Franco-Chinese Joint-Venture Formation and Shareholder Wealth

The main purpose of this article is to test the stock market reaction to Franco-Chinese joint venture announcements and to determine whether it is correlated with joint venture-specific and partner-specific factors. Certain factors specific either to Franco-Chinese joint ventures' characteristics (such as coastal or inland location of French investors in China, capital ownership of French and Chinese partners in the joint ventures, announcement date, business activity of the Franco-Chinese joint ventures) or to French partners (such as their experience in managing Franco-Chinese joint ventures, their international, European experience, and more particularly their experience of Asia) will be analysed with respect to their shareholder value creation. A research sample was prepared from the publication of information on Franco-Chinese joint venture announcements in the French daily newspapers Les Echos and La Tribune between 1994 and 2000 (seven years were analysed). It is important to stress that the announcements used in this sample corresponded to the sole formation of joint ventures. This research sample was made up of 47 Franco-Chinese joint venture announcements for which the relevant abnormal returns (AAR and CAAR) were evaluated. A negative and significant valuation effect was reported for Franco-Chinese joint venture announcements for a reduced event window spanning 7 days around the day of announcement. Among the eight different variables associated with shareholder value creation, only two of them appear to be statistically significant: announcement date and international experience of French partners. First, two opposite time trends were stated in the stock market reaction (negative reaction from 1994 to 1997 and positive from 1998 to 2000). Second, French companies possessing high international experience benefit from an important and positive stock market reaction.     

REIT Dividend Policies and Dividend Announcement Effects During the 2008–2009 Liquidity Crisis

Real estate investment trust (REIT) dividend policies and dividend announcement effects during the 2008–2009 liquidity crisis are examined. Multinomial logit results indicate that REITs with higher market leverage or lower market‐to‐book ratios are more likely to cut dividends, suspend dividends or pay elective stock dividends. These results imply that mitigating going‐concern risk is an important motive for REITs adjusting dividend policies during the crisis and support dividend catering theory where investor demand for dividends impacts corporate dividend policies. Moreover, REITs that cut or suspend dividends experience positive cumulative abnormal returns during the post‐announcement period after controlling for the potential influence from simultaneous funds from operation announcements. The positive market response over the post‐announcement period supports the notion that dividend decisions convey information to investors and is also consistent with the broad catering theory of dividend policy.     

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.     

The Attributes of a Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automotive Industry

While researchers have extensively documented the equity response to product recalls and subsequent shareholder losses, less attention in the literature has been given to examining the damaging recall attributes. Using 1973–1998 automotive safety recall data, this study identifies the kinds of recalls that cause significant shareholder losses. After constructing an equally-weighted automotive market index to control for industry effects and adjusting the abnormal returns to account for the degree of surprise in the recall announcement, the study estimates both percentage and real dollar abnormal returns. We find that the indirect costs of automotive recalls are likely larger than the direct costs.     

Whether and when do alliance terminations pay off?

Engaging in multiple strategic alliances, a firm forms an alliance portfolio. While a larger alliance portfolio signals investors a firm's ability to exploit new opportunities and improve financial performance, having multiple alliances may also undermine financial performance due to a firm's limited ability to effectively manage these alliances. Announcing an alliance termination, a firm signals an intention to increase the effectiveness of a larger alliance portfolio. This article examines the extent to which alliance termination announcements create value for firms with multiple alliances. Building on the resource-based view of the firm and organizational learning literature, the paper hypothesizes a U-shaped relationship between alliance portfolio size and a firm's cumulative abnormal stock return following an alliance termination announcement. This effect is moderated by the amount of a firm's alternative resources and partner-specific experience that affect its ability to effectively manage multiple alliances. The results show that alliance termination announcements create firm value when an alliance portfolio is large.     

Ripple Effects of CEO Awards: Investigating the Acquisition Activities of Superstar CEOs' Competitors

Research summary : This study proposes that CEOs may undertake intensive acquisition activities to increase their social recognition and status after witnessing their competitors' winning CEO awards. Using a sample of U.S. S&P 1,500 firm CEOs, we find that CEOs engage in more intensive acquisition activities in the period after their competitors won CEO awards (i.e., postaward period), compared to the preaward period. Moreover, this effect is stronger when focal CEOs themselves had a high likelihood of winning CEO awards. Our findings also show that acquisitions by focal CEO firms in the postaward period realize lower announcement returns compared to acquisitions by the same CEOs in the preaward period. Managerial summary : Each year a few CEOs receive CEO awards from business media and CEOs who receive such awards become instant celebrities, that is, superstar CEOs. This study explores how superstar CEOs' competitors react to not winning CEO awards. We find that superstar CEOs' competitors undertake more intensive acquisition activities in the postaward period compared to the preaward period. This is particularly true for competitors who were close, yet did not win CEO awards. In addition, acquisitions by superstar CEOs' competitors are associated with lower announcement returns in the postaward compared to the preaward period. These findings collectively indicate that acquisitions may be used as a channel for superstar CEOs' competitors to elevate their own social status, but at a cost to shareholders. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions: The role of private equity firms

