Creditor rights and debt allocation within multinationals

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire-building tendencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.     

Reorganization in bankruptcy and the issue of strategic risk

The decision by creditors to force the firm into bankruptcy, where bankruptcy includes reorganization, is shown to involve the valuation of a lottery over (cooperative) games rather than a lottery over specific monetary outcomes. In the absence of assumptions about strategic (negotiating) risk, the value of creditor claims is seen to be ambiguous. This paper extends Van Horne's model of the optimal initiation of bankruptcy proceedings to include the reorganization option and strategic risk. A modified decision rule is obtained to determine the optimal solution.     

Nondiscriminating Foreclosure and Voluntary Liquidating Costs

Since liquidation and bankruptcy are costly, researchers havetried to find out why the claimants of a troubled firm do notwork out a deal to avoid these costs. In this article we showthat if a creditor has to deal with multiple borrowers who mightdefault, it may be optimal for the creditor to randomly rejectrequests for a loan workout. We further demonstrate that theoptimal acceptance rate used by a creditor is positively relatedto the liquidating cost and negatively related to the defaultbenefit. Our model is particularly relevant when analyzing thedefault decisions of mortgage borrowers and small business owners.     

Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation

This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs. In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral. We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law, where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law. We also find that if the liquidation costs are high, softer bankruptcy law is preferred.     

Credit risk analysis with creditor’s option to extend maturities

We present a Merton (J Finance, 1974)-type structural model of credit risk in which the borrower firm refinances its debt, there is cost for bankruptcy, and the creditor has an option to extend the date of maturity of debt if the firm defaults. We show that a solution exists in such a model and in that solution the creditor has incentive to extend maturity to avoid bankruptcy cost. We solve the model numerically and argue that such maturity extension option for the creditor can have substantial impact on the debt and stock values of the firm.     

Creditor financing and overbidding in bankruptcy auctions: Theory and tests

We present unique empirical tests for auction overbidding using data from Sweden's auction bankruptcy system. The main creditor (a bank) can neither bid in the auction nor refuse to sell in order to support a minimum price. However, we argue that the bank may increase its expected revenue by financing a bidder in return for a joint bid strategy, and we show that the optimal coalition bid exceeds the bidder's private valuation (overbidding) by an amount that is increasing in the bank's ex ante debt impairment. We find that bank–bidder financing arrangements are common, and our cross-sectional regressions show that winning bids are increasing in the bank-debt impairment as predicted. While, in theory, overbidding may result in the coalition winning against a more efficient rival bidder, our evidence on post-bankruptcy operating performance fails to support such allocative inefficiency effects. We also find that restructurings by bank-financed bidders are relatively risky as they have greater bankruptcy refiling rates, irrespective of the coalition's overbidding incentive.     

Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking

We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy affect corporate investment choice by reducing corporate risk-taking. In cross-country analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induce greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying acquisitions that are value-reducing, to acquire targets whose assets have high recovery value in default, and to lower cash-flow risk. Also, corporate leverage declines when creditor rights are stronger. These relations are usually strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization and are also observed over time following changes in creditor rights. Our results thus identify a potentially adverse consequence of strong creditor rights.     

The Brazilian bankruptcy law experience

In early 2005, the Brazilian Congress approved a new bankruptcy law. The new legislation increased creditor protection and improved the efficiency of the bankruptcy system. This paper evaluates the empirical consequences of a bankruptcy reform on a poorly developed credit market. Using data from Brazilian and non-Brazilian firms, we estimated, using two different models, the effect of the bankruptcy reform on contractual and non-contractual debt variables. In general, both models yielded similar results. Concerning contractual debt variables, we found a significant increase in the total amount and the long-term debt and a reduction in the cost of debt. For the non-contractual debt variable, we found no effect in the loans’ ownership structure.     

