Analysis of essential patent portfolios via bibliometric mapping: an illustration of leading firms in the 4G era

This study aims to analyse the essential patent portfolios of individual firms via bibliometric mapping. Based on the maps drawn via this method, important clusters of each company are analysed and two interpretations are made. As an illustration, the mobile phone industry is selected because standardisation is highly important for firms in this industry. Among others, long-term evolution (LTE) of the 4G era is chosen as a standard and Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson, and NTT DOCOMO are included as leading firms. As a result, firm-wise LTE essential patent portfolios were visualised. Based on the information given in these maps, two important clusters (i.e. the clusters composed of frequently emerging words and their periphery and the clusters including particularly noticeable terms) were analysed. In addition, two interpretations were made as follows. First, specialised and expandable technological clusters for each company (14 specialised/expandable clusters for Qualcomm, 8 for Nokia, 11 for Ericsson, and 10 for NTT DOCOMO) were identified. Second, appropriate cooperative strategies were devised according to the ownership patterns of technologies as follows. To begin with, if the technologies were owned by one company (e.g. multi-carriers, duplex channel, error correction), a non-cooperative strategy, such as non-exclusive licensing, was advised. Next, when the technology was owned by two companies (i.e. OFDM (orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing)), a cooperative strategy, such as cross-licensing, was recommended. Finally, if the technologies were owned by multiple companies (i.e. MIMO (multi-input and multi-output) and data transmission), then a cooperative strategy, such as a patent pool, was proposed.     

Who you are or whom you know? Consumption interdependences in social networks

This paper presents an analysis of whether a consumer's decision to switch from one mobile phone provider to another is driven by individual consumer characteristics or by actions of other consumers in her social network. Such consumption interdependences are estimated using a unique dataset, which contains transaction data based on anonymized call records from a large European mobile phone carrier to approximate a consumer's social network. Results show that network effects have an important impact on consumers’ switching decisions: switching decisions are interdependent between consumers who interact with each other and this interdependence increases in the closeness between two consumers as measured by the calling data. In other words, if a subscriber switches carriers, she is also affecting the switching probabilities of other individuals in her social circle. The paper argues that such an approach is of high relevance to both switching of providers and to the adoption of new products.     

INTER-MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH BUNDLING IN THE PRESENCE OF COST ADVANTAGE

This paper presents a model of inter-market competition through bundling wherein each firm has a cost advantage in a different market and competes against fringe firms. Without cost saving through bundling, there is no equilibrium in which the bundled good is provided. However, with cost saving through bundling, there exist equilibria in which one firm provides bundling and the other does not. In this case, bundling can be used as a device for entry deterrence. Finally, we illustrate that bundling can reduce social welfare by discouraging the efficient entrant from entering the market.     

STANDARDIZATION IN THE WIRELESS INTERNET MARKET: LESSONS FROM JAPAN AND KOREA

The wireless Internet market has been growing rapidly since NTT DoCoMo first introduced the service in 1999. This paper provides a framework within which the wireless Internet market can be analysed so as to draw valuable policy implications. We show that if platforms are standardized: (i) social welfare is increased with the rational expectation of larger installed bases; (ii) the neutrality of a revenue‐sharing ratio that is valid for non‐standardized network platforms is affected; and (iii) the collusive interconnection charge is lower than the social optimum insofar as the population mass of content providers is less dense than that of Internet users.     

放松电信管制对日本移动通信市场发展的影响

本文分析了日本移动通信领域的管制改革及其对移动通信市场发展的影响。基于垄断竞争模型的分析表明,移动电话服务商的个数和移动电话服务的边际成本,是影响日本移动通信的需求和价格的关键因素。以移动通信市场自由化为目标的一系列管制改革,刺激了移动通信服务商的增加,降低了移动通信服务商的边际成本,从而促进日本移动电话通信市场的蓬勃发展。基于1991—1999年期间季度数据的经济计量模型,证实放松电信管制对移动通信服务的价格和需求量都有显著影响。此外,本文还推测了移动电话通信的需求曲线和价格弹性。     

Bundling in the Australian Telecommunications Industry

This article considers some of the implications for social welfare of bundling in the Australian telecommunications industry. The practice of bundling—offering two or more products for sale as a single package—is a strategy used in many industries. Although common, there are circumstances when the practice can be used anti-competitively. Yet bundling does not always harm consumers; at times, the practice benefits both consumers and producers, and it can even advantage consumers to the detriment of producers. The general literature on bundling suggests that its effect on social welfare depends on several factors such as market structure, the elasticity of demand for the products, the marginal cost of production, economies of distribution and the use of complex menus. We consider these factors when assessing the likely welfare effects of bundling in the Australian telecommunications industry, concluding that the potential effects of bundling on competition and the information costs imposed on consumers by complex menus of services seem the most significant considerations for social welfare. It is desirable that regulatory authorities monitor developments closely, although heavy-handed regulation of bundling seems undesirable.     