Research summary: We show that private equity ownership (“PE backing”) of the acquirer is a signal of deal quality in cross‐border takeovers. As such, PE‐backed acquirers experience higher announcement returns in cross‐border takeovers, but only if targets are in poor information environments. We show that PE backing is a positive market signal because of PE firms' experience and networks that result from prior deals in target countries. We document that the market correctly anticipates that operating performance of PE‐backed acquirers increases as a result of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Managerial summary: We study cross‐border acquisitions by acquirers that are partially owned by private equity firms (“PE backing”). Cross‐border acquisitions are challenging as acquirers often have little information about targets. We document that investors react positively to cross‐border deals of PE‐backed acquirers—their stock prices increase upon deal announcements. However, this is only the case if targets are in countries with poor information environments. This is because PE backing allows acquirers to access PE firms' deal experience and networks. This makes it easier to identify and evaluate good targets, making it more (less) likely that a deal eventually creates (destroys) value. Consistent with this, we find that earnings of PE‐backed acquirers increase after buying targets in poor information environments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stock market reaction to CEO certification: the signaling role of CEO background

As a direct result of the corporate scandals that started with Enron and led to general unrest in the financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission required chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers of large publicly traded companies to certify their financial statements. Using market signaling theory, we propose that attributes of the CEO send important signals to the investment community as to the credibility of the CEO certification and thus the quality of the firm's financial statements, which in turn impact the stock market reaction to the CEO certification. We find that a CEO's shareholdings and external directorships are positively related to the abnormal returns of CEO certification. Further, the stock market penalizes a firm with a CEO who is associated with the firm's prior financial restatement and rewards a firm with a CEO who is appointed after the firm's prior financial restatement. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of firm and industry characteristics on returns from technology licensing deals: evidence from the US computer and pharmaceutical sectors

This study examines the relationships between firm and industry characteristics and firms' abnormal stock market returns accompanying the announcement of technology licensing deals. In particular, I examine the fit among firms' licensing activities, their resource endowments, and their industry context, and develop hypotheses on its impact on abnormal stock market returns after licensing deals. Analyzing 11 years of inward and outward licensing transactions in the US computer and pharmaceutical industries between 1990 and 2000, I find support for my argument that while firms profit from both inward and outward licensing, the magnitude of such profits is determined by licensing firms' resource endowments, and that these determinants have a different impact in different industry contexts. Understanding these relationships helps explain when firms should use licensing to exploit their proprietary technologies and make better predictions about the impact of licensing transactions on firm performance.     

Do early birds get the returns? An empirical investigation of early‐mover advantages in acquisitions

We explore whether pioneering advantages exist for early‐mover acquirers in industry acquisition waves by examining both combined (target and acquirer) and acquirer stock returns. Combined abnormal returns are higher for acquisitions that occur at the beginning of acquisition waves. However, for acquirers' returns, only strategic pioneers—those acting in manners consistent with having superior information—capture significant advantages. Specifically, early‐mover acquirers who realize superior stock returns are those that conduct acquisitions in related industries, during industry expansionary phases, and finance their acquisitions as financial theory suggests they should when they possess an informational advantage—with cash. Our findings extend the first‐mover literature to corporate practices and link these practices to acquisition returns. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multiagent perspective

Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influences firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multiagent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality, respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Repeating a familiar pattern in a new way: The effect of exploitation and exploration on knowledge leverage behaviors in technology acquisitions

Research Summary: We identify two types of knowledge leverage behaviors undertaken by acquiring firms: integrated and independent knowledge leverage. We address how the prior exploitation or exploration orientation of acquirers influence these two modes of knowledge leverage behaviors. The degree of exploitation of acquirers promotes integrating their existing knowledge with acquired knowledge in innovative actions. In contrast, the degree of exploration of acquirers increases the likelihood that new innovations will use acquired knowledge without integrating it with their prior knowledge. In addition, the firm's prior acquisition rate moderates the relationship between the acquiring firms’ previous exploitation or exploration orientation and their knowledge leverage mode. The findings of this article suggest that pre‐acquisition innovation capabilities are distinct from but influence the post‐acquisition innovation actions. Managerial Summary: Firms often undertake acquisitions to gain access to new knowledge, but they can differ dramatically in how they leverage acquired knowledge. We show that the firm's prior innovation patterns drive this choice. Firms that have previously focused on incremental innovations in their internal innovation efforts tend to integrate acquired knowledge with their own prior knowledge. In contrast, firms that have previously pursued bold innovations tend to leverage acquired knowledge alone in new innovations. Thus, we show that firms use acquisitions as a means to extend their internal innovation patterns—firms that have focused on incremental innovations extend that with acquisitions by linking new innovations to their prior knowledge while firms that have pursued bold initiatives use acquired knowledge to move in new technology directions.     