The impact of delay: Evidence from formal out-of-court restructuring

Different types of bankruptcy restructuring procedures are used in most legal systems to decide the fate of businesses facing financial hardship. We study how bargaining failures in an under-researched type of restructuring procedure, a formal out-of-the court procedure impacts the economic performance of participating firms. Croatia introduced a “pre-bankruptcy settlement” (PBS) process in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. A novel dataset provides us with annual financial statements for both sides of more than 180,000 debtor–creditor pairs, enabling us to address selection into failed negotiations by matching a rich set of creditor and debtor characteristics. Failures to settle at the PBS stage due to idiosyncratic bargaining problems, which effectively delay entry into the standard bankruptcy procedure, lead to a lower rate of survival among debtors as well as reduced employment, revenue, and profits. We are the first study to track how bargaining failures diffuse through the network of creditors, finding a significant negative effect on small creditors, but not others. Our results highlight the impact of delay and the importance of structuring bankruptcy procedures, to rapidly resolve uncertainty about firms’ future prospects.     

Trading activity around chapter 11 filing

This paper uses institutional ownership data and order flow information to document and explain equity trading patterns prior to chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.We provide a model that predicts trading activity prior to filing which results from a difference of opinion amongst different types of investors about whether the firm should be liquidated. We then test trading data to show that trading activity is elevated around chapter 11 filing as the model predicts. We show how institutional holdings change around filing and that chapter 7 firms appear relatively more attractive to institutional investors than emerging firms around filing.     

Variable selection and corporate bankruptcy forecasts

We investigate the relative importance of various bankruptcy predictors commonly used in the existing literature by applying a variable selection technique, the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), to a comprehensive bankruptcy database. Over the 1980–2009 period, LASSO admits the majority of Campbell et al. (2008) predictive variables into the bankruptcy forecast model. Interestingly, by contrast with recent studies, some financial ratios constructed from only accounting data also contain significant incremental information about future default risk, and their importance relative to that of market-based variables in bankruptcy forecasts increases with prediction horizons. Moreover, LASSO-selected variables have superior out-of-sample predictive power and outperform (1) those advocated by Campbell et al. (2008) and (2) the distance to default from Merton’s (1974) structural model.     

Accounting-based versus market-based cross-sectional models of CDS spreads

Models of financial distress rely primarily on accounting-based information (e.g. [Altman, E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23, 589–609; Ohlson, J., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 19, 109–131]) or market-based information (e.g. [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449–470]). In this paper, we provide evidence on the relative performance of these two classes of models. Using a sample of 2860 quarterly CDS spreads we find that a model of distress using accounting metrics performs comparably to market-based structural models of default. Moreover, a model using both sources of information performs better than either of the two models. Overall, our results suggest that both sources of information (accounting- and market-based) are complementary in pricing distress.     

Assessing the Probability of Bankruptcy

We assess whether two popular accounting-based measures, Altmans (1968) Z-Score and Ohlsons (1980) O-Score, effectively summarize publicly-available information about the probability of bankruptcy. We compare the relative information content of these Scores to a market-based measure of the probability of bankruptcy that we develop based on the Black–Scholes–Merton option-pricing model, BSM-Prob. Our tests show that BSM-Prob provides significantly more information than either of the two accounting-based measures. This finding is robust to various modifications of Z-Score and O-Score, including updating the coefficients, making industry adjustments, and decomposing them into their lagged levels and changes. We recommend that researchers use BSM-Prob instead of Z-Score and O-Score in their studies and provide the SAS code to calculate BSM-Prob.     

Who survives? A cross-country comparison

How capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate governance vary across countries has been the focus of recent studies, but how resources are reallocated in response to poor performance has not received as much attention. This paper argues that the market for corporate control and the formal bankruptcy/liquidation processes of a country are two key mechanisms through which corporate assets are reallocated. Ideally, an economy would only allow the best users of economic resources to retain the right to use those assets and any sub-optimal use would result in either a take-over by a more proficient owner or an asset sale. We present evidence that equity market delistings occur more frequently in countries with strong shareholder rights. Furthermore, both strong creditor and shareholder rights increase the use of bankruptcy, relative to acquisitions, as a mechanism to resolve financial distress. We also present some evidence that these mechanisms are not as effective in Japan.     

