in the market—the firm may actually make a higher profit if it keeps its hidden value secret from its competitor’s customers even if advertising to inform those customers is costless. This is because no advertising leads to information heterogeneity among consumers about the existence of the firm’s hidden value, which gives an incentive for both firms to continue targeting their own existing customers rather than poaching each other’s customers, alleviating price competition and increasing firms’ profits. This beneficial strategic effect of keeping some product value secret from the competitor’s customers can persist even when the firms anticipate the hidden value and compete more aggressively for customers in the early period. Our research suggests that firms can benefit from an “under-promise and over-deliver” strategy if they refrain from communicating their extra value to the competitor’s customers. Moreover, positive word of mouth about a firm’s product will not necessarily benefit the firm and can in fact make all firms worse off.     

Stock Liquidity and Firm Value: Evidence from a Policy Experiment in India

The Indian securities market regulator intervened in June 2010 with a regulatory amendment in the listing requirement that mandated all the listed firms other than PSUs (government‐owned companies) to have a minimum public shareholding of 25%. The affected firms were given a 3‐year window to comply with the regulation. This study examines the impact of the new regulation on the affected firms’ value. We explore the relationship between improvement in firms’ value and stock liquidity. This regulatory intervention offers a natural experiment to examine direct causality between stock liquidity and firms’ value. The findings of the empirical analysis confirm the existence of a direct causal relationship between stock liquidity and firm value, stemming from an improved operating performance.     

A Rose by Any Other Name: Are Family Firms Named After Their Founding Families Rewarded More for Their New Product Introductions?

The authors explore the relation between the way different family firms are named, and the shareholder value impact of these firms’ new product introductions. Using an event study of 1,294 product introduction announcements of 107 publicly listed U.S. family firms, the authors find that the presence of the founding family’s name as part of a family firm’s name acts as a valuable firm resource, increasing the abnormal stock returns surrounding the firm’s new product introductions. Superior returns to family-named firms’ new product introductions are partially mediated by these firms’ history of ethical product-related behavior: family-named firms, particularly those with corporate branding, and those wherein a founding family member holds the CEO or chairman position, are more likely to exhibit a history of avoiding such product-related controversies as product safety issues, and deceptive advertising. The authors highlight the managerial and theoretical contributions of this research.     

Taking marketing strategy risks with seemingly no expected gains

This paper investigates the competitive rationale for firms to invest in marketing activities aiming to enhance valuation and achieve differentiation and competitive advantage, while carrying the strategic risks of causing unintended negative consequences. We build a stylized theoretical model where firms offering similar (homogenous) products are competing by determining their marketing strategy and pricing. Each firm must choose between several marketing activities that have different potentials of enhancing consumers’ product valuations while carrying some risk of lowering consumer valuation if unintended negative outcomes occur. The stochastic nature of marketing implies that (1) even when both firms invest the same amount of money aiming to enhance product valuations by the same level, there will be a variety of (posterior) vertical differentiation scenarios where the consumers could value either firm’s product as better as or worse than the rival’s. (2) The firms may employ marketing activities that do not even lead to gains in consumer product valuation in expectation. The duopoly model analysis indicates that associated with strategic pricing, even such stochastic marketing activities may constitute desirable strategies for two a priori symmetric firms in order to avoid a Bertrand type competition as the benefit from differentiation is found to be significant enough to offset the unintended negative outcomes. The oligopoly model analysis indicates that there is an increased incentive to take marketing risk when there is a greater level of competitive intensity in the marketplace. Preliminary experimental evidence is presented to support the main findings from theoretical model analyses. The paper thus provides important managerial implications for firms contemplating investment in seemingly risky marketing activities.

     

Pricing and persuasive advertising in a differentiated market

This paper examines the effects of consumer preferences, firms’ costs, and advertising efficiencies on firms’ pricing and persuasive advertising strategies. We show that as the firms’ horizontal differentiation increases, the firm with a lower value-added product tends to increase persuasive advertising, whereas its competitor tends to reduce advertising. Second, the firm receiving a favorable shock in product valuation will complement the favorable change with additional persuasive advertising rather than reduce advertising spending. Third, an equal improvement in advertising efficiency in the industry will lower the profits for both firms, whereas a decrease in advertising efficiency in the industry can benefit both firms. Fourth, a larger shock that improves a firm’s product valuation or unit cost is more likely to induce higher advertising spending in the industry. Lastly, an exogenous increase in the separation between firms’ product valuations or perceived qualities may actually reduce the price dispersion in the industry.     

Building A Sustainable Shelf: The Role of Firm Sustainability Reputation

The reputation of firms for being environmentally friendly and socially responsible is a key purchase driver for sustainable products. However, the commitment of firms to sustainability varies – some firms are founded on strong environmental and social principles; other more traditional firms are built on strong product/brand focus and are not known for sustainability. In response to market trends, many traditional firms are introducing sustainable products to their portfolios. We argue that the firm’s sustainability reputation (FSR) will influence consumer purchase with respect to equally sustainable products from different firms. Two choice studies demonstrate that FSR favors sustainable product choice when the consumer decides between equally sustainable products. However, FSR affects the choice only for sustainable products and not regular products and does so only for consumers that construe sustainability at a high (abstract) level. Retailers should pay attention to the role that FSR plays in consumer response when they select sustainable products to sell.     

Innovation and Exporting: Does Quality Matter?

We study the effect of innovation on a firm’s propensity to export, developing a simple model where heterogeneous firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market and set their prices as a markup above the marginal cost. The key proposition of our model is that firms that invest in better quality products are more likely to export. We test it using Italian firms’ data. Econometric results suggest that innovation, defined as quality upgrading, has a significant effect on the firms’ propensity to export; and, for those who are already exporting, innovation—defined as new products—has a significant effect on a firm’s turnover.     

Impact of personalization and privacy concerns on information disclosure and pricing

Advances in IT have enabled some firms to offer personalized products according to the private information disclosed by consumers, while others are still offering standardized products, which brings about asymmetric competition. For consumers, disclosing private information for personalized products leads to reduced misfit cost as well as privacy loss. To illuminate the impact of consumers' trade-off between the benefit of information disclosure and the associated privacy concerns on firms' asymmetric price competition, we consider a setting where only one firm is capable of product personalization based on consumers' personal information. The capable firm makes a profit from selling the product and monetizing consumers' information. We demonstrate that as the capable firm becomes more adept at personalization, he may raise or lower the price depending on his profit foci, and an improvement in his capability does not always guarantee a higher profit. Counterintuitively, an increase in the unit misfit cost (i.e., greater product differentiation) can, under certain circumstances, intensity price competition, making both firms worse off and leading to higher consumer surplus. We also show that when consumers are more privacy-concerned, there exists an indirect effect that weakens the impact of an increase in price on the monetization of consumers’ information, and hence price competition can be mitigated and both firms can be better off. Furthermore, we demonstrate that product personalization with misfit-reducing effect always increases consumer surplus under the asymmetric competition. Our findings provide firms and policy-makers with great managerial insights.