Valuing Stakeholder Governance: Property Rights,Community Mobilization,and Firm Value

Research summary : While research has shown that good stakeholder relations increase the value of a firm, less is known about how specific types of stakeholder governance affect firm value. We examine the value of one such governance mechanism—community benefits agreements (CBAs) signed by firms and local communities—intended to minimize social conflict that disrupts access to valuable resources. We argue that shareholders evaluate more positively CBAs with local communities with strong property rights and histories of institutional action and extra‐institutional mobilization because these communities are more likely to cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. We evaluate these arguments by analyzing the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the unexpected announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada. Managerial summary : With firms across many industries facing escalating costs associated with social conflict, new tools are emerging to help firms mitigate these risks by seeking the support of the local communities in which they operate. Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are contracts in which a community provides consent for a new investment in return for tangible benefits, such as local hiring and revenue sharing. We argue that although CBAs are costly for the firm, they are particularly valuable when communities can cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. Our study of investor reactions to the announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada shows that investors value more CBAs signed with communities with strong property rights and histories of protest. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Announcement effects and market efficiency in a thin market: An empirical application to the Singapore equity market

Studies of share price responses to public announcements have assumed that there is no serious thinness in trading. This paper reports the findings of a study of price responses of thinly-traded shares in the Singapore equity market. With appropriate methodological refinements for thinness in trading, the announcement effects of earnings, dividends and capitalisation changes are studied. The results suggest that there are statistically significant abnormal returns during the months up to and including the month of announcement. With some minor exceptions, there appears to be no significant abnormal returns during the months after the announcements: semi-strong form efficiency is thus observed. These results are consistent with prior findings in the developed capital markets.The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions. This paper has benefitted from financial assistance of the Department of Commerce of the University of Queensland.     

中国上市公司可转债发行动因:“后门权益”VS“代理成本”

本文以中国上市公司2002—2008年发行的可转债为研究样本进行实证研究,发现可转债发行公告的财富效应与该可转债实现转股可能性的预期正相关,具体而言,与发行公司的成长机会、财务困境风险水平正相关,并且与整体股市的状况也紧密相关。进一步结合可转债退市的分析表明,中国上市公司可转债融资是一种典型的后门权益融资。实证研究的结果不支持基于代理成本的动因假说。     

Alliance or Acquisition? A Mechanisms‐Based,Policy‐Capturing Analysis

Research summary : While alliance researchers view prior partner‐specific alliance experience as influencing firms' subsequent alliance or acquisition decisions, empirical evidence on the alliance versus acquisition decision is surprisingly mixed. We offer a reconciliation by proposing and testing an analytical framework that recognizes prior partner‐specific experiences as heterogeneous along three fundamental dimensions: partner‐specific trust, routines, and value certainty. This allows us to use a policy‐capturing methodology to rigorously operationalize and test our mechanism‐level predictions. We find that all three mechanisms can increase the likelihood of a subsequent alliance or acquisition, and in terms of the comparative choice between alliances versus acquisitions, partner‐specific trust pulls towards alliances, and value certainty pulls towards acquisitions. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of our approach and method . Managerial summary : This study focuses on an important corporate decision: When a firm has had an alliance with another firm, how would that experience affect the likelihood of a future alliance or acquisition with that same firm? We first suggest that it will depend on three factors: the level of trust that existed in that prior alliance, the extent to which specific work routines were developed, and the degree to which the firm was able to confidently assess the value of the partner firm's resources. We then find that trust is a particularly strong predictor of future alliances, while confidence regarding value more strongly predicts future acquisitions. In this way, we demonstrate more precisely how past corporate choices can affect (consciously or unconsciously) future ones . © 2017 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Value Creation in REIT Property Sell-Offs

We examine major sales of real property by public U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 1992–2002. We find that abnormal shareholder returns are significantly positive, a result that is consistent with findings for conventional firms that sell off real estate. Because REITs do not pay taxes, this finding supports the view that abnormal returns in real estate sell-offs by all types of firms are derived largely from asset allocation efficiencies and do not result exclusively from tax benefits. Shareholder returns are lower in sell-offs motivated by a desire to reduce long-term debt, as is consistent with financial theory regarding the information content of leverage decisions. Returns are inversely related to the firm's operating performance prior to the sell-off announcement, further supporting the case that improved asset efficiencies create value in real estate sell-offs.