Market Based Management™*—A Key to Nucor's Success

Ken Iverson, CEO of Nucor Corporation, transformed Nucor from the virtually worthless corporate shell that it was when he took over as president in 1966 into a Fortune 500 giant with current shareholder value in excess of $5 billion. How did Iverson do it? What are the secrets to his outstanding success? This article argues that an important part of the answer is Market Based Management, a relatively new set of management values and practices that aims to bring the power of a free-market society inside companies. Stated in brief, Market Based Management attempts to replace the traditional “command-and-control” management approach with decentralized decision-making that is designed to make full use of employees' “specific knowledge.” Employees' expanded decision-making authority is reinforced by a powerful incentive compensation system that rewards them handsomely for achieving corporate goals. The result, according to the authors, is highly motivated employees who “take ownership” for their role in contributing to the success of the enterprise.     

How Do Investors Regard ESOs?

All top‐50 and more than 80% of the top‐500 Australian listed companies now reward their executives with stock options (ESOs) of one kind or another.₁ We address the question: “Which method of accounting for ESOs — current practice, the US FASB's recommended practice or the AASB's preferred position — most closely reflects investors' pricing decisions?” We answer the question using models that relate a company's stock price to its earnings and book value of equity calculated according to these three choices of accounting treatment.     

THE HISTORY OF FINANCE: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In this account of the evolution of finance theory, the “father of modern finance” uses the series of Nobel Prizes awarded finance scholars in the 1990s as the organizing principle for a discus‐sion of the major developments of the past 50 years. Starting with Harry Markowitz's 1952 Journal of Finance paper on “Portfolio Selection,” which provided the mean‐variance frame‐work that underlies modern portfolio theory (and for which Markowitz re‐ceived the Nobel Prize in 1990), the paper moves on to consider the Capi‐tal Asset Pricing Model, efficient mar‐ket theory, and the M & M irrelevance propositions. In describing these ad‐vances, Miller's major emphasis falls on the “tension” between the two main streams in finance scholarship: (1) the Business School (or “micro normative”) approach, which focuses on investors ‘attempts to maximize returns and cor‐porate managers’ efforts to maximize shareholder value, while taking the prices of securities in the market as given; and (2) the Economics Depart‐ment (or “macro normative”) approach, which assumes a “world of micro optimizers” and deduces from that assumption how the market prices actually evolve. The tension between the two ap‐proaches is resolved, and the two streams converge, in the final episode of Miller's history–the breakthrough in option pricing accomplished by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Rob‐ert Merton in the early 1970s (for which Merton and Scholes were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1998, “with the late Fischer Black everywhere ac‐knowledged as the third pivotal fig‐ure”). As Miller says, the Black‐Scholes option pricing model and its many successors “mean that, for the first time in its close to 50‐year history, the field of finance can be built, or…rebuilt, on the basis of ‘observable’ magnitudes.” That option values can be calculated (almost entirely) with observable vari‐ables has made possible the spectacu‐lar growth in financial engineering, a highly lucrative activity where the prac‐tice of finance has come closest to attaining the precision of a hard sci‐ence. Option pricing has also helped give rise to a relatively new field called “real options” that promises to revolu‐tionize corporate strategy and capital budgeting. But if the practical applications of option pricing are impressive, the op‐portunities for further extensions of the theory by the “macro normative” wing of the profession are “vast,” in‐cluding the prospect of viewing all securities as options. Thus, it comes as no surprise that when Miller asks in closing, “What would I specialize in if I were starting over and entering the field today?,” the answer is: “At the risk of sounding like the character in ‘The Graduate,’ I reduce my advice to a single word: options.”     

