Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist

Although credit rating agencies exist and are important to the capital markets, there remains a question of why they should exist. Two standard theories are that rating agencies correct a problem of information asymmetry and that they de facto regulate investments. These theories do not fully answer the question. This paper suggests an alternative explanation. While rating agencies produce little new information, they sort information available in the credit market. This sorting function is needed due to the large volume of information in the credit market. Sorting facilitates better credit analysis and investment selection, but bond investors or a cooperative of them cannot easily replicate this function. Outside of their information intermediary and regulatory roles, rating agencies serve a useful market purpose even if credit ratings inherently provide little new information. This alternative explanation has policy implications for the regulation of the industry.     

Bond rating changes and stock returns: evidence from the Spanish stock market

This study analyzes the effect of corporate bond rating changes by international agencies on stock prices. This topic has not yet been analyzed for the Spanish stock market, despite the growing importance of ratings in Spanish financial markets. On an efficient market, rating changes will only have an effect if they contain some new information. The results from an event study indicate that rating actions cause significant negative abnormal returns in issuing firms around the date of the announcement. This evidence indicates an informational effect related to downgrades, which supports the hypothesis that credit rating agencies provide information that may reduce the asymmetric information problem between firms and investors. In the case of upgrades, our results are compatible with a redistribution of wealth between bondholders and owners or with the reputation hypothesis.      

The Impact of the Rating Agencies' Through‐the‐cycle Methodology on Rating Dynamics

Surveys on the use of agency credit ratings reveal that some investors believe that credit‐rating agencies are relatively slow in adjusting their ratings. A well‐accepted explanation for this perception on rating timeliness is the through‐the‐cycle methodology that agencies use. Through‐the‐cycle ratings are intended to measure default risk over long investment horizons and to respond only to changes in the permanent component of credit quality. A second aspect of the through‐the‐cycle methodology is the prudent migration policy. In a benchmark study with a financial ratio‐based credit‐scoring models – an agency‐rating prediction model and default‐prediction models with various time horizons – we confirm the exclusive focus of agencies on the permanent component of credit quality and we model and quantify the agencies' prudent migration policy. A rating migration is triggered only when the rating predicted by the agency‐rating prediction model differs by at least a threshold level of 1.8 notch steps from the actual agency rating. If triggered, ratings are only partly adjusted by 70 per cent at the downside and 60 per cent at the upside. From a 1‐year point‐in‐time perspective, weighting temporary fluctuations in credit quality, the through‐the‐cycle methodology lowers the rating‐migration probability by a factor of 3.5. Both aspects of the through‐the‐cycle methodology contribute equally to this factor. The partial adjustment of ratings lowers the rating‐reversal probabilities on short term and introduces rating drift, the known serial correlation in agency‐rating migrations.     

Exploring the mismatch between credit ratings and loss-given-default: A credit risk approach

It is commonly observed that high grade loans with better ratings are often associated with low recoveries if they default (i.e. with relatively high loss-given-default (LGD)). To address the mismatch problem, this paper proposes a credit risk approach by minimizing LGD for higher rated loans as a risk-rating matching standard in the sense that the decreasing LGD from creditors’ perspective is associated with higher credit rating for the borrower. This standard forces customers’ credit rating of each grade to be optimally determined in correspondence to its LGD, which means the LGD of high grade loans tends to be low. The approach is then tested using three credit datasets from China, i.e. credit data from 2044 farmers, 2157 small private businesses and 3111 SMEs. The empirical results show that the proposed approach indeed guides the way to solve the mismatch phenomenon between credit ratings and LGDs in the existing credit rating literature. By optimally determining credit ratings, the findings derived from this paper help provide a valuable reference for bankers, and bond investors to manage their credit risk.     

Feedback effects between credit ratings and financial markets

Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

居民对中、外资金融机构的比较评价研究——来自中国九个城市的证据

Between domestic financial institutions and foreign or joint venture ones in China, which ones do Chinese people give better assessment to? And what factors affect those comparative assessments? With a household survey in nine cities in China in 2006, we find that China’s domestic financial institutions are considered better than foreign or joint venture ones in terms of financial products, communication with investors, security and prudence, operation standardization and service attitudes. When taken into account the endogeneity of people’s trust on government regulation agencies, empirical results show that people’s more attention to returns or the more trust on government regulation agencies leads to their better assessments on domestic financial institutions than foreign or joint venture ones. The policy implications are: Chinese governments have to take measures to improve residents’ trust in governmental regulation and create a fair competition environment for domestic and foreign financial institutions in China. Domestic and foreign financial institutions make efforts to develop a higher rate-of-return and attractive financial products to service more customers.     

