Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests

We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of the discount-attribution test to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. (The discount-attribution test is a variant of the price-cost test, where the discount is attributed only to the share of total demand that is regarded as effectively contestable.) In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses market-share discounts to boost the demand for its own products. In this framework, we show that the attribution test is misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-cost tests to loyalty discount cases.     

On the anti-competitive effects of quantity discounts

We analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that for a sizeable set of parameter values, quantity discounts harm the smaller firm and reduce consumers' surplus. They can even decrease social welfare, i.e. the sum of producers' and consumers' surpluses. However, the circumstances in which quantity discounts may decrease social welfare are limited and difficult to identify in practice.     

An antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts

Consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market. Bundled loyalty discounts, in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist, have ambiguous welfare effects. Such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing. In some settings, they act as tie-in sales. Existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus. We apply a new test to an illustrative example based on SmithKline that assumes the “tied” market has homogeneous goods. If the tied market is characterized by Hotelling competition, bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price. In numerical examples, we find that this can deter entry or induce exit.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

Asymmetry in capacity and the adoption of all-units discounts

In many abuse of dominance antitrust cases, the dominant firm adopts pricing schemes involving all-units discounts, whereas its smaller competitors often use simple linear pricing. We provide a game-theoretic justification for the observed asymmetry in pricing practices by studying a model in which a firm with full capacity faces a capacity-constrained rival. The asymmetry in capacity between the firms, which gives rise to the captive market, allows the dominant firm to take advantage of the quantity commitment through all-units discounts while the capacity-constrained rival is induced to offer simple linear pricing.     

Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards,discounts and surcharges

The proliferation of new payment methods on the Internet rekindles the old and unsettled debate about merchants’ incentive and ability to differentiate price according to payment choice. This paper develops an imperfect-information framework for the analysis of platform and social regulation of card surcharging and cash discounting. It makes three main contributions. First, it identifies the conditions under which concerns about missed sales induce merchants to perceive that they must take the card. Second, it derives a set of predictions about cash discounts, card surcharges and platform fees that shed light on existing evidence. Finally, it shows that the optimal regulation of surcharging is related to public policy toward merchant fees and substantially differs from current practice.     

Top-floor discounts in residential buildings: Evidence from South Korea

This study assesses the phenomenon of resale price discounts for top-floor units of residential buildings, or “top-floor discounts.” Using 1.9 million resale transactions of apartment units from South Korea, we find that top-floor discounts range from 1.3% to 8.3% of resale prices. We hypothesize that top-floor discounts exist because of larger heating/cooling costs for these units relative to those on lower levels, resulting from relatively more extreme variation in indoor temperatures unique to top-floor apartment units. Using a household-level survey data on energy consumption and exploiting variations in weather conditions and roof material across time and regions throughout South Korea, we provide evidence in support of our hypothesis.     

Analysis of the newsboy problem with fuzzy demands and incremental discounts

This paper proposes an analysis method for the single-period (newsboy) inventory problem with fuzzy demands and incremental quantity discounts. In fuzzy environments, the availability of the quantity discount makes the analysis of the associated model more complex. The proposed analysis method is based on ranking fuzzy number and optimization theory. By applying the Yager ranking method, the fuzzy total cost functions with different unit purchasing costs are transformed into convex piecewise nonlinear functions. To effectively and efficiently find the optimal inventory policy, the proofs of two properties regarding the relative position between the price break and minimums of these nonlinear functions are proposed. The closed-form solutions to the optimal order quantities are also derived. Four cases of a numerical example are solved to demonstrate the validity of the proposed analysis method. It is clear that the proposed methodology is applicable to further cases with different types of quantity discounts and other more complicated cases. More importantly, managerial implications are also provided for decision-makers’ references.     

A multi-item supply chain with credit periods and weight freight cost discounts

It is possible to realize considerable savings by aggregating the replenishment of a variety of items in a multi-item supply chain. This joint multi-item replenishment policy has already been widely applied in a variety of industries. This type of policy may make it possible for the retailer to take advantage of transport economies of scale by the utilization of freight discounts for greater weight. In addition, a supplier will often extend forward financing to a retailer. In this paper, a multi-item supply chain with a credit period and weight freight cost discounts is considered. The retailer bears the freight costs, but the freight carrier provides freight-transport discounts that are positively related to the weight of the cargo transported. From both the individual and the channel perspectives, we deal with the dual problems of determining the ideal supplier credit period, and of the best way for the retailer to make multi-item replenishment and pricing decisions, while still maximizing profits. We outline the optimal properties and develop algorithms for solving the problems described, as well as discuss the impact of the freight cost discounts, the inventory holding cost, and the interest rate on the behavior of both parties.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.     

Streamlining inventory flows with time discounts to improve the profits of a decentralized supply chain

We consider a decentralized supply chain, whereby a supplier sells a product to a group of independent buyers, and develop a strategy for the supplier to offer an all-units price discount or cash rebate for orders that are synchronized with its replenishments. As synchronized orders can be met with inventory directly from receiving to shipping without warehousing, the proposed strategy streamlines system inventory flows to minimize inventory and, hence, the related costs. On the other hand, by increasing the replenishment interval of the supplier, the proposed strategy is able to induce buyers to order in large quantities and hence achieve the objectives of quantity discounts. We show that the proposed strategy can achieve nearly optimal (minimum) system cost, and is much more effective than the existing coordination strategies for decentralized supply chains in the literature.