Defending Home against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms*

We consider exclusive contracts a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, because of the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an anticompetitive exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.     

Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage

This article investigates the incentives of agents working with buyers (buying agents) under the fixed percentage commission system and the implications on housing market outcomes. Our model shows that the absence of a binding contract creates a risk of losing clients for buying agents, which helps mitigate the conflict of interest between buying agents and their clients. Both the buying agent's prediction accuracy regarding their client's reservation prices and the level of tolerance given by the buyer to the buying agent affect the binding force. Results from simulations and empirical analyses using house transactions in Canada support our model predictions.     

Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions

This paper considers a hidden action agency problem where the principal has a single source of hidden information concerning the agent's utility, the agent's effort productivity, or the agent's cost of effort. We examine whether the principal should precommit to disclosing these different single sources of information to the agent. If the optimal contract is invariant over the hidden information and, thus, the disclosure rules (constant elasticity case), such disclosure increases the agent's utility, it can raise or lower profit and total surplus depending on the source of hidden information, and non-disclosure can be optimal if disclosure affects the agent's motivation. If the contract varies with the hidden information and, thus, disclosure rule, disclosure or non-disclosure can be optimal depending on whether the party's payoff is convex or concave in the information variable, respectively.     

The double‐edged effect of knowledge acquisition: How contracts safeguard pre‐existing resources

Research summary : Acquiring knowledge on a partner's pre‐existing resources plays an important yet ambiguous role in collaborative relationships. We formally model how contracts trade off productive and destructive uses of knowledge in a buyer‐supplier relationship. We show that, when the buyer's pre‐existing resources are vulnerable to the revelation of sensitive knowledge, the supplier overinvests in knowledge acquisition as it expects to use the knowledge as a threat in price negotiations. A non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract prevents such overinvestment and reduces the supplier's ability to expropriate the buyer ex post. Our results extend to the cases of renegotiable closed‐price contracts, repeated interactions between a buyer and a supplier, and the use of nondisclosure policies. We draw theoretical, empirical, and managerial implications from our model. Managerial summary : This study yields new insights regarding the use of contract design in protecting pre‐existing, nonrelationship specific assets in buyer‐supplier arrangements. Anecdotal examples illustrate the “dark side” of these arrangements where opportunistic suppliers exploit knowledge of buyers' pre‐existing resources to seek rent and appropriate value. When a supplier is likely to act harmfully, a closed‐price contract that specifies the price of the supplier's component upfront may reduce the supplier's incentives to overinvest in acquiring and exploiting knowledge of the buyer's pre‐existing resources. As such, when a buyer's pre‐existing resources are highly valuable, and thus more vulnerable to use by the supplier outside of the arrangement, a non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract is more efficient. Additionally, limited disclosure policies and informal agreements based on repeated interactions complement indirect governance via price contracts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniting in the letter but breaching in the spirit: Contract flexibility and interfirm collaboration based on the Contracts as Reference Points Theory

Contracts are generally assumed to be farsighted and effective in governing ex post trading behaviors. However, we know little about why not all the ex post trading behaviors can be contractible under conditions of contract flexibility. Drawing on Contracts as Reference Points Theory, this study focuses on contract flexibility which is viewed as an essential ingredient for success in long-term oriented Eastern cultures. We examine the trade-off between uncertainty coping and opportunism induced by contract flexibility, which is conceptualized as a reference-dependence decision problem. Using the dyadic survey data of supplier and buyer relationships, we find that contract flexibility facilitates uncertainty coping. The positive effect of contract flexibility on uncertainty coping is enhanced by buyer political ties and supplier power. The effect of contract flexibility on opportunism is mitigated by supplier power. Moreover, uncertainty coping increases relationship performance, whereas opportunism inhibits relationship performance.     

Option to acquire or divest a joint venture

This paper develops a model for assessing options in joint ventures. The model is used specifically to examine the option to acquire or divest a joint venture, both in the case where the acquisition/divestiture price is specified ex ante in the initial contract and in the case where the price is to be negotiated ex post. The results derived from the model show how the value of the option and each partner's pay‐off from the venture vary with the structure of the option and how the presence of the option may affect the structuring of the joint venture. The main theoretical insights are stated in 12 potentially testable propositions, and possible ways to operationalize some of the propositions for empirical testing are also explored. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Threat of entry,asymmetric information,and pricing

This paper examines the impact of asymmetric information on incumbent firms' propensity to engage in limit pricing when faced with threat of entry. I draw from information economics to argue that incumbents will use price to respond ex ante to entry in situations characterized by asymmetric information. I suggest two situations in which asymmetric information can arise: when potential entrants are from outside the primary industry and when incumbent firms are members of R&D consortia. I then study pricing in the U.S. cable TV industry to show that pricing patterns of incumbent cable TV systems are consistent with limit pricing when the relationship between the incumbent and potential entrant is characterized by asymmetric information. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge—Antecedents and consequences