Impact of sovereign rating changes on stock market co-movements: the case of Latin America

We aim to determine if long-term foreign currency sovereign rating assessments (from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) for the advanced emerging Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Chile) have any significant effect on the correlation between their stock market returns in the last decade. With that purpose in mind, we obtain the time-varying correlation by cDCC modeling using ARX-APARCH filtered returns. The analysis shows that the rating changes do not have a significant effect on the correlations in general. After testing for robustness, we reveal that an upgrade to an investment grade level for a country is more likely to positively diversify it from others in the region instead of creating a common positive regional investment environment. Results have important implications for investors and policymakers.     

Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?

The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks' assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks' risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
(J.E.L.: E53, G21, G33)     

Patterns of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Decisions

This paper examines the pattern of settlements, investor wins and state wins in investor-state dispute settlement cases, focusing on the impact of arbitration rules, the resources and experience of the litigants, the type of treaty breach under investigation, and the pattern of state intervention. Logistic regression results show that settlements are more likely when investors do not disclose their allegations publicly, when the host state has been involved in a greater number of past cases, and when the respondent state has a higher control-of-corruption rating. Panel awards to investors are more likely in cases of alleged direct expropriation and less likely for indirect expropriation. Panel decisions favoring the state increase with higher per capita income and rule-of-law ratings.     

Time to change. Rating changes and policy implications

The recent financial crisis manifested the criticism to rating agencies of being slow in adjusting their rating to current conditions. This paper examines the timeliness of rating changes and identifies factors which result in ‘stickiness’ of rating actions. Knowledge of the stickiness of rating agencies is a first step in designing a more appropriate rating system. Stickiness is characterized by not adjusting the rating even when a market-based estimate of default probability changes. Extending an econometric model of friction the migration policy is modelled in terms of thresholds which have to be crossed by default probability estimates before an up- or downgrade occurs. Default probability estimates have to change by two notches before the rating agency reacts. The timeliness differs across the rating spectrum and over the years. During periods with high defaults and for low credit quality firms agencies tend to rate more timely.     

Investment banks' stock ratings,call warrant issuance,and responses from heterogeneous investors: Evidence from Taiwan

We investigate the responses of the different types of investors on stock rating change announcements made by investment banks around call warrant issuances in Taiwan. The unique characteristics of the Taiwan warrants market allow investment banks to make stock rating change announcements around call warrant issuances for the same stocks they rate. In Taiwan, investment banks are also dealers of call warrants, and thus, the profit and loss results from their warrant business are potentially in conflict-of-interest for their stock ratings. Another feature of the Taiwan stock market allows us to disentangle the types of investors initiating the stock trades. We identify three types of investors: institutional investors, experienced retail investors, and ordinary retail investors. Our findings suggest that institutional investors are able to “see-through” the conflict-of-interest in investment banks; experienced investors are able to partially “see-through” the conflict-of-interest, and ordinary retail investors are unable to “see-through” the conflict-of-interest of investment banks.     

我国发审方式改革的制度分析:一个研究框架

我国新股发行问题的深层次原因是行政监管力度较弱,法律风险水平较低,而核准制并不是主要原因。因此,我国发审方式改革的关键不是从核准制转变为注册制,而是完善相应的制度安排,有效地约束发行人或上市公司及其聘请的中介机构的机会主义行为,进而保护投资者利益。包括加强对发行人及其中介机构的行政监管;健全民事赔偿法律制度,提高发行人及其中介机构的法律风险;完善发行上市相关配套制度,比如提高审核透明度、完善退市制度等。     

Forecasting Turkey’s Credit Ratings with Multivariate Grey Model and Grey Relational Analysis

