Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion

In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds).     

Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine

We compare the experience with collusion in the market for lysine with the predictions of theory. The lysine market provides an ideal setting following the confessions of cartel participants in antitrust investigations. Data availability allows demand and cost functions to be estimated and observed mark-ups compared with predictions. We find that several integral aspects of collusion in the lysine market are not adequately addressed in the literature: the dynamics associated with entry and investment; persistent asymmetries between firms; the cartel's bargaining problem; and the existence of cheating in equilibrium. These issues are likely to have much wider applicability beyond the lysine market.     

Capacity reservation under spot market price uncertainty

Capacity reservation contracts and spot markets are two alternative purchasing practices. We focus on the cost-effective management of the combined use of these two procurement sources. Due to the variability of the spot market prices and demand uncertainty, the flexibility of combined sourcing can be advantageous. Spot market purchasing is a benefit in case of low spot market prices or insufficient reserved capacity, and the capacity reservation contract is an operational risk hedging for high spot market price incidents. The structure of the optimal combined purchasing policy is complex. In this paper we consider a simple and easy-to-implement capacity reservation—base stock policy and compare it to single sourcing options. We examine the joint effect of demand and spot market price uncertainty. Our analysis shows that in the case of large spot market price variability the combined sourcing is superior over spot market sourcing even in the case of low average spot price. The combined sourcing is also superior over long-term sourcing even in the case of high average spot price if there is large spot market price variability. Analytical and simulation results are presented to show the effect of the different price, cost, and uncertainty parameters on the optimal capacity reservation—base stock policy and on the expected percentage gain over single sourcing.     

Efficiency outcomes of market concentration and managed care

The paper examines how hospital cost efficiency has reacted to extensive horizontal integrations of hospitals and rapid growth of managed care in the US health care industry. Cost efficiency is estimated by using panel data approaches to relax the assumptions for the hospital effects imposed in earlier studies. The paper shows that higher managed care penetration over time is associated with greater hospital efficiency, and higher market concentration is positively associated with efficiency when markets are highly competitive or highly concentrated.     

Imperfect competition law enforcement

Competition policy is a subject of often heated debate. Competition authorities, seeking to prevent or battle anticompetitive acts in complex cases to the best of their abilities, regularly find themselves advised by rival economic theories and disputed empirical analyses. As a consequence, there is a real possibility that they may occasionally err, missing true violations of competition law or finding firms liable that actually had no other intentions than good competition. In this paper, possible consequences of such imperfect competition law enforcement on firm strategies are considered. In a simple model of collusion, it is found that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforcement errors: Type II errors decrease expected fines, while Type I errors encourage industries to collude precautionary when they face the risk of a false conviction. Hence, fallible antitrust enforcement may stifle genuine competition, thus stimulating the very behavior competition policy is meant to deter. When enforcement errors are non-negligible, competition authorities run the risk of being over-zealous, in the sense that welfare is best served by an authority that is selective and conscientious in its targeting of alleged anticompetitive acts.     

Impact of rainfall pattern on cereal market and food security in Sudan: Stochastic approach and CGE model

The paper aims at analysing the impact of the likely change in rainfall on food availability and access to food in Sudan. The empirical investigation is based on an integrated approach consisting of a stochastic method and CGE model. The former, related to the Monte Carlo analysis, provides the likely changes in rainfall patterns and their probability of occurrence based on historical data. These results are at the basis of the scenarios simulated in a standard CGE model augmented with a stochastic component. Achievements underline the negative impact on the two dimensions of food security taken into consideration, mainly due to a reduction in cereal supply, a marked cereal inflation pressure and income contraction; the greater negative effect on the poorest households; and a deterioration of the economic performance of the country. In this context, the paper stresses a strong interconnection among climate change and variability, poverty and food insecurity and thus the need for an integrated policy-making approach.     

Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market

This paper studies how communication is used by a retail gasoline cartel in Australia to coordinate price increases, a role of communication in collusion not highlighted by Genesove and Mullin (Am Econ Rev 91(3): 379–398, 2001). A unique data set from the trial record allows for quantifying not only the pricing dynamics, but also the communication patterns. Both empirical and narrative evidence suggests the collusive communication and pricing behavior is well captured by the price cycle equilibrium of the Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56(3): 571–599, 1988) model.     

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.     

