企业改制中应注意的土地使用权问题

国有企业长期以来形成了大量的厂房、居住房等房产，以及与房产相配套或尚未投入开发使用的大量土地使用权。这些土地往往既有生产用地也有生活用地，在企业改制资产中占有很大或相当大的比重。     

土地用益物权作为企业出资时的问题探析

土地，因其特性而比其他资源更为人们所关注，我国直接涉及土地资源管理的法律有物权法、土地管理法、农村土地承包管理法（以下称“土地承包法”）和城市房地产管理法（以下称“房地产管理法”）。间接涉及的法律法规则更多，难以一一列举。新近发布的《中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定》又再次提出，要按照依法自愿有偿原则．允许农民以转包、出租、互换、转让、股份合作等形式流转土地承包经营权这一土地用益物权，发展多种形式的适度规模经营。     

农村宅基地使用权抵押融资法律问题探析

根据我国现行法律规定,宅基地使用权不得抵押,但是随着市场经济发展以及城市化进程的加快,宅基地使用权抵押已经在现实中不断发生,法律限制被不断突破,各地也在积极探索宅基地使用权的抵押融资。宅基地抵押融资是否触犯法律规定,这种抵押能否真正为融资安全提供保障,融资机构处分抵押标的后,会产生什么样的社会后果？带着这些问题笔者在调查的基础上对当前各地做法进行了归集。宅基地使用权抵押法律制度的基本规定（一）一般性规定宅基地使用权管理制度与农村土地承包经营权制度构成我国集体经济所有制的主要形式,是对农民生存权、     

关于土地使用权评估的法律依据剖析

《中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定》提出,要加强土地承包经营权流转、管理和服务,要建立健全土地承包经营权流转市场,以公开规范的方式转让土地使用权。目前国家出台涉及到土地使用权评估的法律有《土地管理法》、《农村土地承包管理法》、《城市房地产管理法》和《物权法》等。这些法律的出台和贯彻执行,对土地使用权评估提供了有力的法律支撑。     

土地使用权收回的类型及法律依据

土地使用权回收的问题,因上海市近期对多幅地块的处理规定而引起广泛的热议。上海市规划和国土资源管理局2010年2号预申请公告多数地块的《国有建设用地使用权出让预申请须知》中,"土地期满后的处理方法"都是"出让人收回并补偿相应残余价值"或者"出让人无偿收回"。随后,上海市澄清该规定是全国性规定而不是业界误传的"上海新规"。那么,当前对于土地使用期限到期之后的处理,有哪些方式?各有什么样的法律依据?本刊对此     

企业改制中应注意的土地使用权问题

企业改制是以完整经营性业务和资产出资发起设立股份公司的过程.根据<公司法>第80条的规定,股份有限公司设立时"发起人可以用货币出资,也可以用实物,工业产权、非专利技术、土地使用权作价出资".本文即是对企业改制出资资产中有关土地使用权如何处理问题进行的探讨.     

我国建设用地使用权制度的完善

我国《物权法》的出台初步建立了我国的土地物权体系,解决了实践中的一些疑难问题,但是现行的土地出让制度在用益物权的本质与权能规定之间发生了冲突,在土地使用权出让金的收取和分配上,存在不公平问题。为进一步完善我国的建设用地使用权制度,需要引入“地上权”概念,限制政府自利性。在《物权法》和现行法律法规的冲突与衔接问题上,应按照下位法服从上位法、旧法服从新法等原则来处理。     

江苏盐城:做活土地文章,发展集体经济

本文总结了盐城市经营土地发展集体经济的主要形式和取得的成效,对进一步做活土地文章、发展集体经济提出了对策建议。     

土地使用权变更有关契税的特殊规定

《土地管理法》规定,城市市区的土地属于国家所有,单位和个人依法使用的国有土地．由县级以上人民政府登记造册,核发证书,确认使用权。国有土地使用权的取得,主要有土地使用权划拨和土地使用权出让两种形式。土地使用权划拨是指土地使用者通过各种方式依法无偿取得的土地使用权：土地使用权出让是指土地使用者向国家交付土地使用权出让费用．国家将国有土地使用权在一定年限内让予土地使用者的行为．     

探讨中国土地资本新思路简

城镇化必须解决土地问题,土地问题的核心是正确处理土地使用权与所有权的关系 改革开放以来,中国进入经济高速增长和城市化进程加快的历史时期,土地除了是农业增长的关键保障之外,还成为中国城市快速扩张及工业高速发展的重要工具,关平地方政府融资及财政增长与稳定,被视为引发社会矛盾和权益纠纷的“导火线”,是中国“三农”问题的集中表现。如何解决18亿亩耕地、四亿亩农村建设用地、三万个建制镇和集镇、300万个村庄、7．5亿农村人口的富裕成长,已成为中国经济社会可持续发展的核心和不可逾越的主题。     

让知识产权成为资本

当前以知识产权为代表的高端产业链几乎占整个产品价值的60％以上,而包括加工原材料在内的中国制造产业链只占20％～30％．这是一个不可持续、非常令人难以接受的状况。中国只有向产业链高端,也就是向知识产权一端进发、努力,才能改变这一状况,在2011中关村论坛年会知识产权专场分论坛上,北京金融资产交易所、中国技术交易所董事长...     