Firms’ performance under different bankruptcy systems: a Europe–USA empirical analysis

This study empirically analyses the effect that the bankruptcy law has on firms’ performance based on its financial situation. To do this, we considered the different types of efficiency and their influence on firms’ value. The study was carried out for Germany, Spain, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. We applied System‐GMM estimation to dynamic panel data. The main results show that under creditor‐oriented systems, there is a decrease in the value of both financially distressed firms and those filing for bankruptcy.     

Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France,Germany, and the U.K.

Using a sample of small firms that defaulted on their bank debt in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, we find that large differences in creditors' rights across countries lead banks to adjust their lending and reorganization practices to mitigate costly aspects of bankruptcy law. In particular, French banks respond to a creditor‐unfriendly code by requiring more collateral than lenders elsewhere, and by relying on collateral forms that minimize the statutory dilution of their claims in bankruptcy. Despite such adjustments, bank recovery rates in default remain sharply different across the three countries, reflecting very different levels of creditor protection.     

Asset volatility

We examine whether fundamental measures of volatility are incremental to market-based measures of volatility in (i) predicting bankruptcies (out of sample), (ii) explaining cross-sectional variation in credit spreads, and (iii) explaining future credit excess returns. Our fundamental measures of volatility include (i) historical volatility in profitability, margins, turnover, operating income growth, and sales growth; (ii) dispersion in analyst forecasts of future earnings; and (iii) quantile regression forecasts of the interquartile range of the distribution of profitability. We find robust evidence that these fundamental measures of volatility improve out-of-sample forecasts of bankruptcy and help explain cross-sectional variation in credit spreads. This suggests that an analysis of credit risk can be enhanced with a detailed analysis of fundamental information. As a test case of the benefit of volatility forecasting, we document an improved ability to forecast future credit excess returns, particularly when using fundamental measures of volatility.     

Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.     

Business environment and the incorporation decision

Using firm-level data from 52 countries we investigate how a country’s institutions and business environment affect firm’s organizational choices and what impact the organizational form has on access to finance and growth. We find that businesses are more likely to choose the corporate form in countries with developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems, strong shareholder and creditor rights, low regulatory burdens and corporate taxes and efficient bankruptcy processes. Corporations report fewer financing, legal and regulatory obstacles than unincorporated firms and this advantage is greater in countries with more developed institutions and favourable business environments. We do find some evidence of higher growth of incorporated businesses in countries with good financial and legal institutions.     

A hybrid bankruptcy prediction model with dynamic loadings on accounting-ratio-based and market-based information: A binary quantile regression approach

While using the binary quantile regression (BQR) model, we establish a hybrid bankruptcy prediction model with dynamic loadings for both the accounting-ratio-based and market-based information. Using the proposed model, we conduct an empirical study on a dataset comprising of default events during the period from 1996 to 2006. In this study, those firms experienced bankruptcy/liquidation events as defined by the Compustat database are classified as “defaulted” firms, whereas all other firms listed in the Fortune 500 with over a B-rating during the same time period are identified as “survived” firms. The empirical findings of this study are consistent with the following notions. The distance-to-default (DD) variable derived from the market-based model is statistically significant in explaining the observed default events, particularly of those firms with relatively poor credit quality (i.e., high credit risk). Conversely, the z-score obtained with the accounting-ratio-based approach is statistically significant in predicting bankruptcies of firms of relatively good credit quality (i.e., low credit risk). In-sample and out-of-sample bankruptcy prediction tests demonstrated the superior performance of utilizing dynamic loadings rather than constant loadings derived by the conventional logit model.