The knowledge problem,determinism, and <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Sensory Order</Emphasis>

The arguments presented in Hayek's The Sensory Order suggest that the mind/brain is a decentralized spontaneous order. The decentralized nature of decision-making and the central role of classification in perception, cognition, and action, are solutions to the knowledge problem that confronts the system. The nature of this decentralized complex system suggests that the ordering is deterministic and that free will in the sense of a decision-maker being able to stand outside the circle of cause and effect is an illusion. If determinism is correct, how can we hold individuals responsible for their actions? It is argued that the evolution of responsibility, blame and credit are the products of a second Hayekian spontaneous order. Responsibility and the allocation of credit and blame are part of an implicit social contract that facilitates cultural evolution, political freedom, and economic growth. It is responsibility, not the existence of free will, that makes freedom possible.     

The Role of Culture and Meaning in Rational Choice

The Wason card selection and the Tversky &; Kahneman frame anomaly are examined in the context of a probabilistic, constructivist biological model of decision-making. Rational choice requires that decision-makers understand the meaning of the choices they confront. In fact, the determination of meaning and the process of rational choice represent two sides the same coin. Further, perception, cognition and action are ill-posed problems. To solve these problems ‘missing data’ must be supplied by the brain. This data is acquired by both ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes. These evolutionary processes facilitate the determination of meaning and as a product of that process also facilitate the construction of rationality. Two interrelated brain systems involved in this construction process are examined: an emotional system that rapidly and non-consciously assigns reward expectancy values to objects in the environment and a sensory-motor system that participates in the discovery of more general information that facilitates environment/body interactions. Jointly, these systems help a naïve agent to find ‘meaning in an unlabeled world’ and to predict the outcomes of future interactions with that world by supplying ‘background’ information, i.e., by supplying the missing data necessary for rational choice. This ‘background’ represents the imprint of the statistical structure of the world on the brain and, as such, embodies the individual’s Bayesian priors. Lack of sufficient background capacities can result in systematic judgment errors and seemingly irrational decisions. Complex culture is a key aspect of the environment that facilitates the construction of rationality, in part, by becoming internalized as background. Culture facilitates the creation of complex social constructs that contribute to cultural evolution, reduce uncertainty, and increase rationality; however, cultural evolution can get ahead of itself—potentially leading to background failure and errors in judgment and choice. Finally, it is not simply complexity or lack of hands-on experience that lead to error: an additional component that might be called semantic opacity is necessary.     

Inter-temporal choices with temporal reference dependence

I develop an intertemporal choice model for rational deviators whose preferences depend not only on their actual consumption but also on comparison to their beliefs about the optimal consumption. The standard decision maker is loss averse with respect to this belief-dependent reference point. When psychologically weighted loss aversion is low, a decision maker deviates from the standard intertemporal choice behavior and over-consumption, as well as the alternative possibility of under-consumption can be rationalized. When the decision maker has time-varying degrees of loss aversion, he re-optimizes the consumption plan through adjusted beliefs as subsequent selves realize that past decision for the present period is no longer optimal. In the dynamic model, I solve for consistent intertemporal optimization rules by which a dynamic deviator should meet rational intertemporal consistency at each point in time. Finally, I demonstrate that the dynamic reference dependent model can solve a puzzling feature in lifecycle consumption data.     

Spontaneously Evolved Social Order versus Positive Legislation in English Constitutional History

Medieval institutions contain an important strain of spontaneous order, especially from the pre-Christian period. A series of irregular successions after the Norman conquest made royal charters increasingly important in establishing the sovereign's legitimacy. Henry I's coronation charter (1100) formed the basis of Henry II's aggressive program of reform legislation, as well as for Magna Carta (1215). Henry II aimed at restoring the legal and political institutions of his grandfather Henry I after a period of civil strife and social degeneration. The fact that almost all later charters grew out of Henry I's charter, combined with the fact that later charters expanded and refined legal and political institutions, establishes the evolution of spontaneous order in the English charters. This evolution continued throughout the middle ages as subsequent kings confirmed Magna Carta.     

Principles of network development and evolution: an experimental study

This paper reports on an experimental investigation of the evolution of networks and the individual decision-making processes that guide it. Inasmuch as there is no history of experimental work on network formation, part of the paper is devoted to the formulation of problems that can be examined experimentally. The results are that networks, composed of decentralized decision makers, are capable of overcoming complex coordination and learning problems and converge to stationary configurations. While stationarity is frequently observed, such an achievement is not guaranteed, and when it does not occur, significant and persistent inefficiencies can result. The models of equilibration based on the principle of Nash equilibrium are more reliable than models based on the alternative principles of efficiency seeking or focalness of the network configuration. However, individual decision making within networks is not in accordance with the simple decision rule of Nash best response. Instead, we observe complicated strategies that appear to trade short-term profits in order to signal to and teach other agents the strategies required for long-term profit maximization.     