The concept of credit rating rooted back to mid-nineteenth century has become one of the most important elements in the world economy together with the globalization period gradually accelerating in the last two decades and increasing the interaction and sensitivity in the international markets. With the globalization and deepening in the financial markets; the effect, reliability and stability of knowledge of the actors who are in charge for directing the global capital flows have quite a big importance in terms of the decisions to be made in the future. In this process, credit rating agencies eliminating the information asymmetry between the countries and institutions who want to create financial resource by borrowing from the savings owners and foreign institutions. Credit ratings determined by the mentioned organizations are accepted as an indicator of the countries to meet the financial obligations in other words their creditworthiness. For Turkey’s economy having a structure with a high level of external financing needs in terms of accelerating the growth and development process, it is inevitable to have an international creditworthiness increasing long-term investment tendency meeting foreign capitals’ trust search. In this study, firstly the determinants of the credit ratings given by credit rating agencies are determined and then forecasting Turkey’s future credit ratings by combining them with multivariate grey model and grey relational analysis are performed.

     

Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.     

What is the optimal design for lottery-linked savings programmes?

In this article, we determine the optimal design of lottery-linked savings (LLS) programmes. LLS vehicles, such as lottery bonds, are financial instruments that preserve depositors’ principal but provide randomized variable returns to these depositors through periodic lottery drawings, in lieu of the regular coupon payments traditionally received by bondholders. This type of asset is very popular in Europe. We note that the framing of LLS instruments is linked to their popularity, and we attempt to elucidate that link and thereby determine the optimal structure of payments for LLS programmes. Our goal is to frame LLS programmes in a manner that both maximizes their investors’ satisfaction and preserves their ability to serve as inexpensive sources of capital for their issuers. We demonstrate that the optimal pay-off structure is characterized by a high level of skewness, as investors are willing to accept a decrease in the small and medium prizes of the lottery in exchange for an increase in the grand prize. Thus, to attract a maximum number of depositors, the issuers of LLS programmes should prioritize the jackpot size relative to the other lottery pay-offs and insist on high skewness for the lottery pay-offs relating to the LLS assets.     

The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies: Evidence from the East Asian Crisis

We demonstrate that credit rating agencies aggravated the East Asian crisis. In fact, having failed to predict the emergence of the crisis, rating agencies became excessively conservative. They downgraded East Asian crisis countries more than the worsening in these countries' economic fundamentals would justify. This unduly exacerbated, for these countries, the cost of borrowing abroad and caused the supply of international capital to them to evaporate. In turn, lower than deserved ratings contributed – at least for some time – to amplify the East Asian crisis. Although this goes beyond the scope of our paper, we also propose an endogenous rationale for rating agencies to become excessively conservative after having made blatant errors in predicting the East Asian crisis. Specifically, rating agencies would have an incentive to become more conservative, so as to recover from the damage these errors caused to them and to rebuild their own reputation.     

The value relevance of brand valuation

The reports published by independent parties are often used to provide an estimation of brands due to the lack of literature and best practices regarding which brand valuation method is more value relevant and reliable than another. Over the last several years, brand valuation debate is growing in importance because of the need to provide a value of intangibles for different purposes. The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, we aim to understand whether brand valuation related to listed companies provided by three independent agencies is value relevant and therefore whether these brand valuations are taken into consideration by investors in their decision-making process. Second, we assess which of the three methods reflects the stock markets in a better way. We analyse a sample of 71 brands valuated by Interbrand, Brand Finance and BrandZ from 2013 to 2015. The results show that brand valuation provided by the independent agencies is value relevant; in addition, they reveal that the Brand Finance method, based on the royalty relief approach, is more value relevant than the others. This study contributes to the extant literature on value relevance by providing evidence on the impact of stock prices of brand agencies’ valuation.     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

IPO盈余"过度包装"的治理机制设计

中国A股上市公司IPO"过度包装"现象普遍存在,一个根本原因是当IPO公司的价值被高估时,对IPO公司的高定价行为缺乏有效的治理机制.本文在中国特定的环境下,分析了初始公司面临发股收益、持股收益与控制权收益组合时,IPO公司价值被高估没有约束机制以及引入约束时对于公司股票发行定价决策的影响.本文通过设计一个发股收益与控制权收益不可兼得的治理机制,可以把IPO盈余"过度包装"的融资行为内生化.