The analysis of a price war strategy under market demand growth

We use the finite repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game model herein to discuss how firms choose their optimal strategy under a price war with market demand growth. This model has two players: one is an R-type player and the other is a TFT-type player. Each player has two strategies to choose from: a preemption strategy and a “wait” strategy. Our results indicate that: (i) if the probability that the opponent is an R-type (TFT-type) player is high, then the time when the opponent adopts a preemption strategy will be early (late); (ii) Market demand growth is an incentive for cooperation among firms; (iii) if the market demand growth rate is high, then the R-type player will not have an evolutionary advantage. We use the competition between cell phone manufacturing firms Nokia and Motorola in China as an example. When Nokia is an R-type player and adopts a preemption strategy, Motorola should preferably use a preemption strategy rather than a “wait” strategy. However, as a TFT-type player, this will benefit Motorola under the situation of market demand growth.     

Mixed bundling auctions

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.     

Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence

We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm à la Cournot in a second market. We compare treatments where the multi-product firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether to bundle or not. We also contrast the simultaneous and the sequential order of moves in the duopoly market. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling: with bundling and simultaneous moves, the multi-product firm offers the predicted number of units. When the multi-product firm is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling, especially when it chooses to bundle, even though in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum, bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another.     

Performance comparison of two diffusion models in a saturated mobile phone market

This research examines a performance comparison of the Lotka–Volterra (LV) and extended Bass models in the saturated mobile phone market of the Republic of Korea. A three species LV model is developed and applied to Korean mobile phone service providers in terms of competitive impact. Fitting the historical data of the Korean mobile communication service market, the results show that the goodness of fit of the three species LV model in the case of competition among three companies is better than that of the extended Bass model. The advantages and disadvantages of the two models are discussed based on the results of empirical tests.     

Beyond mobile number portability: measuring consumer preferences for service portability in Japan's mobile phone market

Japan's mobile phone market has been oligopolized by three incumbents who are seeking vertically integrated business models, which may prevent competitors from using platform layers to provide original services. We conduct two types of conjoint analysis to measure consumer stated preferences and draw two main conclusions from the analyses. First, the average consumer is willing to pay more than JPY 2000 (US $20) to increase mobile service portability. Second, the average consumer's willingness to pay corresponds to JPY 100–200 (US $1–2) per song for securing music download platforms. A dilemma exists in consumer preferences for service portability in Japan's mobile phone market, namely the choice between free mobile service portability and convenient music download platforms.     

Equilibrium Partner Switching in a Bargaining Model With Asymmetric Information

We study a model in which the seller of an indivisible object faces two potential buyers and makes an offer to either of them in each period. We find that the seller's ability to extract surplus from them depends crucially on the value of the cost of switching from one buyer to the next. If the seller is pessimistic about the buyers' valuations and there is a switching cost, however small, then the market is a natural bilateral monopoly; the second buyer is never called on. If the switching cost is zero, or if the seller is optimistic, then switching, and possibly recall of the original buyer, may occur.     

Switching costs, consumer heterogeneity and price discrimination

In a duopoly with price discrimination and switching costs, we analyse the evolution of market structure, when an incumbent and a new entrant compete, and a new class of users with lower willingness to pay appears in the market. We find that the market share of the new entrant depends on the degree of heterogeneity and the level of switching costs. In particular, if the degree of heterogeneity is intermediate, the evolution of market structure is similar for high and null switching costs. Since consumer surplus and social welfare are unambiguously lower under high switching costs, this result points at the risk of inferring the degree of market competitiveness from the convergence in market shares.     

Analysis on the growth of telecommunication services: a global comparison of diffusion patterns

With the development of the Internet, the telecommunication market has seen a rapid shift from voice-based services to data-based services. Relationships of substitutability and complementarity have emerged among communications technology services such as Internet service, mobile phone service and fixed telephone service. The article analyses the diffusion patterns of communication services in different continents. A modified logistic growth model is estimated using panel data for the years 1975–2004. The research forms a valuable framework for forecasting demand for new services based on the diffusion of incumbent services and can inform strategies for entering the communications network industry.     