An Experimental Analysis of Intertemporal Allocation Behavior

If the future is uncertain, optimal intertemporal decisions rely on anticipating one's own optimal future behavior as is typical in dynamic programming. Our aim is to detect experimentally stylized facts about intertemporal decision making in a rich stochastic environment. Compared to previous experimental studies our experimental design is more complex since the time horizon is uncertain and termination probabilities have to be updated. In particular the decision task is non-stationary as in real life which seriously complicates the task of diagnosing behavioral regularities. In this study we give some illustrative results and provide some general perspectives. Our main result is that subjects' reaction to information about termination probablilities are qualitatively correct.     

Self is Never Neutral: Why Economic Agents Behave Irrationally

Modern economics understands utility from the concept of decision utility inferred from individual choice making. It explains agents' decisions or choices in turn by the paradigm of utility maximizing. From our perspective, however, this is a fatal mistake because economic agents do not always choose what they really want in order to maintain their "self-value." In fact, subjects are never neutral. When agents are not able to obtain something they want, they downplay its desirability in order to get psychological satisfaction. But when they are forced to accept what they do not want, they try to rationalize that they really did want it, again in order to save face. Although such "irrational" behavior may decrease economic utility, it gives agents psychological satisfaction and subjective comfort, thus increasing their immaterial utility. In this sense, agents remain rational when conducting such behaviors, even though they run directly contrary to neoclassical rationality concepts.     

Decision and time from a Humean point of view

Until recently, little attention has been paid to the consequences of Hume’s theory of action for intertemporal decision. Yet in view of the recurring discussion concerning situations of conflicting choice between a close and a remote objective, which runs from Book 2 of the Treatise, to the second Enquiry, to the Dissertation, intertemporal decision appears, at least in part, to be an outcome of the role of the natural relation of contiguity in the formation of the structure of desires, and thus different from the structure of pleasure. This paper shows, and expresses formally, that Hume’s approach provides alternative conditions which explain time-consistency on the one hand, and dynamic time-inconsistency on the other, when the link between contiguity and the ’violence’ of the passions is taken into account. The possibility of time-inconsistency is acknowledged by Hume as giving rise to general aversion, therefore constitutes a key argument in explaining the origin of government.     

政府产业管制中的非理性倾向分析

关于政府产业管制的行为属性的分析和研究,学术界通常是从理性的角度看待问题的.其实,从有些方面来观察政府的产业管制行为,政府管制行为中经常蕴涵着非理性的倾向.本文拟在对政府非理性行为及其属性作出解说的基础上,分析政府非理性行为倾向的形成机理,并在一定程度上联系政府产业管制的现实选择来说明这种非理性行为倾向对政策制定所产生的影响,从而对政府管制自然垄断产业提出一些可供探讨的观点.认识政府行为的非理性倾向,无疑对于理解政策的行为底蕴有着重要意义.     

Intertemporal dynamic choice under myopia for reward and different risk tolerances

This paper discusses the rationality in an intertemporal dynamic choice under human psychological biases through numerical experiments. A decision maker tries to find the optimal choice in a financial problem by maximizing the subjects?? expected utility for multiple periods, which is measured by the value function in the prospect theory. The subjects are assumed to be myopic for monetary reward and show time-inconsistent preference. Additionally, they have different risk tolerances for gains and losses, causing the framing effect. Under these conditions, a comparative analysis is carried out numerically to evaluate a combined effect of the two psychological factors on the intertemporal choice. The paper also presents a simple computational method for the numerical analysis and proves its validity.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS WITH HETEROGENEOUS TIME PREFERENCES

The overlapping generations model presented herein requires incorporation of exactly three periods in which one lives, but makes intertemporal decision‐making twice, neither once nor three times. Single decision‐making at the outset, none thereafter, ignores the fact that one makes decisions every day anew as long as tomorrow exists. Incorporating such observations most simply requires decisions to be made at the first period and the second, but not at the third or last period. Our model reveals how the Mabiki (infanticides) and the Narayama (elderlycides) can occur simultaneously. We also find conditions under which child‐indulgence and parental overprotection called sunekajiri might be reckoned a virtue.     