This paper proposes a conceptual model for a firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge (CCK). Knowledge calibration is achieved when there is a match between managers’ ex ante confidence in the accuracy of held knowledge and the ex post accuracy of that knowledge. Knowledge calibration is closely related to knowledge utility or willingness to use the available ex ante knowledge: a manager uses the ex ante knowledge if he/she is confident in the accuracy of that knowledge, and does not use it or uses it with reservation, when the confidence is low. Thus, knowledge calibration attained through the firm's CCK enables managers to deal with incomplete and uncertain information and enhances quality of decisions. In the supply chain context, although demand- and supply-related knowledge is available, supply chain inefficiencies, such as the bullwhip effect, remain. These issues may be caused not by a lack of knowledge but by a firm's lack of capability to sense potential disagreement between knowledge accuracy and confidence. Therefore, this paper contributes to the understanding of supply chain knowledge utilization by defining CCK and identifying a set of antecedents and consequences of CCK in the supply chain context.     

Social Capital and Union Revitalization: A Study of Worker Networks in the UK Audio‐Visual Industries

This article examines Jarley's contention that trade union revitalization is conditional upon the generation of social capital through the systematic creation of networks. It draws on a qualitative study of freelance workers in the UK audio‐visual industry to consider two propositions. The first, that ‘social capital within networks is forged on “bonds” that are conducive to trade union identity’ was not sustained by the data, which instead suggested that social capital is more likely to be generated by networks outside trade union structures. However, the data did support the second proposition that ‘trade unions can harness social capital in order to achieve concrete industrial relations outcomes’ by linking networks to reservoirs of expertise and influence.     

ASSET REDEPLOYMENT,ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY IN DECLINING INDUSTRIES

The resource-based perspective suggests that firms are bundles of assets, some of which are fungible in nature. To the extent that some resources are fungible, firms should be able to redeploy them to enter new markets when their existing businesses decline. On the other hand, perspectives that emphasize the business-specific nature of routines or managerial skills point to inherent risks in organizational transformation. In a declining market, resources can be redeployed within the firm through diversification-oriented acquisitions, or they can be redeployed through market mechanisms through consolidation-oriented acquisitions. In this paper, we examine the differences in performance outcomes between diversification-oriented acquisitions and consolidation-oriented acquisitions in industries within the defense sector, which have experienced significant decline. Our results indicate that consolidation-oriented acquisitions outperform diversification-oriented acquisitions in the decline phase of their industries in terms of both ex ante (stock market based) and ex post (operating) performance measures. At the corporate level, we find a positive relationship between focus and Tobin’s q, even when the industry is in decline. The implication of our results is that assets from declining industries are redeployed more effectively through market mechanisms than within the firm through the acquisition of complementary assets. ©1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asset accumulation,interdependence and technological change: evidence from pharmaceutical drug discovery

Although the resource‐based view of the firm has been written about extensively, the process by which firm assets are accumulated has not been explored in detail. That is, we know little about the micro‐level mechanisms by which assets are built, nor do we have sufficient empirical evidence why some assets are more difficult to imitate, trade, or substitute. In this exploratory paper, we attempt to provide a better understanding of asset accumulation via an empirical research program in pharmaceutical drug discovery. Using a combination of field research, discovery data from nine pharmaceutical firms, and data on 218 alliances involving new technologies for experimentation and testing, three causes affecting asset accumulation are identified and described. First, the difficulty of imitating a particular asset is affected by interdependencies with other assets. Second, trading of assets can be impeded by structural inertia in the core of a firm that is adopting the technology asset. And third, fully specifying all factors affecting imitation and trading ex ante is very difficult, if not nearly impossible, under conditions of rapid technological change. We propose that the complex interactions of these causes can give rise to imperfections in factor markets. Finally, implications for further research are discussed as well. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report

When intervening in markets, say to block a merger, competition authorities are constrained by the limited information they have about the social desirability of the available alternatives. Compared to ex ante control, ex post control is based on the more accurate information that becomes available in the intervening period, but entails temporary losses to social welfare and reversal costs incurred to unscramble the eggs. Through a toy model, we identify situations in which the competition authority finds it optimal to commit to forego the option of ex post review in order to avoid chilling ex ante socially beneficial mergers. On the other hand, the case for ex post review is strengthened if post-merger market conducts can signal the merged firm's private information about the consequences of the merger.     

