Adoption externalities as public goods

A public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities. For positive externalities, agents furnish a public good by taking an action. Similarly, for negative externalities, agents furnish a public good by not taking an action. We examine these externalities in a binary choice problem, i.e. adoption externalities. In each case, there is a potential role for government intervention, even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed, since one equilibrium Pareto dominates all others. We analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models, and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention.     

Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities

We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert externalities on non-contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the sign of the externality. If this is positive, the principal prefers to delegate as long as the agency costs are not too high; if the externality is negative, the principal prefers to centralize for all sizes of agency costs.     

发展外部性:区位竞争优势战略定位的研究基础--以济南市为例

发展是有外部性的,既有正外部性,也有负外部性。区域发展的不平衡且差距的扩大就是发展负外部性的表现,区域经济一体多样化中竞争与合作良性互动关系就是发展正外部性的表现。文章以济南市为例,探讨了区域发展中当存在发展外部性时,一个地区如何取得区位竞争优势,化不利因素为有利因素的现实问题,这对区域发展的战略定位研究有重要意义。     

Buchanan on increasing returns and anticommons

This article discusses Buchanan’s work on increasing returns and anticommons. The two topics have externality as a common element. And size matters in both cases. Increasing returns is a case of positive externalities, the anti-commons is a case of negative externalities. Buchanan demonstrated that a work ethic generates economy-wide benefits in a setting of generalized increasing returns. In contrast, unanimity (in anticommons) can make it more difficult to address other externality problems in analyzing work ethic and moral community. This article provides an overview of both these areas of research.     

Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited

We revisit job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities from a different perspective, extending Schmitz (2013a). When two sequential tasks need to be performed by wealth-constrained agents, the principal can hire only one agent or two different agents. When there exists an outcome externality in terms of the fixed cost and such an externality is not too large, if the two tasks are conflicting (resp. synergistic), then it is optimal for the principal to hire two different agents (resp. only one agent). When there exists an outcome externality regarding the marginal cost, the opposite result holds.     

Altruism and Determinacy of Equilibria in Overlapping Generations Models with Externalities

This paper deals with an OLG model with production and a single commodity, in which agents are assumed altruistic and the aggregate production function contains external effects. I prove that, if the technology satisfies a minor assumption, which encompasses positive and negative externalities, some curvature conditions on the utility function ensure local determinacy of stationary and period 2 equilibria. I prove that non-separable, strictly concave preferences are a fundamental ingredient for the occurrence of indeterminate equilibria. Finally, considering the case of unbounded growth, I establish that for any utility and production functions a unique balanced growth path is globally determinate.
JEL Classification Numbers: C62, E32     

Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation

We model externality abatement as an implementation problem. A social planner would like to ensure efficient behaviour among a group of agents whose actions are sources of externalities. However, the planner has limited information about the agents' preferences, and is unable to distinguish individual agents except through their action choices. We prove that if a concavity condition on aggregate payoffs is satisfied, the planner can guarantee that efficient behaviour is globally stable under a wide range of behaviour adjustment processes by administering a variable pricing scheme. Through a series of applications, we show that the concavity condition is naturally satisfied in settings involving negative externalities. We conclude by contrasting the performance of the pricing mechanism with that of a mechanism based on direct revelation and announcement dependent forcing contracts.     

The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem

This paper clarifies and synthesizes elements of the two decade old debate concerning the Coase theorem and the empty core. Five lessons can be derived from this debate. First, the Coase theorem may break down when there more than two participants (provided the additional participants bring an additional externality to the table). Second, the problem of the empty core does not disappear in a world of positive transaction costs. Under reasonable assumptions about the transactions technology, transaction costs may well exacerbate the empty-core problem. As a consequence, it is important to differentiate between transaction costs (when the core exists) and costs due to the empty core because each has different implications for rationalizing institutional arrangements. Third, the Coase theorem will not break down when the number of participants increases if the new participants do not bring additional externalities with them. If, however, additional participants bring in additional externalities, then the core may be empty and Pareto efficiency may not emerge from costless negotiations. Fourth, Pareto Optimality can be achieved when the core is empty by judicious use of penalty clauses, binding contracts, and constraints on the bargaining mechanism. Fifth, when a non-excludable public good is involved, a free-rider problem arises as the number of agents increases, and this undermines the Coase theorem; in this case, Coasean efficiency requires the participation of all agents affected by the externality in the writing of binding contracts.     

Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability

We evaluate how governance uncertainty—exemplified by turnout uncertainty—affects the trade‐off between internalization of externalities and political accountability in the design of the fiscal state. We show that centralization only weakens political accountability in the presence of negative externalities. Unlike positive externalities, negative externalities allow federal politicians to extract higher rents. This yields two new insights. First, decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. Second, centralization may not be Pareto efficient in economies with positive externalities despite the fact that policy can be tailored to regional taste differences and centralization internalizes the positive externality.     