Information sharing and profit allotment based on supply chain cooperation

To maximize customer value created by a supply chain system as a whole, one of the key issues in supply chain management is how to have profit and benefit properly shared between partners in an effective manner of the supply chain integration. In this regard, information sharing between partners plays a rather important role in business process and management integration of the supply chain. The paper focuses on analyzing the value created from information sharing by decreasing inventory level and on investigating the collaborative mechanism of providing incentive to retailer by upstream partner via sharing profit gained information sharing in the context of three-echelon supply chain system. The issue of dealing with the interest conflict between the supply chain as a whole and individual partners is addressed based on information sharing analysis by means of cooperative game approach, a graphic model with three-dimensions is developed to depict the possible cooperative solutions of profit allotment between partners, and a problem solving method addressing how the profit allotment between partners can effectively motivate the partners to be cooperative with each other is presented as well.     

Predatory Pricing and the Speed of Antitrust Enforcement

A common complaint is that in certain industries antitrust action against predation istoo slow to ensure that a true victim can survive until the antitrust process has beenconcluded. This paper discusses, in the context of two recent antitrust cases, the sources of delay in the antitrust process, and different policy reforms aimed at speeding up the process or otherwise protecting a true victim.     

季戊四醇的生产应用及市场分析

介绍了季戊四醇合成工艺的现状及应用情况,分析了国内外季戊四醇的生产现状和市场情况,指出中国目前季戊四醇生产存在的问题,并给出一些建议。     

Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in multinational corporations

Growing interest has emerged in viewing the multinational corporation as a knowledge creating and diffusing entity. The importance of sharing knowledge across organizational and national boundaries has been established in previous research. However, the question of which organizational policies lead to knowledge sharing between multinational units is still not fully understood. In particular, the link between compensation mechanisms and knowledge sharing has not received attention in previous studies. By studying 164 foreign‐owned subsidiaries located in Finland and China, this article attempts to identify the relationship between subsidiary bonus pay based on MNC‐wide performance and knowledge sharing between different units of the MNC. In line with the knowledge‐based perspective of the firm, the results suggest that incentive pay based on the collective performance of the MNC leads to greater knowledge sharing. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product development strategies for established market pioneers,early followers,and late entrants

At the time of entry, market pioneers are known for emphasizing major product development projects. After being in the market for many years, however, do market pioneers, early followers, and late entrants maintain different product development strategies? Data from 2273 established manufacturing businesses reveal that market pioneers have the highest probability of engaging in product development, which covers product R&D spending as well as new product sales. Even so, market pioneers and early followers tend to emphasize minor projects, such as product improvements and line extensions. Late entrants are less likely to engage in product development, but those that do tend to emphasize major development efforts. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Equilibrium Selection in a Homogenous Product Market: An Experimental Study

Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature also suggest that there exist multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price-matching guarantees and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized market models, obtains testable predictions, and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably. I am grateful to Jim Cox, Martin Dufwenberg, Haimanti Bhattacharya, and the editor of this journal and the two referees for their suggestions. I thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and North American Economic Science Association meeting at Tucson, 2003 for their helpful comments. A research grant from ESL, University of Arizona, for this project is gratefully acknowledged. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.     

GMO standards,endogenous policy and the market for information

The paper develops a composite index of GMO standards restrictiveness for 60 countries, assigning objective scores to six different regulatory dimensions. Using this index and its components, we empirically investigate the political and economic determinants of GMO regulations for 55 countries, controlling for spatial autocorrelation. Results show that many of the determinants highlighted in the theoretical literature, such as the structure of the agricultural sector and the institutional environment are important determinants of the restrictiveness of the GMO regulation. As a key result there emerges a prominent role of the market for information, showing that the structure of domestic mass media (public vs. private) is an important driver of GMO standards.     

Relationship between innovativeness,quality, growth,profitability, and market value

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between innovativeness, quality, growth, profitability, and market value at the firm level. Building on concepts from a resource‐based view of a firm and organizational learning, innovation and quality literature, we propose the innovativeness–quality–performance model, which describes how a firm's capability to balance innovativeness with quality drives growth and profitability, and in turn drives superior market value. Results of structural equation models indicate that (1) innovativeness mediates the relationship between quality and growth, (2) quality mediates the relationship between innovativeness and profitability, (3) both innovativeness and quality have mediation effects on market value, and (4) both growth and profitability have mediation effects on market value. Implications for theories and practices are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Retailer policy, uncertainty reduction, and supply chain performance

We investigate how the retailer’s inventory policy affects the total cost of a serial supply chain. When the retailer uses the locally optimal (s,S) policy, there is randomness in order time and order quantity to the supplier whereas the supplier sees randomness only in order quantity for the suboptimal (R,T) policy and only in order time for another suboptimal (Q,r) policy. Using an extensive computational study, we find that the suboptimal policies perform better from the total supply chain perspective. The benefit of policy changes is magnified when the retailer costs are low, when the supplier costs are high, and when there is information sharing.