PROFITABILITY OF PRODUCT BUNDLING*

Using copulas to model the stochastic dependence of values, this article establishes new general conditions for the profitability of product bundling. A multiproduct monopolist generally achieves higher profit from mixed bundling than from separate selling if consumer values for two of its products are negatively dependent, are independent, or have sufficiently limited positive dependence. The profitability of monopoly bundling also extends to situations where a multiproduct firm competes with a single‐product rival.     

Diffusion, substitution and competition dynamism inside the ICT market: The case of Japan

Under the new information society paradigm that emerged in the 1990s, contrary to its conspicuous achievement as an industrial society, Japan is experiencing a vicious cycle between non-elastic institutions and insufficient utilization of the potential benefits of information and communication technology (ICT).However, a dramatic deployment of mobile telephones with Internet access service such as NTT DoCoMo's i-mode service in the late 1990s provides encouragement that, once the potential is exploited, Japan's institutional systems can effectively stimulate the self-propagating nature of ICT. The rapid deployment of Internet Protocol (IP) mobile service in Japan can be attributed to worldwide advances in the utilization of personal computers (PCs) and the Internet. Thus, a complex technology web triggered by the dramatic advancement of PCs and the Internet and co-evolving diffusion, substitution and competition dynamism has emerged in the global ICT market, particularly in Japan's mobile communication business.The above observations prompt the hypothetical view that, despite a lack of institutional elasticity, recent advances in Japan's IP mobile service deployment can be attributed to a co-evolutionary dynamism between diffusion, substitution and competition inside the ICT market. Thus, policy questions could be how to create such a co-evolutionary dynamism by means of ICT innovation, enriched functions, reduced price and competitive environment.In order to demonstrate the foregoing hypothesis, an empirical analysis of the mechanism co-evolving diffusion, substitution and competition dynamism inside Japan's ICT market is attempted by utilizing four types of diffusion models identical to respective diffusion dynamics.     

转换成本视角下互联网企业的创新竞争策略

在转换成本和网络效应存在下互联网产业通过产品创新活动争夺市场份额。某些“创新”的主要目的为排除竞争。互联网产业一个典型的发展过程是：企业依靠外部融资支撑的策略性创新，降低消费者向其产品转换的成本，争夺市场份额，并在投资约束的限制下走向合并，最终抬高了市场集中度。特别的，转换成本的存在让企业有动力通过事前控制转换成本的创新，争夺事后的市场势力，并且“收割”事后锁定的用户。     

PLATFORM PRICING IN MIXED TWO‐SIDED MARKETS

When a consumer can appear on both sides of a two‐sided market, such as a user who both buys and sells on eBay, the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides. I develop a general model for such “mixed” two‐sided markets and show that a monopolist platform's incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand, which embody the bundling effect, and price‐cost margins adjusted for network externalities, which incorporate “two‐sidedness.” The optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar Lerner formula.     

服务品牌的促销机理与组织保障

服务品牌是提升服务质量的标识性动力,是与消费者沟通、开拓市场和培养消费者忠诚的重要促销策略。本文运用双赢交易方法分析了服务品牌的促销机理,说明了服务品牌的形成过程也即在服务现场的买卖接触中,买卖双方彼此认同并共同推动关系进展的过程,而先进服务人员的表现是促进服务品牌促销机理形成的决定性因素。要使服务品牌的促销机理在市场开拓中发挥作用,企业必须在战略上重视对优秀服务人员的培养,对高质量的服务进行激励与保护。     

The co-evolution of technology and methods of standard setting: the case of the mobile phone industry

This paper applies the concept of co-evolution to technology, institutions, and industry structure in the mobile phone industry with a focus on technology and the institution/method of standard setting. The paper shows how changes in technology have caused the method of standard setting to come full circle. New switching technologies, in particular electronic switching, enabled a change from integral to modular problem solving and thus a change from quasi-vertical integration to open standard setting in the wireline telecommunications industry in the late 1970s and later in the mobile phone industry. Growth in those mobile phone markets that initially implemented an open standard setting process encouraged other countries to adopt similar types of standard setting where government agencies and firms were the mechanisms for this transmission of open standard setting methods. However, the latest technological change, the mobile Internet, requires integral problem solving and this has caused quasi-vertical integration to return in the form of service providers determining the mobile Internet standards and the specifications for the phones that support their mobile Internet services. A new set of firms is transmitting these methods of standard setting to the rest of the world.