Estimation of Implicit Bankruptcy Costs

This paper presents a new methodology, quasilinear estimation, for efficiently estimating economic variables reflected in the prices of corporate securities. For example, ex ante bankruptcy costs are not directly observable, however, if these costs are sufficiently large, then current security prices are affected and bankruptcy costs can be indirectly measured. When bankruptcy costs and other relevant parameters are known, there are many numerical solution techniques that can be used to determine security prices. One technique, the method of lines, is compatible with quasilinear estimation, which has been employed extensively in the physical sciences for the estimation of coefficients in differential equation models. We demonstrate that quasilinear estimation is a potentially reliable and efficient technique for the estimation of corporate bankruptcy costs and the asset variance from security prices.     

An Early Warning System of Financial Distress Using Multinomial Logit Models and a Bootstrapping Approach

This study adopts multinomial logit models to separately measure the extent to which financial ratios and corporate governance signal the likelihood of "slight distress events" and "reorganization and bankruptcy." The results show that corporate governance variables are closely related to the occurrence of "slight distress events." The estimated misclassification costs of the 1,000 resamples generated through bootstrapping procedures are statistically lower for a model that makes use of corporate governance (CG model) than one without corporate governance (non-CG model) at all cutoff points in 2009, and cutoff points from 0.11 to 0.27 in 2008. Since corporate governance is incrementally useful in predicting financial distress, the CG model's predictive ability improves as two corporate governance factors are considered: ownership ratio of insiders and pledge-ownership ratio of insiders.     

Cash-flow shortage as an endogenous bankruptcy reason

This paper develops a simple model for a leveraged firm and endogenizes the firm’s bankruptcy point by assuming that equity issuance is costly. Equity-issuance costs reflect the difficulties in issuing new equity for firms that are close to financial distress. The resulting model captures cash-flow shortage as a reason to go bankrupt, though the equity value is positive. I analyze the optimal bankruptcy point as well as corporate bond prices and yield spreads for various levels of equity-issuance costs in order to study the impact of different liquidity constraints. Finally, I discuss the consequences on optimal capital structure.     

OPTIMUM CORPORATE LEVERAGE WITH RISKY DEBT: A DEMAND APPROACH

Traditional models of corporate interior optimum leverage rely on institutional schemes such as taxes, bankruptcy, and agency costs. Theories of leverage indifference in the presence of risky debt depend on various features of perfect and complete markets and on the assumption that all investors hold a uniform portfolio. In the model developed here, corporate interior optimum leverage is obtained as a result of a fundamental risk-return trade-off for investors who hold nonuniform portfolios of risky equity and debt claims in the absence of market mechanisms, forcing leverage indifference. The dynamic optimization solution accommodates bankruptcy costs and specialized institutional factors but does not rely on their presence.     

TAXATION,BANKRUPTCY COSTS,AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A MULTI-PERIOD CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

In this paper, a multi-period version of the CAPM is used to establish conditions for an optimal capital structure in the presence of a tax on corporate earnings, and bankruptcy costs. It is shown that the optimal point is reached when the marginal tax advantage arising from an increase in debt, is equal to the marginal increase in expected bankruptcy penalties.     

Optimization of corporate capital structure A probabilistic Bayesian approach

This article develops a probabilistic approach to the problem of optimization of corporate capital structure. The approach enables quantitative assessment of optimal Debt to Equity ratio and includes calculation of probability of corporate bankruptcy in the future as a function of the time interval remaining until the bankruptcy. The probability is then used in a modified formula of discount share valuation to calculate the (share) value of a corporation that can become bankrupt at some future moment. Assessing the corporate (share) value in dependence on Debt/Equity ratio (which affects both corporate returns and probabilities of bankruptcy), one can find optimal value of the ratio which maximizes the share value. The optimal Debt/Equity ratio appears to be dependent on current corporate profitability, liquidity, and other fundamental factors. Factors of macroeconomic environment also appear to be relevant.     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited

Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 50 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial "pecking order" in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required.
In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other "contracting") costs, and information costs all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (the levels of debt and equity in relation to the target) and flows (or which security to issue at a particular time).     

The Canadian Keiretsu

This article describes the Canadian keiretsu , in which a main Chartered Bank dominates an interlocking group of corporate clients, investment dealers, trust companies, and professional advisors. Such a network facilitates information-sharing and monitoring among group members, while also reducing the agency costs of banker misbehavior. Most major Canadian firms are members of a keiretsu , and stock ownership of Canadian corporations is far more concentrated than ownership of U.S. companies.
Given their many similarities of history, law, and geography, Canada and the United States should have ended up with similar corporate ownership and governance structures. But they did not, and the difference was Canada's less restrictive banking and bankruptcy laws, which in turn can be traced to Canada's distinctly non-populist historical experience.
The Canadian keiretsu arose primarily for two reasons: (1) the larger concentration of commercial banking (the six largest Canadian banks today account for 98% of the industry's assets) allowed by Canadian law; and (2) the greater powers of Canadian secured lenders in the event of default. Unlike a U.S. Chapter 11 filing, in a Canadian bankruptcy the lender's right to assume control of the assets was not stayed until quite recently. And, even with the recent change in Canadian bankruptcy law, Canadian secured lenders have much stronger protection of their claims in bankruptcy than their U.S. counterparts in Chapter 11.     

PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY A RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to extend the risk management paradigm to include the decision by individuals to use the Federal Bankruptcy Act to manage personal financial risks. Broadening risk management to include personal bankruptcy is consistent with the view that risk management is no longer an interdisciplinary discipline that has a singular focus on managing corporate pure risks.     