科技创新财税政策的合理边界研究

科技创新活动存在着知识溢出,具有极强的正外部性,导致市场失灵,这就需要政府在科技创新领域有所作为。根据庇古(Pigou)关于外部性思想的阐述,财税政策是解决外部性问题的重要手段,科技创新领域也不例外,科技创新财税政策的合理边界应由科技创新活动外部性的大小来界定。     

A model of techno-economic evaluation for eco-industrial park project

An eco-industrial park or estate is a community of manufactaring and service businesses located together on a common property. The goat of ElP is to create a win-win harmonious development aspect of ecooomic development and environmental protection. This paper emphasizes that the external .effect of an EIP is its main characteristic of technoeconomic evaluation for eco-industrial park project. From the view of the property, rights, the EIP＇s product is typicalty public-private. The government should take some inca.rares for the quantitative analysis on ecological positive externalities of the enterprises in EIP, and also should adopt Coase＇s Theorem, which supports that the market transaction is the best way to deal with positive externalities （external economics or diseconoraics）, or Pigou＇s Theorem, which holds that the government anti-positive externalities programs are the best way to cope with positive externalities, to internalize the EIP＇s external effects, which is also a fundamental tool to encourage investors to actively invest in EIP projects, Furthermore. this paper thinks that the EIP ＇s income should be equal to the income of staple products of the private property, and that of its by-products of the public property. According to this principle, this paper has put forward three major indicators, net present value （NPV）, internal rate of renan （IRR）, and investment repayment period （IRP）, which are also extensively used indicators in ardinary project techno-economic evaluation model to evaluate EIP technoeconomic effects. Theoretically, the indicatory not only can be used in EIP project evaluation, but also can provide a quantitative measure toot for the government to support EIP＇s construction to the maximum. In the end. a case is analyzed.     

Ramsey,Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents,and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities

This paper analyzes the effects of nonatmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second‐best level of public good provision to exceed the first‐best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, the second‐best commodity tax rate may fall short of the first‐best rate. Moreover, in this case, heterogeneity may imply an equity‐efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the nonatmospheric type.     

Keeping up with the Joneses, consumer ethnocentrism, and optimal taxation

This paper sets up a two-good (domestically- and internationally-produced goods) model of a small open economy with consumption externalities and uses it to examine the optimal taxation. Since keeping up with the Joneses leads an individual consumption's to impose a negative externality on the consumption of others, a consumption tax and tariff are thereby socially desirable to correct this distortion. Due to the fact that the government has to account for additional distortion caused by consumer ethnocentrism and that keeping up with the Joneses in the consumption of domestic goods tends to reinforce the influence of ethnocentrism on the purchase of domestic products, the consumption of imported goods is subject to a higher tariff rate because of the cross-market externality. Of interest, if consumption only involves an own-market externality, there is no cyclical consequence for the optimal taxes. However, if consumption involves both own- and cross-market externalities, the optimal tariff is state-contingent and, more specifically, is countercyclical.     

Transfers and the Samuelson Rule in Stock Externality Provision—Why Do We Need Them Both?

This paper examines the relationship between the Samuelson rule for efficient provision of stock externality and unilateral transfers for equalization of mitigation costs among the agents. Using a generic model of stock externality provisions, we proved that the revised Samuelson rule that allows transfers is a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient provision of stock externalities. In addition, selection of social welfare weights of the agents plays a key role in directions and magnitudes of the transfers. We discuss the implications of the revised Samuelson rule in economic modeling of climate change, an empirical case of stock externality, through numerical simulations in the RICE model.     

Spatial-dynamic seawater intrusion and pumping cost externalities in a confined aquifer

This paper analytically develops the economic theory of seawater intrusion in confined aquifers and, in the process, creates generally applicable solution methods for illuminating steady-state spatial externality relationships for other spatial-dynamic diffusion resource management issues. By linking a confined aquifer and its unconfined recharge region with a dynamic boundary condition neglected in the economics literature, we introduce the physical realities that generate spatial externalities in all renewable confined aquifers. We derive spatial-dynamic first-order conditions for optimal extraction and characterize the policy relevant spatial-dynamic pumping cost and seawater intrusion cost externalities with hydrological assumptions appropriate to the different dynamic timescales of system components and the focus on seawater intrusion. For confined aquifers, we prove the marginal seawater intrusion cost externality decreases linearly in distance from the coast. Moreover, we demonstrate that the marginal seawater intrusion cost externality generally exceeds marginal pumping costs near the coast, implying substantial divergence between optimal and common property extraction near the coast, and significant divergence may extend to the inland aquifer boundary depending on both the magnitude and shape of the revenue function relative to extraction costs and aquifer parameters.     

Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities

A standard assumption in the economics of law enforcement is that the probability of a violator being punished depends only on the resources devoted to enforcement. However, it is often true that the productivity of enforcement resources decreases with the number of violators. In this paper, an individual who violates the law provides a positive externality for other offenders because the probability of being punished decreases with the number of individuals violating the law. This externality explains the existence of correlation between individuals’ decisions to break a law. The model evaluates the implications when determining the socially optimal enforcement expenditure, focusing specifically on the case of neighborhood crime. In particular, using a parametrized functional form, I show that neighborhood externalities will enhance or impede enforcement, depending on the crime rate.     

International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries

This paper examines the impact of cross-border financial externalities on moral hazards of the banking sector, and an international policy coordination mechanism to reduce the moral hazards of the banking sector considering cross-border financial externalities. We demonstrate that the moral hazard of banking, such as reducing the monitoring efforts, is aggravated by cross-border financial externalities, while the introduction of an international policy coordination mechanism might reduce the moral hazard caused by these externalities. Moreover, international policy coordination is less likely to be sustained when the policy maker is short-sighted and the banking sector has greater political influence. However, when the distortionary cost of a liquidity aids policy is lower with high administrative transparency, and cross-border financial externality is greater, the coordination mechanism is more likely to be sustained. The results imply that efforts to launch an effective international financial coordination mechanism should start with countries with higher administrative transparency, more political stability, and enhanced financial integration.     

论森林生态产品的外在性

文章运用现代经济学的外部性理论系统分析了森林生态产品外部性的表现形式。在分析森林生态产品外部性的特点和本质的基础上提出解决这种外部性的最佳途径是由政府提供森林生态产品这种公共产品。