A coming ‘Magnesian’ age? Small states,the global system,and the international community

Since Plato, we have considered that the ideal polis, or political community, is the small state, akin to the idyllic ‘Magnesia’ of the Laws. The Platonic ideal, however, generally has been considered unrealistic. Even in the ancient world, the Alexandrine model ‐ an expanding, pluralistic network of large trading cities under a single aegis ‐ came to contradict it. Subsequent history, especially the imperialism of the nineteenth century which swallowed up many small polities around the world, seemed to prove that only large and powerful entities were ‘fit’ to survive. Why, then, are there still so many small‐sized countries in the world today? Why is their number actually increasing? Decolonisation, the end of bipolarity, democratisation, trade liberalisation and the digital revolution are five factors that have given small states more freedom. Yet many are vulnerable, and the economics of their situations are precarious. The workings of the global system, particularly the globalisation of business, may harm them even while promoting their freedom. The international community, a large part of which is now in fact made up of small states, should be prepared to act, for the global public good as well as out of sheer political and also environmental self‐interest, to help safeguard the livelihood of the world's many and varied small states, whose ‘Magnesian’ venues and values can be of both functional and normative importance for mankind as a whole.     

On the relationships between the effectiveness of national planning and the state of technical, economic, social and political structures

This paper examines the French economic development after WW II by viewing the different stages of government planning and the background conditions under which these plans were implemented. Technical, economic, social and political conditions have to be taken into account. In the first stage, the Monnet Plan, there existed a background of political splintering and general economic catastrophe. The goal was clear to everyone: things had to return to normal. Therefore, financial aid applied in the appropriate areas helped to achieve the set goal, since personal and national interest coincided on a large scale. In the next stage political cohesion existed, but interests were diversified to such an extent that no single goal could be defined. In order to coordinate the different interest groups, a common language had to be found, which was chosen to be that of national accounting. While this allowed better communication between civil servants and business, it left out the unions and consumers. As a result, this stage of the plan had only limited success. It did strengthen national cohesion and the language of national accounting was accepted by many. Plan VII for 1975 to 1980 therefore should take into account all the factors of the past plans. The goal should be to obtain political cohesion and to adapt the economy to the new energy crisis. That is, the economy should not be based on the present trajectory: more and better. Three main areas must be included: (1) Economic development (not necessarily growth); (2) Social progress; (3) New social accounting with a new language. It should be remembered that objectives, resources, planning methods and an effective language are closely dependent upon the state of economic, social and political conditions as well as current events.     

思政课教师从“高大全”到“人性化”教育转向问题研究

在中国共产党思想政治教育史上,党的十一届三中全会"自然"地规定了榜样思想政治教育从"高大全"向"人性化"历史性转向的分水岭。随着改革开放步入深水区,"人性化"榜样思想政治教育同样面临着社会转型的挑战、榜样类型单一与价值多元化的不协调、缺乏科学的模式、榜样权益保障机制不健全等诸多困境,需要营造良好的文化育人环境,树立多类型的榜样,构建人性化的教育模式,健全榜样权益保障机制,使"人性化"榜样思想政治教育模式逐步趋向成熟。     

公羊学家孟光

三国时期征伐战争不断，但在这种动荡的时局下，魏蜀吴三地仍涌现出许多著名的经学思想家。在众多左氏经学思想家中，孟光作为一名公羊经学家显得格外特别。《三国志》中有关孟光的记述不多但形象鲜明。具体表现在他对当时蜀汉政事见解独到，对公羊经学的喜爱以及敢于直言的个性，这些都与公羊经学思想有一定的联系。从孟光身上，能看到一位公羊经学思想家对政治的分析能力，但也能发现由于它的直言使自己政治抱负得不到施展，实在是一种遗憾。     

Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments

In many cases policy makers employ multiple instruments to address a single environmental problem, but much of the economics literature on instrument choice focuses on comparing properties of single policy instruments. We argue that under a fairly broad set of circumstances the use of multiple policy instruments can be justified as optimal in a second-best world. We examine two broad categories of second-best policy making: cases with multiple market failures only some of which can be corrected at any one time; and cases with exogenous (often political) constraints that cannot be removed. The fact that the use of multiple policy instruments can be justified economically in these two cases does not imply, however, that all multiple instruments employed in actual practice are economically justified.     

What made Economists so Politically Influential? Governance-related Ideas and Institutional Entrepreneurship in the Economic Liberalisation of Israel and beyond

Liberal economists are known to be one of the driving forces behind economic liberalisation in various countries, but how did they become so politically influential? Constructivists generally suggest that during economic crises liberal economists persuaded decision-makers to adopt pro-market policy ideas as solutions for economic turbulence. While this answer is true, it is also only partial because it disregards the role played by governance-related ideas and institutional entrepreneurship in the political actions of liberal economists. I argue that ideas regarding decision-making mechanisms provided liberal economists with the basis for creatively exploiting pre-liberalisation institutions, such as central banks and central budget offices, through which these economists enhanced their long-term political influence. An in-depth examination of a paradigmatic case of economic liberalisation driven by liberal economists – Israel's Stabilisation Plan – exemplifies that argument. The existence of like-minded economists and similar pre-liberalisation policy-making institutions in many other countries hints that the Israeli experience is not unique.     

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.     