Why do some outside successions fare better than others? The role of outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity

Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post‐succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide support for our theory. This study contributes to upper echelon theory and research by identifying outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity as an important aspect of their background that influences a range of major organizational outcomes, including CEO turnover, director turnover, and firm performance. Managerial summary: It is challenging to be a new CEO who comes from outside of the organization. Our study examines why some new outside CEOs fare better than others. We suggest that a positive relationship with the board of directors is a key factor in a new outside CEO's success. A new outside CEO can better manage the relationship with the board if he or she has prior experience working with other demographically diverse boards. In contrast, when the focal board is more diverse than the other boards on which the new CEO previously served, the new CEO tends to struggle in managing his or her relationship with the board, experiencing a higher likelihood of turnover and delivering worse financial performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Salesperson influence tactics and the buying agent purchase decision: Mediating role of buying agent trust of the salesperson and moderating role of buying agent regulatory orientation focus

Little is known about antecedents of salesperson influence tactic usage or how and which influence tactics impact buying agent purchase decisions. To aid such understanding, we draw from the relationship selling literature, and both regulatory fit and focus theories, to propose a novel theoretical framework and test hypotheses. The study's findings, derived by applying the critical incidence methodology to a heterogeneous dataset of buying agents (n > 200) representing small and medium enterprises and acting as key informants on salespeople, show that: (i) salesperson influence tactics heterogeneously explain the buying agent's trust of the salesperson, (ii) trust of the salesperson serves as a mechanism through which influence tactics impact the buying agent's purchase decision, (iii) buying agent's regulatory orientation moderates the relationship between salesperson influence tactics and buying agent's trust of the salesperson, and (iv) salesperson regulatory orientation predicts a salesperson's use of particular influence tactics. The article concludes with a discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the research.     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do converters facilitate the transition to a new incompatible technology? A dynamic analysis of converters

This paper analyzes the process of transition in standards between incompatible technologies when converters are available. Contrary to a common presumption that converters facilitate the transition from an old technology to an otherwise incompatible new technology, I find circumstances in which the possibility of transition is blockaded by the existence of converters. In the welfare analysis of converters, a distinction is made between ex ante and ex post efficiency effects. Finally, I also analyze the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome.     

Pay-for-delay patent settlement,generic entry and welfare

“Pay-for-delay” settlement (P4D), in which the brand patentee reversely pays the generic infringer to delay market entry, is typically criticized for blocking competition but is often excused for its potential to maintain innovation. We present a game-theoretic model to show that when the generic firm’s entry decision is endogenized, P4D can actually increase ex post competition under certain conditions. We further explore the impact of P4D on ex ante innovation and find that the brand’s innovation incentive may increase or decrease, depending on the generic firm’s entry cost and other factors. Our findings contribute to the ongoing P4D debate by identifying conditions under which (1) P4D can improve consumer surplus and (2) the trade-off between competition and innovation can be reconciled.     

Comment on “Merger Policy in the United States”

This paper comments briefly on a merger policy article by Dennis Mueller. It concurs with Mueller's judgment that X-efficiency consequences are of crucial relevance in developing a sound antitrust policy toward mergers. It agrees also that firms proposing mergers overstepping structural guidelines should be permitted an efficiencies defense, but it stresses the difficulties of making ex ante efficiency predictions.     

Internet companies' growth strategies: determinants of investment intensity and long‐term performance

To exploit first‐mover advantages, pioneers may be motivated to amass customers before rivals enter the market. Likewise, when they enjoy increasing returns due to network effects, static scale economies, or learning effects, companies have incentives to invest aggressively in growth. This paper presents econometric analysis of factors that determined the intensity of Internet companies' investments in growth, and analyzes the long‐term performance consequences of such investments. Results indicate that first movers spent significantly more on upfront marketing than non‐pioneers. Contrary to expectations, however, firms in markets that exhibited increasing returns did not spend more on their early customer acquisition efforts than other sample companies. Although the typical sample company did not earn positive long‐term returns, heavy early investments in growth were nevertheless economically rational. In most cases, reducing marketing outlays would have worsened a bad outcome, consistent with an inverted ‘U’ relationship between long‐term returns and upfront marketing spending. Thus, the typical sample company invested in marketing, ex ante, at levels close to those that would have maximized returns, observed ex post. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

IT外包的投资、再谈判机制分析

本文从IT承包商(vendor)和客户(client)的角度考虑去设计最优契约。由于客户方的需要,或者是由于契约的不完全性导致契约经常需要再谈判,而且由于契约修改后的执行问题也可能引起法律诉讼,因此对于如何决定事前的投资、谈判利润分配和契约诉讼的赔偿都是一系列要解决的问题,本文正是根据这些问题的提出而逐步展开的。