THE DEBT MATURITY CHOICE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

In this paper I develop and test three nonmutually exclusive hypotheses about the determinants of corporations' debt maturity choices using a sample of corporate bonds issued between 1982 and 1986. The empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that firms use bond maturity to facilitate monitoring by outsiders (the monitoring hypothesis) and weakly supports the hypothesis that firms with high-quality projects use bond maturity to signal project quality (the signaling hypothesis). The evidence does not support the hypothesis that firms use bond maturity to achieve an optimal trade-off between interest tax shields and bankruptcy costs (the tax/bankruptcy cost hypothesis).     

破产企业治理结构与破产会计信息质量监控

本文以新破产法 (草案) 的基本框架为依托, 将破产企业分为破产和解企业、破产重整企业和破产清算企业三类, 探讨了不同类型破产企业的治理结构及其会计信息的特点, 提出了明确破产会计信息质量的监控目标、建立全面的破产会计制度规范、构建完整的破产会计信息质量监控体系、提高破产相关人员的综合素质等监控破产会计信息质量的基本思路。     

Impaired bank health and default risk

Empirical studies in corporate finance have long been focused on the role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress. The environment and events in Japan provide a “natural experiment” that allows such empirical studies. The number of bankruptcies steadily increased throughout the 1990s, and peaked in 2000. During this period, Japan's banking sector, in contrast, faced considerable problems regarding the disposal of their bad loans. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how various measures of bank health and how defaults of major trading partners affected the probability of bankruptcy among medium-size firms in Japan. Using probit models, we examine the causes of bankruptcy for unlisted Japanese companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We find that several measures of bank-specific financial health have had significant impacts on a borrower's probability of bankruptcy, even when observable characteristics relating to these borrower's financial variables are controlled. In particular, a close bank–firm relationship—which usually reduces the probability of bankruptcy—exacerbates the impacts of a financial crisis, which substantially damages other bank health measures as well.     

Comparing the performance of market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models

Recently developed corporate bankruptcy prediction models adopt a contingent claims valuation approach. However, despite their theoretical appeal, tests of their performance compared with traditional simple accounting-ratio-based approaches are limited in the literature. We find the two approaches capture different aspects of bankruptcy risk, and while there is little difference in their predictive ability in the UK, the z-score approach leads to significantly greater bank profitability in conditions of differential decision error costs and competitive pricing regime.     

A comprehensive structural model for defaultable fixed-income bonds

An exact valuation formula for defaultable corporate coupon bonds is proved. The model incorporates discrete coupons, bankruptcy costs, taxes and the market risk generated by a stochastic risk-free structure. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we generalise previous pricing models for corporate bonds; second, we provide a comprehensive formula in order to properly disentangle the contribution of several risk factors to credit spreads.     

A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question

In this paper, empirical evidence with respect to both the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy is assessed. This should be of interest for three related reasons. First, there is a need to provide further evidence as to the size of bankruptcy costs. Second, for the first time a proxy methodology for measuring indirect costs of bankruptcy is presented and actually measured. Third, a simple format for measuring the present value of expected bankruptcy costs is compared with the present value of expected tax benefits from interest payments on leverage. This comparison has important implications for the continuing debate as to whether or not an optimum capital structure exists for corporations.     

Proposals to Establish a Partnership Bankruptcy Regime in China: With Lessons from the UK and USA

Following in the steps of the USA and UK, China introduced partnerships with limited liability in 2006, the same year that a market‐oriented bankruptcy statute was enacted. Although the bankruptcy statute enshrines basic elements of modern bankruptcy law, it fails to stipulate specific rules for partnership bankruptcy. As partnership with limited liability acquires increasing importance, especially limited partnerships as a popular form of private equity firms, a partnership bankruptcy regime becomes indispensable. This article considers the experience of the UK and USA in order to make proposals to establish a partnership bankruptcy regime in China. Although partnership bankruptcy law can be formulated by analogy to corporate bankruptcy law, special considerations must be given to the characteristics of partnership such as unlimited liability and lack of separation of management from ownership. Further, as partnership bankruptcy may lead to partner bankruptcy and vice versa, conflicts between partnership creditors and partners' personal creditors must also be considered. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Since the formulation of the M & M irrelevance propositions 40 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes current firm value. Some finance scholars have followed M & M by arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the increased probability and costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M & M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other “contracting”) costs, and information costs (the main factor in the pecking order theory) all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much if not most of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (leverage ratios) and flows (specific choices between debt and equity). Even if companies have target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation from those targets—one that will depend on the transactions and information costs associated with adjusting back to the target relative to the costs of deviating from the target. As the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the target.     

Low‐income,low‐asset debtors in the U.S. bankruptcy system

The United States' bankruptcy system faces a major problem: many consumers are too poor to file for bankruptcy, usually because they cannot afford the necessary attorney fees. Some consumers appear to spend months trying to save the funds to pay their attorneys, thus either delaying their bankruptcies or foregoing bankruptcy altogether when they fail to save enough money. Others file for repayment bankruptcy in order to pay attorney fees during the case, when liquidation bankruptcy is usually a better fit for consumers with low incomes and low asset levels. The most recent comprehensive bankruptcy reform, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), exacerbated these problems by implementing additional procedural requirements that resulted in attorneys raising their fees. These problems have led to calls for administrative bankruptcy, especially for low‐income, low‐asset (LILA)/no‐income, no‐asset (NINA) debtors. Administrative bankruptcy would make bankruptcy more accessible by lowering access costs, for example, by eliminating the need for consumers to hire attorneys. Administrative programs in the United States, however, have a history of long‐term decline, especially when these programs serve low‐income people. It has become a cliché that poor people's programs become poor programs. A better solution would be to eliminate the procedural requirements imposed by BAPCPA and simplify the decision consumers must make about which type of bankruptcy to use.