Relationship and Transaction Lending: New Evidence and Perspectives

In this article, I try to answer three questions: (1) How do relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the cycle? (2) How do economic systems that are more “bank oriented” perform compared to “market-oriented” systems? (3) What are the consequences on relationship banking of the recent structural bank regulation reforms adopted to separate specific investment and commercial banking activities? Building on some recent evidence, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) Relationship banks protect their clients in normal downturns; (2) when recessions coincide with a financial crisis, countries that rely relatively more on bank financing tend to be more severely hit; (3) the effects of structural bank regulation initiatives on relationship banking are uncertain.     

WHY SOCIETY NEEDS "IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE"—AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR VALUATIONS AND MONETARY POLICY

Despite all the talk of a New Economy and the revolutionary import of the Internet, this article suggests that there is nothing really new under the sun. When Christopher Columbus was building the ships for his expeditions to the East Indies, only the vaguest estimates could be made of their potential value. At this stage, nobody knew if Columbus would be able to manage the crossing, when the ships would return, and what cargo they would eventually carry. In this sense, Columbus's venture bears a striking resemblance to many of today's Internet stocks. This paper raises and attempts to answer a number of interesting questions. For example, how do risky ventures with very high fixed (startup) costs but very low expected variable costs raise the capital necessary to fund the fixed costs? What role should government (and, in particular, monetary) policy play in encouraging (or discouraging) funding for such ventures? And how does one establish the value of such ventures when there is little or no revenue and, in some cases, no clearly defined product? The answer to the first question is investor enthusiasm–or, in Alan Greenspan's terms, “irrational exuberance.” Irrational exuberance plays a very important economic role in giving entrepreneurs access to the cheap financing necessary to fund ventures with heavy startup costs. Indeed, “irrational exuberance” may be the best solution for financing large fixed costs, not only because it is a private (as opposed to a government‐financed) solution, but because it gives investors direct access to the risks and rewards of promising investment opportunities. Before the recent “democratization” of capital markets, such ventures would have been funded by large corporations if not government agencies. As for the third question, this paper suggests there is only one useful way to estimate the value of ventures without revenues or products. The author provides a back‐of‐the‐envelope, “Fermitype” valuation method that is based on the principle of “human capital arbitrage.” For those Internet startups that lure top executives away from established firms with large grants of stock options but relatively low salaries, there is a “breakeven level” for the future stock price that can be calculated using a fairly modest amount of information about the executive's past and current compensation plans. For outside investors, such movements of human capital provide what is perhaps the most reliable basis for estimating the value of the firm.     

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Trend

Corporate Social Responsibility, or “CSR,” has recently become a subject of study by financial economists. While there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to support all variety of positions, broad‐based statistical evidence about the CSR movement is in short supply. This article presents some new empirical evidence that aims to answer three related questions about CSR: First, are corporations increasing their “investment” in what is considered socially responsible behavior? Second, does corporate investment in social responsibility affect a company's financial performance and shareholder value? Third, why do companies invest in CSR: to increase shareholder value, or to uphold a “moral” commitment to non‐investor stakeholders and “society”? Using a social responsibility metric that measures the net CSR strengths (i.e., strengths less concerns) of each S&P 500 and Domini 400 company, the authors report that the average net CSR for both indexes decreased during the 15‐year period (1991‐2005) of the study—though the Domini 400, as might be expected, experienced a smaller decline. The authors also report that corporate strengths have increased, on average, but at a slower rate than the “concerns,” which suggests that corporate CSR efforts may be aimed at a moving target with steadily rising expectations and requirements. Second, the authors report that companies with more CSR strengths or fewer CSR weaknesses produced higher ROA over the same 15‐year period. The authors' findings here suggest a “circular” causality in which profitable companies are more likely to invest in CSR initiatives to begin with, but then find their performance further improved by such investment. Third, the authors' findings suggest that most companies devote resources to CSR initiatives as a means of maximizing long‐run value rather than out of a prior commitment to stakeholders. More specifically, the study shows that companies appear to invest more heavily to build CSR strengths than to eliminate CSR concerns. And as the authors conclude, this behavior is consistent with a strategy of using CSR as a form of “risk management” that promotes corporate strengths in order to limit the potential negative effects of—perhaps by diverting attention from—their weaknesses.     