Shareholder litigation rights and capital structure decisions

We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD laws adoption lead to higher financial leverage, which enhances firm value. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante or financially constrained firms. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.     

Price reaction to rights issues in the Indian capital market

This study examines securities price reaction to announcements of rights issues by listed Indian firms during the period 1997–2005. We document a positive but statistically insignificant price reaction to such announcements. The price reaction is significantly more negative for firms with a family group affiliation compared to firms with no family group affiliation. The notable differential price reaction between firms with and without a family group affiliation can be explained by the “tunneling hypothesis.” For firms affiliated with a family group, we surmise that investors perceive that the proceeds of the rights issue may be misused for the benefit of the controlling shareholder. We also find that higher levels of individual shareholding in the firm are associated with a more positive price reaction to the announcement.     

Shareholder rights, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital

This study extends research into whether shareholder rights and disclosures of financial-related attributes are associated with firms' costs of equity capital. Using cost-of-equity-capital estimates derived from expected earnings growth valuation models, we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights regimes and higher levels of financial transparency are associated with significantly lower costs of equity capital. We also find evidence that greater financial disclosure and stronger rights regimes interact in reducing firms' costs of equity capital, such that the effect of a high level of one mechanism is minimal when it is combined with a low level of the other. Finally, we document that neither factor dominates the other in their associations, and that there are tradeoffs between disclosure levels and shareholder rights in their influence on firms' implied costs of equity capital. JEL Classification G30 · M10     

Property rights and access to equity capital in China

This study uses recent improvements to China's physical and intellectual property protections to test information asymmetry, signaling, and litigation risk theories of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find robust evidence that stronger physical and intellectual property protections are associated with lower initial returns, especially among smaller IPOs and non-equity carve-outs. This result is consistent with the notion that property rights reduce information asymmetry among IPO participants; however, some of China's reforms, including the 2014 establishment of specialized intellectual property courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, appear to have increased litigation risk. Additional tests indicate that property rights positively impact the likelihood that an IPO firm is backed by venture capital. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that strong property rights help alleviate the adverse selection problem that results from information asymmetry among firms and equity investors.     

Staged venture capital contracting with ratchets and liquidation rights

This paper uses real options analysis to study later round financing in the presence of two standard venture capital contracting provisions: anti-dilution (ratchet) and liquidation preference. We argue that such provisions can preclude financing of a positive NPV venture in the case of a large follow-on financing relative to firm value. Liquidation preference contracting at multiples greater than one is not feasible in the later round if the financing is small relative to firm value. We highlight an interaction effect between the two provisions: increasing the liquidation multiple can help to avoid dilution and the need for the prior venture capitalist to waive ratchet provisions.     

Creditor rights and capital structure: Evidence from international data

For a large sample of 48 countries, we find robust evidence that strong creditor rights are associated with low long-term leverage across countries. We further find that strong creditor protection lowers long-term debt issuance, the extent to which investments are financed with long-term debt, and target leverage ratios. Finally, we find that firm and country characteristics influence the link between creditor protection and long-term leverage. Our results support the demand-side view that strong creditor protection discourages firms from making long-term cash flow commitments to service debt because managers and shareholders avoid the risk of losing control in the case of financial distress.     

Shareholder wealth effects of rights issues: Evidence from the New Zealand capital market

This study examines security price reaction to the announcement of rights issues by New Zealand firms between 1976 and 1994. Over this period, price reaction to rights issue announcements in New Zealand was significantly negative. The price reaction to the announcement was more negative for underwritten compared to non-underwritten rights issues. The evidence suggests non-underwritten rights issues have higher expected participation in the issue by existing shareholders. The results are broadly consistent with the adverse selection cost arguments of Eckbo and Masulis [Eckbo, B.E., Masulis, R.W., 1992. Adverse selection and the rights offer paradox. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 293–332] and help further explain the rights offer paradox whereby firms in a small capital market, like New Zealand, continue to rely on rights issues to raise new equity. Price reaction to the rights issue announcement was also more negative the larger the relative issue size. This result supports both the adverse selection cost and information asymmetry arguments of Krasker [Krasker, W.S., 1986. Stock price movements in response to stock issues under asymmetric information. Journal of Finance 41, 93–105] and the signaling framework hypothesis of Miller and Rock [Miller, M.H., Rock, K., 1985. Dividend policy under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance 40, 1031–1051].     

Settling the debate on multinational capital structure using the CEPR measure

Portfolio theory suggests that because of diversification benefits, multinational corporations (MNCs) should have lower risk and therefore could have more debt. Empirical studies, however, have repeatedly shown that MNCs from the US face higher risks and have lower debt levels. Burgman (1996) suggests that agency costs as well as political and exchange rate risks are the explanation. Kwok and Reeb (2000) explain this puzzle, presenting an upstream-downstream hypothesis suggesting that MNCs from emerging markets reduce their risk by going international (they go to safer markets), while firms from developed countries increase their risk by going abroad (they go to riskier markets). By introducing a new measure of Country Export Partner Risk (CEPR), we show that the weighted average risk level of a country's export trading partners is negatively related to the leverage of its multinationals, thus confirming the upstream-downstream hypothesis. Furthermore, once controlling for CEPR, we find that the multinationality of the firm is positively related to leverage, thus lending support to the traditional diversification argument. Our findings, therefore, help settle the debate between these two opposing streams of multinational capital structure literature.