地方政府经济行为与制度创新

国有资本营运,实质上依然是价值运动及其不断增殖的过程,内容包括国有资本的社会配置和国有资本的生产经营活动。目前,就我国地方政府作为其行政区划国有资本事实上的产权主体而言,国有资本营运绩效的获取,在很大程度上取决于地方政府经济行为的规范与否。     

浅谈高校图书馆"学科馆员"制度实施的现状与对策

"学科馆员"制度在我国试行已近十年,从2007年中国图书馆学会和北京高校情报资料研究会分别举办了学科馆员专题研讨会;CALIS三期规划中提出了普遍服务与学科服务两项工作重点,并于2010年与2011年成功举办了两届"学科馆员培训班".与10年前相比,我国学科馆员制度的环境、理论研究、实践成果、技术应用、队伍建设等方便正在发生着很大的变化.但是作为一个新生事物,一项新的系统工程,它需要我们一代又一代的人不断探索深究,逐步完善,不可一蹴而就.     

农村"一事一议"制度存在的问题及完善对策

"一事一议"制度是农村基层民主政治建设的重要内容,对解决村级公益事业和基础建设问题,减轻农民负担,调动起农村参与集体管理的积极性有着重要作用.本文对农村"一事一议"制度存在的问题进行分析,并提出完善对策,期望对加快社会主义新农村建设有所帮助.     

地方政府投融资行为研究

地方政府因利益的独立化而产生的冲动,促使其在投融资活动中表现出非理性行为,对国有银行进行过多的行政干预,导致资的不合理配置。必须对投融资管理体制进行改革和创新,增加制度约束,矫正地方政府的非理性投资行为。     

解决"三农"问题需要农业土地制度第二次创新

过去行之有效的"土地承包制"为什么今天不灵了?产生"三农"问题的制度根源是什么?这一切都根源于现有的土地产权制度。在农业生产领域实现产权制度变革,组建股份制的"土地合作社",是农业土地制度的第二次创新。     

我国农地制度与地方政府行为关系分析

我国现阶段的农地制度是20世纪80年代初为解决农民的温饱问题而建立起来的，随着经济体制改革的深化和经济的快速发展，农地问题上的体制性冲突日益凸现。一方面，土地产权制度的不完善为地方政府的失范行为提供了条件和空间：农地转让制度的不完善导致地方政府的寻租行为，土地所有权主体虚位给地方政府侵权行为提供了条件；另一方面，地方政府的失范行为又强化和扩大了土地产权制度不完善的消极影响：地方政府寻租行为严重侵害农民利益，违法用地导致土地闲置浪费，过度干涉导致农户承包经营权更加残缺。我们必须打破计划经济的制度框架和思维定式，不失时机地进行农地产权制度的改革，尽快实现土地国有、农户永佃的模式。     

关于财政支出"越位"与"缺位"的思考

文章从财政支出“越位”、“缺位”的具体表现及其影响分析出发，认为要矫正财政支出“越位”、“缺位”．国家必须进一步深化改革，从体制转轨、政府职能界定、事权划分、预算约束的加强等方面入手。     

刍议环境税的"大棒"与"胡萝卜"效应

环境税是在可持续发展这一理论框架下提出的重要税种,而且在很多西方国家已经实施很多年。目前环境税的开征在我国已经越来越提上日程。鉴于西方实施环境税的经验,本文认为,政府在征收环境税时,应注重其大棒与胡萝卜双重效应,分析其短期与长期效应,权衡政府与企业的关系,只有这样才能使环境税的实施达到预期效果。     

制度变迁中地方政府经济行为分析

从传统计划经济体制向市场经济体制转换的制度变迁深刻地影响着地方政府的行为,其表现在不同体制下的地方政府行为角色、方式和效果不同,地方政府行为过程中有着明显的必然性和有限性特征.规范地方政府行为应该正确认识地方政府行为的性质.     

地方政府制度创新:动力和意义

制度在经济发展过程中发挥着重要作用,发现更好的制度安排对每个社会都是重要的,对发展中的经济尤其如此。因为,不同的制度安排所导致的绩效会相差很大。基于此,对于相互竞争的地方政府来说,进行制度创新,发现更有效率的制度,不仅是履行职能的需要,更为重要的是可以获得巨大的创新利润,从而创造竞争优势。制度创新利润不仅体现在增加地方政府的财政收入上,而且可以促进社会整体福利的提高,实现帕累托改进。制度创新带来的不仅仅是交易成本节约,更为重要的是巨大的社会外部效应。     

地方性公共品供给制度创新研究

在市场经济条件下 ,地方政府的主要职责是分级提供各种地方性公共品 ,满足居民生活和企业生产的共同需要。但是 ,政府提供并不等于政府生产 ,更不等于政府垄断生产。中国现行地方性公共品供给制度的主要缺陷是地方政府以及公共部门的过度垄断。按公共品生产与提供、直接生产与间接生产分开等原则 ,打破垄断 ,有序地向国内外开放公共品生产市场 ,大力推进公共品生产的市场化 ,形成“公”与“私”以及各自内部的竞争 ,将有助于提高地方性公共品供给效率 ,增进公共福利 ,并有助于推进中国的市场化进程。     

Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size

It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision.     