Demand functions and the integrability condition

Abstract

This is not written to prolong the discussion of integrability, a topic on which at long last there seems to be universal agreement on all essential points. I shall only give a brief answer to a question that has recently been raised by Dr. P. A. Samuelson 1 about a theorem of mine published in this journal². Stating that he is not quite clear about my theorem, Dr. Samuelson says that this might be due to an ambiguity in translation from the Swedish. My answer is that I cannot seennything wrong in the theorem. Some c'omments are added to clarify my position.     

Reshaping accounting research: Living in the world in which we live

This paper is derived from my participation as a faculty guest of the University of Wollongong's Faculty of Commerce 20th Annual Doctoral Consortium. Consistent with the theme of “paradigm, paradox, and paralysis?”, I argue in this paper that accounting practice and scholarship suffer from paralysis created by the imposition of a neoclassical economic paradigm. Starting from the premise that accounting is foremost a practice, I argue that accounting cannot be limited by any one type of understanding. A human practice like accounting is simply to multi- faceted and complex to be sensibly “modeled” in any one particular way. The “flight from reality” (Shapiro, 2005), that occurred because of the empirical revolution in accounting, should be abandoned in favor of a more problem driven approach to accounting research and practice.     

Financial liberalization and contagion with unobservable savings

How does the presence of decentralized market-based channels for borrowing and lending affect financial integration and financial contagion? To answer this question, I develop a two-country model of financial intermediation, where banks have access to country-specific investment technologies, and agents can borrow and lend in an international hidden market. In this environment, the possibility of hidden borrowing and lending has three main effects. First, it improves welfare with respect to the autarkic equilibrium, by allowing gains from “hidden” financial integration. Second, it halts the process of “official” financial integration. Third, it lowers the resilience of the economy to unexpected shocks to fundamentals.     

ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCE

This article is based on remarks I gave at the 2000 meeting of the Southern Finance Association (SFA). I was extraordinarily flattered to be named Distinguished Scholar for 2000 by the SFA; I would like to thank the members and officers of the association for this award. As an SFA board member, I participated in establishing the Distinguished Scholar program. The original idea was to broaden participation in SFA by more of the profession's senior researchers. Last year I believe we chose the ideal person for the inaugural award, Professor Richard Roll of UCLA. But I must admit that I felt somewhat awkward in accepting the award this year. Although I certainly appreciate having my work recognized, I have attended SFA meetings regularly over the last quarter century. They afford a wonderful opportunity to renew valued friendships (some going back to graduate school) and revisit my southern roots. So this award is quite special for me, even if I do not consider myself its ideal recipient.     

理财文化——中美财富观的不同(英文)

I always ask myself "why is the economy condition in different countries different?" It is a question hard to answer.However,there is no doubt that the difference of the attitudes towards money among different countries contributes a lot to that.In this paper,I want to compare the Chinese and American attitudes which may be typical.     

Can Companies Use Hedging Programs to Profit from the Market? Evidence from Gold Producers*

In this article, the authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the hedging activities of 92 North American gold mining companies during the period 1989‐1999. The aim of the study was to answer two questions: (1) Did such hedging activities increase corporate cash flows? (2) And if yes, were such increases the result of management's ability to anticipate price movements when adjusting their hedge ratios? Although the author's answer to the first question is “yes,” their answer to the second is “no.” More specifically, the authors concluded that:

• ? During the 1989‐1999 period, the gold derivatives market was characterized by a persistent positive risk premium— that is, a positive spread between the forward price and the realized future spot price—that caused short forward positions to generate positive cash flows. The gold mining companies that hedged their future gold production realized an average total cash flow gain of $11 million, or $24 per ounce of gold hedged, per year, as compared to average annual net income of only $3.5 million. Because of the positive risk premium, short derivatives positions did not generate significant losses even during those subperiods of the study when the gold price increased.
• ? There was considerable volatility in corporate hedge ratios during the period of the study, which is consistent with managers incorporating market views into their hedging programs and attempting to time the market by hedging selectively. But after attempting to distinguish between derivatives activities designed to hedge and those designed to profit from a view, the authors conclude that corporate efforts to time the market through selective hedging were largely if not completely futile. In fact, the companies' adjustments of hedge ratios appeared to consistently lag instead of leading the market.