科学、价值与判断在环境影响评估架构中之整合

公共政策研拟，尤其是环境影响评估，不仅牵涉技术性科学层面，同时涵盖社会性价值评估与政策性决策判断。旨在探讨如何将科学、价值与判断等因素合理融合于环境影响评估作业过程中，并据此研拟一环境影响评估架构，作为中国台湾地区环保部门开发案审核依据之参考。本文所研拟之环境影响评估架构的理论基础包括社会选择理论、社会判断理论及多属性评估方法。通过社会选择理论分析环境政策制定的机制；通过社会判断理论解释科学与价值如何整合于政策制定及其可行性中；而通过多属性评估方法建立开发案评选的集体决策技术。以山坡地开发为例说明此架构在实践中的应用。     

True indexes and rational habit formation

In this paper we discuss the construction of true indexes when tastes change endogenously. True indexes take the substitution possibilities of the consumer to a changing economic situation into account when equating the utility level of a particular period to the utility level attained in the base period through an appropriate change in income or the wage level. When tastes change endogenously, the current decision depends on the past history of consumption but, by the same token, the future path of consumption will depend on the current choice. In a true index, these intertemporal links of the current decision have to be taken into account. For a particular specification of the habit formation process, this is achieved by an appropriate transformation of prices and expenditures. A true intertemporal wage index is computed for the period 1946–1967 in the U.S. Because of increasing needs and intertemporal rationality, this index is roughly constant and equal to 1: real wages remained constant!     

Do firms plan?

The late F. A. Hayek is remembered for the argument that the decentralized price system has enormous advantages over planned systems in the critical areas of information transmission and the use of knowledge. In many minds, the recent fall of the Soviet-style economies in Eastern Europe has decisively made that case. But not all are persuaded. The model of central planning that originally impressed Lenin—the modern business corporation—remains in many minds a formidable piece of empirical evidence in favor of the possibility and desirability of centralized administrative control. This paper argues that Hayek's theory of spontaneous order can in fact include the case of such apparently purposive and extramarket forms as the business firm. It picks up a number of suggestions in Hayek's evolutionary theory of social institutions and uses them to draw a picture of the firm that is somewhat different from what one finds on the easel of neoclassical transaction-cost analysis. In the Hayekian picture, firms and markets are both systems of rules of conduct. And both are systems for economizing on knowledge in the face of economic change, albeit quite different kinds of knowledge and change. In the end, the firm is not a model for political planning for one very simple reason: the firm does not plan.When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the productive group is no longer a matter of indifference or a mechanical detail. Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is imperative, a process of cephalization, such as has taken place in the evolution of organic life, is inevitable, and for the same reasons as in the case of biological evolution.There is no reason why a polycentric order in which each element is guided only by rules and receives no orders from a centre should not be capable of bringing about as complex and apparently as purposive an adaptation to circumstances as could be produced in a system where a part is set aside to preform such an order on an analogue or model before it is put into execution by the larger structure. In so far as the self-organizing forces of a structure as a whole lead at once to the right kind of action (or to tentative actions which can be retracted before too much harm is done) such a single-state order need not be inferior to a hierarchic one in which the whole merely carries out what has first been tried out in a part. Such a non-hierarchic order dispenses with the necessity of first communicating all the information on which its several elements act to a common centre and conceivably may make the use of more information possible than could be transmitted to, and digested by, a centre.     

Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent's payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty.     

Status,Risk-Taking and Intertemporal Substitution in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper examines intertemporal risk-taking in a stochastically growing economy with externalities in human capital accumulation where agents have preferences for social status. In order to isolate the effects of status concerns on long-run expected growth, the analysis is embedded in a non-expected utility setting, which disentangles the effects from risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. We examine the interaction between status desire and risk, risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. The externalities generated by the status game are able to correct the allocative distortions from the knowledge spillovers.Acknowledgement The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for his valuable comments.     

Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent's payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty.     

The effect of acute pain on risky and intertemporal choice

Pain is a highly salient and attention-demanding experience that motivates people to act. We investigated the effect of pain on decision making by delivering acute thermal pain to participants’ forearm while they made risky and intertemporal choices involving money. Participants (n = 107) were more risk seeking under pain than in a no-pain control condition when decisions involved gains but not when they involved equivalent losses. Pain also resulted in greater preference for immediate (smaller) over future (larger) monetary rewards. We interpret these results as a motivation to offset the aversive, pain-induced state, where monetary rewards become more appealing under pain than under no pain and when delivered sooner rather than later. Our findings add to the long-standing debate regarding the role of intuition and reflection in decision making.     

Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem

We propose a model of costly decision making based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision-maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time, and lets the decision maker 'think ahead' about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature. By formulating an intertemporal, state-contingent, planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature, and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state, we attempt to capture the basic observation that individuals generally do not think through a complete action plan. Instead, individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise.     

SOCIAL CHANGE: THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION*

In 1900 only 6% of unwed teenage females engaged in premarital sex. Now, three quarters do. The sexual revolution is studied here using an equilibrium matching model, where the costs of premarital sex fall over time due to technological improvement in contraceptives. Individuals differ in their desire for sex. Given this, people tend to circulate in social groups where prospective partners share their views on premarital sex. To the extent that society's customs and mores reflect the aggregation of decentralized decision making by its members, shifts in the economic environment may induce changes in what is perceived as culture.