The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding

In this study we explore the endogenous determination of moral objections to free riding. We first derive the individually rational behavior for given preferences. The motivational structure is allowed to evolve evolutionarily based on the comparison of the relative reproductive success of all possible preference types. The tastes that emerge are not necessarily those assumed in models resorting to altruism or moral obligations. In general, an effective social conscience preventing free riding need not be evolutionarily stable. In the first model that we explore, moral objections to free riding and, in turn, voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods are not to be expected with one notable exception, namely unanimity games. In the second model that we explore, the evolutionarily stable probability that an individual develops social conscience is positive.     

科技创新的制度供给——一些国家科技创新的基本做法

知识创新, 科技创新是２１ 世纪全球经济竞争、政治角逐和综合国力较量的核心内容。“科学需要从体制上给予支持”, 为迎接挑战, 世界上许多国家都先后制定了推进本国科技创新的计划, 确定了各自的未来科技发展和创新的目标, 并为此给予了一系列保证计划和目标实现的制度安排。这些国家的经验证明, 制定国家未来科技发展的战略目标和战略计划, 是一国科技创新最重要的制度保证; 而从财政、金融、税收、管理等诸多方面确保和鼓励企业主导型科技创新体制的形成和运转, 是实现国家科技创新的不可或缺的制度供给。     

Global Security Policies against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem: An Experimental Approach

The World Trade Center attack has shed light on the urgent need to implement preventing measures against terrorism and to enhance cooperation in the global security system for all countries. However, international coordination cannot be taken for granted. It is often ineffective and likely to fail for several reasons. Perhaps the more prominent reason to explain failure in coordination is that collective actions against terrorism may suffer from the well‐known free riding problem. In this paper we experimentally investigate cooperation dilemma in counterterrorism policies by measuring to what extent international deterrence policy may suffer from free riding. In our game, contributions to the group account do not aim to increase the production of the public good but instead seek to decrease the probability that a stochastic event destroys the good. A country could choose to free ride by investing nothing in the international deterrence policy and instead invest all its resources in its own national protection or even choose to ignore totally terrorism by investing on alternative projects. We also look at the effects of institutions that allow sanctioning and rewarding of other countries to facilitate coordination on deterrence policy. We find that, in absence of institutional incentives and after controlling for risk aversion, most of countries defect by investing very weakly in collective actions against terrorism while largely investing to protect themselves. In contrast, the introduction of punishment/reward incentive systems improves significantly the contribution level to the collective security account.     

Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence

Collective action can take place at a plurality of levels. It has to be based on a constitution which defines the basic rules of interaction. Here, we are concerned with the problem of the constitutional setting of bottom-up formal institutions with a club nature. The pressure to improve the efficiency of services pushes local administrations to co-ordinate to produce public goods. This process has stimulated the birth of different forms of agencies or private companies with a club nature. The aim of this paper is to discuss the effects of institutional interdependence on the efficiency of this kind of collective action. In order to shed some light on this problem, the paper first discusses the problem of the relativity of efficiency to the institutional setting. A framework of analysis is then discussed to identify the main factors affecting collective action. Finally some evidence will be provided by a comparative institutional analysis performed on some case studies concerning local associational forms among communes in north-eastern Italy.     

When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods

We consider duopolists innovating and producing a good subject to network externalities. If successful in R&D, a firm sells both the old product and the new one. The new product increases the utility of its user; it also generates a higher network externality than does the old product. A firm which fails to innovate nevertheless profits from the success of the rival: the network effect raises the value of the old product it still produces. A firm free-rides on the innovative efforts of another firm, reducing the incentives of any firm to innovate.     

政治学视角的“消费自由”——兼论生态消费的自由意蕴

消费社会的到来给人们带来了消费自主权和消费选择的自由,推动了消费的大众化和民主化,鼓励了个人主义的滋长,符合古典自由主义的核心理念;但从更深刻的层面看,消费主义与自由并无必然联系,消费主义本身未能从消极自由的角度保证"免于干涉",甚至更暗中阻碍着人的自主自决能力的发展。因此,追求自由的路径在于引导人们远离消费主义生活模式。