     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

On the separation of monetary and prudential policy: How much of the precrisis consensus remains?

Prior to the crisis, monetary policymakers and prudential authorities had clearly defined tools and goals with little or no conflict. The crisis revealed a variety of overlaps, where one set of policies seems to influence those in another. Does this mean that two policy realms can no longer remain separate? I address the question by first asking whether monetary policy creates significant financial stability risks. My answer is generally no. Given that, central bankers should refrain from reacting to financial stability risks in most circumstances. Instead, the job of safeguarding the financial system should be left, as it was prior to the crisis, to prudential policymakers. But how can prudential policy best maintain financial stability? I argue that given our current state of knowledge, stress tests are the best tool to ensure crisis will be rare and not terribly severe. So, my answer to the question in the title is that the precrisis consensus remains largely intact.     

United States Bankruptcy Code,Section 304(b)(3): “Other Appropriate Relif” for Multinational Bankruptcy

Section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code was enacted to provide a statutory solution to the “murky and uncharted waters” of multinational bankruptcies. Part I of this article provides a brief background and analysis of section 304; Part II canvasses court decisions fashioning relief to multinational bankruptcies; and in Part III, the author attempts to synthesize the legislative goal of efficient multinational bankruptcy administration with examples of “appropriate relief” that American bankruptcy courts should consider. L'article 304 du code américain sur l'insolvabilité a été passéafin de fournir une solution légale aux “eaux troubles et inconnues” des faillites multinationales. La première partie de cet article donne une brève histoire et analyse de l'article 304; la deuxieme partie couvre les décisions juridiques qui détermient comment assister les compagnies mutinationales en faillite; et dans la troisième partie, l'auteur essaye de synthétiser le but législatif d'une administration éfficace des faillites multinationales avec des exemples de “secours adéquats” que les tribunaux américains de faillite devraient prendre en compte.     

Contagion inside the credit default swaps market: The case of the GM and Ford crisis in 2005

We study the General Motors (GM) and Ford crisis in 2005 in order to determine if the credit default swap (CDS) market is subject to contagion effects. Has the crisis spread to the whole (CDS) market? To answer this question, we study the correlations between CDS premia, by using a sample of 226 CDSs on major US and European firms. We do evidence a significant rise in correlations during the crisis episode, but little “shift-contagion” as defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). When using dynamic measures of correlations (EWMA and DCC-GARCH), we also show that correlations significantly increased during the crisis, especially in the first week.     

Options markets, self-fulfilling prophecies, and implied volatilities

This paper answers the following often asked question in option pricing theory: if the underlying asset's price does not satisfy a lognormal distribution, can market prices satisfy the Black-Scholes formula just because market participants believe it should? In complete markets, if the underlying asset's objective distribution is not lognormal, then the answer is no. But, in an incomplete market, if the underlying asset's objective distribution is not lognormal and all traders believe it is, then the answer is yes! The Black-Scholes formula can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The proof of this second assertion consists of generating an economy where self-confirming beliefs sustain the Black-Scholes formula as an equilibrium. An asymmetric information model is provided, where the underlying asset's price has stochastic volatility and drift. This model is distinct from the existing pricing models in the literature, and it provides new empirical implications concerning Black-Scholes implied volatilities and the bid/ask spread. Similar to stochastic volatility models, this model is consistent with the implied volatility “smile” pattern in strike prices. In addition, it is consistent with implied volatilities being biased predictors of future volatilities.