Foreign direct investment,political risk and the limited access order

The common explanations for political risk in foreign investment focus on the opportunism of host-country governments. However, when governments are too weak to regulate and effectively control them, domestic business elites may also cause political risk. In the literature on political risk, the host state is mostly modelled as a single, cohesive actor and elites outside of the government are not taken into account. By contrast, this paper conceptualises political risk as a lack of government assertiveness vis-à-vis domestic business elites, drawing on the limited access order (LAO) concept developed by Douglass North and his co-authors. It presents the case of Swedish Tele2’s investment in Russia. The mobile telecommunications provider was highly successful in Russia until it became a threat to the business interests of three Russian oligarchs. Regulatory agencies in Russia lacked the necessary authority to provide a level playing field in the telecommunications industry. They did not intervene when Tele2’s access to vital licenses was blocked by competitors, effectively squeezing the Swedes out of the Russian market. This paper concludes that in LAOs foreign investors are initially welcome, but political risk is high when the market competition with domestic elites becomes intense.     

Forging success: Soviet managers and accounting fraud, 1943–1962

Attempting to satisfy their political masters in a target-driven culture, Soviet managers had to optimize on many margins simultaneously. One of these was the margin of truthfulness. False accounting for the value of production was apparently widespread in some branches of the economy and at some periods of time. A feature of accounting fraud was that cases commonly involved the aggravating element of conspiracy. The paper provides new evidence on the nature and extent of accounting fraud; the scale and optimal size of conspiratorial networks; the authorities’ willingness to penalize it and the political and social factors that secured leniency; and inefficiency in the socialist market where managers competed for political credit.     

Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization

The study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. Using panel data for 123 countries in 1970–2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth. As the results show, globalization indeed promotes growth. The dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries. Although less robustly, information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect.     

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.     

把握企业思想政治工作的切入点

随着现代企业制度的建立和企业改革的不断深入,企业思想政治工作也面临着诸多新的问题。思想政治工作要改革创新,更好地适应现代企业发展变化的实际情况,就必须把求实作为思考和解决问题、检验工作成效的尺度。     

Political preferences and public sector outsourcing

Given the intensive and ideologically charged debate over the use of private contractors for publicly funded services, it is somewhat surprising that many social scientists have preferred to explain government outsourcing by the pursuit of economic efficiency. Starting out from different theories, we investigate political explanations of government outsourcing using a Swedish data set in which outsourcing varies between municipalities and over time, as well as between services. Our identification strategy focuses on two services with similar contracting problems and local market conditions: preschools and primary schools. We study a period in which Swedish municipalities had full discretion in the provision of preschools, while their influence on the private provision of primary education was limited by a national voucher system. The comparison of preschools with primary schools in a difference-in-differences model suggests that the political color of the ruling majority influences outsourcing, which is consistent with the Citizen Candidate model of representative democracy.     

Role of Sport in International Relations: National Rebirth and Renewal

The modern history of sports is inextricably intertwined with national pride, international prestige, and world politics. In many ways, sport has created spillover effects that go beyond sporting results. First, it has played an important role in nation‐building and as a benchmark of national identity. Second, it has served as a vessel through which nations and people assert political independence and to express a distinctive identity. Third, it acts as a conduit of power, allowing nations such as Australia to augment its global status and position on the world stage. Last, sport constitutes a means of contextualizing the renewal or rebirth of a nation, like the success of the 1964 Tokyo Games for post‐war Japan.     

Japanese nationalism and geographical thought

There has been simultaneous emergence in many countries of the world of political disputes over aspects of national history in the 1990s. Geographical knowledge has political implications. Hence it is concerned with the formation of national identity as well as historical knowledge. This paper examines the relationships between Japanese modernisation and geographical thought, the characteristics of school textbooks and geopolitics in Japan during the Asia Pacific War, and recent disputes about views of history and the meaning of views of geography in the post‐Cold War era. Consequently, it is shown that the view of geography promoted the formation of national identity in the same way as that of history through geographical education and geopolitics. Taking the roles of geography into consideration, it can be said that an imaginative geography based on an ethnocentric view plays an important role in the time of rethinking national history. We should be aware of such an ethnocentric view of geography and make an effort to overcome differences in views between nations.     

How trade politics affect invasive species control

Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species, including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitutes a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper, we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman's (GH) well-known political economy model. We show that our measure of disguised protectionism—the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game—is equal to the tariff that would be set if there were no invasive species and no international disciplines on trade policy. The informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public-goods protection are formidable.     

Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Countries

Transaction-cost politics views economic policy-making as a political process constrained by asymmetric information and limited commitment possibilities. This paper examines some implications of this perspective for less-developed countries (LDCs) considering policy reform. It emphasizes that success requires reform of the rules and institutions which govern the strategic interaction of the participants in the political game, and that reforms must cope with the special interests and asymmetric information which already exist. In this light, it examines some broad issues of the design of constitutions and institutions (definition and enforcement of property rights, control of inflation, and of government expenditures, federalism, and redistribution), as well as some specific issue of the design of organizations and incentives (problems posed by the interaction of multiple tasks and multiple interests, and their interaction with the limitations on auditing and administration that exists in many LDCs).     

Economic growth in a politically fragmented world

I explore the effects of economic and political integration on economic growth in a model of vintage human capital and sequential intergenerational bargains. Adoption of a new technology raises not only the productivity but also the bargaining position of the future generations, creating a bias for the current generations to preserve the current technology. Economic integration (i.e., the sharing of frontier technology among countries) promotes growth if there is a diversity in human capital distribution or a coordination failure across countries. On the other hand, political integration (i.e., the merging of countries into a single bargain) promotes stagnation as it eliminates the diversity and coordination failures.     

Adam Smith's Conceptualization of Power,Markets, and Politics

This paper argues that Adam Smith is a/the "founding father figure" of modern social/political economy as well as economics. Smith wrote extensively and insightfully on the subject of power , and thereby class and stratafication in society. This paper explicates four main types of power relations in Smith's analysis, notably drawing on the Wealth of Nations : wealth power, monopoly power, employer power, and political power. Smith's focus on power helps to differentiate his broader vision and rich discourse from that of many contemporary neoclassical writers and sharpens our appreciation for his contributions to social and political economy.